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Rekha Kumari v. The State Of Bihar And Ors.
Summary of Court Opinion (S.N. Hussain, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner contested an Order dated 9 August 2006 by the State Election Commissioner (Case No. 28/2006) which held that the petitioner’s date of birth was 16 November 1985 and, on that basis, found her ineligible for two elected posts because she had not completed 21 years of age when she filed nominations. The petitioner had filed nominations and been elected as (a) Member of Goitha Panchayat (nomination filed 9 March 2006; scrutiny 13 March 2006; election held 8 June 2006; declared elected 18 June 2006; certificate 19 June 2006) and (b) Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti (nomination and election process culminating on 28–29 June 2006; oath administered 29 June 2006), and had been functioning in those posts.
On 13 July 2006, Respondent No. 7 (Kiran Kumari) filed a complaint (Case No. 28/2006) before the State Election Commission challenging the petitioner’s elections solely on the ground of age. Notices were issued on 19 July 2006; the petitioner filed a written statement on 5 August 2006; and the State Election Commissioner passed the impugned order on 9 August 2006 setting aside the petitioner’s elections and directing re-elections. The petitioner challenged that Order by filing the present writ petition; the High Court heard counsel for the petitioner, the State and the Bihar State Election Commission.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the State Election Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain and decide a post-election challenge to the validity of an election (based on alleged disqualification by reason of age) after the election process had concluded, including issuance of certificate and administration of oath.
- Whether Respondent No. 7 was legally entitled to challenge the petitioner’s election(s), given (a) that she was neither a candidate nor a voter in the Goitha Panchayat election and (b) that she participated in the Panchayat Samiti election and did not raise any objection during the election process.
- Whether the State Election Commission could decide a disputed question of fact (petitioner’s date of birth) on the basis of documentary entries (such as the Board’s matriculation certificate and an undated application) without conducting an enquiry or examining persons who provided the information.
- What is the proper forum/remedy for challenging an election under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (i.e., the role of Section 137 (election petition), Section 139 (grounds to declare election void), Section 136(2) (disqualification referrals) and the bar under Article 243-O / Section 138)?
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The elections (both Member of Goitha Panchayat and Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti) had concluded before Respondent No. 7's complaint and the Commission therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint after the process concluded; reliance was placed on a court order (Neelam Kumar Sharma v. State) and on Sections 136, 137, 139 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act and Article 243-O of the Constitution.
- Respondent No. 7 was not eligible to challenge the Goitha Panchayat election because she was neither a candidate for that post nor a voter of that Panchayat (reliance on Raghuni Nayak v. District Magistrate, Darbhanga).
- Respondent No. 7 could not validly challenge the Pramukh election until an eligible person successfully challenged the petitioner’s election as Member of Goitha Panchayat; no such eligible challenge existed.
- Petitioner asserted her date of birth was 9 March 1985 supported by: admission register entries (father’s declaration dated 23 January 1989), a transfer certificate and a letter from the Headmaster certifying the date as 9 March 1985, an affidavit of the father, and an application to the Board for correction—while the Board certificate showing 16 November 1985 was not based on any affidavit/application by the parents.
- An undated application relied on by Respondent No. 7 (said to be application for Shiksha Mitra) was allegedly forged, bore no signature or the petitioner’s handwriting, and the forwarding letter (25 August 2006) post-dated the impugned order; hence its genuineness was doubtful and it could not be relied upon.
- The petitioner contended she was not given an opportunity to argue orally before the Commission and that the Commission passed the order immediately after receipt of her written statement.
Respondents' Arguments (State Election Commission and Respondent No. 7)
- Section 136(2) of the Act permits reference to the State Election Commissioner where questions of disqualification arise, and Sub-section (1) disqualifies persons if so disqualified by law; thus the Commission had jurisdiction to decide whether the petitioner fell within a disqualification (on the ground of age).
- Respondents relied on provisions in the earlier Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (Section 139(2)) and authority of this Court in Suo Motu action by the High Court v. State of Bihar (2002 (1) PLJR 495) to support the notion that an authority other than the election petition forum could decide such matters.
