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Dayal v. Buja And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court

Mar 6, 1958

Judgment

Subsequent
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gurnam Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Shrimati Nanki was a limited owner of property inherited from her husband Partapa. She made a gift of the disputed property, including agricultural land and a residential house, in favour of her pichhlag (younger) son Dayal.

Buja and Labhu, described as fourth-degree collaterals of the last maleholder, sued for a declaration that the gift was not binding on their reversionary rights. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs' suit. The defendants appealed to the District Judge. The Additional District Judge, Patiala, by order dated 15th December 1952, dismissed the appeal, and both lower Courts held that (a) the plaintiffs were fourth-degree collaterals of the last maleholder and (b) Shrimati Nanki, being a limited owner, was not competent to make the gift. The present (second) appeal is by the defendant against those findings.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act (HSA) changed the legal position so that the widow (limited owner) became an absolute owner retrospectively, thereby ousting the reversionary rights of collateral heirs and making such gifts unchallengeable.
Whether the appellate Court (in a second appeal) may take into consideration legislative changes (specifically the HSA) that have occurred since the decree appealed from was passed.
Whether a suit by reversioners is maintainable where the alienation (here, a gift) by the limited owner took place before the commencement of the HSA.
Whether discretionary declaratory relief should be granted when the donee of the gift (Dayal) is also an heir who would succeed on the donor's death (i.e., whether the gift operates as acceleration of succession and hence whether declaration should be refused on discretionary grounds).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (defendants / Dayal's side)

The position was changed by the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act: the Act confers absolute ownership on a widow in respect of property left by her husband that was in her possession on the Act's commencement; section 14 is expressly retrospective.
Because of the Act, the gift cannot now be challenged by reversioners.
The appellate Court can, in the nature of a rehearing, take into account changes in legislation that occurred after the decree appealed against was given; therefore the change in law could be taken into consideration in this second appeal.
Even though the alienation occurred before the Act, the appellate Court should consider the intervening legislative change and consequently the plaintiffs' reversionary rights would be displaced.

Respondents' Arguments (plaintiffs / Buja and Labhu)

The gift was made by Shrimati Nanki before the commencement of the HSA and she was not in possession of the property at the time the Act came into force; she was not a full owner at the time of alienation and therefore was incompetent to alienate the property.
Because the alienation occurred before the HSA, the plaintiffs (as reversioners) retained a right to seek a declaration that the gift was not binding on their reversionary rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court in this Opinion
Hari Kishan v. Hira (A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 89)	Addressed whether suits by reversioners were competent where alienation occurred before the HSA; held such suits could be competent.	The Court stated it was bound by the Division Bench decision in Hari Kishan v. Hira and followed its holding that a suit of this nature was competent when the alienation had taken place before the commencement of the Act; consequently the Court held the present suit was maintainable but later refused relief on discretionary grounds.
Goddam Venkayamma v. Gaddam Veerayya (A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 280)	Cited among authorities supporting the view that the HSA ousts reversioners' rights (i.e., combined effect of ss.14 & 16 makes limited estates full and removes reversioners' expectant rights).	Listed as an authority supporting the proposition that the HSA brought a revolutionary change and that so-called reversionary heirs are ousted; the Court noted these authorities but ultimately followed the binding Punjab decision on the point of pre-Act alienations.
Patha Padda Elliah v. Palagiri Gangamma (A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 776)	Cited among authorities supporting the view that the HSA ousts reversionary rights.	Relied upon as part of an array of authorities supporting the proposition that reversioners no longer have a right to challenge alienations after the HSA; contrasted with binding Punjab authority on pre-Act alienations.
Gostha Behari Bera v. Hari Das Samantha (A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 557)	Cited among authorities supporting the view that the HSA ousts reversionary rights.	Included in the list of authorities supporting the proposition that reversioners' expectations were extinguished by the HSA; the Court observed that Calcutta High Court opinions generally favoured the view that HSA does not save post-Act reversionary suits but noted conflicting views on pre-Act alienations.
Thailambal Ammal v. Kesavan Nair (A.I.R. 1957 Kerala 86)	Cited among authorities supporting the view that the HSA ousts reversionary rights.	Referred to as an authority aligning with the view that the HSA transformed limited estates into full ownership and thereby destroyed reversionary expectations; nevertheless the Court acknowledged that some High Courts (including Kerala) favoured the view that alienations before the Act were not saved by HSA.
Dhirajkunwar v. Lakhansingh (A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 38)	Held that a suit by reversioners was not maintainable and that the provisions of the HSA must be applied even at the stage of appeal.	Relied upon as supporting the Patna view that the Act's provisions apply at appeal stage and that suits by reversioners are not maintainable; the Court noted its agreement with the reasoning of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on this point, though it felt bound by the Punjab Division Bench decision on pre-Act alienations.
Ram Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir (A.I.R. 1957 Patna 480)	Held that where the HSA came into force during the pendency of appeal, the plaintiff reversioner lost his right and the appellate Court may take into account the legislative change; consequently the suit was dismissed.	Cited as the Patna authority explicitly supporting the proposition that appellate Courts can consider subsequent legislative changes and that a reversioner's rights may be lost by the HSA when it comes into force during appeal; the Court discussed this authority in detail and acknowledged its force but ultimately followed the binding Punjab Division Bench on the narrow issue before it.
Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad (A.I.R. 1957 Patna 674)	Cited among Patna authorities supporting the view that the HSA ousts reversionary rights and that the Act's provisions may be applied at appeal.	Referred to as part of the Patna line of cases that favour applying the HSA on appeal and treating reversioners' suits as not maintainable; the Court acknowledged these authorities in contrasting views across High Courts.
Sm. Laxmi Debt v. Surrindra Kumar Panda (A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 1)	Cited among authorities supporting the view that the HSA does not save alienations made before its commencement (i.e., that pre-Act alienations were not automatically validated by the HSA).	Referenced to show that Orissa High Court opinion aligned with the view that alienations before the HSA are not necessarily saved; the Court noted the existence of such contrary authorities when considering the binding Punjab Division Bench decision.
Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri (A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 5)	Established that the hearing of an appeal in India is in the nature of a rehearing, and an appellate Court may take into account facts and legislative changes arising after the decree appealed from.	The Court relied on this Federal Court authority to support the proposition that appellate Courts are competent to take into account legislative changes which have supervened since the decree appealed against; this principle underlies the Patna decisions and was discussed in considering whether intervening law (the HSA) could be applied on appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded through the following steps, based exclusively on the text of the opinion:

