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Chattar Singh v. State Of Punjab
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion addresses a rule petition directed against the State Government under Article 226 seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus concerning a contract entered into between the petitioner and the State. The contract was made on 12-12-1952, effective from 4-12-1952 to 3-12-1953, and included a clause (Clause 7) permitting the Government to cancel the contract at any time without assigning any reason or liability for compensation. The petitioner contended that the contract was terminated by executive action that was capricious and mala fide, resulting in a breach of fundamental rights under Article 14 of the Constitution, alleging discrimination and denial of the right to seek compensation in a court of law.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued under Article 226 to enforce or prevent breach of a contract entered into with the State Government.
- Whether Clause 7 of the contract, which permits unilateral termination by the State without compensation, violates the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 14 guaranteeing equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.
- Whether Article 226 can be invoked to prevent breach of contract or to enforce contractual obligations against the State.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The termination of the contract by the State was capricious and mala fide executive action.
- Clause 7 is discriminatory and deprives the petitioner of the right to seek judicial enforcement or compensation, violating Article 14.
- The action of the State resulted in breach of fundamental rights.
State Government's Arguments
- Article 226 is not intended to enforce contracts or prevent their breach.
- There is no prohibition in the Contract Act against the State contracting out of rights.
- No discrimination exists in the contract clause allowing unilateral termination.
- Citing English and Indian precedents, mandamus cannot be used to compel performance of contracts by public authorities.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ex parte Pering (1836) 111 E. Rule 1040 (A) | Mandamus cannot be granted to public boards to enforce contracts. | Supported the principle that mandamus is not a remedy to enforce contractual obligations against public authorities. |
| Dubar Goala v. Union of India, AIR 1952 Cal. 496 | Mandamus does not lie to enforce or restrain contractual obligations; contracts voluntarily entered into cannot be enforced by writ. | Reiterated that remedies for breach of contract lie in civil courts and not under Article 226. |
| Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Rly. Co., Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1951 Pat 231 | Article 226 should not be invoked where an alternative adequate remedy exists in civil courts for breach of contract. | Emphasized the extraordinary nature of writ jurisdiction and reluctance to interfere in contractual disputes with adequate civil remedies. |
| Earbier v. Connolly (1884) 113 US 27 | Upheld municipal order within police powers restricting hours of operation. | Court found this precedent inapplicable to the petitioner's case as it concerned police powers, not contractual rights. |
| Shelley v. Kraemer (1947) 334 US 1 | Contracts violating public policy (racial restrictions) are unenforceable. | Distinguished from the present case as no public policy violation was alleged here. |
| Naubat Ral v. Union of India, AIR 1953 PunJ 137 | Article 226 does not apply for obtaining declarations or enforcing contracts. | Supported the view that Article 226 is not a tool for enforcement of contracts or to prevent their breach. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the petitioner's claim that termination of the contract was discriminatory and violative of Article 14. It held that the contract clause permitting unilateral termination by the State without compensation did not amount to discrimination or breach of fundamental rights. The Court emphasized the principle that mandamus under Article 226 is not a remedy to enforce contractual obligations or to prevent their breach, especially when an alternative remedy exists in civil courts. The Court relied on established precedents from Indian and English jurisdictions underscoring that writ jurisdiction is extraordinary and should not be used to interfere in contractual disputes. The petitioner’s reliance on foreign cases concerning police powers and public policy violations was found inapplicable. Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s fundamental rights were not infringed and that the contract’s termination did not warrant interference under Article 226.
Holding and Implications
The petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged with costs.
The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner cannot invoke Article 226 to enforce the contract or prevent its breach by the State Government. The Court reaffirmed the principle that contractual disputes, even involving the State, must generally be resolved through ordinary civil remedies rather than writ jurisdiction. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding the limits of mandamus under Article 226.
1. This is a rule directed against the State Government under Article 226 to show cause why a writ of 'mandamus' should not be issued in regard to the contract entered into between the petitioner and the state.
2 The contract which is complained of was made on 12-12-1952, and was to begin from 4-12 1952, and was to continue up to 3-12-1953. In this agreement there is a clause (Clause 7) which gives to the Government the right to cancel the contract without assigning any reason and without their being liable for any compensation and this could be done at any moment. The submission of the petitioner is that his contract was put an end to "as a result of executive action which was capriciously taken and the action of the Government is 'mala fide' and that it has resulted in a breach of his fundamental right which he claims under Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Article 14 provides for equality before- the law and is in the following terms: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. According to the petitioner, the breach of fundamental right lies in this that Clause 7 is discriminatory and the provision contained therein deprives him of the right to go to a Court of law to enforce a suit for compensation and undue favour has been done to the person in whose favour the contract has now been made.