- Respondents submitted the Board’s matriculation certificate (Annexure B) and an application of the petitioner for Shiksha Mitra (Annexure C) showed the petitioner’s age rendered her ineligible for the elections; the petitioner had not adduced valid evidence to contradict the Board certificate nor had she challenged it as forged before the Commission.
- Respondents asserted that the petitioner was given full opportunity before the Commission and that the Commissioner considered all points before passing the impugned order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Neelam Kumar Sharma v. State (Order dated 25 Sep 2006, C.W.J.C No. 8246 of 2006) | Demonstrated that the Election Commission refused to interfere in election matters where the election process had already concluded (used to support contention that post-election challenges are not maintainable before the Commission). | The Court noted this order as supporting the petitioner's contention that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to entertain challenges after the election process had concluded. |
| Raghuni Nayak v. District Magistrate, Darbhanga (1958 BLJR 177) | Authority for the proposition that a person who is neither a candidate nor a voter of a constituency is not legally eligible to challenge an election of that constituency. | The Court relied on this decision to hold that Respondent No. 7 was not competent to challenge the petitioner’s election to the Goitha Panchayat (since she was neither candidate nor voter there). |
| Suo Motu action by the High Court v. State of Bihar, 2002 (1) PLJR 495 | Interpreted earlier statutory provisions (Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993) and contemplated an authority other than the election-petition forum for some election-related questions. | The Court observed that respondents wrongly relied on this decision because the earlier Act's provisions are no longer applicable after the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 came into force; thus Suo Motu decision based on the 1993 Act could not govern the present case. |
| Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604 : AIR 1988 SC 1796 | Establishes that entries in school registers have evidentiary value only if made on information given by parents or by someone with special means of knowledge; mere production of documents does not prove the contents unless the source is examined. | The Court applied this principle to hold that the Board's matriculation certificate (which did not show that parents had provided the date) lacked probative value unless the parents or the person who provided the information were examined. |
| Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha, AIR 1965 SC 282 | Supports the requirement that entries in registers/documents must be proved as to their source for probative value. | The Court cited this authority alongside Birad Mal Singhvi to reinforce that the Board certificate could not be treated as conclusive proof of date of birth without inquiry/examination of source. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the statutory scheme under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 and the nature of the questions presented:
- Supersession of earlier law: The Court concluded that reliance by respondents on Section 139(2) of the earlier Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 and the Suo Motu decision was misplaced because the 1993 Act provisions were replaced by the 2006 Act. The Court therefore interpreted the provisions of the 2006 Act as applicable.
- Proper forum to challenge elections: Under the 2006 Act, Section 139 sets out grounds for declaring an election void but identifies the "prescribed authority" as the decision-maker. Section 137 prescribes that elections to Panchayat offices shall not be called in question except by an election petition presented to the prescribed authority (Munsif or Sub-Judge as applicable). Section 138 and Article 243-O of the Constitution bar courts from interfering in electoral matters except through the statutory election-petition process. The Court concluded that the prescribed authority for declaring elections void is the authority under Section 137, i.e., by election petition.
- Limited scope of State Election Commission under Section 136(2): The Court read Section 136(2) of the 2006 Act as permitting the State Election Commission to decide only those disqualifications that are evident on their face (not requiring evidence) and cannot be legally denied. Where a disqualification raises a disputed question of fact that is contested and requires evidence, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to decide it once the election process has concluded.
- Competency and estoppel of Respondent No. 7: The Court observed that Respondent No. 7 participated in the Panchayat Samiti election without raising any objection during the process and was neither a candidate nor a voter in the Goitha Panchayat election; accordingly, she was not competent to challenge the Goitha Panchayat result and was estopped from raising the objection later after being defeated.
- Evidentiary assessment of documents relating to date of birth: The Court examined the competing documentary proofs: (a) Board's matriculation certificate giving date of birth as 16 November 1985 (relied upon by Respondent No. 7) and (b) petitioner’s school admission register entries, transfer certificate, headmaster’s letter, an application for correction to the Board and an affidavit of the father supporting 9 March 1985 (relied upon by petitioner). The Court applied the principle from Supreme Court precedents that a school/Board entry has evidentiary value only if it is shown to be based on information from parents or a person with special means of knowledge. Because the Board certificate did not show the source and the authorities did not examine parents or the person who supplied the information, the Board certificate had no probative value standing alone.
