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Sarup Singh And Another v. State Of Punjab And Others .
Judgment Summary: Gurdev Singh, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an election to the Market Committee, Makhu. Four candidates submitted nomination papers: petitioners Sarup Singh and Mehar Singh, and respondents Dr. Ranjit Singh and Avtar Singh (respondents 3 and 4). On the date of scrutiny (6th October, 1937) the Returning Officer rejected the nomination papers of both petitioners by identical orders stating:
“The certificate issued by Bahadur Singh President is not complete as it does not give the address of the candidate. Hence the papers are not valid and are rejected.”
Subsequently Avtar Singh withdrew and Dr. Ranjit Singh was declared elected unopposed. There was no provision for an election petition under the rules, and on 19th October, 1937 the two petitioners approached the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the Returning Officer's rejection of their nomination papers.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Returning Officer validly rejected the petitioners' nomination papers because the certificate of the President of the Co-operative Society did not include the candidate's address.
- Whether a joint writ petition by two persons whose nomination papers were individually rejected is competent (i.e., whether the two petitioners could maintain a single joint petition challenging separate, individual decisions).
- Whether Rule 35 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) Rules, 1961 — which makes the Deputy Commissioner the final authority in case of dispute regarding interpretation of the rules — ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 to entertain the petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (represented by Mr. Doabia)
- The defect relied on by the Returning Officer (omission of the candidate's address in the certificate issued by the President of the Co-operative Society) was of no consequence and did not invalidate the nomination papers.
- The certificate in question was not required to be appended to or endorsed on the nomination papers in the manner asserted by the Returning Officer; reliance was placed on rule 27 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) Rules, 1931 and the prescribed form (form 'P').
- When it was shown that the joint petition was not maintainable, Mr. Doabia requested that the Court exercise its discretion to treat the joint petition as if it had been filed solely on behalf of Sarup Singh.
Respondents' Arguments (represented by Mr. K.S. Nehra)
- Mr. Nehra defended the Returning Officer's order as valid and contended that the nomination papers were rightly rejected for lack of the candidate's address in the certificate.
- He advanced a preliminary objection that a joint petition by two persons with separate individual rights was not competent and cited authority (Vinod Kumar v. Municipal Committee Pathankot) to support that position.
- He further relied on rule 35 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) Rules, 1961, contending that the Deputy Commissioner is the final authority on disputes regarding rule interpretation and so the writ petition should not have been entertained by the Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vinod Kumar v. Municipal Committee Pathankot. 1967 69 P.L.R 909. | That the mere existence of a common question is not sufficient to justify a joint writ petition; joint petitions are not competent when orders affect individual rights of different persons. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that the joint petition by the two petitioners was not maintainable because each had separate nomination papers and separate orders affecting individual rights. |
| Jiwan Singh v. The Consolidation Officer. 1962 64 P.L.R 568. | Referenced as part of the review of authorities concerning competence of joint petitions; illustrates prior Division Bench treatment in this area. | Used as part of the background authorities reviewed in Vinod Kumar; cited in relation to the competence of joint petitions and to show prior judicial treatment of similar procedural issues. |
| Revenue Patwari Union, Punjab v. The State of Punjab. 1961 63 P.L.R 630. | Authority where the Division Bench refused to allow a conversion of a multi-party petition into a petition on behalf of a single petitioner. | The Court considered that decision but held that there is no absolute bar to converting a joint petition into a petition for one petitioner; in the present case the Court exercised its discretion to treat the petition as one by Sarup Singh alone. |
| Rangi Lal Choudhury v. Dahu Sao. 1061 Vol. I. Doabias Election Cases 160. | Principle that a defect in a nomination paper which is not of a substantial character (a mere technical or formal defect) should not justify rejection if the purpose of the provision is not frustrated and identity/intent is clear. | The Court applied the ratio of this case to conclude that the omission of the address in the certificate was a technical defect not of substantial character, and therefore not a valid ground to reject the nomination paper. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps addressing preliminary objections and then the merits.
- On the objection based on rule 35 (that disputes about interpretation must be referred to the Deputy Commissioner): the Court held the objection to be untenable. Rule 35 could not affect the High Court's power to interpret the rules under Article 226, particularly where there was no statutory provision for an election petition and the petitioners had no other remedy.
- On the competence of the joint petition: the Court accepted the principle established in Vinod Kumar (and earlier authorities) that a single writ petition is not justified merely because a common question arises when the orders complained of relate to individual rights of different persons. Because the two petitioners had individual nomination papers and separate orders rejecting them, the joint petition was not maintainable. Nevertheless, exercising judicial discretion and considering the injustice caused to the petitioners by the rejection, the Court allowed conversion of the joint petition and treated it as a petition filed by Sarup Singh alone. The Court noted that while a Division Bench in Revenue Patwari Union refused such a conversion in that case, there is no absolute prohibition and each case depends on its facts.