4. By way of preliminary objection the learned Advocate General has submitted that Article 226 is not meant to enforce contracts or to prevent the breach of those contracts. There is no provision in the Contract Act which prohibits contracting out by the State and in this particular case there is discrimination of any kind whatsoever. In support of his submission that in its supervisory jurisdiction this Court should not issue any order for the enforcement of a contract, he relies on an English judgment 'Ex parts Pering' (1836) 111 E. Rule 1040 (A). This was a suit in which the petitioner wanted to enforce his right under a patent and Littledale J. said:
"The claim seems to be in the nature of a quantum meruit for the use of the patent. We cannot giant the 'mandamus". Patteson J. observed.
"The claim, if valid, must be founded on a contract. But we cannot grant a 'mandamus' to a public board ordering them to carry a contract into effect."And Coleridge J. concurred:
5. Bose J. in -- 'Dubar Goala v. Union of India', AIR 1952 Cal. 496 (B), said at p. 498:
"It is an elementary proposition that a 'mandamus' does not lie to enforce or restrain the performance of a contractual obligation: -- 'P. K. Banerjee v. L. J. Simonds', AIR 1947 Cal. 30V at pp. 314-315 (C). Further it is inapproriate to grant a declaration in an application under Article 226 that a particular contract is illegal and therefore unenforceable because it contains a provision for 'begar' or forced labour. The petitioners have voluntarily entered into the contract. There is no suggestion that at the initial stage when they first came into contact with the Railway Contractor (opposite party No. 4) they were compelled to enter into the agreement under threat or duress. Even if the agreement had in fact been entered into under duress the remedy would be by an action and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is because the porters offered to undertake the work of a porter on the terms and conditions of a contract applicable to all porters of the same class that they have rendered themselves liable to do this work of two hours a day for the Railway. It is open to the petitioners to give up the work of railway porters and remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the railway administration or to cancel their obligation with the railway contractor. The very idea of a contract or agreement negatives any suggestion of forced labour."
The Patna High Court In -- 'Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Rly. Co., Ltd. v. State of Bihar', AIR 1951 Pat 231 (D), seemed to be of the same opinion. Das J. said at p. 241:
"None of those decisions are any authority for the proposition that a party who has entered into an agreement with another party can ask a superior Court for writ of 'mandamus' under Article 226 when illegally dispossessed by the latter party in breach of the agreement, instead of going to the ordinary Civil Court of competent jurisdiction for the necessary reliefs. I have great doubt if Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked in a case of this nature. The aggrieved party in this case can get an effectual and adequate remedy by an ordinary action in the Civil Court -- for enforcement of the agreement, for recovery of possession and damages, if any. The power to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is an extraordinary power, and in several recent decisions of this Court it has been held that where there is an alternative adequate remedy, this Court will be reluctant to exercise its powers under Article 226."
6. What counsel for the petitioner wishes me to do is that I should first embark on an inquiry and find out whether there is a breach of contract and then enforce it in my supervisory jurisdiction by directing the State not to break that contract and the chief ground that he gives for this is that thereby a breach of his fundamental right would be prevented. I cannot see what fundamental right arises in the case of a contract such as this. The contract was 'entered into between the State and the petitioner after tenders had been called and the petitioner's tender was accepted. I do not see that there is any kind of discrimination introduced in this case by the mere fact of there being a clause authorising the State to put an end to the contract between the State and the petitioner and making the contract with somebody else. Two judgments have been relied upon by Mr. D. D. Khanna. One is -- 'Earbier v. Connolly', (1884) 113 US 27 (E). That was a case of a laundry and the order made by the Municipal authorities was that no laundry should work between the hours of 10 in the night and 6 in the morning. This was upheld on the ground that this was within the police powers of the State. I cannot see how the observations of Field J. help the petitioner in this case. The other case relied upon by Mr. D. D. Khanna was from the district of Columbia, ---'Shelley v. Kraemer', (1947) 334 US 1 (P). That was a case where a contract had been entered into between two private parties and one of the restrictions in the contract was that the transferee shall be debarred from transferring the property to any Negro. This was held to be against public policy of the United states and therefore the Court refused to enforce this part of the contract. There is no such thing in the present case.
7. In this Court we have held in -- 'Naubat Ral v. Union Of India', AIR 1953 PunJ 137 (G) that provisions of Article 226 do not apply for getting a declaration. I cannot see how the provisions of that Article can be used for purposes of enforcement of a contract or to prevent a breach of contract. I am therefore of the opinion that this petition should be dismissed and I would therefore discharge the rule with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 75/-. Rule discharged.
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