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Dwarka Das v. New Bank Of India Limited
Factual and Procedural Background
The New Bank of India Limited (plaintiff/respondent) sued Naranjan Singh (defendant No.1) and his son Avtarjit Singh Jaspal (defendant No.2) for recovery of Rs. 19,186/13/-, comprising Rs. 12,941/2/- on a pronote dated 29 October 1946 and Rs. 6,245/11/- on an overdraft current account, with interest at differing rates. The pronote was executed by both defendants; the overdraft account was in the name of defendant No.1 alone.
The plaintiff alleged that when the pronote was executed on 29 October 1946, defendant No.1 deposited title deeds of his property “Dove Villa”, Simla, with the Bank by way of equitable mortgage as security for the loan, and that on 12 December 1946 defendant No.1 created a further charge on the same property for the overdraft amount. On 12 March 1949 defendant No.1 mortgaged the same property to Messrs Dwarka Das Jagan Nath (appellants), who were impleaded as defendant No.3. The suit sought recovery of the amounts and sale of the mortgaged property.
Defendants Nos.1 and 2 admitted liability on the pronote but denied the overdraft liability and denied creation of any charge on the property; they alleged the 12 December 1946 letter (re: overdraft) was inadmissible for want of registration. Defendant No.3 denied the plaintiff's charge and claimed priority for its mortgage. Defendant No.1 died during the suit and his legal representatives were substituted.
The trial court entered a decree for the plaintiff for the entire amount with costs, allowed the displaced principal debtors time for payment till March 1952, and permitted the plaintiff to realize the amount thereafter by sale of the mortgaged property. Defendant No.3 appealed; the dispute on appeal was confined to the plaintiff's alleged charge on the property mortgaged to the appellants, and to related interest issues.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the letters (Exhibits P.4 and P.5), delivered by the debtor a day after the pronote, constituted a contract creating an equitable mortgage that required registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, or whether they were mere records of a completed transaction and therefore did not require registration.
- Whether the letter dated 12 December 1946 (Exhibit P.7), relied on to create a charge in respect of the overdraft account, constituted the contract creating that charge and thus required registration; and if unregistered, whether it was inadmissible so as to defeat the plaintiff's claim to a charge for the overdraft amount.
- Application of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, No. 70 of 1951 (particularly Chapter III and section 29): whether interest on debts owed by displaced persons ceased to accrue from 15 August 1947 and the consequent effect on the decretal interest and the amounts recoverable by the plaintiff.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Defendant No. 3 / Counsel Mr. M. C. Sud)
- Contended that Exhibits P.4 and P.5 (letters of 30 October 1946) purported to create or declare a right or interest of value above Rs.100 in immovable property and therefore required registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act.
- Argued that if those letters were inadmissible for want of registration, the plaintiff would have no evidence of intention to create a charge by deposit of title deeds.
- Relied on authorities where contemporaneous writings were held to embody the contract and therefore to require registration (cases cited in the opinion, e.g., Hari Shankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha, Lala Ram Sarup v. Lala Shiv Dayal Mehra).
Plaintiff (New Bank of India Ltd.)
- Relied on Exhibits P.4 and P.5 (two letters written by Naranjan Singh on 30 October 1946) to prove that title deeds were deposited with the Bank in connection with the advance of Rs.11,000 made on 29 October 1946 and to evidence the intention to create an equitable mortgage.
- Relied on Exhibit P.7 (letter of 12 December 1946) as the basis for asserting a further charge over the property for the overdraft account amount due on that date.
Defendants Nos. 1 and 2
- Admitted liability on the pronote but denied liability as to the overdraft account.
