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Balbhadar Mal Kuthiala And Others v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax Punjab, Etc, .
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion — Reference under Section 66(1), Income Tax Act
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Balbhadhar Mal Kuthiala, filed an appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal against an assessment for the year 1945-46. The appeal, posted, reached the Tribunal on 6 June 1949 and was listed for hearing on 6 December 1949. A notice of hearing was sent by registered post, prepaid, acknowledgment due, to the petitioner at the Simla address supplied in the appeal. The posting took place on 28 October 1949 and, because the addressee was not available in Simla, the letter was redirected to Hoshiarpur. The postal authorities at Hoshiarpur returned the cover to the office of posting with the pencil endorsement "Inkariwala hai" (refused to accept).
On 6 December 1949, when the appeal was called, no one appeared for the appellant; on 13 December 1949 the Tribunal dismissed the appeal for default, recording that the referee by the post office that the addressee refused service was "tantamount to a service."
The assessee received information of the dismissal on 7 February 1950 and on 13 February 1950 applied to the Tribunal for restoration, filing an affidavit denying that any registered letter had been presented or that he had refused it. The Tribunal rejected the restoration application by order dated 27 October 1950, principally on the ground that it had no inherent power to review or set aside its own order.
Separately, the assessee applied under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act for a statement of the case to be referred to the High Court, and the Tribunal referred three specified questions concerning (1) validity of the dismissal, (2) whether the endorsement "refused" justifies a presumption of service, and (3) whether a real opportunity of hearing had been afforded. The Tribunal refused to include in the statement subsequent events (the restoration application, affidavit, and the Tribunal's order rejecting that application), considering them subsequent to its dismissal order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Where a properly addressed registered letter, postage prepaid, is returned by the post office with an endorsement by a postman "Inkariwala hai" (refusal), does a presumption arise of due service of the letter on the addressee?
- If the answer to the first question is in the negative, whether the Tribunal's order dismissing the appeal for default is liable to be recalled on the ground that the appellant had not been given an opportunity of being heard (i.e., whether the dismissal is null)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Mahajan, counsel for the assessee)
- The presumption of service under the postal-service rules arises only where a letter sent by post is not returned as undelivered; if a letter is returned (for any reason), that is direct evidence the letter was not delivered and therefore no presumption of service arises.
- The postal postman's endorsement that the addressee "refused" cannot be taken into evidence or admitted without formal proof (for example, examination of the postman), so the endorsement does not create a presumption of service.
- Reliance was placed on authorities including Govind Chandra v. Dwarka Nath (19 Cal WN 489: AIR 1915 Cal 313), C. Jagannath v. J. E. Sassoon (ILR 18 Bom 606) and Butto Kristo Roy v. Gobindaram (AIR 1939 Pat 540).
- The Court should consider subsequent events (restoration application, affidavit denying tender/refusal, and Tribunal's refusal) and should direct the Tribunal to include those matters in the statement under Section 66(2) or (4) as appropriate.
Tribunal's Position / Respondent's Contentions
- The Tribunal treated the postal endorsement "refused" as tantamount to service and so dismissed the appeal for default when no one appeared at the hearing.
- On the assessor's later application for restoration the Tribunal refused to recall or review its own order, stating it had no inherent power to review or set aside its order.
