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Abdul Quadir & Ors v. The State Of Bihar & Ors

Patna High Court
Aug 22, 2007
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.K. Katriar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition challenges the Collector's order dated 2.2.2007 (Annexure 5) in Misc. Case No. 10 of 2006 (Arvind Mishra v. State of Bihar), whereby the Collector set aside the selection process for appointment of Shiksha Mitra in East Saraiya Panchayat and directed a fresh selection under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan scheme.

Procedural history: The Gram Panchayat Purvi Saraiya had advertised for Shiksha Mitra posts; seven petitioners here applied and were unsuccessful. Some unsuccessful candidates filed CWJC No. 7735 of 2005, which was disposed of by this Court on 12.7.2006 (Annexure 4) granting liberty to represent before the Collector. Representations were submitted and the Collector issued the impugned order setting aside the entire selection. The petitioners challenge that impugned order before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Collector had jurisdiction to set aside the entire selection process after the enactment/notification of the Bihar Panchayat Elementary Teachers' (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 (the "Rules"), which provide a new forum for redressal of grievances (Rule 18) and repeal prior administrative resolutions (Rule 20).
  2. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the Collector was required to examine grievances of each individual candidate before setting aside the entire selection process, or whether a wholesale quashing was permissible where mass irregularities were found.
  3. What is the effect of Rule 20's repeal/savings provisions (notably sub-clauses (ii) and (iii)) on pending matters arising under earlier administrative resolutions and on the service status of already appointed teachers?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Collector overlooked the counter-affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Education in CWJC No. 7735 of 2005, which stated that "there is no illegality in preparing the selection list for appointment of the Panchayat Shiksha Mitras".
  • The Collector failed to examine individual cases, particularly those of the present petitioners, and instead set aside the entire selection process.
  • The Collector's approach of setting aside the whole process without individual consideration had been disapproved by this Court in Santosh Kumar v. State of Bihar (CWJC No. 2932 of 2007, judgment dated 30.5.2005), as relied on by petitioners.

Respondent / State Arguments (as presented)

  • Learned Additional Advocate General (AAG) provided submissions tracing the history of the scheme for appointment of such teachers and argued on the merits of the impugned Collector's order (details of each point of merit argument were not set out in detail in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Santosh Kumar v. State of Bihar (CWJC No. 2932 of 2007) — judgment dated 30.5.2005 Previously disapproved the approach of a Collector setting aside an entire selection without individual examination (as relied on by petitioners). The Court examined the factual differences and held that the facts of the present case were different; therefore the prior disapproval did not control here.
Vijay Shankar Pathak v. The State of Bihar (CWJC No. 2261 of 2006) — judgment dated 23.5.2007; reported 2007 (3) PLJR 621 Addressed the question of whether such teachers are employees of the State Government. The Court noted that contention that teachers are employees of the State Government had already been rejected in this judgment; thus teachers are employees of the concerned panchayat.
Ram Lakshman Glass (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (CWJC No. 1248 of 2000) — reported 2000 (2) PLJR 122; Division Bench upheld in (2001) 1 BLJR 59 : 2000 (4) PLJR 572 Interpreted provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (transfer of pending matters to tribunals) — used as an illustration of transfer principle. Used as precedent showing that where a new forum/tribunal is created by statute, pending matters ordinarily stand transferred to the new forum unless contrary intention is indicated.
Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, (2000) 4 SCC 406 Interpreted the transfer provisions under the 1993 Act (illustrating transfer of pending matters to newly constituted tribunals). Cited as authority supporting the principle that pending matters transfer to the newly created forum by statute.
Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 536 (Constitution Bench) Explained the legal position regarding transfer of pending matters to a new forum; relied upon Paragraphs 34 and 37 for illumination. Cited to affirm that matters pending under previous dispensation ordinarily stand transferred to the forum created by a new enactment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis followed a sequence of legal and factual determinations:

