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Inder Chand Jain, Petitioner v. Pooran Chand-Bansi Dhar .
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a revision petition challenging an order of the Court at Delhi which returned an application brought by the petitioners under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act on the ground that the Delhi Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it.
The petitioners are the firm Chhunnu Mal–Kishan Chand and its partners Indar Chand Jain, Kishan Chand Jain and Dharam Pal Tain. A dispute arose between them and the Bombay firm Messrs. Puran Mal–Bansi Dhar (respondent No. 1). The Bombay firm wrote on 16-4-1956 appointing Mr. N. N. Dubash (respondent No. 2) as its arbitrator and called on the petitioners to appoint their arbitrator within seven days. The petitioners replied on 20-4-1956 contending that any reference to arbitration was illegal and inoperative on various grounds.
Despite that, respondent No. 4 (the Native Share and Stock Brokers Association of Bombay) appointed Jayant Amar Chand (respondent No. 3) as a second arbitrator on behalf of the petitioners, communicated by letter dated 7-5-1956. The petitioners filed an application in the Delhi Court on 4-6-1956 under Sections 32 and 33 denying the existence and validity of the alleged arbitration agreement. The Bombay firm objected that the Delhi Courts lacked jurisdiction, and the lower Court upheld that objection and returned the application. This revision petition challenges that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Delhi Court had jurisdiction under Section 33 read with the definition of "Court" in Section 2(c) of the Indian Arbitration Act to entertain an application challenging the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or award.
- Whether the situs for jurisdiction under Section 2(c) depends on the subject-matter of the reference alone or also on the residence/place of business of the parties (i.e., whether a suit could have been instituted in Delhi because the petitioners reside there).
- Whether, on the facts of this case, any part of the cause of action in a suit that the Bombay firm might have instituted (arising out of the subject-matter of the arbitration) arose at Delhi, such that the Delhi Court could properly exercise jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners asserted that they were residents of Delhi and therefore, under the ordinary rules, a suit based on the contracts in dispute could have been brought in the Delhi Court; on that basis the Delhi Court had jurisdiction to decide the application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act.
- The petitioners also denied that there was any admission before the lower Court that no part of the cause of action arose at Delhi; after the lower Court's order they filed an application pointing out that the observation was incorrect and that factual issue remained to be decided.
- They relied on judicial observations in Radha Kishen v. Bombay Company Ltd. (Abdul Rahman J.) and Cursetji J. A. Wadia v. Dr. R. D. Shiralee (Kania J.) as supportive of the proposition that residence/place of contract may give jurisdiction to a Court to entertain Section 33 applications.
Respondents' / Bombay Firm's Arguments
- The Bombay firm contended that the Delhi Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitioners' application under the Arbitration Act because the contracts in dispute were entered into at Bombay and no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Delhi Court.
- In the revision proceedings the respondents again maintained that, on the facts, no part of the cause of action in any suit which the Bombay firm might have brought arose at Delhi — a factual contention which the Court said required determination by the lower Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Radha Kishen v. Bombay Company Ltd., AIR 1943 Lah 295 | Observation that a Court would have jurisdiction under Section 33 where a suit on the subject-matter could have been instituted at that place (example given: Amritsar where contract took place and defendants resided). | The opinion notes Abdul Rahman J.'s remark but states that the matter in Radha Kishen was decided on other grounds; the Court observed that the case was not being considered in the same manner as the present case and did not treat it as determinative here. |
| Cursetji Jamshedji Ardaseer Wadia v. Dr. R. D. Shiralee, AIR 1943 Bom 32 | Kania J.'s observation that Section 2(c) does not mean that the whole cause of action must have arisen within the jurisdiction; any Court that could decide the questions arising from the subject-matter of the reference would be proper. | The opinion records this observation but points out that, as with Radha Kishen, the issue in those cases was not considered in the precise way it arises here; the Court therefore did not treat it as directly dispositive of the present jurisdictional question. |
| Venkatasamiappa v. Srinidhi Ltd., 1950-1 Mad LJ 709 | Direct consideration of whether a Court's jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act depends on subject-matter (and where a suit could have been brought) rather than on mere residence/place of business of the parties; Balakrishna Ayyar J.'s detailed exposition that jurisdiction depends on the subject-matter of the reference. | The Court treated this decision as directly applicable and persuasive. It quoted Balakrishna Ayyar J.'s reasoning at length and expressed entire agreement with the view that jurisdiction under Section 2(c) and related provisions depends on the subject-matter of the dispute, not on where parties reside or carry on business. |
| Guardian Assurance Co. v. Shiva Mangal Singh, AIR 1937 All 208 | Interpretation of similar words in an earlier Act (Act of 1899) supporting the construction that jurisdiction relates to subject-matter rather than residence/place of business. | This decision was cited with approval in Venkatasamiappa, and the present Court notes its citation with approval in that judgment when adopting the same line of reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the relevant statutory provisions: Section 32 (bar on suits for decision on existence, effect or validity of arbitration agreements or awards) and Section 33 (procedural route: application to the Court to decide the question on affidavits), read with the definition of "Court" in Section 2(c), which defines "Court" as a civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit.