- On the merits (Sarup Singh's nomination paper): the Court observed that the prescribed form (form 'P') had been amended (by the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) (First Amendment) Rules, 1966) to require a certificate of the President/Chairman of the Co-operative Society or the Assistant Registrar in a specified form which included the candidate's address. The certificate on Sarup Singh's nomination paper did omit his address and was therefore technically defective.
- However, the Court applied the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 28 (which governs scrutiny of nomination papers), which provides that a nomination should not be rejected merely on account of an incorrect description of particulars if the identity of the candidate, proposer, or seconder can otherwise be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, Sarup Singh's nomination paper itself (through the proposer's entries) contained all relevant particulars including parentage, address and membership of the co-operative society, so the candidate's identity could be established beyond reasonable doubt. There was also no contention at scrutiny that the certificate did not relate to the petitioner or that he was not a member of the stated co-operative society.
- Relying on the ratio in Rangi Lal Choudhury v. Dahu Sao, the Court treated the omission as a mere technical defect not of substantial character. Because the defect did not frustrate the purpose of the requirement and identity could be ascertained, the Returning Officer's rejection was without authority.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is accepted. The Court set aside the election of respondent No. 3 (Dr. Ranjit Singh) as void and directed respondent No. 1 to hold fresh elections for the seat vacated by Dr. Ranjit Singh in the Market Committee, Makhu, District Ferozepore. The Court treated the joint petition as having been filed by Sarup Singh alone for purposes of adjudication.
Consequences and immediate implications:
- The rejection of Sarup Singh's nomination paper (for the technical defect of omission of address in the certificate) was declared improper and without authority.
- Dr. Ranjit Singh's unopposed election is void; fresh elections are ordered for the relevant seat.
- The Court directed that the parties bear their own costs.
Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles (including the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 28 and the Supreme Court authority exemplified by Rangi Lal Choudhury) to emphasise that technical/formal defects which do not affect identity or the substance of the nomination should not be allowed to defeat candidacy. The judgment does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond the application of these authorities to the facts; the direct practical effect is limited to setting aside the election and ordering a fresh poll.
Petition accepted. Parties to bear their own costs.
Gurdev Singh, J.:— For election to the Market Committee, Makhu, four candidates put in their nomination papers, two being the petitioners, Sarup Singh and Mehar Singh, and the other two were Dr. Ranjit Singh and Avtar Singh respondents 3 and 4. On the date of scrutiny, 6th October, 1937, the nomination papers of both the petitioners were rejected by the Returning Officer vide his orders marked C and D, which are in identical terms and reproduced in extenso read as under:—
“The certificate issued by Bahadur Singh President is not complete as it does not give the address of the candidate. Hence the papers are not valid and are rejected.”
2. Subsequently, Avtar Singh respondent having withdrawn from the contest, Dr. Ranjit Singh was declared elected unopposed. There being admittedly no provision for any election petition, the two petitioners approached this Court on 19th October, 1937, with this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the order of the Returning Officer rejecting their nomination papers.
3. It is urged that the defect in the nomination papers, on the basis of which the petitioners had been excluded from contesting the election, was of no consequence and the nomination papers furnished by the petitioners were perfectly in order as the certificate issued by Bahadur Singh, which was found to be defective, was not required to be appended to or endorsed on the nomination papers. Reference in this connection is made to rule 27 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) Rules, 1931 and form Prescribed under those rules.
4. No one has appeared to contest the petition, but Mr. K.S Nehra, appearing for respondents 3 and 4, besides defending the order of the Returning Officer as valid, has urged by way of preliminary objections that the joint petition by the two petitioners who had individual rights and who had put in separate nomination papers, was not competent, and the writ petition should not have been entertained as under rule 35 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) Rules, 1961, in case of dispute regarding the interpretation of these rules the Deputy Commissioner is the final authority. So far as the latter objection is concerned, it is clearly untenable. Rule 35 of which he relies cannot affect the powers of this Court to interpret the rules, and since it is not disputed that there is no provision for an election petition and none could thus be preterred by the petitioners, the petitioners are justified in contending in this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution that there his been no non-compliance or breach of the relevant rule.
5. In Support of the preliminary objection that the joint petition is misconceived and does not lie, Mr. Nehra has relied upon Vinod Kumar v. Municipal Committee Pathankot . 1967 69 P.L.R 909., where on review of the relevent authorities, including the Division Bench decision of this court in Jiwan Singh v. The Consolidation Officer . 1962 64 P.L.R 568., I observed as follows:—
“It now appears to be well-settled that the mere fact that a common question arises for consideration is not enough to justify the making of a joint petition. Similar orders may be passed in dealing with cases of different individuals, but that does not justify the making of a single writ petition when the orders relate to individual rights of different persons. I am, accordingly, of the opinion that the present petition on behalf of all the five petitioners is not competent.”