  1. Identification of the regulatory change: The earlier administrative policy (resolution no. 1458 dated 11.8.2004) for appointment of Shiksha Mitra was supplemented (resolution no. 1748 dated 2.9.2005 adding clause 14) and ultimately replaced by the Bihar Panchayat Elementary Teachers' (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 ("the Rules"), made under provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006.
  2. Content of the Rules: The Rules set out a detailed selection procedure and, importantly, provided a new grievance redressal forum (Rule 18) and a repeal/savings clause (Rule 20). Rule 18 prescribes specific authorities (Deputy Development Commissioner for Prakhand Shikshak; Block Development Officer for Panchayat Shikshak) and a 30-day disposal timeline. Rule 20 repeals earlier circulars and policy decisions subject to two exceptions in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) concerning continuity of terms/conditions and recognition of existing appointees.
  3. Legal principle on transfer of pending matters: The Court relied on settled law that where a new statutory forum is created, pending matters generally stand transferred to that forum unless the new statute indicates otherwise. The Court invoked analogies and authorities (Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985; RDDBFI Act, 1993; and the cited case law) to support the proposition.
  4. Application to the present facts: Applying Rule 20's repeal/savings provisions and the transfer principle, the Court concluded that matters arising from the earlier policy decision with respect to selection processes now fall to be adjudicated by the forums under Rule 18. The earlier forums (including the Collector) thereby lose existence for adjudicating such matters, except where this Court in a specific order had directed the application to be filed before the Collector or another authority.
  5. Specificity of the impugned order: The Court observed that, in the present case, the Collector passed the impugned order in view of a specific direction of this Court (the disposal route directed by the earlier order disposing CWJC No. 7735 of 2005). Thus the Collector's order was not without provenance from the Court's direction.
  6. On the question whether individual cases had to be examined: The petitioners argued the Collector should have examined individual candidates pursuant to the Court's earlier direction (as in Santosh Kumar). The Court scrutinised that contention and found the facts in Santosh Kumar materially different. The Collector had recorded findings of "serious defects/irregularities" pervading the entire selection process. The Court relied on the established principle that where enquiry discloses mass-scale irregularity, it is permissible to set aside a selection process in bulk without issuing individual notices or examining each individual case. Applying this principle, the Court held the Collector was justified in setting aside the entire process.

Holding and Implications

WRIT PETITION DISMISSED.

Implications and immediate consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The challenge to the Collector's order was rejected; the impugned order setting aside the earlier selection process and directing a fresh selection therefore stands.
  • All pending matters concerning selection processes under the earlier policy are to be adjudicated by the authorities designated under Rule 18 of the Rules, unless a specific order of this Court had directed otherwise for particular cases.
  • Rule 20 repeals prior policy decisions and administrative circulars subject to limited savings (Rule 20(ii) regarding terms and conditions of existing teachers; Rule 20(iii) regarding continuity/renaming of existing Panchayat Shiksha Mitra), and thus the earlier administrative forum generally loses existence for future adjudication.
  • The Court noted that no new appellate remedy was created by the earlier dispensation or by the Rules; thus rights of appeal previously non-existent remain unaffected.
  • No order as to costs was made.

The opinion expressly distinguishes an earlier decision (Santosh Kumar) on the facts, and applies established principles relating to statutory transfer of pending matters and the permissibility of wholesale quashing of a selection process where mass irregularities are found. The Court did not indicate that it was laying down any novel precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

S.K Katriar, J.:— This writ petition is directed against the order dated 2.2.2007 (Annexure 5), passed by the learned Collector of the district of East Champaran, Motihari, in Misc. Case No. 10 of 2006 (Arvind Mishra v. State of Bihar), whereby he has set aside the selection process for appointment of Shiksha Mitra in the East Saraiya Panchayat, Paharpur Block, under a scheme of the Department of Human Resources, known as “Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan”. Elaborate submissions have been advanced by learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective stand.

2. According to the writ petition, the Gram Panchayat Purvi Saraiya had issued an advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates for selection of Shiksha Mitra in the various centres of the Panchayat. The seven petitioners of this writ petition were also applicants. After completion of the selection process, the merit list was prepared. Aggrieved by the same, a few unsuccessful candidates moved this Hon'ble Court by preferring CWJC No. 7735 of 2005, which was disposed of by order dated 12.7.2006 (Annexure 4), whereby the petitioners were given the liberty to represent their cases before the Collector of the district to be disposed of by speaking order(s) within the time indicated in the order. Those petitioners did submit their representations leading to the impugned order whereby, for the reasons assigned therein, the entire selection process held earlier has been set aside, and the Panchayat has been directed to undertake fresh selection process. Hence this writ petition. While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned Collector overlooked the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Education in CWJC No. 7735 of 2005, wherein she had stated that, “….there is no illegality in preparing the selection list for appointment of the Panchayat Shiksha Mitras”. It is next submitted that the learned Collector has not examined individual cases, particularly those of the present petitioners and has instead set aside the entire selection process. Such an approach by the same Collector has been disapproved by this Court in its judgment dated 30.5.2005, passed in CWJC No. 2932 of 2007 (Santosh Kumar v. State of Bihar).