The Court observed that the Hindu Succession Act (HSA), especially reading section 14, is expressly retrospective and that the combined effect of sections 14 and 16 transforms the position of a widow who was formerly a limited owner: under the Act she is made an absolute owner in respect of property left by the husband that was in her possession on the date of commencement.
Because a reversioner's interest was historically an expectant (non-vested) interest dependent on the death of a limited heir, the HSA's conferment of full ownership on a widow meant that reversionary rights (spes successionis) were ousted as a general proposition. The Court listed numerous authorities that it considered supported this proposition.
The Court then confronted conflicting authorities: several High Courts (Patna, Madhya Pradesh) had taken the view that the HSA's provisions must be applied even at the appellate stage and that reversioners' suits became not maintainable when the Act came into force; by contrast a Division Bench of this Court (Hari Kishan v. Hira) had held that where the alienation occurred before the commencement of the Act, a suit by reversioners could still be competent.
The Court acknowledged the principle (from Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and cases following it) that an appellate hearing is in the nature of a rehearing and that appellate Courts may take into account legislative changes which have supervened since the decree appealed from was given. The Court considered the Patna line of authorities (including Ram Ayodhya Missir) that applied that principle to hold reversioners' actions not maintainable when the HSA intervened.
Despite the persuasive (and, in the Court's view, logically coherent) arguments that the HSA ousted reversionary rights and could be applied on appeal, the Court felt itself bound by the Division Bench decision in Hari Kishan v. Hira. In Hari Kishan the principle adopted was that a suit by reversioners remained competent when the alienation had taken place before the commencement of the HSA.
Applying the binding authority (Hari Kishan) to the facts — since it was admitted the gift by Shrimati Nanki was made before the commencement of the HSA — the Court held the present suit by the reversioners to be maintainable. However, the Court exercised its discretion and refused to grant the declaratory relief sought because the donee (Dayal) is the heir of Shrimati Nanki under the HSA and the gift operated as acceleration of succession; a declaration would in effect benefit a person who would succeed to the property when succession opened.
On this discretionary basis the Court accepted the appeal, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, and made no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed (APPEAL ALLOWED; SUIT DISMISSED).

