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Kesar Devi v. Nanak Singh .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Oct 29, 1957
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Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment disposes of Civil Revision No. 518‑D of 1956. The revision was directed against an interlocutory order dated 26 November 1956 of the Subordinate Judge, 11th Class, Delhi, which rejected a defence plea by the defendant (the petitioner) that section 16 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 ("the Act") was ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1) of the Constitution of India.

Procedural posture: Along with the revision, the petitioner sought withdrawal of the case to this Court under Article 228 of the Constitution for determination of the constitutional question.

Factual background (as stated in the opinion): On 31 January 1956 the defendant purchased the house in dispute. The plaintiff, Nanak Singh (the respondent here), instituted a suit for pre‑emption of that sale. The plaintiff's pleaded grounds for claiming the right of pre‑emption were:

  • That he was a co‑sharer of the vendors in parts of the property sold (staircase, courtyard, deorhi, entrance, chabutra and latrines).
  • That the sale concerned property having a staircase common to property owned by him.
  • That the sale concerned property having an entrance from a street common with property owned by him.
  • That the plaintiff's property and the property purchased by the defendant were contiguous.

At trial the learned Judge relied on earlier authorities and upheld section 16 against the defendant's plea. The present revision challenges that interlocutory ruling and seeks constitutional determination under Article 228. The Court below and the parties addressed whether section 16 is constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 16 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution (i.e., whether the statutory classification between agricultural/village immovable property and urban immovable property, and corresponding lists of persons entitled to pre‑emption, is constitutionally permissible).
  2. Whether section 16 of the Act, insofar as it creates a right of pre‑emption in favour of persons who own immovable property contiguous to the property sold (the "sixthly" clause), infringes Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and is therefore invalid.
  3. Whether the statutory right of pre‑emption created by section 16 amounts to a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) (the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property), and if so, whether it falls within the scope of Article 19(5).
  4. Ancillary: whether the Court should withdraw the case to this Court under Article 228 for a definitive ruling on the constitutional questions raised.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's / Defendant's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that section 16 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act was ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
  • The petitioner urged that a discriminatory situation arose because, by section 189 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (Delhi Act No. VIII of 1954), the right of pre‑emption as regards agricultural land had been abolished in Delhi; maintaining a right of pre‑emption in respect of urban immovable property therefore constituted unjustifiable discrimination violative of Article 14.
  • The petitioner also relied on section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, arguing that custom (the basis for the pre‑emption right under section 7 of the Act) had been largely abolished under that Act in relation to Hindu law; to preserve a customary‑based pre‑emption right for urban property but not for other matters involving Hindu law was said to be discriminatory.