- Acknowledged that title deeds had been deposited with the Bank but denied that any charge had been created in respect of either account; maintained that the 12 December 1946 letter was inadmissible for want of registration.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rachhpal Maharaj v. Bhagwandas Daruka, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 272 | Held that a document recording a past transaction and executed to put the record on file does not, by itself, create the charge and is not compulsorily registerable when it merely records a completed equitable mortgage. | The court relied on this authority to support the view that Exhibits P.4 and P.5 were records of a completed transaction and therefore did not require registration. |
| Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar, A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 36 | Held that a contemporaneous memorandum listing title deeds deposited as security was merely a written record of particulars and neither purported nor operated to create or declare any interest necessitating registration. | The court cited this decision to show that a list of title deeds delivered with a loan can be admissible evidence of creation of an equitable mortgage without requiring registration. |
| Ralli Brothers, Karachi v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., I.L.R. 11 Lab. 564 | Where a list of title deeds deposited was headed to show deposit as security, it is evidence only of the purpose for which they were deposited and not itself the operative instrument creating the charge. | The court invoked this authority to reinforce that a list or record of deeds may be mere evidence of deposit as security and not a document conferring substantive rights that require registration. |
| Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Official Receiver, Karnal, A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 166 | Held that a document containing merely a list of documents deposited as collateral security does not constitute the agreement between parties and thus does not require registration. | Applied to support the proposition that Exhibits P.4 and P.5 were non-operative records and not registrable instruments. |
| Firm Btshen Das Gobind Ram v. Sahukara Bank Ltd., Ludhiana, A.I.R. 1941 Lah. 224 | Decision that a document stating “Please acknowledge receipt of the following title deeds deposited with you … in connexion with the loan … to be advanced to us” was a record and did not require registration. | The court found the present case to be fully covered by this authority and accepted its reasoning in holding Exhibits P.4 and P.5 to be non-registrable records. |
| Hari Shankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha, A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 167 | Held that where parties contemporaneously executed a written contract evidencing the deposit and containing essentials (including power of sale), such a document itself creates the mortgage interest and requires registration. | The court distinguished this case on its facts and treated it as authority for the converse proposition that a writing which is the operative instrument requires registration; Exhibit P.7 was assessed against this principle and found to be an operative document requiring registration. |
| Lala Ram Sarup v. Lala Shiv Dayal Mehra, A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 285 | Where a letter, contemporaneous with deposit, was the sole repository of the terms of the bargain and contained operative terms creating the security, it could not be treated as mere recital and required registration. | The court relied on this case as distinguishable from the present letters P.4 and P.5, and used it to explain when a contemporaneous writing will amount to the operative instrument (applied by contrast to deem Exhibit P.7 registrable). |
| Behram Rashid Irani v. Sorabji Rustomji Elavia, I.L.R. 38 Bom. 372 | This case was cited by appellant but the court stated it had no bearing on the point at issue (i.e., distinguishing circumstances and facts). | The court found it inapplicable to the facts before it and did not rely upon it for the decision. |
| Pranjivandas Jagjivandas Mehta v. Chan Ma Phee, I.L.R. 43 Cal. 895 | This case was cited by appellant but the court concluded it had no bearing on the point at issue. | Not applied; court treated it as inapplicable in the present factual matrix. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by identifying the three requisites of an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds: (i) a debt, (ii) deposit of title deeds, and (iii) an intention that the deeds be security for the debt. The existence of the first two requisites was not disputed.
With respect to the pronote (advance of Rs.11,000 dated 29 October 1946), the court examined Exhibits P.4 and P.5 (letters written by the defendant on 30 October 1946) to determine whether they constituted the operative contract of mortgage (which would require registration) or merely a record of a transaction already completed by the deposit of title deeds (which would not require registration).
The court concluded that Exhibits P.4 and P.5 did not constitute the contract of mortgage. Instead, they recorded a past transaction: Exhibit P.5 listed the title deeds “deposited … in connection with an advance of Rs.11,000 made to me by the Bank on 29th October, 1946,” and Exhibit P.4 declared the property free of encumbrances and the deposit of deeds against the advance. The court noted that the letters did not contain the terms of a contract, nor purport to create or operate as the instrument creating the charge. The letters were regarded as evidentiary records intended to obviate a later plea that the deeds were deposited for some other purpose.
The court relied on authorities (notably Rachhpal Maharaj and Sundarachariar) holding that memoranda or lists recording the deposit of deeds contemporaneously or shortly after the deposit, which merely record an already completed equitable mortgage, are admissible in evidence to prove the creation of the charge and do not require registration.