Implications and consequences as stated in the opinion:

The Court held that although the HSA generally alters the position of limited owners and may oust reversionary expectations, it was bound by the Division Bench decision in Hari Kishan v. Hira to recognize that a suit by reversioners is competent where the alienation occurred before the commencement of the HSA.
Despite holding the suit to be maintainable, the Court refused discretionary declaratory relief because the donee (Dayal) is an heir under the HSA and the gift is in the nature of acceleration of succession; setting aside the gift was unnecessary and would merely benefit the eventual heir.
Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiffs' declaration fails, the gift to Dayal stands, the appeal succeeds, and there is no order as to costs.
The Court did not purport to lay down a new, broader precedent displacing the conflicting High Court views; rather, it applied binding precedent of this Court (Hari Kishan) on the specific question of pre-Act alienations and exercised discretion in refusing relief.

This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities, reasoning and outcome as set out in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Gurnam Singh, J.:— This regular second appeal arises out of a suit for a declaration. Shrimati Nanki was a limited owner of the property inherited by her from Partapa, her husband. She made a gift of the property in dispute including the agricultural land and a residential house in favour of her pichhlag son Dayal. Buja and Labhu, fourth degree collaterals of the last maleholder, instituted the present suit for a declaration that the gift of the ancestral property made by Shrimati Nanki was not binding upon their reversionary rights. The suit was resisted on several grounds by Shrimati Nanki and her son Dayal. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge, Patiala, by his order dated 15th December, 1952 dismissed the appeal. Both the Courts found that the plaintiffs were fourth degree collaterals of the last maleholder and Shrimati Nanki being a limited owner was not competent to make the gift. The present appeal by the defendant is directed against the findings of the Courts below.

2. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the position was entirely changed on account of the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act. The gift, according to him, now cannot be challenged. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that the change in the legislation could be taken into consideration by this Court in this second appeal. It is by now well settled and indeed universally recognised that the Hindu Succession Act confers absolute rights of ownership on widow of the last maleholder in respect of the property left by him, which was in her possession on the date of commencement of the Act, even though the husband had died long before the Act came into force. Prom a reading of section 14 of this Act it is clear that it is made expressly retrospective. The widow being absolute owner, the question of reversioners in such cases does not arise.

3. The heirs of the last full owner who would be entitled to succeed to his estate on the death of a limited heir were called reversioners. Their interest naturally was expectant on death of a limited heir. It was not a vested interest. That being so the reversioners had a mere chance of succession. Their right to demand the preservation of the estate during its enjoyment by the limited heir was recognised. Thus they were entitled to bring a suit seeking declaration that the alienation by the limited heir was not binding on their reversionary rights. The Hindu Succession Act has, however, brought a revolutionary change in the status of these reversioners. In my view the combined elect of sections 14 and 16 of this Act is that the so called, reversionary heirs are no more so as the estate of a limited heir is no more a limited estate. That being so they have no vested right in the estate and no Chance to succeed. In such a situation, in my opinion, they have no right to bring a suit for a declaration questioning the alienation by a full owner. Their right of reversion or any kind of spes successionis is completely ousted by this Act. This view of the matter, in my opinion, does not admit of any doubt. The following authorities abundantly support this view Hari Kishan v. Hira . A.I.R 1957 Punj. 89, Goddam Venkayamma v. Gaddam Veerayya . A.I.R 1957 Andhra Pradesh 280., Patha Padda Elliah v. Palagiri Gangamma . A.I.R 1957 Andhra Pradesh 776., Gostha Behari Bera v. Hari Das Samantha . A.I.R 1957 Cal. 557., Thailambal Ammal v. Kesavan Nair . A.I.R 1957 Kerala 86., Dhirajkunwar v. Lakhansingh . A.I.R 1957 M.P 38., Ram Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir . A.I.R 1957 Patna 480., Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad . A.I.R 1957 Patna 674. and Sm. Laxmi Debt v. Surrindra Kumar Panda . A.I.R 1957 Orissa 1.. In view of this abundant authority this position was not challenged by the learned counsel for the respondents. He, however, submitted that the present case was distinguishable. He pointed out that Shrimati Nanki made this gift before the commencement, of the Hindu Succession Act. She was thus not in possession of the property in dispute at the time of the enforcement of the Act. Therefore, she does not derive any help from the Hindu Succession Act. At the time of alienation in favour of her son she was not full owner of the property and was, therefore, incompetent to alienate it. In these Circumstances it was contended that the reversioners were entitled to the declaration prayed for. From the appellant's side it was contended that the alienation before the commencement of the Act did not make any difference as the appellate Court could take into consideration the legislative changes effected during the pendency of the appeal. It was argued that the hearing of an appeal was in the nature of rehearing and therefore the appellate Court was entitled to take into account the change in law effected after the decree appealed against. The authorities cited above are undoubtedly divided in a case of this nature where the alienation took place before the commencement of this Act. The Patna authority cited above supports the view advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. It would be proper to cite that authority straightaway. In Ram Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir the facts were as follows:—