The lower Court had proceeded on the factual basis that the contracts in dispute were made at Bombay and that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Delhi Court. The petitioners countered that because they resided in Delhi a suit could have been brought there and consequently the Delhi Court had jurisdiction.
The Court analyzed the competing positions through precedent. It noted that two earlier decisions (Radha Kishen and Cursetji Wadia) contained observations that might support the petitioners' contention but were not decided in the same factual and legal posture as the present case. The Court then examined the Madras decision in Venkatasamiappa v. Srinidhi Ltd., where Balakrishna Ayyar J. had carefully considered the precise question now before the Court and concluded that the statutory language makes jurisdiction depend on the subject-matter of the dispute and not on the residence or place of business of the parties.
The Court found the reasoning in Venkatasamiappa persuasive and stated that it was in entire agreement with the view that Sections 2(c) and 31(1) (and analogous provisions) do not make jurisdiction contingent on where parties live or carry on business; rather, jurisdiction is tied to whether the Court could decide the subject-matter of the reference as if it had been sued upon there. The Court emphasized the deliberate omission in the statutory text of words regarding residence or place of business, and accepted the policy reasons set out in the Madras judgment.
Despite upholding the correctness of the legal ground on which the lower Court concluded it had no jurisdiction, the Court recognized that the factual question whether any part of the cause of action in a suit that the Bombay firm might have brought arose at Delhi remained open and required determination by the lower Court after full consideration of pleadings and affidavits. Accordingly, the Court remitted the matter to the lower Court to decide that factual question.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court upheld the correctness of the ground on which the lower Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitioners' application under the Arbitration Act, but remitted the case to the lower Court to determine, after full consideration of pleadings and affidavits, whether in fact any part of the cause of action in a suit which the Bombay firm might have instituted (arising out of the subject-matter of the arbitration) arose at Delhi. The parties were directed to appear in the lower Court on 14-10-1957. There was to be no order as to costs in the revision petition.
Implications:
- The controlling legal principle affirmed by the Court (following Venkatasamiappa) is that jurisdiction under Section 2(c) and related provisions is dependent on the subject-matter of the reference — whether the Court could decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if those questions had been the subject-matter of a suit — rather than being determined solely by the residence or place of business of the parties.
- The direct practical effect in this litigation is procedural: the matter is remitted to the lower Court for a factual determination on whether any part of the cause of action arose in Delhi; until that factual question is resolved the lower Court's return of the application stands as the subject of reconsideration. The Court made no order as to costs in the revision petition.
- This opinion adopts and applies existing judicial reasoning (notably Venkatasamiappa) rather than announcing a distinct new principle; the immediate consequence is the remand for factual determination rather than a definitive, final adjudication on jurisdiction on the existing record.
1. This is a revision petition against the order of Court at Delhi returning the application, under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act to the present petitioners on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it.
2. The petitioners are the firm Chhunnu Mal-Kishan Chand and its partners Indar Chand Jain, Kishan Chand Jain and Dharam Pal Tain, and a dispute has arisen regarding some dealings which they had with Bombay firm Messrs. Puran Mal-Bansi Dhar respondent No. 1. The petitioners received a letter dated 16-4-1956 from the Bombay firm stating that whereas claims, disputes and differences had arisen and were pending between them the Bombay firm had appointed Mr. N. N. Dubash respondent. No. 2 as its arbitrator and calling on the petitioners to appoint their arbitrator within seven days. The petitioners sent a reply dated 20-4-1956 contending that any reference to arbitration was illegal and inoperative on various grounds. However, respondent No. 4 the Native Share and Stock Brokers Association of Bombay proceeded to appoint Jayant Amar Chand respondent No, 3 as a second arbitrator, on behalf of the petitioners this appointment being communicated by a letter dated 7th of May 1956.