Turning to the overdraft account, the court found materially different facts. On 12 December 1946 a sum was due on the overdraft account and the plaintiff relied on Exhibit P.7 (a letter of that date) as the means by which the additional charge was created. Unlike the pronote situation, the title deeds were already with the Bank and there was no allegation of any prior oral agreement creating the charge; the letter itself was, therefore, the sole repository of the contract. Exhibit P.7 stated, in effect, “please note your lien on the title deeds … pledged with you in pronote account for Rs.11,000,” and thus either did or did not create the charge.
The court held that if Exhibit P.7 was intended to create the charge, it would be an instrument creating an interest in immovable property and would require registration; if it did not create the charge, there was no other evidence of any agreement to create such a charge. Because Exhibit P.7 was unregistered, it was inadmissible to prove the creation of a mortgage or charge for the overdraft amount, and therefore the plaintiff could not claim any charge on the property in respect of the overdraft account.
Finally, the court addressed interest under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, No. 70 of 1951. It noted that the principal debtors were displaced persons and that section 29 of the Act provides that no interest shall accrue or be deemed to have accrued in respect of any debt owed by a displaced person on and from 15 August 1947. Applying the Act, the court computed the interest up to that date for each account (Rs.540 on the pronote; Rs.346 on the overdraft), adjusted the decretal totals accordingly, and limited the plaintiff's charge on the mortgage to the portion attributable to the pronote debt as so calculated.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal is partly accepted and the decree is modified.
The court's specific dispositive conclusions and consequences are:
- Pronote/Equitable Mortgage: Exhibits P.4 and P.5 were held to be records of a past and completed transaction and did not require registration. The plaintiff's charge on the mortgaged property in respect of the pronote account is established and extends to Rs. 11,540/-. The plaintiff Bank is entitled to recover this sum by sale of the mortgaged property.
- Overdraft Account: Exhibit P.7 (letter dated 12 December 1946), which was the sole written instrument relied upon to create a charge in respect of the overdraft, was held to be the operative contract if it was intended to create the charge and therefore required registration. As it was not registered, it was inadmissible and the plaintiff cannot claim any charge on the property in respect of the overdraft amount. Consequently, the plaintiff Bank shall have no charge over the property for the overdraft component and no personal liability of A.S. Jaspal Singh for the overdraft sum is recognized for the purposes of charging the property.
- Interest under Displaced Persons Act: By application of section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, interest is deemed to have ceased to accrue after 15 August 1947. Using the rates claimed by the plaintiff, interest up to that date was computed as Rs.540 on the pronote and Rs.346 on the overdraft. The total decretal amount, as recalculated in the opinion, was Rs.17,116/4/3, of which Rs.11,540 relates to the pronote and is chargeable on the mortgaged property; the remainder (shown as Rs.5,576/4/3 in the opinion) is not chargeable on the property and A.S. Jaspal Singh is not personally liable for that amount vis-à-vis the property. The plaintiff is not entitled to any future interest on the decretal amount.
- Priority between Mortgagees: The appellants (subsequent mortgagees) shall have a second charge on the property in dispute for the uncharged portion; the Bank's charge is limited to the pronote amount as above.
- Costs: In view of the circumstances the parties were ordered to bear their own costs in the appeal.
No broader novel legal principle was announced beyond applying existing authorities on the distinction between records of completed equitable mortgages (not requiring registration) and operative written instruments creating a charge (which require registration), and applying the statutory effect of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act section 29 to interest accrual.