- Reliance on a potentially forged document: The Court noted an undated application purportedly of the petitioner, relied upon by Respondent No. 7, was forwarded to the Commission after the election and after the impugned order; the petitioner contested its genuineness and the Court found it improper for the Commission to rely on that document without ascertaining its authenticity.
- Conclusion from analysis: Because the question of date of birth was a contested question of fact requiring inquiry and because the Commission lacked jurisdiction to decide such contested factual disputes after completion of the election process, the impugned order could not stand.
Holding and Implications
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 9TH AUGUST 2006 QUASHED; WRIT PETITION ALLOWED.
Direct effect on the parties:
- The impugned Order of the State Election Commissioner in Case No. 28/2006 (9 August 2006) is quashed.
- The petitioner is directed to be reinstated as Member of Goitha Panchayat and as Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti.
Broader implications: The Court’s decision emphasizes that under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006, post-election challenges that raise contested questions of fact (requiring evidence) must be pursued by an election petition before the prescribed authority (per Section 137 and Section 139) and not decided by the State Election Commission after the election process has concluded. The opinion does not expressly purport to lay down a novel binding precedent beyond the statutory interpretation and application summarized above.
S.N Hussain, J.:—Heard learned Counsel, for the Petitioner, learned Counsel for the State and learned Counsel, for the Bihar State Election Commission.
2. This Writ Petition has been filed challenging Order dated 9th August, 2006, by which the State Election Commissioner allowed Case No. 28 of 2006 filed by Kiran Kumari (Respondent No. 7), holding that the date of birth of Rekha Kumari (Petitioner) was 16th November: 1985, and hence she having not completed 21 years of age, was neither eligible at the time of filing nomination paper for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat on 9th March, 2006, nor was she eligible' at the time of filing nomination paper for the post of Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti on 28th June, 2006, and consequently after setting aside the elections of the Petitioner directed the aforesaid posts to be vacant. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the programme for elections having been declared and nominations from the members having been invited by the Bihar State Election Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission” for the sake of brevity), the Petitioner filed her nomination paper for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat under Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti within the prescribed time on 9th March, 2006, whereas, Respondent No. 7, who was voter of Dandwa Panchayat, filed nomination paper, for the post of Member of Dandwa Panchayat. It was also stated that on 10th March, 2006 the authority fixed 13th March, 2006, as the date for scrutiny of the nominations with a liberty to file objection, but no objection was ever raised against the Petitioner's nomination, Whereafter, it was scrutinised and accepted and symbol was also allotted to the Petitioner on 13th March, 2006. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that thereafter election for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat was held on 8th June, 2006, whereafter, counting of votes was done and the Petitioner having secured highest number of votes was declared elected on 18th June, 2006, and, accordingly, a certificate was granted to her on 19th June, 2006, as successful candidate.
3. Subsequently, 28th June, 2006, was fixed as the date of filling nomination, scrutiny and election for the post of Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti, within which Goitha Panchayat and Dandwa Panchayat along with other Panchayats were situated. Petitioner and Respondent No. 7 filed their respective nominations and, thereafter, they were scrutinised and accepted as no objection was raised by any one against them. Accordingly, election was held on 28th June, 2006, in which the Petitioner having secured maximum number of votes was elected and a certificate to that affect was granted to her and, accordingly, on 29th June, 2006, oath was also administered to the Petitioner as Pramukh of aforesaid Panchayat Samiti. Whereafter, she started functioning since then as Pramukh of the said Panchayat Samiti.