- When framing the case under Section 66(1), the Tribunal confined the reference to questions arising out of its order of dismissal and refused to include subsequent events/documents because those events occurred after the order and did not arise out of that order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar (1953) 23 ITR 180 : AIR 1953 SC 118 | Limits on the High Court's jurisdiction under Sections 66(1) and (2): reference is conditional on there being an order by the Tribunal under Section 33(4) and a question of law arising out of such order. | The Court relied on it to emphasise that the High Court's advisory jurisdiction is confined to questions referred under Section 66 and cannot decide questions not so referred. |
| Purshottam Laxmidas v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City (1956) 30 ITR 143 : AIR 1956 Bom 505 | Composition of the paper book in a Section 66 reference; Tribunal's discretion to include documents in the paper book. | The Court applied it to hold that documents relating to events occurring after the Tribunal's order which the Tribunal refused to include cannot be taken into the paper book or considered by the High Court. |
| Govind Chandra v. Dwarka Nath (19 Cal WN 489 : AIR 1915 Cal 313) | Obiter remarks suggesting an endorsement of "refusal" may require proof (postman evidence) and might not alone justify presumption of tender and refusal. | The Court treated these remarks as obiter, noting the case did not contain a final decision that the endorsement could not be considered without postman evidence, and did not accept this as decisive against the presumption. |
| C. Jagannath v. J. E. Sassoon (ILR 18 Bom 606) | Authority relied upon by the appellant for the proposition that a returned registered letter rebuts the presumption of delivery. | The Court observed this decision pre-dated Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and was therefore of limited assistance to the appellant's contention. |
| Butto Kristo Roy v. Gobindaram (AIR 1939 Pat 540) | Followed the observations in Govind Chandra; relied upon by the appellant. | The Court held it cannot be regarded as authority for the contrary view because it merely follows earlier remarks and the point was not material to that case's final outcome. |
| Mohan Lal v. Sundar Lal Nand Lal (AIR 1949 EP 295) | When a registered letter returned with remark "refused" a presumption arises that the addressee refused it even without proof of handwriting. | Relied on by the Court as supporting the proposition that an endorsement of "refused" gives rise to a presumption of tender and refusal. |
| Sher Afzal v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1926 Lah 520) | Supports the presumption under Section 114 that a returned registered letter endorsed "refused" indicates refusal by addressee. | Used as supporting authority for the presumption that the postman's usual course of business was followed. |
| Raunaq Ram v. Prabh Dayal (AIR 1930 Lah 439) | Same proposition: returned registered cover with note "refused" permits a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that addressee refused. | Adduced as authority favoring the presumption of tender and refusal without examination of the postman. |
| Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v. Commissioner of Income Tax (U.P. Lucknow 1952) 22 ITR 104 : AIR 1952 All 857 | Whether mere endorsement "refused" by postal authorities is sufficient to justify presumption of service. | The High Court answered that question in the affirmative; the present Court relied on that decision as directly supporting the presumption. |
| Nirmalabala Debi v. Provat Kumar Basu (52 Cal WN 659) | Held that a registered letter returned with endorsement "refused" will be presumed served upon the addressee without examining the postman. | The Court cited this as a direct precedent adopting the presumption in favour of service. |
| Aga Gulam Husain v. A. D. Sassoon (ILR 21 Bom 413) | Contrary view taken by the Bombay Court in earlier decisions on whether returned covers rebut the presumption of delivery. | The Court noted this contrary authority but treated some of these older decisions as distinguishable or of limited assistance in light of later statutory provisions. |
| Baluram Ramkissen v. Bai Pannabai (ILR 35 Bom 213) | Where a registered, properly addressed cover returned "refused", Court entitled to draw inference under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and hold there was sufficient service. | The trial Court's reasoning in this case was cited as supportive of drawing the inference of service from a returned registered cover endorsed "refused". |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two broad strands: (A) the jurisdictional limits under Section 66 for the reference to the High Court, and (B) the substantive question whether a returned registered letter marked "refused" gives rise to a presumption of service.
A. Jurisdictional and procedural analysis under Section 66
- The Court reiterated that the High Court's jurisdiction under Sections 66(1) and (2) is limited to questions of law arising out of an order of the Appellate Tribunal made under Section 33(4). It cannot entertain questions or evidence which do not arise out of that Tribunal order.
- Section 66(4) permits the High Court to remit a stated case back to the Tribunal only for clarification or to fill lacunae that are necessary to enable the High Court to determine the question(s) already referred. It does not permit raising entirely new questions or including events that happened after the order which produced the reference.
- Relying on precedent (notably Commissioner of Income-tax v. Arunachalam Chettiar and Purshottam Laxmidas), the Court held that subsequent events (the restoration application, the affidavit denying tender/refusal, and the Tribunal's rejection of restoration) did not arise out of the order under Section 33(4) and therefore could not be included in the statement of case or considered by the High Court on this reference. Documents withheld by the Tribunal from the paper book under Section 66 should not be considered by the High Court.
B. Substantive analysis on presumption of service from a returned registered letter endorsed "refused"
- The Court examined statutory provisions: Section 27 of the General Clauses Act (meaning of service by post), Section 63 of the Income-tax Act (service by post to be deemed effected where requisition is properly addressed, prepaid and posted by registered post), Section 16 of the Evidence Act (proof by general course of business), and Section 114 of the Evidence Act (permitting certain presumptions based on usual course of business).