Chopra, J.:— The New Bank of India Limited, respondent, instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 19,186/13/- against Naranjan Singh and his son Avtarjit Singh Jaspal on the basis of a pronote and an overdraft current account, Rs. 12,941/2/- being due on the first and Rs. 6,245/11/- on the second account, including interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the first and 7½ per cent per annum on the second. The pronote dated 29th October, 1946 in the amount of Rs. 11,000/- was executed by the two defendants, but the overdraft account was in the name of Naranjan Singh alone. It is alleged that at the time of executing the pronote on 29th October, 1946, Naranjan Singh, defendant No. 1 deposited the title deeds of his property known as “Dove Villa”, Simla, with the plaintiff Bank as security, by way of equitable mortgage, for repayment of the said loan. It is further alleged that on 12th December, 1946, Naranjan Singh created a further charge on the same property for the amount due on the overdraft current account. On 12th March, 1949, Naranjan Singh mortgaged this property for a sum of Rs. 7,000/- with Messrs Dwarka Das Jagan Nath, appellants. The subsequent mortgagees were impleaded as defendants No. 3 and a prayer for recovery of the amount by sale of the mortgaged property was made. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the debtors, admitted their liability in the amount due on the pronote but denied the one claimed on the overdraft account. While admitting that the title-deeds were deposited with the Bank as alleged, on 29th October, 1946, the defendants denied to have created any charge with respect to either of the accounts on the said property. The letter dated 12th December, 1946, in respect of the overdraft account was alleged to be inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. Defendant No. 3 also denied the charge in favour of the plaintiff and further pleaded that the same could not take priority over the mortgage in their favour Naranjan Singh defendant died during the pendency of the suit. His sons, Avtarjit Singh Jaspal and Madanjit Singh and Mrs. Naranjan Singh were impleaded as his legal representatives.
2. On all the points in issue, the trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit for the entire amount with costs. Since the principal debtors were displaced persons, they were allowed time for payment of the decretal amount till the end of March 1952. Thereafter the plaintiff was at liberty to realise the amount by sale of the mortgaged property. Future interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum was also allowed. Defendant No. 3 alone has now come in appeal and the dispute is confined to the alleged charge of the plaintiff's dues on the property mortgaged with the appellants. In support of their case, the plaintiff Bank, so far as the pronote account is concerned, relied upon two letters Exhibits P. 4 and P. 5. These were written by Naranjan Singh defendant on one and the same date, viz., 30th October, 1946. It shall be remembered that the pronote was executed a day earlier, viz., on 29th October, 1946. The two letters were addressed to the Manager of the Bank at Lahore. The relevant portion of Exhibit P. 5 says:—
“Please acknowledge receipt of the following title deeds, deposited, by me with you, in connection with an advance of Rs. 11,000 made to me by the Bank on 29th October, 1946, jointly with S.A.S Jaspal.”
3. Exhibit P. 4 is in the following terms:—
“With reference to an advance of Rs. 11,000 made to me by the Bank on 29th October, 1946, jointly with S.A.S Jaspal against the deposit of the title deeds of my houses and premises known as “Dove villa” with attached piece of land measuring about 1713 sq. yards, situated below main Railway Station Simla, I hereby declare, that there are no other title deeds in respect of the above property with me or lodged with any body else excepting those deposited with you. I further declare that the above property is free from all sorts of encumbrances and that I am the sole owner of the property”
4. “Dove villa”, Simla, was purchased by Naranjan Singh defendant for Rs. 22,500 from Mrs. S.M Millet by a registered deed dated 30th August, 1944. This sale-deed along with some other connected documents was handed over to the plaintiff Bank by Naranjan Singh. In “the list of title deeds” contained in Exhibit P. 5, the date of the sale deed was given as 30th August, 1946. All other particulars of the property and as regards its sale in favour of Nararjan Singh were correctly mentioned. Mention of the year “1946”, instead of “1944”, appears to be only a typographical mistake. The same mistake (giving the year as 1946 instead of 1944) was made in the date of the power of attorney mentioned at No. 1(b) of the list in Exhibit P. 5. Appellant's objection as regards identity of the property can therefore be readily rejected. The letter specifically mentions the sale deed to be the one relating to “Dove villa”, Simla, and gives all its details correctly. The sale deed actually delivered related to the property subsequently mortgaged with the appellant.