Respondent's / Plaintiff's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's or plaintiff's separate legal arguments beyond the plaintiff's pleaded factual grounds for pre‑emption listed in the factual background.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Uttam Singh v. Kartar Singh (A.I.R. 1954 Pb. 55 F.B.; earlier reported 1885 7 All. 775) Decision relating to the right of pre‑emption with regard to agricultural land; used by trial judge. Court observed the first case relates to agricultural land and has no application to the present dispute over urban immovable property.
Oudh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 417) Authority relied upon by the trial judge in determining validity of pre‑emption provisions. Court noted that although the decision was given after the Constitution, the suit in that case had been decided by the trial judge long before the Constitution came into force; the Court held that case has no application to the present facts (suit and sale both post‑Constitution).
Punjab State v. Inder Singh (A.I.R. 1953 Pb. 20) Identification/enumeration of objects of the law of pre‑emption in regard to agricultural land and village immovable property. Court relied on this authority (together with Uttam Singh) to list five objects of pre‑emption for agricultural/village land and to support the view that classification between agricultural/village and urban property is rooted in differing objectives.
Govind (Gobind) Dayal v. Inayatullah (1956 S.C. 479) Judicial statement of the objects of the right of pre‑emption in relation to urban immovable property (quiet enjoyment; prevention of intrusion of strangers) and the consequences of intrusion. Court used Mahmood J.'s articulation of the objects and consequences (disturbance of domestic comfort, possible breach of peace) to assess whether statutory restrictions are reasonable under Article 19(5) as being in the interest of the general public.
Bidi Supply Company v. Union of India (citation in text: "136 P.R 1894") Criterion for acceptable legislative classification (intelligible differentia having rational relation to the object sought to be achieved). Court applied the criterion from this authority to uphold the classification in the Act between agricultural/village immovable property (section 15) and urban immovable property (section 16) as meeting the constitutional test under Article 14.
Panch Gujar Gaur Brahmans v. Amar Singh (A.I.R. 1954 Raj. 100) Held that right of pre‑emption based on vicinage/contiguity is void as infringing Article 19(1)(f). Court cited this and several similar regional decisions in support of the conclusion that a right of pre‑emption founded on mere contiguity (vicinage) is not a reasonable restriction under Article 19(5) and is therefore void under Article 19(1)(f).
Siremal v. Kantilal (A.I.R. 1954 Raj. [1956?]) Regional authority holding pre‑emption based on contiguity invalid under Article 19(1)(f). Used with other regional decisions to support the proposition that vicinage‑based pre‑emption is unconstitutional.
Shankerlal v. Poonamchand (A.I.R. 1954 Raj. 231) Regional decision addressing validity of vicinage/contiguity based pre‑emption rights. Relied upon as consistent authority that contiguity‑based pre‑emption infringes Article 19(1)(f).
Rangnath v. Baburao (A.I.R. 1956 Hyd. 120) Another regional decision treating vicinage/contiguity based pre‑emption as invalid under Article 19(1)(f). Cited in conjunction with the other regional authorities supporting invalidity of the sixth clause of section 16.
Babulal v. Gowardhan Das (A.I.R. 1956 Madhya Bharat 1) Regional authority addressing vicinage/contiguity pre‑emption and Article 19. Cited with other similar authorities to affirm that contiguity‑based pre‑emption is not a reasonable restriction under Article 19(5).
Dhani Nuth v. Budhu (Sir Meredyth Plowden; cited in text) Historical authority noted for the proposition that the owner of land subject to a right of pre‑emption is restricted in his freedom to transfer. Cited to show that a right of pre‑emption imposes restrictions on vendor's liberty to transfer and on vendee's right to acquire; used to frame Article 19 analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured manner addressing Article 14 and Article 19 challenges separately and applying the authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Classification and Article 14:
    • The Act distinguishes between agricultural/village immovable property (covered by section 15) and urban immovable property (covered by section 16). The court emphasised that these two classes rest on different bases and considerations (different objects of pre‑emption), and thus each section provides a distinct list of persons entitled to pre‑emption in preferential order.
    • The court enumerated five objects of pre‑emption for agricultural/village land (preserving village community integrity; implementing agnatic theory; avoiding fragmentation; reducing litigation/friction and promoting public order/domestic comfort; meeting needs of particular society at particular stage) drawing on Punjab State v. Inder Singh and Uttam Singh v. Kartar Singh.
    • For urban immovable property, the court relied on Mahmood J.'s formulation in Govind Dayal v. Inayatullah: the objects are quiet enjoyment by the pre‑emptor and prevention of intrusion of strangers to avoid inconvenience or disturbance.
    • Applying the test from Bidi Supply Company v. Union of India, the court found that the classification is based on an intelligible differentia which has a rational relation to the objects of the right of pre‑emption for each category. Consequently, neither section 15 nor section 16 is vulnerable to attack under Article 14 on the basis of that classification per se.
    • The court rejected the petitioner's contention that the abolition of pre‑emption for agricultural land under section 189 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (1954) created an unconstitutional discrimination: the court found that any distinction pre‑dated that provision and was rooted in the intelligible differentia already discussed; therefore the contention had no force.
    • The court likewise rejected the argument that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (section 4) produced an unconstitutional discrimination by abolishing custom in Hindu law: the court noted that the Hindu Succession Act does not abolish custom in the abstract and that rules of custom vary by subject, locality and tribe; moreover, section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act itself recognises preferential rights in certain situations. On that basis the court found no Article 14 violation from the continuation of a custom‑based pre‑emption right for urban immovable property under the Act.
  2. Article 19(1)(f) and Article 19(5):
    • The court accepted that a right of pre‑emption restricts the owner's freedom to dispose and the vendee's freedom to acquire property, thereby engaging Article 19(1)(f).
    • Under Article 19(5) the question is whether such restrictions are "reasonable" and in the interests of the general public. The court evaluated whether the restriction serves public order, convenience or is otherwise reasonable.
    • Applying the objects of urban pre‑emption (quiet enjoyment and prevention of intrusion) and Mahmood J.'s observation that intrusion may disturb domestic comfort and possibly public peace, the court found that the restrictions serving those objectives are in the interest of the general public and can be reasonable under Article 19(5).
    • Section 16 was parsed clause by clause. The first five classes (cosharers; owners of building/site; owners where staircase is common; owners where entrance is common; owners of dominant/servient tenements) concern persons who jointly use part or whole of the property or whose rights arise from shared use; intrusion by a stranger in these circumstances can produce inconvenience, disturbance or breach of the peace. Consequently the restrictions embodied in those clauses are reasonable and saved by Article 19(5).
    • By contrast, the sixth class (persons who own immovable property contiguous to the property sold) rests on contiguity/vicinage alone: such persons hold their properties independently and the sale of contiguous property does not, according to the court's analysis, directly or immediately interfere with quiet enjoyment or privacy, nor does it present a clear basis for breach of the peace. Therefore a pre‑emption right grounded solely on contiguity does not secure the stated public objects and cannot be considered a reasonable restriction under Article 19(5). Thus the sixthly clause was held to infringe Article 19(1)(f).
  3. Outcome of Article 228 application:
    • The Article 228 petition for withdrawal to this Court for determination of the constitutional question was addressed and disposed of in the course of the judgment; the record was to be sent back to the trial court for disposal according to the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that section 16 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 is partly valid and partly invalid: the right of pre‑emption claimed under clause "sixthly" (in favour of owners of immovable property contiguous to the property sold) is inconsistent with Article 19(1)(f) and cannot be enforced; the rights of pre‑emption based on the remaining five clauses of section 16 are not in contravention of Article 19 and are enforceable.