- Applying Section 27 and principles of evidence, the Court observed that when a letter is properly addressed, prepaid, posted and registered, the usual presumption is that it was delivered in the ordinary course of post unless the contrary is proved.
- The Court held that the postal peon's endorsement "refused" is made in the usual course of the post office's business. Consequently, the endorsement itself is admissible to raise a presumption that the letter was tendered to the addressee and refused. The presumption of tender and refusal derives from the common course of business of the post office and from statutory presumptions under Sections 27 and 114 as applied via Section 16.
- The Court reviewed earlier authorities that were cited for the opposite view, treating some of the remarks in those decisions as obiter or of limited assistance (for example, Govind Chandra) and distinguishing others on the ground that they pre-dated Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The Court found controlling authority and consistent reasoning in a number of decisions (Mohan Lal, Sher Afzal, Raunaq Ram, Nirmalabala Debi, Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen and Baluram Ramkissen) that endorse the presumption.
- The Court emphasized that the presumption is one of fact and rebuttable, not conclusive; the appellant remains free to rebut it by evidence.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court answered the first referred question in the affirmative: where a properly addressed registered letter, postage prepaid, is returned with a postal endorsement "refused" (Inkariwala hai), a presumption arises that the letter was refused and that the notice was tendered to the addressee. The presumption is rebuttable.
The second referred question was rendered unnecessary because it only arises if the answer to the first question had been in the negative.
Disposition of the petition seeking inclusion of subsequent events and other relief:
The Court held it could not consider events or documents occurring after the Tribunal's dismissal order because those matters did not arise out of the Tribunal's Section 33(4) order, and accordingly refused to direct the Tribunal to include those matters in the statement. The petition asking, in substance, for such inclusion (and the related attempt to invoke Article 227) was dismissed. The Court noted respondents had no notice of the fresh case raised in argument and left the assessee free to present a fresh application if so advised. No order as to costs was made.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Tribunal's practice of treating a postal endorsement "refused" on a returned registered cover as giving rise to a presumption of service is upheld (subject to rebuttal). The assessee's attempt, on this reference, to have subsequent events added to the stated case was rejected.
- Procedural consequence: The High Court's jurisdiction on a Section 66(1) reference is limited strictly to questions of law arising out of the Tribunal's order under Section 33(4); subsequent events that occurred after that order are outside the scope of such a reference and cannot be included in the paper book by direction of the High Court under Section 66(4).
- On precedent: The Court based its conclusion on existing statutory provisions and earlier authority; the opinion applies those principles to the facts but does not purport to state the creation of any novel legal rule beyond the application of those authorities. (The Court explicitly described the presumption as rebuttable.)
This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning contained in the provided opinion; no external facts or inferences beyond the text have been introduced.
1. This is a reference by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act for determination of the following question :--
"(i) Where a properly addressed registered letter, postage prepaid, -is returned by the post office with ah endorsement by a postman 'Inkariwala hai' (in the category of refusal), does a presumption arise of due service of the letter on the addressee? and, following as a corollary,
(ii) If the answer to the above question is in the negative, whether the order of the Tribunal, dismissing the appeal for default, is not liable to be recalled on the ground that it is null, as the appellant had not been given an opportunity of being heard in support of his appeal?"
2. The facts giving rise to the reference are:--
The petitioner Balbhadhar Mal Kuthiala preferred an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal against an assessment of the year 1945-46. The appeal was submitted by post and it reached the Tribunal on 6th June, 1949. The appeal was fixed for hearing for 6th December, 1949, and a notice thereof was issued to the petitioner at his Simla address, as given in the memorandum of appeal, by registered post prepaid and acknowledgment due. The registered letter was delivered to the post office on 28th October, 1949. The addressee being not available in Simla, the post office there redirected the letter to Kuthiala House, Hoshiarpur. The postal authorities at Hoshiarpur returned the cover to the office of posting with an endorsement in pencil 'Inkariwala hai' (refuses to accept), presumably made by the postal peon. On 6th December. 1949, when the appeal was called for hearing, no one was present on behalf of the appellant. On 13th December, 1949, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal with the following order :--
"A notice fixing the hearing of assessee's appeal for (5th December 1949 was issued by the office on 27th October 1949. The notice was issued to the assesses under Registered Post Acknowledgment due, it was returned by the Post Office with the remarks that the addressee refused to receive the service of the notice. This refusal is tantamount to a service. Nobody was present on the date of the hearing. The appeal, is therefore, dismissed for default of appellant's appearance."