5. Mr. M.C Sud, learned counsel for the appellant, next contends that the letters Exhibits P. 4 and P. 5 required registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, for they purported to create or declare a right or interest of the value of more than rupees one hundred in the immovable property. It is further submitted that in case these letters are thrown out as inadmissible, there remains nothing to prove the intention that the title deeds were deposited for the purpose of creating a charge on the property. The requisites of an equitable mortgage are:—
(i) a debt;
(ii) deposit of title deeds, and
(iii) an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt.
6. Existence of the first two essentials is not denied in this case. If the two letters be held to have been rightly admitted in evidence, there can be no serious dispute that the third requisite too is fully satisfied. In Ex. P. 5, the defendant acknowledged that the title deeds were deposited “in connection with an advance of Rs. 11,000” made to him by the Bank on 29th October, 1946 Exhibit P. 4 declared that the property, the title deeds of which were deposited with the Bank, was free from any encumbrances and that the advance of Rs. 11,000 was made by the Bank “against the deposit of title deeds”. The intention of creating an equitable mortgage by deposit of the title deeds is abundantly clear.
7. The defendants have not even suggested that there was, or could possibly be, any other object for depositing the title deeds with the Bank, on the day the advance was made and the pronote executed. The evidence and the circumstances leave no doubt that it was with no other intention than to create a charge on the property to which the title deeds related.
8. As regards admissibility of the letters Exhibits P. 4 and P. 5, it has to be seen whether they, or either of them constitutes the contract of mortgage or they merely contain a statement of facts from which the contract of mortgage, already completed by the deposit of title-deeds, can be inferred. It is only in the former case that the letters would be regarded as transferring interest in the property and would require registration. I have no doubt in my mind that the letters fall under the latter category. The letters individually or taken together, as suggested by Mr. Sud, cannot be regarded as repositories of the contract of mortgage. Their contents and the surrounding circumstances strongly lead to the inference that the parties did not intend to reduce their bargain to the form of a document. The letters do not constitute the agreement between the parties, nor do they contain the terms of the contract. Exhibit P. 5 merely gives the list and particulars of the documents which were delivered, “in connection with” the money advanced by the Bank, a day earlier. Exhibit P. 4 contains a declaration that there were no other documents, excepting those deposited with the Bank, and that the property to which those documents related was free from all sorts of encumbrances. The most that can be paid is that the letters purported to acknowledge or record the transaction which had been completed a day earlier and by which an equitable charge was created. The letters do appear to have been obtained with a view to obviate the possibility of a plea that the documents were deposited for some purpose other than the one of creating security. As laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rachhpal Maharaj v. Bhagwandas Daruka . A.I.R 1950 S.C 272., a document recording a past transaction and got executed with that intent does not, by itself, create the charge and become compulsorily registerable. The memorandum in the form of a letter addressed to the creditor in that case was in the following terms:—
“We write to put on record that to secure the repayment of the money already due to you from us on account of the business transactions between yourselves and ourselves and the money that may hereafter become due on account of such transactions we have this day deposited with you the following title deeds in Calcutta at your place of business at No. 7, Sambhu Mullick Lane, relating to our properties at Samastipur with intent to create an equitable mortgage on the said properties to secure all moneys including interest that may be found due and payable by us to you on account of the said transactions…..”.
9. On the question of admissibility of the above document, their Lordships observe:
“Turning now to the memorandum before us, it is clear, on the face of it, that the parties did not intend thereby to create the charge. The document purports only to record a transaction which had been concluded and under which the rights and liabilities had been orally agreed upon. No doubt it was taken by the respondents to show that the title deeds of the appellant's properties were deposited with them as security for the moneys advanced by them, and to obviate a possible plea that the deeds were life with them for other purposes, as indeed was contended by the appellant in his written statement, taking advantage of the non-registration of the memorandum in question. But that is far from intending to reduce the bargain to writing and make the document the basis of the rights and liabilities of the parties. In agreement with the High Court, we are of opinion, that the memorandum delivered by the appellant along with the title deeds deposited with the respondents did not require registration and was properly admitted in evidence to prove the creation of the charge.”
10. The memorandum under consideration in Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar . A.I.R 1931 P.C 36. consisted of a list of the title deeds which were deposited on the day the loan was obtained, and contained the following introductory words:—
“As agreed upon in person I have delivered to you the undermentioned documents as security.”