3. The petitioners then filed their application in the Court at Delhi under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act and 4-6-1956 denying the existence and validity of the alleged agreement under which the Bombay firm had caused the matters in dispute to be referred to arbitration. The Bombay firm raised the objection that the Delhi Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, and the present petition has been filed challenging the order of the lower Court by which this contention was upheld.
4. Section 32 of the Arbitration Act provides that notwithstanding any law for the time being in force no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence effect or validity of an arbitration, agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration, agreement or award be set aside amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than its provided in this Act. The first part of Section 33 reads :
"Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits."
The meaning of the term "Court" is defined be Section 2(c) which reads;
" 'Court' means a civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been subject-matter of a suit but does not except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 1 include a Small Cause Court."
5. The lower Court proceeded to decide the matter on the basis that it was admitted that the contracts in dispute were entered into at Bombay and that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Delhi Court, and the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that since they were residents of Delhi a suit on the basis of the contracts in dispute could have been filed by the Bombay firm in the Delhi Court, was repelled.
6. On behalf of the petitioners it is denied that there was any admission in the Court below that no part of cause of action arose at Delhi in any suit which the Bombay firm could have brought on the basis of the contracts and the argument has again been advanced that since any person can bring a suit either in a Court located where all or part of the cause of action arose or else where the defendant resides, a suit based on the disputes which have been referred to arbitration by the Bombay firm could have been brought at Delhi and therefore the Court here had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, Support of this contention was sought to be derived from certain observations made by Abdul Rahman J. in Radha Kishen v. Bombay Company Ltd., AIR 1943 Lah 295 and by Kania J. in Cursetji Jamshedji Ardaseer Wadia v. Dr. R. D. Shiralee AIR 1943 Bom 32 Actually in the first case Abdul Rahman J. decided the matter on other grounds but undoubtedly on p. 297 he has remarked :
"Since an application like this is not covered by Clause 9 of the agreement such Courts would have jurisdiction to entertain it under Section 2(c) Arbitration Act as could have decided 'the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference' and as a suit for damages which is now proposed to be the subject-matter of the reference could have been instituted at Amritsar, both because the contract had been taken place at Amritsar and the defendants were residing at that place, the Courts in Amritsar would be competent to entertain the application under Section 33 Arbitration Act."
In the other case Kania J. has observed;
"In my opinion the construction sought to be put on Section 2(c); by the petitioners is erroneous. It docs not mean that a Court has jurisdiction to receive and award only if the whole cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court. Reading the sub-section as worded, it is deaf that any Court which would have jurisdiction to decide the question arising from the subject-matter of the reference, would be the proper court in which the award may be filed."
In neither of these cases was the question being considered in the manner in which it has arisen in the present case.
7. The question however, has been considered in this light in the case Venkatasamiappa v. Srinidhi, Ltd. 1950-1 Mad LJ 709 a decision by Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ. The facts in that case were that a company with its office in the city of Madras had been carrying out some contracts at Bangalore for the Central P. W. D. The other party in the proceedings was a resident of Bangalore who had taken some part in carrying out these works as a sub-contractor and as a result of his dealings with the Madras company he claimed to be entitled to receive a sum of about Rs. 36,000/-.
On the other hand the Madras company claimed that if the accounts were gone into a sum could be due to the company from the sub-contractor. The disputes between them were, referred to arbitration by an agreement drawn up at Madras and the arbitrators were residents of Madras. By the terms of their award a sum of about Rs. 22,000/- was found to be due to the Madras company and the arbitrators filed an application under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act on the original side of the Madras High Court for filing the award. The matter came before Subba Rao J, who rejected the objection of the Bangalore sub-contractor that the Madras High Court had no jurisdiction to receive the award, This decision was reversed in a Letters Patent Appeal.