4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also averred that much thereafter on 13th July, 2006, Respondent No. 7 filed a complaint before the Commission, which was numbered as Case No. 28/2006, in which she challenged the elections of the Petitioner for both the posts, namely, Member of Goitha Panchayat and Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti on the sole ground that she had not attained the age prescribed by law at the time of fifing her nominations for the aforesaid posts. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also states that on 19th July, 2006, notices were issued to the Petitioner by the Commissioner, Where after on 5th August, 2006, the Petitioner appeared and filed her written statement (Annexure 6) and only on the filing of the written statement, the State Election Commissioner passed impugned Order dated 9th August, 2006, (Annexure 1) without giving any opportunity to the Petitioner to place her case by way of arguments and allowed the claim of Respondent No. 7 setting aside the Petitioner's elections on the posts of Member of Goitha Panchayat and Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti. Accordingly, re-election had been Ordered, which has not yet started.
5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner raised several legal and factual errors in the impugned Order. He submitted that since both the aforementioned elections for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat as well as for the post of Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti have already been concluded on 18th June, 2006, and 28th June, 2006, respectively; whereafter certificates of successful election have been granted to her and oath of office has also been administered to her and whereafter she has been functioning on those posts, no such complaint, as filed by Respondent No. 7, was maintainable before the Commission and the Commission had no jurisdiction or authority to entertain and decide the same. In this regard, he relied upon an Order of this Court dated 25th September, 2006, passed in C.W.J.C No. 8246 of 2006, (Neelam kumar Sharma v. State), which clearly shows that in the said Writ Petition the Commission itself refused to interfere into such an election matter on the ground that the election process having already been concluded, it had no jurisdiction to pass any Order. He further relied upon Sections 136, 137 and 139 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the sake of brevity) and also upon Article 243-0 of the Constitution of India.
6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner stated that Respondent No. 7 has challenged both the elections of the Petitioner, namely, for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat as well as Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti. So far as Petitioner's election for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat is concerned, it is stated by her counsel that Respondent No. 7 was, admittedly, neither a candidate for that post nor was she even a voter of the said Panchayat, hence, she was legally not eligible to challenge the said election before any authority. In this regard, he relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Raghuni Nayak v. District Magistrate, Darbhanga, reported in 1958 BLJR. 177.
7. So far Petitioner's election for the post of Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti is concerned, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that Respondent No. 7 can also not challenge this election of the Petitioner until her election for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat is not successfully challenged by any eligible person. In the instant case, it is quite apparent that no eligible person has challenged the election of the Petitioner for the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat and hence the entire claim of Respondent No. 7 should have been rejected on the ground that she was not eligible to raise any such objection against her election to the post of Pramukh. In this regard, he also averred that Respondent No. 7 had never claimed either in her complaint before the Commission or even in the counter-affidavit filed before this Court that earlier she was not aware about the age of the Petitioner not has any date of such information been mentioned therein, hence there was no occasion for the Commission to entertain such frivolous complaint.
8. So far question of date of birth of the Petitioner is concerned, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that her date of birth was 9th March, 1985, but in the impugned Order it has wrongly been held to be 16th November, 1985, as the Admission Register of the Primary School, Atopur, Block Gurua, District Gaya, clearly shows her date of birth to be 9th March, 1985, as declared in the school by her father on 23rd January, 1989, (Annexure “A” to Annexure 6). He also submitted that the Headmaster of the said school had also issued a transfer certificate on 23rd March, 2006, (Annexure “B” to Annexure 6) to the Petitioner for obtaining higher education, in which her date of birth was specifically mentioned as 9th March, 1985. In this regard, he submitted that the Headmaster of the School also addressed a letter to the Deputy Secretary, Bihar State Election Commission, Patna, certifying that the date of birth of the Petitioner was 9th March, 1985, as entered in the Admission Register of the school, original of which he was ready to produce (Annexure “C” to Annexure 6). He also stated that the Petitioner has filed a petition (Annexure “D” to Annexure 6) before the Secretary, Bihar School Examination Board, Patna (hereinafter referred to as “the Board” for the sake of brevity) through the Headmaster of the school for correction of date of her birth much earlier, which is still pending. He also relied upon the affidavit of her father showing her date of birth to be 9th March, 1985, and also upon the voter list.