11. The memorandum was written contemporaneously with the pronote on which the suit was based, and it also bore an attestation. As regards its admissibility, their Lordships arrived at the following conclusion:—
“…….that the memorandum was not other than a written record of the particulars of deeds the subject of an agreement constituted in fact by the act of deposit and the payment of the money and that it neither purported nor operated to create or declare any right, title or interest in the property included in the deeds, with the result that it did not require registration.”
12. In Ralli Brothers, Karachi v. Punjab National Bank Limited . I.L.R 11 Lab. 564, no formal document embodying the terms of the contract between the parties was executed, but a list of the title deeds deposited with the creditor was contemporaneously drawn up and signed by the debtor. The list was headed with the following description:—
“List of title deeds deposited by Messrs Mool Chand Mutsaddi Lal with the Punjab National Bank Limited, Delhi, as security of the promissory note for Rs. 2,00,000 (Two Lacs only) executed on the 22nd October, 1919)”.
13. It was held:
“The list merely shows that the documents included therein had been deposited by way of security. In other words, it is merely evidence of the purpose for which the deeds had been deposited with the Bank and nothing more.”
14. Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Official Receiver, Karnal . A.I.R 1940 Lah. 166., is another decision of this Court in which it was held that where a document contains a mere list of documents deposited with the mortgagee when creating an equitable mortgage regarding certain property, the mere fact that it is stated in the heading of the list that the property was encumbered will obviously not be sufficient to turn it into a document embodying the agreement between the patties, and that such a document does not require registration. A Division Bench of this Court in Firm Btshen Das Gobind Ram v. Sahukara Bank Ltd. Ludhiana . A.I.R 1941 Lah. 224., had under consideration a document almost identical in terms to the one in question before us. The document stated—
“Please acknowledge receipt of the following title deeds deposited with you by us in connexion with the loan, cash credit overdraft……to be advanced to us.”
15. Below this were given particulars of the title deeds. As regards the real character of the document, Tek Chand J. observes:
“It did not constitute the operative instrument; it did not certain the conditions of the transaction; it was merely a record of the title deeds that had been deposited as collateral security for the amount which the Bank had verbally, agreed to advance in the cash credit account and, therefore, did not require registration.”
16. The case in contest is fully covered by this authority and I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed therein. In fact, the matter now seems to have been finally concluded by the pronouncement of their Lordships in Rachpal Maharaj's case referred to above.
17. The cases relied upon by Mr. Sud are clear distinguishable. They need not detain me long, since a decision on the point in question must necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In Hari Shankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha . A.I.R 1939 P.C 167., it was held that where the parties professing to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds contemporaneously enter into a contractual agreement in writing which evidence the deposit and contains all the essentials of the transaction, expressly conferring a power of sale on the mortgagee, and which in fact purports to be an instrument not merely evidencing the transaction already completed but by itself effective to create an interest in the property in favour of the mortgagees, such a document requires to be compulsorily registered. The document under consideration before their Lordships contained all the essentials of the transaction by which the security was created. Referring to the document the document their Lordships observe—
“It states that it is hereby agreed and declared between and by the parties that in consideration of the sums advanced the title deeds of the property shall be held as a security on the said property and refers to any proceeding which may be had for the protection of this security or for procuring payment of the moneys hereby secured. It then sets out all the details of the transaction and specifically confers a power of sale on the mortgagees.”
18. In Lala Ram Sarup v. Lala Shiv Dayal Mehra . A.I.R 1940 Lah. 285., the document is reproduced at page 287 and with respect to it the learned Judge observes:
“This letter together with the title deeds was handed over to the plaintiff. In the face of the contents of this letter, it is idle for the appellant to contend that it contained merely a recital of an already completed equitable mortgage. Not only were the writing of the letter and the deposit of title deeds contemporaneous transactions, but it is clear that the letter was the sole repository of the terms of the bargain.”