6. Admittedly, in the instant case, the two petitioners had put in separate nomination papers, which were dealt with individually by the Returning Officer, and he passed separate orders rejecting the same, though for identical reasons. By this order, the individual rights of the petitioners were affected, and there was no right common to them, which was denied or taken away by the impugned orders of the Returning Officer. In these circumstances, the joint petition is not maintainable. Mr. Doabia does not contest this, but he prays that in exercise of the discretion vesting in this Court, this petition be treated as having been made only on behalf of Sarup Singh. Such a course was suggested to the Division Bench in Revenue Patwari Union, Punjab v. The State of Punjab . 1961 63 P.L.R 630., but the learned Judges refused to accede to it. There is how ever, no absolute bar in adopting such a course, and whether or not a joint petition should be allowed to be converted into a petition on behalf of only one of the petitioners, will depend upon the facts of each case. I think, in view of the glaring injustice that has been done to the petitioners, as will be indicated hereafter, it is a fit case in which the request of Mr. Doabia should be accepted, and I, accordingly, treat this petition as having been made by Sarup Singh along.
7. Turning to the merits of the case, I find that Mr. Doabia's contention that the defect in the certificate of the President of the Co-operative Society is of no consequence as such a certificate is not prescribed in the form ‘P’ is untenable. This argument is based upon from ‘P’, as originally prescribed, but since then this form has been amended by the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) (First Amendment) Rules, 1966, and now every nomination paper must bear a certificate of the President or Chairman of the Co-operative Society concerned or the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies of the District in the following form:—
“I do hereby certify that Shri——————of (address)————is a member of Co-operative Society————which is a licencee of Market Committee————under the Act.
Signature of President/Chairman, Co-operative
Society/Assistant Registrar, Co-operative
Societies of the district.”
8. There is no doubt that the certificate appearing on the nomination paper of the petitioner Sarup Singh is defective in as much as it does not give his address. But, I agree with Mr. Doabia that this omission does not invalidate the nomination paper. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 28, which relates to scrutiny of nomination papers, clearly lays down:—
“The nomination of a candidate shall not be rejected merely on the ground of an incorrect description of his name or of the name of his proposer or seconder, or of any other particulars if the identity of the candidate, proposer or seconder, as the case may be, can otherwise be established beyond reasonable doubt.”
9. In the nomination paper filed by Sarup Singh, all his particulars including his parentage, address and the fact that he was a member of the Makhu Zamindara Co-operative Marketing-cum Processing Society, Makhu, were given by his proposer. Thus, there could be no difficulty in a certaining the identity of Sarup Singh in respect of whom this certificate, to which objection is taken, was issued by the President of the Makhu Zamindara Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society, Makhu. In fact, at the time of the scrutiny there was no objection that the certificate did not relate to the petitioner or that he was not a member of the Makhu Zamindara Co-operative Marketing-cum Processing Society, Makhu, whose President had signed this certificate.
10. Apart from this, the omission of the petitioner's address in the certificate did not constitute a defect of a substantial character so as to entail the rejection of his nomination paper. In Rangi Lal Choudhury v. Dahu Sao . 1061 Vol. I. Doabias Election Cases 160. a nomination paper in which the name of the Assembly Constituency was entered as “Bihar Assembly Constituency” instead of “Dhanbad Assembly Constituency” was declared to be valid by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, with these observations:—
“That was undoubtedly a defect in the form as filled in by the proposer. The question, however, is whether in these circumstances it can be called a defect of a substantial character, which would justify the rejection of the nomination paper. It seems to us that the defect appeared partly because of the mistake in the panning of the Hindi form which was supplied to the candidates for the purposes of the nomination to this bye election. The form, however, as put in clearly shows in the heading the particular assembly constituency for which the election was being held then follows the part which has to be filled by the proposer and there the proposer made a mistake in filling the word “Bihar” instead of the word “Dhanbad” in the blank space, relating to the constituency. Considering, however, that the name of the constituency was already there in the heading, it would in our opinion be not improper in the circumstances of this case to say that the proposer was nominating the candidate for the constituency which was already mentioned in the heading.”
11. Applying the ratio of that case, it is abundantly clear that the nomination paper contained all the necessary particulars about the candidate and did not suffer from any substantial defect. The defect pointed out by the Returning Officer is merely of a technical character and thus of no consequence. The rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner Sarup Singh being without any authority, he could not be prevented from contesting the election. The election of respondent No. 3 is consequently void and is set aside. The petition is accepted and the respondent No. 1 is directed to hold fresh elections for the seat vacated by Dr. Ranjit Singh, respondent No. 3, in the Market Committee, Makhu, District Ferozepore. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the patties to bear their own costs.
Petition accepted.
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