8. The main judgment was delivered by Balakrishna Ayyar J., and it seems to me that he has admirably summed up the arguments against the case advanced on behalf of the present petitioners as follows:
"Before us Mr. Ranganatha Sastri raised two points. The first is that the view of Subba Rao J., that this Court has jurisdiction to receive the award and pass a decree in terms thereof is erroneous. To assess the validity of his objection it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act. Section 2(c) of the Indian Arbitration Act (X of 1940) defines the word 'Court' as follows:
'As aforesaid the dispute between the respondents was that the first respondent claimed a sum of Rs. 36,000/- from the 2nd respondent under the contract whereas the second respondent claimed that if the accounts were looked into a large amount would be due to him. Admittedly the second respondent is a registered firm having its office at No. 292, China Bazar Road, Madras. The first respondent, if he had wanted, could certainly have filed the suit with regard to the subject-matter of the reference on the Original Side of this High Court. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent governs the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court. Under the said clause in regard to suits other than those for land, the High Court is empowered to receive, try and determine suits of every description if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within such limits. As admittedly the second respondent carries on business in Madras, the plaintiff could have filed the suit on the Original Side of this Court, in which case the subject-matter of the reference would have been the subject-matter of a suit pending in this Court. In that view the Court has jurisdiction to receive the award filed under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act.' This passage will itself show that before this Court can acquire jurisdiction over the matter, it would have been necessary for the appellant before us to have figured as the plaintiff. Not merely that, he must have elected to sue the respondent not in Bangalore, where the suit could normally have been filed, but in Madras. The jurisdiction of this Court would have been contingent on these two factors and we doubt whether the jurisdiction conferred by Sections 2(c) and 31(1) is such a contingent jurisdiction. Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar attempted to surmount this difficulty by saying that in arbitration proceedings both the parties are in the position of plaintiffs and also defendants and for that reason the suit could have been filed in Madras assuming without granting, that cither party could have laid the action at Madras, it will be realised, if one pauses to think over the matter, that the contention, that in arbitration proceedings both the parties simultaneously fill the role of plaintiff and defendant, makes it more difficult than ever to construe Sections 2(c) and 31(1) in the manner that Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar desires. Because in that view the indention which Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar now attributes to the Legislature could have been sufficiently and more simply expressed in the statute by saying that the Court having jurisdiction is the Court within the limits of whose territorial jurisdiction any of the parties resides. The conclusion which Subba Rao, J. arrived at, does not, it seems to us, necessarily follow from the words employed in the Act. It will be noticed that there is no reference either in Section 2(c) or Section 31(1) of the Act to the place where the parties dwell, or carry on business, or personally work for gain. The jurisdiction of the Court is made to depend not on any of these factors but solely on the subject-matter; there is no reference to any other circumstances. If the intention of the Legislature had been to confer jurisdiction not merely with reference to the subject-matter of the dispute between the parties, but also with reference to the residence of parties or their place of business, it should not have been difficult to insert appropriate words in Section 2(c) and Section 31(1) of the Act, Analogy and precedent are to be found in some very familiar provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The words employed in the Act lay stress on the subject-matter of the reference; there is such an avoidance of words having reference to the place of residence or place of business of the parties that the omission must have been deliberate and we can think of at least one good reason why the Court having jurisdiction should have been defined in relation to the subject-matter of the dispute or action. Otherwise, the Court having jurisdiction might depend on the accident as to who first raised the dispute or decides to file a suit."
In the following passage the judgment of the Allahabad Court in Guardian Assurance Co. v. Shiva Mangal Singh, AIR 1937 All 208 interpreting similar words in the Act of 1899 in the same way is cited with approval. I find myself in entire agreement with the view set out above and I have quoted the passage in extenso because I think the argument could not possibly be more clearly or cogently expressed.
9. It is, however, contended that the lower Court wrongly observed that it was admitted that no part of the cause of action in any suit which the Bombay firm could have brought arose at Delhi, In this connection it is stated that after the announcement of the order of the lower Court the petitioners filed an application there pointing out that this observation was incorrect and this matter is still before the lower Court for decision. On behalf of the respondents some attempt was made to argue that in fact no part of the cause of action in, any suit which the Bombay firm might have brought arose at Delhi, but this is a obviously a matter that required decision by the lower Court after full consideration of the pleadings and affidavit of the parries.
Accordingly while I uphold the correctness of the ground on which the lower Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the application, I consider that the case should be sent back and the question of Jurisdiction decided after the lower Court has considered whether in fact any part of the cause of action in a suit which the Bombay firm might have instituted arising out of the subject-matter of the reference to arbitration, arose at Delhi, The parties have been directed to appear in the lower Court on 14-10-1957. There will be no Order as to costs in this revision petition.
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