Implications and consequences:

  • The interlocutory order of the trial court is interfered with only to the extent necessary to declare that the sixthly clause of section 16 is void as infringing Article 19(1)(f); the remaining clauses of section 16 remain valid and may be enforced by persons entitled under those clauses.
  • The Article 228 application was disposed of accordingly and the record was ordered to be sent back to the trial court for further proceedings in conformity with this judgment and according to law.
  • The opinion does not assert that it has established a new broad precedent beyond the specific constitutional determinations stated; it applies existing authorities to uphold the classification under Article 14 and to invalidate the vicinage/contiguity‑based right under Article 19(1)(f).

Disposition: Order accordingly (Falshaw, J. agreed).

Show all summary ...

Mehar Singh, J.:— This judgment will dispose of Civil Revision No. 518-D of 1956, against the order, dated November 26, 1956, of the Subordinate Judge, 11 Class, of Delhi, rejecting a plea in defence by the defendant, who is the petitioner, that section 16 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), is ultra vires the provisions of the Articles 14 and 19(1) of the Constitution of India and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1224-1) of 1956 under Article 228 of the Constitution of India for withdrawal of the case from the trial Court for determination of the question of law as to the interpretation of the said Articles of the Constitution.

2. On January 31, 1956, the defendant purchased the house in suit and Nanak Singh Plaintiff, who is the respondent in this Court in both the cases, has brought a suit to pre-emption that sale on the ground:—

(1) That he is a co-sharer of the vendors in a part of the property sold, that is, in the stair case, the courtyard, deorhi, entrance, chabutra and latrines.

(2) That the sale is of a, property having a stair case common to the property owned by him.

(3) That the sale is of a property having an entrance from a street common with the property owned by him.

(4) That the property owned by him and the property purchased by the defendant are contignous.

3. That defendant has taken a number of defences to the suit and the one defence that is for consideration in these petitions is whether section 16 of the Act is ultra vires of the provisions of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The learned trial judge has, relying on Uttam Singh v. Kartar Singh . A.I.R 1954 Pb 55 F.B. and Oudh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria . A.I.R 1954 S.C 417., decided this question against the defendant. It is against that interlocutory order that the revision petition is directed and the petition under Article 228 of the Constitution is, as pointed out, for withdrawal of the case to this Court and for determination of the said question. The first of the two cases relied upon by the learned trial judge relates to the right of pre-emption with regard to agricultural land and obviously has no application in the present case. In the second case, though the decision has been given after the Constitution; the suit had actually been decided by the trial Judge long before the Constitution came into force. Even that case has no application to the facts of the present case, in which not only the suit has been instituted after the Constitution but even the sale was executed after that.

4. The suit relates to urban immoveable property, which is a house. In the Act, although right of pre-emption in regard to agricultural land or village immoveable property or urban immoveable property is dealt with in section 4, but section 15 provides for the persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in respect of sales of agricultural land and village immoveable property and section 16 relates to persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in regard to urban immoveable property. Those two sections proceed on entirely different basis and considerations and therefore, each provides a separate list of persons entitled to enforce a right of pre-emption in the preferential order stated in the section. The Act has made classification on the basis of agricultural land and village immovtable property as a separate subject matter falling within the scope of section 15 and the urban immoveable property falling within the scope of section 6. The classification is intelligible in this that the basis for the right of preemption in the former case is different from the basis of the right of pre-emption in the latter case. In the Punjab State v. Inder Singh . A.I.R 1953 Pb. 20., and Uttam Singh v. Kartar Singh . 1885 7 All. 775. the following five objects of the law of pre-emption, in so far as it relates to agricultural land and village immovtable property, have been enumerated:—

(1) To preserve the integrity of the village community.