Information of this order reached the assessee on 7th February, 1950. On 13th February, he submitted an application to the Tribunal for restoration of his appeal and for its decision after affording an opportunity to him of being heard in support of the contentions raised in the appeal. This application was accompanied by an affidavit of the petitioner stating that no registered letter purporting to be from the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was ever presented to him by the postal authorities and that he had never refused to accept the same. The Tribunal rejected the application, vide their order dated 27th October, 1950, mainly on the ground that the Tribunal had no inherent power of reviewing or setting aside their own order.
3. Simultanebusly, the petitioner had presented another application to the Tribunal under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act praying that a statement of the case be drawn up and the following questions referred for determination of the High Court:--
(i) Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the order of dismissal of the case preferred by the appellant, in limine is an order valid in law?
(ii) Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was in law justified to draw the conclusive inference that the notice, of hearing was in fact served upon the assessee?
(iii) Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal did give in law a real opportunity to the appellant of being heard?
The Appellate Tribunal accepted this application, but confined the reference to the questions reproduced above. The assessee wanted that the draft statement should also include a reference to his haying made a miscellaneous application for setting aside the Tribunal's order dated 6-12-1949, to his filing an affidavit denying that the notice was tendered to or refused by him and to the order of the Tribunal rejecting the application. This prayer of the assessee was refused on the ground that these were events which happened subsequent to the Tribunal's order, and no question relating to them could he said to arise out of that order.
4. These subsequent events and the facts relating thereto were stated by the assessee in a petition under Section 66 (4) of the Income Tax Act read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, presented to this Court on 12th May, 1952.
5. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel for the assessee, contends that this Court while answering the questions should take regard of the events that subsequently happened and take into consideration the documents relating thereto. It is further submitted that the Appellate Tribunal be required to state the case including the subsequent events and refer it, under Sub-sections (2) or (4) of Section 66. Now, it is a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of the High Court, which is only advisory and a limited one, is confined to the determination of the questions raised and referred by the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court cannot raise arid start determining any question which has not been referred either under Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 66.
The section makes it further clear that reference can only be made with respect to a question of law which arises out of an order of the Appellate Tribunal under Sub-section (4) of Section 33 of the Act. No reference would, therefore, be permissible from an order of the Tribunal made under any other provision of law or in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar, (1953) 23 ITR 180: (AIR 1953 SC 118) (A) it was held that the jurisdiction of Tribunal and of the High Court, under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 66, is conditional on there being an order by the Appellate Tribunal which may be said to be one under Section 33 (4) and a question of law arising out of such an order.
It was further observed that if the question of law arises out of an order made by the Tribunal on any miscellaneous application, which "does not clearly fall within the four corners of Section 33(4) but purports to have been made in exercise of what it regarded as its inherent powers, then the Appellate Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 66 to refer a case, nor would the High Court have jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of that section to direct the Tribunal to ,do so.
6. Under Sub-section (4) to Section 66, the High Court may refer the case back to the Appellate Tribunal to make additions thereto or alterations therein, if the Court is satisfied that the statements in the case referred are not sufficient to enable it to determine the question raised by the Tribunal. Here again, no new questions can be raised or are required to be raised. The case can be sent back for clarification of the statement or filling up any lacuna that may be found therein, but this ought to be with a view, to enable the High Court to determine the questions that have actually been raised. No such flaw is shown to exist in the present case. The statement does not appear to be in any way incomplete or wanting in the narration of material facts 'necessary for the determination of the questions raised therein.
7. Section 66(4) has no application to a case where the Appellate Tribunal states a case with regard to certain Questions of law but refuses to state a case with regard to some other questions which the assessee or the Commissioner, as the case may be, wants to raise. For this purpose the assessee or the Commissioner can only make an application to the High Court under Sub-section (2) to Section 66. No such application has been presented by the assessee in this case. Moreover, as already observed, the questions of law which can be raised under Section 66 are those and those alone which arise out of an order of the Appellate Tribunal under Section 33 (4).
8. Evidently, therefore, I am here to answer only those questions which have actually been referred and not to raise and determine any new or additional questions. The events that took place after the order of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal under Section 33 (4) cannot be gone into or taken into consideration. As a matter of fact, the documents relating thereto should not have been included in the paper book.