3. Learned Additional Advocate General in his elaborate submissions has taken me to the history of the scheme for appointment of such school teachers, and has also made submissions on the merits of the impugned order.

4. I have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The Bihar Government in the Department of Human Resources issued resolution no. 1458, dated 11.8.2004 (Annexure-1), which was in the nature of administrative instructions, being a policy decision of the State Government, making provision for appointment of school teachers designated as “Shiksha Mitra” for primary schools which includes elementary and middle schools. Detailed procedure for selection process was prescribed therein. There is no need to go into the details of the scheme because of the subsequent development.

5. The State Government realised that the said resolution dated 11.8.2004 (Annexure 1) did not provide for a forum for redressal of grievances and, therefore, issued a supplementary resolution no. 1748, on 2.9.2005, whereby clause 14 was inserted in the said Resolution (Annexure 1). Clause 14 is reproduced here in below for the facility of quick reference:—

6. After issuance of the resolution of 2.9.2005, a person aggrieved by the selection process had to approach the. Collector of the district, and the mode and manner of disposal of the complaint is indicated therein.

7. By circular no. 1458, dt. 11.8.2004, the educational qualifications were raised. This completed the scheme for the selection and appointment under the policy decision by executive instructions. There is no need to go into the details of the scheme because of the subsequent developments discussed here in below.

8. The aforesaid policy decision was substituted by the Bihar Panchayat Elementary Teachers' (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’), issued in terms of Article 243G (11th Schedule, Item No. 17) of the Constitution, alongwith Section 47 and Section 48 read with Section 146 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), providing detailed procedure for selection of teachers for the schools in a panchayat. It also provides for the forum for redressal of grievances.

9. It is essential to notice the salient provisions of the Rules. Rule 1 gives the name to the Rules stated hereinabove. Rule 2 prescribes the definitions. Rule 3 provides the nomenclature of the teachers who are in two categories. The first category, is known as Prakhand Shikshak. (Block Teachers), and the second one Panchayat Teachers. Ruje 5 provides for reservation of vacancies for appointment. Rule 6 provides for appointment of Urdu teachers, and Rule 7 provides for appointment of Physical Education teachers. Rule 8 lays down the eligibility criteria, and Rule 9 prescribes the procedure for conducting the selection process. Rule 10 provides for appointment on compassionate ground. Rule 11 provides for scrutiny of the certificates and testimonials. Rule 12 provides for service conditions. Rule 13 provides for transfer of teachers. Rule 14 provides for maintenance of service records, and Rule 15 provides for leave. Rule 16 provides for payment of salary. Rule 17 provides for disciplinary action. Rule 19 vests the requisite power in the State Government to issue notification/circulars for clarification etc.

10. Rules 18 and 20, which are vital in the present context, may be noticed closely. Rule 18 provides the form for redressal of grievances, and is set out hereinbelow:—

11. Rule 20 is the repeal and savings clause and is reproduced here in below:—

12. It is thus manifest that except the forum for redressal of grievances found in Rule 18, the duties, functions, and powers in the Rules entirely vests in the panchayat. In other words, teachers are employees of the concerned panchayat. The nomenclature of the teachers under the Rules is different. The earlier policy decision provided for appointment of Shiksha Mitra which has been abolished, and has been substituted by the Prakhand Shikshak to be posted at the Block level, and the Panchayat Shikshak at the Panchayat level. The mode and manner of selection, and the forum for redressal of grievances, are different. It is clear from a piain reading of Rule 18 that the aggrieved person can file an application before the Deputy Development Commissioner of the district with respect to the grievances arising out of the selection process or service conditions, etc. of a Prakhand Shikshak, and with respect to the Panchayat Shikshak before the Block Development Officer. The same has to be disposed of within thirty days of submission of the application.

13. It is thus manifest on a plain reading of Rule 20 that all circulars/orders/administrative instructions/policy decision(s), issued on the subject earlier, shall henceforth be deemed to have been superseded and lose their existence, subject to two exceptions to be found in sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iii) of Rule 20. Clause (ii) provides that in spite of supersession of the earlier circulars/administrative instructions, the terms and conditions of service of those of the teachers appointed earlier, shall remain unaffected. Clause (iii) provides that Panchayat Shiksha Mitra appointed earlier, shall now be deemed to have been appointed under the present Rules and shall be known as Panchayat Shikshak.