(2) To implement the agnatic theory of law.

(3) To avoid fragmentation of holdings.

(4) To reduce the chances of litigation and friction and to promote public order and domestic comfort.

(5) To meet the needs of a particular society at a particular stage of the evolution.

5. In Govind Dayal v. Inayatullah . 1956 S.C 479., at pages 787, 799, 801 and 803 Mahmoud J. has pointed out that the objects of the right of preemption in regard to urban immoveable property are:—

(a) the quit enjoyment of his own immoveable property by the pre-emptor, and

(b) the prevention of intrusion of strangers to obviate inconvenience or disturbance which would arise by their introduction.

6. As the objects to be secured by the right of pre-emption in regard to either class of property are not the same, the legislature has proceeded on the classification of the properties as above giving in each case a separate list of persons who are according to law, entitled to enforce a right of pre-emption in preference to each other and in preference to as ranger. It is clear the classification is based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes has one type of property from other type of property and further that the differentia has a rational relation to the objects behind the right of pre-emption with regard to each type of property in as much as the right is secured to a set of persons in each case having regard to the subject underlying the right. This classification fulfills the criterion laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bidi Supply Company v. Union of India . 136 P.R 1894.. So that upon the basis of this classification provisions neither of section 15 nor of section 16 can be impugned as being ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. But the learned counsel for the petitioner urges that in Delhi State by section 189 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (Delhi Act No. VIII of 1954 right of pre-emption with regard to agricultural land has been abolished and he contends that to upheld such a right in regard to urban immoveable property in these circumstances, is in contravention of Article 14, for he considers that there is an unjustifiable discrimination between urban immoveable property and what might be described as non-urban immoveable property in as much as right of pre-emption is left in-tact in regard to the former class of properties whereas it has been abolished in regard to the latter class of properties. The argument is not sound for the simple reason that classification or discrimination has not resulted on account of section 189 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 but it already existed in the Act itself and it has been based on intelligible differentia which has reasonable relation to the object of the right conferred by the statute. It has not been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is any questionable discrimination in the application of the provisions of section 16 to the same class of properties to which it applies. This contention on behalf of the petitioner has no force. The right of pre-emption in regard to urban immoveable property is a right, according to section 7 of the Act, based on custom. The learned counsel for the petitioner refers to section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act (Act No. XXX of 1956) and points out that by that section custom, in so far as it concerns Hindu Law, has mostly been abolished and to maintain a right of pre-emption according to custom under the Act would be to apply custom with a discrimination in this that while it continues to apply in the case of right of pre-emption to urban immoveable property, it has practically ceased to apply to the subjects covered by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The last named Act does not purport to abolish custom in the abstract, it only abolished custom, subject to its own provisions, in so far as Hindu Law is concerned. This does not create any discrimination in the application of custom in circumstances exactly similar. Rules of custom were not only according to the subject matter to which they apply but also according to the locality and the tribe. If custom with regard to one aspect of Law is abolished that does not mean that its continuance with regard to the other aspect if Law is a discrimination that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 14. Asa matter of fact, in so far as the question of the right of pre-emption is concerned, even in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, section 22 provides for preferential right to acquire property in certain cases so that the very Act upon which the learned counsel places reliance gives recognition to a statutory right of pre-emption and the right of pre-emption in regard to urban immoveable property under the Act is also a statutory right of pre-emption though it is based on the proof of custom as to the existence of the right. This argument based on section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, does not in the least show that there is any contravention of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution because the right of pre-emption under the Act in regard to urban immoveable property still continues to exist. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, relates to a subject matter which is obviously quite different from the subject with which the Act deals. So even this contention on behalf of the petitioner has no substance.

7. It has then been strenously urged that right of pre-emption is a restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioner to acquire, hold and dispose of property within the scope of article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. There is no doubt that right of pre-emption operates as a restriction upon the right of the owner of the property to dispose of the same and at the some time it operates adversely to the vendee's right to acquire such property. In Dhani Nuth v. Budhu. Sir Meredyth Plowden pointed out at page 511, that the owner of land, subject to the right of pre-emption, is restricted in the claim of the pre-emptor and he is not at full liberty to transfer to whom ??? please. Similarly in Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah, at page 805, Mahmood J. also refers to the restrictions or qualifications, because of the rights of pre-emption operating in derogation of the vendor's absolute right to sell his property. It is obvious that the right of pre-emption restricts the rights of the owner to dispose of his property as he pleases and the rights of the vendee to acquire the property. Article 19 of the Constitution is immediately attracted, but according to sub-article (5) of that very Article what is to be seen is whether those restrictions are reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property within the scope of Article 19(5). It has already been pointed out that in Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah, Mahmood J. has referred to the objects behind the right of pre-emption in regard to urban immovable property.