“A Hindu female S executed a sale deed in 1914 in favour of father of defendants 2 and 3. The properties covered by the sale deed were subsequently mortgaged in favour of defendant 1 daughter of S. The plaintiff an the reversioner brought a suit for declaration that lie sale deed executed by S was farzi, without consideration and without any legal necessity and was not binding upon him. All the lower Courts decreed the plaintiff's claim. During the pendency of Letters Patent Appeal the Hindu Succession Act came into force Held that in view of the change in law brought by the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff lost his right as reversioner in respect of property held by defendant No. 1 and therefore the plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed as not maintainable. It is well established that an appellate Court is entitled to take into consideration legislative changes which have supervened since the decision under appeal has been given.”

4. Reliance for the finding that the changes in law could be taken into consideration was placed on the authority of the Federal Court reported in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri . A.I.R 1941 F.C 5.. In this authority it was observed that—

“The hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of India is in the nature of re-hearing and therefore in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the appellate Court is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. Consequently, the appellate Court is competent to take into account legislative changes since the decision in appeal was given and its powers are not confined only to see whether the lower Court's decision was correct according to the law as it stood at the time when its decision was given.”

5. Their Lordships referred to some English cases in the course of their judgment. The Patna view has been consistently followed by that Court. The same view of the matter was taken by Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dhiraj Kunwar v. Lakhansingh. That Court also held that suit by reversioners was not maintainable. It further found that the provisions of the Act must be applied to a case even at the stage of appeal. If I may say so, with respect, I entirely agree with the observations made by the learned Judges of the Patna High Court. For the reasons given by the learned Judges in the judgments cited above I am of the view that a suit of this nature by the reversioners is not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. I am, however, bound by the view of the Division Bench of this Court—Hari Kishan v. Hira, where it was held that a suit of this nature was competent when the alienation had taken place before the commencement of the Act. The learned Judges deciding the Punjab case had no occasion to consider the Patna view. It appears from the report that their decision preceded the decisions of the Patna High Court. At any rate those decisions and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court were not referred to by them. The view that the Hindu Succession Act does not save the alienations made before the commencement of the Act also found favour with Calcutta, Orissa and Kerala High Courts. Those authorities have already been cited in the earlier part of the judgment. It is, however, recognised by all these authorities that the suit by the reversioners is not maintainable when the alienation is made after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act as the limited owner became full owner after its enforcement. It is admitted in the present case that the alienation by way of gift was made by Shrimati Nanki in favour of her son before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act. That being so following the authority of this Court I hold that the present suit by the reversioners was maintainable. The question, however, is whether this Court should be inclined to grant discretionary relief to the plaintiffs in view of the fact that the person in whose favour the gift is made is a heir to Shrimati Nanki when the succession opens. It is not denied that Dayal defendant is a heir according to the Hindu Succession Act to Shrimati Nanki being her son. He is, therefore, entitled to succeed to her property when the succession opens. In such a case I am firmly of the view that the discretionary relief in the nature of declaration should be refused. The declaration, if given, will enure to the benefit of the person succeeding to the property after Shrimati Nanki's death. It is not denied that the donee is her heir. The gift in his favour is thus in the nature of acceleration of succession. It is, therefore, unnecessary to set it aside. It may be mentioned here that all the cases where a contrary view to that of Patna High Court was taken were cases of sales by widows effected before the Hindu Succession Act came into force. None of these cases is a case of a gift in favour of the next heir. The present case is, therefore, distinguishable. As already said the gift is in the nature of acceleration of succession. I would, therefore, accept this appeal and dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs.

6. In the result the appeal succeeds and the suit of the plaintiffs stands dismissed. There is no order as to costs in the circumstances of this case.

7. Appeal allowed.