19. The other two cases Behram Rashid Irani…(Original Defendant) v. Sorabji Rustomji Elavia…(Original Plaintiff).* . I.L.R 38 Bom. 372. and Pranjivandas Jagjivandas Mehta v. Chan Ma Phee . I.L.R 43 Cal. 895. relied upon by Mr. Sud have no bearing to the point at issue.
20. In my view, the letters (Exhibit P. 4 and P. 5) were no more than mere record of the past and completed transaction and, therefore, did not require registration. The intention that the title deeds were deposited as security of the loan is abundantly clear. The charge with respect to the amount due on the pronote account is thus fully established.
21. As regards the overdraft current account, the matters are, however, absolutely different. The account was opened with the plaintiff Bank on 4th May, 1946. On 12th December, 1946, a sum of Rs. 5,230/4/3/- was due from Naranjan Singh defendant in this account. It is then that Naranjan Singh is said to have created a further charge for this amount on the property already equitably mortgaged. The plaintiff's own case is that this additional charge was created by means of a letter (Exhibit P. 7) written that day by the defendant. The title deeds were already deposited with the Bank. The amount had fallen due. It is not even alleged that the letter was preceded by any oral agreement creating the charge between the parties. The letter, according to the plaintiff itself, is thus the sole repository of the contract between them. Exhibit P. 7 says:—
“I am availing a temporary overdraft from time to time. As security against this I would request you to ‘please note’ your lien on the title deeds of houses and premises known as ‘Dove Villa’ with attached piece of land measuring 1713 sq. yards situated below main Railway Station, Simla pledged with you in pronote account for Rs. 11,000/- jointly with Mr. A.S Jaspal.”
22. The statement “please note your lien on the title deeds” was either intended to create a charge or it was not so intended Obviously, the charge was to be on the property to which the title deeds related. If the statement intended to create a charge, the document would be creating an interest in the immovable property and would, therefore, require registration. If it were not so intended, there remains nothing else for the plaintiff to prove the alleged charge. As already observed, it is on the basis of the letter alone that the plaintiff's case, as regards the charge, rests. The letter cannot, therefore, be regarded as a record of any past or completed transaction. It contains the bargain between the parties and if the bargain was to create a mortgage, the letter required registration. Having not been registered, it is inadmissible in evidence and has to be left out of consideration. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot claim any charge on the property in dispute with respect to the amount due on the over draft current account.
23. Chapter 3 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, No. 70 of 1951, (which came into force on 10th December, 1951) relates to reliefs granted to displaced persons. Section 29, the first section in this Chapter, lays down inter alia that no interest shall accrue or be deemed to have accrued in respect of any debt owed by a displaced person, on and from the 15th day of August, 1947. It is not disputed that the principal debtors in this case are displaced persons. In the Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 6 and 7 of 1956 decided by us today, it has been held that the decree under consideration is in respect of ‘debt’ as defined by section 2(6) of the Act. That, makes section 29 applicable to the case. According to it, interest shall be deemed to have ceased to accrue after the 15th August, 1947. No interest thereafter can, therefore be allowed. Calculated at the rates claimed by the plaintiff, the interest up to that day on the pronote account cones to Rs. 540/- and that on the overdraft current account to Rs. 346/-. Thus, the total amount for which the plaintiff's suit can be decreed comes to Rs. 11,540/- plus Rs. 5,576/40/- viz., Rs. 17,116/4/3. Out of this amount, the plaintiff's charge on the mortgaged property shall extend to Rs. 11,540/- only; the plaintiff Bank shall be entitled to recover this amount by sale of the mortgaged property. The appellant shall have a second charge on the property in dispute. For the sake of clarification, it may be mentioned that the plaintiff Bank shall have no charge on the property in respect of the second item of the decretal amount and that A.S Jaspal Singh respondent shall also not be personally liable for this amount, viz., Rs. 5,576/4/3. The plaintiff Bank shall not be entitled to any future interest on the decretal amount. The other directions contained in the decree under appeal shall stand. In the result, the appeal is partly accepted and the decree modified accordingly. In view of the circumstances of the case, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.
24. Gosain, J.:— I agree.
25. Appeal accepted.
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