8. Those objects are:—

(1) securing of quiet enjoyment of his own property by the pre-emptor, and

(2) exclusion of strangers to obviate the inconvenience or disturbance which would arise by their introduction.

9. The learned Judge further points out at page 814 the consequences of such intrusion or introduction of a stranger. He observes:—

“The intrusion of a stranger as a cosharer must not only give rise to inconvenience, but disturb domestic comfort,

if not, as in some cases, lead to breach of the public peace.”

10. A restriction placed to secure such objects and to avoid, such consequences appears to me to be on the face of it a restriction in the interests of the general public and consequently within the scope of sub-article (5) of Article 19. Section 16 of the Act provides:—

“16. The right of pre-emption in respect of urban immoveable property shall vest—

FIRSTLY, in the cosharers in such property, if any,

SECONDLY, where the sale is of the site of the building or other structure, in the owners of such building or structure,

THIRDLY, where the sale is of a property having a staircase common to other properties, in the owners of such properties,

FOURTHLY, where the sale is of property having a common entrance from the street with other properties, in the owners of such properties,

FIFTHLY where the sale is of a servient property, in the owners of the dominant property and vice versa,

SIXTHLY, in the persons who own immoveable property contiguous to the property sold.

11. The section actually deals with two classes of persons. The first class of persons dealt with are those who jointly use part or whole of the property and the second class is of persons who hold their property independently but claim the right on the ground of contiguity. In the first class of persons preference is given to coshareis and the others come according to the importance of the use of the property by them. But one thing is clear that in this class intrusion or introduction of a stranger would lead to the same consequences as pointed out by Mahmoed J. whether the pre-emptor is a cosharer or belongs to any other category in this class. The reason is the fact that the property is in common use of the pre-emptor and the vendor, whether as a whole or only in part, and the introduction of a stranger in such property would more often than not lead not merely to inconvenience but to breach of the peace. Thus the provisions of section 16 with regard to first five classes of persons, who are entitled to enforce a right of preemption in regard to urban immoveable property, provide a reasonable restriction on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and that is in the interest of general public. In their cases the restriction being reasonable, the provisions of section 16 are saved by sub-article (5) of Article 19. Same consideration cannot apply to the sixth class of persons referred to in section 16 for their right is based not on any common use of the property but merely on the ground of continuity. Such persons occur or are in possession independently of their properties without interference by their adjoining or contiguous neighbour. So if property contiguous to them is sold then that does not directly or immediately interfere with their quiet enjoyment of their own property or their privacy. In such a case apparently there is no basis for any breach of the peace. Thus the right of pre-emption in their favour cannot be said to secure public order and to be in the interest of general public. In so far as this class of persons are concerned the restriction imposed by the right of pre-emption in their favour cannot be described a reasonable restriction within the scope of sub-article (5) of Article 19. It is in view of similar considerations that in Panch Gujar Gaur Brahmans v. Amar Singh . A.I.R 1954 Raj. 100., Siremal v. Kantilal . A.I.R 1954 Raj 1956., Shankerlal v. Poonamchand . A.I.R 1954 Raj. 231. Rangnath v. Baburao . A.I.R 1956 Hyd. 120. and Babulal v. Gowardhan Das . A.I.R 1956 Madhya Bharat 1., the learned Judges have consistently maintained that the right of pre-emption on the basis of vicinage or contiguity is void as infringing article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution but not so on the other grounds for those come within the scope of sub-article (5) of that Article. In consequence the order of the learned trial Judge under revision is interfered with only to this extent that the right of pre-emption claimed by the plaintiff, under clause ‘sixthly’ of section 16 of the Act is a right which is not consistent with the provisions of article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and as such can not be enforced, but right of preemption based on the remaining five clauses of that section is a right not in contravention of article 19 and it can be enforced by persons) referred to in those clauses. This also disposes of the petition under Article 228 of the Constitution and the record will now be sent back to the trial Court for disposal of the case in conformity with this judgment and according to law.

12. Falshaw, J.:— I agree.

13. Order accordingly.