14. The Panchayat has althrough been the hub of the scheme, under the earlier policy decision as well as the present Rules. This is manifestly to promote the objects of Part IX of the Constitution and the Act. The primary responsibility of the selection process is vested in the local panchayat. Section 11(3) of the Act makes every gram panchayat a body corporate and a separate legal entity, shall have perpetual succession and common seal, and shall sue and be sued in its name. In other words, teachers are employees of the concerned panchayat. The contention to the effect that they are employees of the State Government has already been rejected in the judgment dated 23.5.2007, in CWJC No. 2261 of 2006 (Vijay Shankar Pathak v. The State of Bihar), reported in 2007 (3) PLJR 621.

15. The legal position is now clear for disposal of the present writ petition on merits. I must first of all deal with the question of forum. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Collector has been divested of his jurisdiction and could not have passed the impugned order. In view of the provisions engrafted in Rule 20(ii), all previous circulars/administrative instructions etc. shall cease to have any force. Those were in the nature of administrative instructions, whereas the Rules is under the rule-making powers and has statutory flavour. Law is well settled that in case of creation of such a new forum by fresh enactment, adjudication of pending matters depends on the provisions in the new Act. If no contrary intention is indicated in the new Act, the pending matters would ordinarily stand transferred to the forum(s) under the new Act.

16. The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, created Administrative Tribunals for adjudication of disputes relating to service conditions of the employees of the Union of India. All matters as on the date of enforcement of the Act, pending in different courts stood transferred to the Tribunal in terms of Section 29 of the Act; with the exception of the appeals pending before a High Court.

17. Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due Jo Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, provides that, all matters with respect to the subject matter covered by the Act, shall automatically stand transferred to the Tribunals created under the Act. The judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2000) 4 SCC 406 (Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank), and that of this Court in CWJC No. 1248 of 2000, reported in 2000 (2) PLJR 122 (Ram Lakshman Glass (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar) have interpreted the provisions of the 1993 Act to the same effect. The latter judgment was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court reported in (2001) 1 BLJR 59 : 2000 (4) PLJR 572] (Ram Lakshman Glass (P) Ltd. v. The State of Bihar).

18. The Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000, reorganised the undivided State of. Bihar into the present State of Bihar and the State of Jharkhand. In view of the provisions of Section 89 of the Act, the matters which fell within the jurisdiction of the newly created Jharkhand High Court as on the date of the enforcement of the Act, but pending before the Patna High Court, stood transferred to the High Court of Jharkhand.

19. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 (Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India) has illumined the position and has, in Paragraphs 34 and 37, held to the same effect. In view of the foregoing discussion, it appears to me that all Matters with respect to the selection process of teachers under the old policy decision, shall now have to be adjudicated by the authorities contemplated by Rule 18. Rule 20 repeals all policy decisions and administrative circulars, etc., except the service conditions in terms of Rule 20(ii), and continuance of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra in terms of Rule 20(iii), and the earlier forum loses its existence. The Rules do not by an express provision or necessary intendment provide that the pending matters shall continue to be adjudicated by the previous forums. I am, therefore, of the view that all matters pending before any other authority including the Collector of the district, shall automatically stand transferred to the forums provided by Rule 18, except those the applications which have been directed to be filed before the Collector or any other specific authority in terms of the order of this Court in a specific case, otherwise it will cause serious complications and review petitions will be required to be filed for modification of the orders in cases which have been disposed of. Such an order (passed by the Collector or so under orders of the Court) may or may not be irregular, may suffer from excess of jurisdiction, but is not voidable, let alone being void, inter alia, for the reason that right of appeal is not affected, because no such right of appeal had been created under the quondam dispensation nor under the Rules. In the present case, the impugned order has been passed by the Collector in view of the specific direction of this Court.

20. This takes me on to the last question canvassed on behalf of the petitioners on the factual aspects of the matter. He has contended that it was incumbent on the Collector to examine the grievance of every individual candidate as per the direction in the aforesaid order in CWJC No. 2932 of 2007, which was, inter alia, allowed on the ground that individual cases were not examined. The contention on first flush appears to be attractive but does not survive a deeper scrutiny. The facts obtaining in the said CWJC No. 2932 of 2007 stood on a different footing compared to the present one. Paragraphs 4 to 7 of the impugned order in the present case may be reproduced:

21. It is thus manifest on a plain reading of the findings recorded by the Collector that he has, on examination of the entire materials before him come to the conclusion that serious defects/irregularities pervaded the entire selection process. It has been held in a long line of cases, which are particularly with respect to examinations either of students or for appointments, that notice to individuals need not be issued or individual cases need not be examined where enquiry reveals a mass scale irregularity. In my opinion, the present case is clearly covered by that line of cases. Therefore, he was justified in setting aside the selection process as a whole without considering individual cases.

22. In the result, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.