The Tribunal had refused to include in the statement any reference to the assessee's application for restoration of the appeal, his affidavit in support of the facts stated in the application and the order of the Tribunal dismissing that application. In Purshottam Laxmidas v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City, 1956-30 ITR 143; (AIR 1956 Bom 505) (B). it was held that the paper book in a case referred to the High Court under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act can only consist of the statement of the case and the documents which the Tribunal considers should be included in the paper book and that the assessee has no right to incorporate in the paper book a document with regard to which the Tribunal refuses to give its permission for being so included. The subsequent events or the documents relating thereto cannot, therefore, be taken into consideration, nor can any decision be based thereon.
9. Let me now proceed to consider the questions referred by the Tribunal.
10. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act lays down :--
"27. Meaning of service by post. -- Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression 'serve' or either of the expressions 'give' or 'send' or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would bo delivered in the ordinary course of post."
Section 63 the Indian Income-tax Act provides that a notice or requisition under the Act may be served on the person therein named either by post or, as if it were a summons issued by a Court, under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908. It means that where, the Income Tax authorities choose to serve the requisition by post, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post the letter containing the requisition.
11. Under Section 16 of the Evidence Act, to prove that an act has been, done it is admissible to prove any general course of business or office according to which it would normally have been done, there being a probability that the general course was followed in the particular case. Thus, where the question is whether a particular letter reached A, the facts that it was posted in due course and was not returned through the dead-letter office are relevant (Illustration (b) to Section 16).
12. According to Section 114, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The Court may thus presume that the common course of business or of any office has been followed in the particular case. The presumption of the course of business having been followed is specially strong in the case of public offices, e.g., the post office.
13. Mr. Mahajan contends that the presumption of service arises only in cases where the letter sent by post is not returned by the postal authorities as undelivered, but where it is so returned, for whatsoever reason, there is a direct and self-evident proof of the fact that the letter was not delivered. According to him, the report of the postman that the addressee had refused to accept the letter cannot be taken notice of or admitted into evidence without formal proof, and there would be no presumption of service in such a case. Reliance is being placed upon Govind Chandra v. Dwarka Nath, 19 Cal W.N. 489 : (AIR 1915 Cal 313) C. Jagan-nath v. J. E. Sassoon, ILR 18 Bom 606 (D) and Butto Kristo Roy v. Gobindaram AIR 1939 Pat 540 (E). I do not see any force in the contention.
14. The presumption equally attaches to the postal peon's report 'refused', because the report is made in the usual course of business and it is open to the Court to presume that the usual course was followed in the particular case. When a letter is duly addressed and posted, particularly when it is also registered, the presumption is that the postman did tender the letter to the addressee. The fact that the letter came back does not in itself rebut the presumption that it was tendered. The writing of endorsement 'refused' 'falls within the ambit of 'common course of business' of the postman and, therefore, even without any formal proof, involves the presumption that it was written on a refusal by the addressee. There is ample authority in support of this view.
15. Mohan Lalv. Sundar Lal Nand Lal AIR 1949 EP 295 (F) is a decision of my Lord the Chief Justice in which it was held that when a registered letter addressed to a person is recei-ved back with the remark 'refused' a presumption arises that the letter was refused by such person himself even though the word 'refused' is not proved to be in his handwriting. A similar view was taken by Zafar Ali J. in Sher Afzal v. Mohan Lal AIR 1926 Lah 520 (G) and by Addison J. in Raunaq Ram v. Prabh Dayal AIR 1930 Lah 439 (H) and it was observed that where a notice sent by post in a registered cover is returned by the postman with a note that the addressee refused to receive it, and the posting of the notice has been proved, there arises a presumption under Section 114 Evidence Act that the addressee did refuse to receive it.
16. In Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U. P. Lueknow 1952-22 ITR 104: (AIR 1952 All 857) (I) a notice fixing the date of hearing of the appeal wag sent to the appellant by the Appellate Tribunal by registered post at the address given by him for service. The notice came back with the endorsement by the postal authorities as 'refused'. The Tribunal thereupon dismissed the appeal for default. On an application by the assessee under Section 66 (1) of the Income Tax Act, one of the questions referred to the High Court was
"Whether the mere endorsement of 'refusal' to accept the service of the notice of hearing of the appeal made by the postal authorities was sufficient in the eye of law to justify the presumption of service of the notice on the applicant."
