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Kuldip Singh And Others v. Shrimati Maqbul Kaur .
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns a petition under Article 133(1) of the Constitution seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order of this Court in Regular First Appeal No. 183 of 1955. The appeal was filed by Mst Maqbul Kaur, but the office reported that it appeared prima facie to be barred by time. The present petitioners, respondents in that appeal, filed an application asserting the appeal was time barred and requested that the limitation issue be decided before printing the record. The Court considered this question and ruled in favour of the appellant, directing the record to be printed. The petitioners now seek to appeal against that order dated 4th December, 1956.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an interlocutory order deciding a vital issue but not finally disposing of the appeal qualifies as a “judgment, decree or final order” under Article 133 of the Constitution for the purpose of appeal to the Supreme Court.
- Whether the order directing printing of the record despite a limitation objection constitutes a final order permitting appeal under Article 133.
- Whether the test of finality depends on the actual effect of the order or on the potential effect if decided differently.
- Whether the case involves any substantial question of law fit for appeal to the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners contended that if the order had been in their favour (i.e., holding the appeal barred by limitation), it would have finally disposed of the appeal. Therefore, they argued the order should be regarded as final for the purpose of appeal.
Court's Response to Petitioners
- The Court rejected this contention, holding that finality depends on the actual effect of the order made, not on the hypothetical effect if decided differently.
- The Court noted that the Explanation to Article 132, which broadens the meaning of "final order," is not extended to Article 133, indicating a narrower interpretation of finality under Article 133.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohammad Amin Bros. Ltd. v. The Dominion of India, A.I.R 1950 F.C 77 | Finality means an order that finally disposes of the suit, not merely deciding a vital issue. | Applied to hold that the interlocutory order in question was not final as it did not end the appeal. |
| Jagat Ram v. Ganga, A.I.R 1951 Punj. 30 | An order rejecting an application to appeal in forma pauperis is not a final order under Article 133. | Supported the view that interlocutory orders are not final orders for appeal purposes. |
| Batala Engineering Co. v. Custodian Evacuee Property, A.I.R 1951 Punj. 412 | An interlocutory order deciding some issues in a winding-up application is not a final order under Article 133. | Reinforced that interlocutory orders determining issues are not final orders permitting appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the scope of Article 133 of the Constitution, which permits appeals to the Supreme Court only against judgments, decrees, or final orders. It emphasized that finality must be judged in relation to the suit or appeal and that deciding a vital issue is insufficient unless the order finally disposes of the suit. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the potential finality of an order if decided differently should be considered, stating that the actual effect of the order is determinative. The Court distinguished Article 133 from Article 132 by noting that the Explanation extending the meaning of "final order" in Article 132 is absent in Article 133, indicating a stricter interpretation. The Court also relied on precedents to confirm that interlocutory orders are not final orders for the purpose of appeals under Article 133. Finally, the Court found no substantial question of law or fitness for appeal in the case and dismissed the petition with costs.
Holding and Implications
The petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is dismissed with costs.
The direct effect of this decision is that the interlocutory order directing printing of the record despite a limitation objection does not qualify as a final order permitting appeal under Article 133. No new precedent was set beyond reaffirming the established principle that only final orders disposing of the rights of parties are appealable under Article 133.
Passey and Chopra, JJ.:— This is a petition under Article 133(1) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order of this Court in Regular First Appeal No. 183 of 1955. When the appeal was filed by Mst Maqbul Kaur, the office reported that prima facie the appeal appeared to be barred by time. The present petitioners who were respondents in that appeal also presented an application that the appeal was barred by time and prayed that the matter of limitation be decided before printing of the record. The question was gone into and decided in favour of the appellant, and printing of the record was directed to be proceeded with. It is against this order dated 4th December, 1956 that the petitioners want to go in appeal to the Supreme Court.
2. It is only against a “judgment, decree or final order” of this Court that an appeal is competent under Article 133 of the Constitution. The test for determining the finality of an order is whether the order finally disposes of the rights of the parties.
3. The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. The fact that the order decides a matter and even a vital issue is by itself not material, unless the decision puts an end to the suit (Mohammad Amin Bros. Ltd. v. The Dominion of India . A.I.R 1950 F.C 77.). Applying this test to the present case the order cannot be regarded as final, for it does not finally dispose of the appeal, although it decides a vital point at issue between the parties.
4. Shri Prem Chand Pandit, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the order, if it had been just the other way, viz., in favour of the petitioners, would have finally disposed of the appeal as time barred and since he prays for that order being made in the proposed appeal, the order in question ought to be regarded as final. In my view the contention is not acceptable. The finality of the order depends upon the effect of the order that is actually made and not of the one that might or is sought to be made. It is not the potentiality of the point at issue to put an end to the legal proceedings that has to be looked into, but the actual order that is made thereon. If that had been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, an explanation similar to the one added to Article 132 could have been added to this Article as well. The Explanation to Article 132 says—
“For the purposes of this Article, the expression ‘final order’ includes an order deciding an issue which, if decided in favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the case.”
5. This explanation is expressly made applicable only to Article 132, which strongly indicates that the same expression “final order” appearing in the Article that follows was not intended to have the same connotation for the purposes of that Article.
6. In Jagat Ram v. Ganga . A.I.R 1951 Punj. 30., an order rejecting an application to appeal in forma pauperis was not regarded as a judgment, decree or final order within the meaning of Article 133. In Batala Engineering Co. v. Custodian Evacuee Property . A.I.R 1951 Punj. 412., it was held that an interlocutory order determining some of the issues arising on an application for compulsory winding up of a company will not be covered by the word “judgment” or “final order” in the Article.
7. In any case, we are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law or is otherwise fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. The petition is dismissed with costs.
8. Petition dismissed.
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