9. In the said circumstances, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that Petitioner's date of birth being mentioned as 16th November, 1985, in the certificate of the Board having, admittedly, not been recorded on the basis of any application or affidavit by any of the parents of the Petitioner, whereas, on the other hand, there was an affidavit by her father along with other relevant documents to show that her date of birth was definitely 9th March, 1985, there was no occasion for the Commission to rely upon the said certificate in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. He also stated that the only other document, which was relied upon by Respondent No. 7, is an undated application said to be filed by the Petitioner for the post of Shiksha Mitra, which was forwarded by the Block Development Officer on 25th August, 2006, (Annexure A), in which her date of birth was mentioned as 16th November, 1985. He submitted that neither the Petitioner had sent the said letter nor was it in her handwriting nor even did it contain her signature and further more there was no occasion for the Petitioner to file any such application as she had already been elected as Pramukh a couple of months back. Moreover, the said forwarding letter js dated 25th August, 2006, which is even subsequent to the date of passing of the impugned Order and as such no objection regarding that had been raised by Respondent No. 7 before the Commission and, thus, it is clearly a forged and fabricated document prepared specially for the purposes of this case only.
10. On the other hand, learned Counsellor the Commission as well as learned Counsel for private Respondent No. 7 vehemently opposed the contentions of learned Counsel for the Petitioner and submitted that Section 136(2) of the Act specifically provides that if any question arises as to whether a Member of a Panchayat at any level or Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat or Sarpanch of Gram Katchahri was before election or has become after election subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of State Election Commissioner. It was further submitted that Sub-section (1) of the aforesaid section provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person shall be disqualified for election or after election for holding the post of Mukhiya, member of the Gram Panchayat Sarpanch, Panch of-the Gram Katchahri, member of the Panchayat Samiti and member of the Zila Parishad if such person is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State. They also submitted that the Commission had full jurisdiction and authority to consider such a matter and decide the same in accordance with'law as the Petitioner comas under the category of disqualification under law on the ground of age.
11. In this connection, they relied upon the provision of Section 139(2) as provided in the earlier Act, namely, Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, in which, it was provided that if any question arises as to whether'a member of a Panchayat at any level has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Sub-section (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Government may by law provide. They also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Suo Motu action by the High Court v. State of Bihar, reported in 2002 (1) PLJR 495, in which, it was held that if an election petition cannot be filed within 30 days then clearly the guidelines given by the Constitution in Sub-clause (2) of Article 243F, re-produced in the aforesaid provision of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, was possibly contemplating an authority other than the authority, which is to hearan election petition. Hence, learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the Commission had full jurisdiction and authority to, pass the impugned Order even sub motu.
12. Learned Counsel for the Respondents also submitted that the certificate (Annexure B) of the Board aiong with her own application (Annexure C) filed by the Petitioner for the post of Shiksha Mitra clearly goes to show that the nomination papers filed by the Petitioners for the aforesaid two posts contained wrong statements with respect to the Petitioner's age and according to the actual age of the Petitioner, she was not eligible to file nomination paper either for the post of Member of the Panchayat or for the post of Pramukh of the Panchayat Samiti. They also stated that neither any valid evidence were adduced by the Petitioner before the Commission to contradict the certificate of the Board nor was the said certificate ever challenged by the Petitioner as forged and fabricated. It was further stated on behalf of the Respondents that full opportunity was given to the Petitioner to place her case but she only filed her written statement but never tried to argue the case although her Advocate was throughout present and only thereafter the impugned Order was passed considering all the points involved and hence it requires no interferences.
13. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the points raised by the parties and the materials produced on record, it is quite apparent that learned Counsel for the Respondents have wrongly relied upon Section-139 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 and the decision of this Court passed on its basis in the case of Suo Motu action by the High Court (supra) as the provisions of the said earlier Act are no more applicable due to coming into force of the new Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006, Section 139 of which reads as follows:
139. Grounds for declaring election to be void—
(1)Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) if the prescribed authority is of opinion--—
(a) that on the date of his election, a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen as a member under this Act; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a, returned candidate or his agent; or
(c) that any nomination paper has been improperly rejected; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected.
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or
(ii) by any corrupt practice, committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent; or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or reception of any vote which is void; or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rules or Orders made thereunder the prescribed authority shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.
(2) If in the opinion of the Prescribed Authority, any agent of a returned candidate has been guilty of any corrupt practice, but the prescribed authority is satisfied.