The question was answered in the affirmative and it was held that the mere endorsement of 'refusal' made by the postal authorities was sufficient in the eye of law to justify the presumption of service of the notice on the appellant.
17. Certain obiter remarks made in the course of the decision in 19 Cal WN 489: (AIR.' 1915 Cal 313) (C) no doubt, support Mr. Maha-jan's contention that the endorsement of 'refusal' is required to be proved and that a letter returned by the postal authorities as having been refused does not justify the presumption that the refusal was made by the addressee. The dispute in the case was confined to the particular date on which the notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served upon the defendant, and the ultimate decision was that the endorsement of refusal made by the postal authorities on the cover was not admissible in evidence in proof of the allegation that the cover was tendered to and refused by the addressee on the date of the endorsement. The case thus contains no final decision that the endorsement, such as it was, could not be taken into consideration, unless the postman was examined.
18. Directly, the matter came up for decision of the same Court in Nirmalabala Debi v. Provat Kumar Basu. 52 Cal WN 659 (J). Reliance on 19 Cal WN 489: (AIR 1915 Cal 313) (C) was placed in support of the contention that since the registered letter' had come back, the presumption that it had been delivered in due course to the addressee was rebutted and since the postman had not been examined to prove the endorsement of refusal, there was no evidence that the letter had been tendered to the addressee. The argument was not accepted by Chakravartti, J. and it was held that where a notice addressed to a person and sent by registered post is returned to the sender with an endorsement 'refused' made by the postman, the notice would be presumed to have been duly served upon the addressee without the examination of the postman or other evidence regarding tender and refusal.
19. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Mahajan, ILR 18 Bom 606 (D) was given before Section 27 of the General Clauses Act was enacted and is, therefore, not of much assistance. A contrary view was, however, taken by the same Court in Aga Gulam Husain v. A. D. Sassoon ILR 21 Bom 413 at p. 418 (K) and again in Baluram Ramkissen v. Eai Pannabai ILR 35 Bom 213 (L). In this last case a summons of Order 5 rule 25 CPC and the cover was sent by registered post addressed to the defendant in accordance with the provisions returned with the endorsement 'refused to take' it was held that as it appeared' that the cover was properly addressed to the defendant and had been registered, duly stamped and posted, the Court'was entitled to draw the inference indicated in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and to hold that there was sufficient service.
20. The decision in AIR 1939 Pat 540 (E) cannot be regarded as an authority for the contrary view, because it simply follows the above quoted remarks in 19 Cal WN 489: (AIR 1915 Cal 313) (C) and contains no independent discussion. Moreover, in this case also, the point was not material for the final decision of the case. This is apparent from the following observation of Chatterji, J. at page 547 -
"But even assuming that this notice was served on the plaintiffs, it does not improve the defendants' position at all."
21. For the reasons already stated. I am if the view that where a properly addressed registered letter is received back with the endorsement 'refused' made by the postman, the letter may be presumed to have been refused by the addressee, even without examination of the postman or other evidence regarding tender and refusal. Undoubtedly, the presumption is one of fact and rebuttable, it can never be regarded as conclusive. I would, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative. The second Question could arise only if answer to the first had been in the negative.
22. Mr. Mahajan lastly submits that the order of the Tribunal dated 27th October, 1950 refusing to restore the appeal dismissed for de-fault be quashed in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is argued that the order was based on the wrong notion that the Appellate Tribunal had no inherent power of reviewing their own order and restoring the appeal dismissed for default and that the Tribunal had, therefore, refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. The matter, in my opinion, cannot be gone into because of there being no proper petition before us in this connection. In the application dated 12th December 1952 with the heading
"Petition under Section 66C4) of Indian, Income Tax Act read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India", the relief claimed is stated as follows:--
"....... that the statement of case submitted by the Appellate Tribunal be referred hack to them with the direction that a reference to the Miscellaneous application aforesaid and the Tribunal's order thereon be included in the statement of case which should be returned to this Hon'ble Court with those additions thereto and the documents referred to in para 11 above."The respondents, therefore, have had no notice of the fresh case sought to be made out by the assessee during arguments. The assessee may, if so advised, present a fresh application for the purpose. This application of his stands dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case no order is made as to costs.
Bhandari, C.J.
23. I agree.
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