(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the Orders and without the consent of the candidate;
(b) that the candidate took all reasonable measures for preventing the commission of corrupt practices at the election; and
(c) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agent; then the Prescribed Authority may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void.
14. The elections in question have been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the new Act, Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 139 of which as shown above provided that only the prescribed authority can decide the election of the returned candidate to be void and the only authority prescribed in the Act is the Election Tribunal as provided in Section 137 of the new Act, which reads as follows:
137. Election Petition-(1) The election to any office of a Panchayat or a Gram Katchahry shall not be called in question except by an election petition as prescribed:
Provided that if an election to any office of a Gram Panchayat or Gram Katchahry is under dispute, the election petition shall lie before such Munsif within whose jurisdiction such Gram Panchayat or Gram Katchahry is situated and if the election to any office of Panchayat Samiti or to a Zila Parishad is under dispute, the election petition shall lie before such Sub-Judge within whose jurisdiction such Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, as the case may be, is situated.
15. Furthermore, so far as the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the new Act is concerned, it is quite apparent that only such disqualifications, which are evident on their face and cannot be legally denied and also do not require any evidence can be referred for decision of the State Election Commission. Section 136(2) of the Act reads as follows:
136. “Disqualification for Membership—
(2) If any question arises as to whether a Member of a Panchayat at any level or Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat or Sarpanch of Gram Katchhary was before election or has become after election subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clause (1); the question shall be referred for the decision of State Election Commissioner. The matter of disqualification may be brought to the notice of State Election Commission in the form of a complaint, application or information by any person or authority. The State Election Commission may also take suo-motu cognizance of such matters and decide such matters expeditiously after allowing sufficient opportunity to the affected parties of being heard.
16. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision two aspects are quite apparent. Firstly that if the disqualification is from the date prior to the start of election process, such objection should have been raised before the Commission during the election process itself. Secondly that where the matter is with respect of a disputed question of fact, which, is contested and contradicted by the concerned person and which requires evidence to decide the same, the Commission has got no authority or jurisdiction to decide the same specially when the process of election has concluded. In such circumstances, only option left for Respondent No. 7 was to file an election petition before the prescribed authority under the provision of Section 137 of the Act, which clearly provides that the election to any office of a Gram Panchayat or a Gram Katchahry shall not be called in question except by an election petition as prescribed. The specific wordings of the aforesaid section read with the provisions of Article 243-O ofthe Constitution provided a bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters. It reads as follows:
243-O. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matter-Notwithstanding anything in this Act—
(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituents, made or purporting to be made under Article 243-K, shall not be called in question in any Court.
(b) no election to any Panchayats shall be called in question except by an election petition prescribed to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.
17. To sum up the matter, Section 137 of the Act specifically provided that the election to any office of a Panchayat or a Gram Katchahry shall not be called in question except by an election petition as prescribed, whereas, Section 138 of the Act provided that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the prescribed authority, under the Act, which has been provided in Section 137 of the Act. Section 138 of the Act reads as follows:
138. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters-Not withstanding anything contained in this Act—
(a) The validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 243K of the Constitution of India shall not be called in question in any Court;
(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the prescribed authority under this Act.
18. Furthermore, Section 139 of the Act provided the grounds for declaring election to be void by the prescribed authority when the result has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate or on other grounds stated therein. Thus, it is quite clear that the prescribed authority mentioned in the aforesaid provision of law is clearly the authority mentioned in Section 137 of the Act and no one else and hence any application filed after the election process is over before any other authority except the authority prescribed under Section 137 of the Act is not maintainable. Article 243 of the Constitution of India as well as Section 138 of the Act also provides a bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters except by way of an election petition presented to such authority as provided under the law made by the State Legislature.
19. So far the question of eligibility of Respondent No. 7 for filing the said complaint before the Commission is concerned, it is quite apparent that she filed her nomination for the post of. Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti and she participated in the election without raising any objection during the entire election and she challenged the result of the said election subsequently only after being defeated. Legally, the claimant (Respondent No. 7) was barred from doing so in the aforesaid circumstances as has been held by this Court in the case of Raghuni Nayak (supra).
20. In these circumstances, the challenge being only on the ground of the age of the Petitioner, it was nowhere stated by Respondent No. 7 either in hercomplaint before the Commission or in her counter-affidavit filed before this Court that she had no knowledge or information earlier about the age of the Petitioner. Hence, after having participated in the election without raising any such objection, Respondent No. 7 was legally estopped from challenging the validity of that election after having lost' therein. Furthermore, so far question of Petitioner's election to the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat is concerned, it is admitted by Respondent No. 7 that the latter was neither a candidate for that post nor was she a voter in that constituency and hence she had no occasion to challenge the said election of the Petitioner also. In the said circumstances, it is held that the case fited by Respondent No. 7 before the Commission was itself not maintainable in the eye of law.
21. 1. With respect to the age of the Petitioner, it is quite apparent that the Petitioner claimed her date of birth to be 9th March, 1985, whereas, Respondent No. 7 claimed that the Petitionerwas born on 16th November, 1985. Respondent No. 7 had challenged the date of birth (9th March, 1985) given by the Petitioner in her nomination paper (Annexure D) only on the ground of a certificate (Annexure B) issued by the Board with respect to her passing of the matriculation examination in 2001, in which her date of birth was given as 16th November, 1985. Apart from the aforesaid certificate, only one document was produced by Respondent No. 7 before the Commission, which is an undated application said to be of the Petitioner for appointment to the post of Shiksha Mitra. From Annexure “A” to the counter-affidavit filed by Respondents No. 2 and 3, it is quite apparent that the said undated application of the Petitioner was sent by the Block Development Officer to the Secretary of the Commission on 25th August, 2006, much after the declaration of the election result and even after the passing of the impugned Order. Furthermore, in the aforesaid circumstances the Petitioner having seriously challenged the said document as forged and fabricated, bearing neither her own handwriting nor her signature and nor even there being any occasion for the Petitioner to file such an application, there was obvious possibility that the said document was prepared for the purpose of this case only. Hence, without ascertaining the genuineness of the said application, the authority concerned committed serious error in law in relying upon the same and deciding the case on its basis.
22. So far the matriculation certificate of the Board is concerned, it is not in dispute that the date of birth of the Petitioner recorded therein was not on the basis of any application or affidavit filed by her parents and hence it had no probative value unless her parents were examined or person on whose information the entry was made, was examined. This view is settled by various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as by various High Courts including the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, reported in 1988 Supp SCC 604 : AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1796, in which it was held as follows:
If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value. Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of document were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents of the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents.
23. This view also finds support by another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 282.
24. But without appreciating the requirements of law the authorities neither ever tried to ascertain as to how the date of birth has been recorded in the Board's certificate or in the Scholar's Register, nor any effort was made to examine the parents of the Petitioner or any other persons concerned. On the other hand, it was the Petitioner, who produced the affidavit of her father showing her date of birth to be 9th March, 1985 and in support thereof, she produced the Admission Register of the Primary School, in which her date of birth was mentioned as 9th March, 1985, as declared by her father on 23rd January, 1989, as well as other documents of the school and her application before the Board for correction of her date of birth forwarded by the Headmaster, all of which showed her data of birth to be 9th March, 1985. The fact that the Petitioner was above 21 years of age was also proved by the Identity Card issued by the Commission as well as the voter list.
25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as the documents produced by the Petitioner, the question of date of birth of the Petitioner could not have legally been decided without holding a proper enquiry, examining the parents and other concerned relatives of the Petitioner and in absence thereof the documents concerned along with affidavit of the father of the Petitioner had to be relied upon. Furthermore, this question being a contested question of fact requiring evidence should not have been gone into by the Commission as the same can only be decided by an appropriate authority prescribed under the law for the purpose. Accordingly, the impugned Order dated 9th August, 2006, passed by the State Election Commissioner, Bihar, in Case No. 28/06 is hereby quashed and this writ application is allowed. The authorities concerned are directed to reinstate the Petitioner on the post of Member of Goitha Panchayat as well as on the post of Pramukh of Banke Bazar Panchayat Samiti.
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