In these writ applications the prayer of the petitioner is for quashing the proceeding initiated by the respondent-joint Commissioner of Income-tax, Special Range, Ranchi (respondent No. 3) under section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), for reopening the assessment for the assessment years 1989-90 to 1995-96 including the notices dated 13-3-2000, issued under section 148 of the Act directing the petitioner to file the return for the assessment years aforesaid within the time mentioned in the notice itself for the purpose of making the reassessment for the period, in question. Further prayer of the petitioner is for restraining the respondent authority from taking any action in terms of section 147 of the Act including passing any reassessment order.

2. Learned counsel has challenged the very initiation of the proceeding on the following grounds : (i) the instant proceeding initiated against the petitioner for reopening of the assessment is not on account of any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose the material facts but on the basis of the enquiry made under sections 133(6) and 131 of the Act wherein it was found that the transaction entered into by the petitioner with the sub-contractor, namely, Sri K. N. Kutty, is a sham transaction which is not permissible in the eye of law ; (ii) the reopening of the completed assessment is barred by the doctrine of merger as the assessment order merged with the appellate order passed by the respondent-Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ; (iii) the instant proceeding is sought to be initiated at the behest of the superior authority, namely, the Commissioner (Appeals) ; (iv) once the assessee has disclosed the true and full primary and jurisdictional facts, such proceeding cannot be initiated for the reopening of the assessment which is based upon true and full disclosure of the material evidence and, lastly, the very initiation of the instant proceeding is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the following decisions : (i) Sheo Narain Jaiswal v. Income Tax Officer (1989) 176 ITR 352 (Pat) ; (ii) Peico Electronics and Electricals Ltd. v. Deputy. CIT (Assessment) (1994) 210 ITR 991 (Cal); (iii) Arvind Mills Ltd. v. Deputy CIT (2000) 242 ITR 173 (Guj) ; (iv) Hemraj Munshi Ram v. Union of India (1999) 7 DTC 310 (Pat-HC) : (2000) 245 ITR 155 (Pat) ; (v) Krishna Metal Industries v. H. M. Algotar (1997) 225 ITR 853 (Guj) ; (vi) Fenner (India) Ltd. v. Deputy CIT (2000) 241 ITR 672 (Mad); (vii) Income Tax Officer v. Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) 103 ITR 437 (SC) and (viii) Dhanaraj Singh and Co. v. CIT (1996) 218 ITR 312 (Pat).

2. Learned counsel has challenged the very initiation of the proceeding on the following grounds : (i) the instant proceeding initiated against the petitioner for reopening of the assessment is not on account of any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose the material facts but on the basis of the enquiry made under sections 133(6) and 131 of the Act wherein it was found that the transaction entered into by the petitioner with the sub-contractor, namely, Sri K. N. Kutty, is a sham transaction which is not permissible in the eye of law ; (ii) the reopening of the completed assessment is barred by the doctrine of merger as the assessment order merged with the appellate order passed by the respondent-Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ; (iii) the instant proceeding is sought to be initiated at the behest of the superior authority, namely, the Commissioner (Appeals) ; (iv) once the assessee has disclosed the true and full primary and jurisdictional facts, such proceeding cannot be initiated for the reopening of the assessment which is based upon true and full disclosure of the material evidence and, lastly, the very initiation of the instant proceeding is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the following decisions : (i) Sheo Narain Jaiswal v. Income Tax Officer (1989) 176 ITR 352 (Pat) ; (ii) Peico Electronics and Electricals Ltd. v. Deputy. CIT (Assessment) (1994) 210 ITR 991 (Cal); (iii) Arvind Mills Ltd. v. Deputy CIT (2000) 242 ITR 173 (Guj) ; (iv) Hemraj Munshi Ram v. Union of India (1999) 7 DTC 310 (Pat-HC) : (2000) 245 ITR 155 (Pat) ; (v) Krishna Metal Industries v. H. M. Algotar (1997) 225 ITR 853 (Guj) ; (vi) Fenner (India) Ltd. v. Deputy CIT (2000) 241 ITR 672 (Mad); (vii) Income Tax Officer v. Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) 103 ITR 437 (SC) and (viii) Dhanaraj Singh and Co. v. CIT (1996) 218 ITR 312 (Pat).

In this case, Mr. Jhunjhunwala has appeared on behalf of the revenue and filed a counter-affidavit, wherein, inter alia, it is stated that the enquiry under sections 133(6) and 131 of the Act was conducted in relation to Kapoor Brothers at the time when the appeal was pending before the Commissioner (Appeals) for the assessment year 1996-97 on a direction of the Commissioner (Appeals). During the enquiry, the statement of the said contractor, Sri K. N. Kutty, notice in terms of section 148 of the Act was issued to the petitioner for the assessment years 1989-90 to 1995-96 as the petitioner has shown certain amount paid to Sri Kutty and in order to ascertain the genuineness of the transaction made with Sri Kutty the enquiry was conducted and pursuant thereto the instant notice was issued. The statement made by Sri Kutty is made annexure A to the counter-affidavit. It is further stated that the notice in terms of section 148 was issued after due enquiry as envisaged under sections 133(6) and 131 of the Act and after recording the statement of Sri Kutty the reason has been recorded while issuing notice under section 148 of the Act. It is further alleged that on 30-9-1999, the statement of Sri Kutty was. recorded under section 131 and on 17-11-1999, order was passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and on 13-3-2000, notice under section 148 was issued. It is true that the enquiry was initiated on the direction of the Commissioner (Appeals) but before the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax was received by the office of the joint Commissioner. It is further alleged that the reasons can only be given to the assessee after he files his return pursuant to the notice issued under section 148 of the Act. The notice was issued in order to verify the genuineness of the transaction made with the said Sri Kutty and during the enquiry it has come to the notice of the joint Commissioner that the transaction between the petitioner and the said Kutty is a sham transaction. It is further alleged that no order was passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal till date nor the department has received such order passed by the Tribunal on the point in dispute. It is further stated that the notice under section 148 was issued on the basis of the enquiry which was conducted as per direction of the Commissioner (Appeals) for collecting additional evidence during the pendency of the appeal, on the contrary statement made by the petitioner to the effect that the notice was issued at the behest of the superior authority is not correct. It is denied in the counter-affidavit that the reason recorded by the respondent joint Commissioner was on the basis of the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The issuance of notice was necessitated on the basis of the statement recorded by Sri Kutty with respect to the transaction entered into by the petitioner with the said Sri Kutty, The statement made by Sri Kutty itself would go to show the reasons for the purpose of issuing notice under section 148 of the Act. Mr. Jhunjhunwala with reference to the statement made in the counter-affidavit submits that the order passed under section 143(1)(a) or notice issued under sections 143(2) and 142(1) or any order passed under section 143(3) in the case of the assessee can always be subject to reopening on the ground of escaping assessment in terms of sections 147 and 148 of the Act. According to Mr. Jhunjhunwala even if the assessment under section 143(3) has been completed, such notice in terms of section 148 can be issued for the income escaped from assessment. Mr. Jhunjhunwala further submits that the petitioner's case before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal was with respect to investment allowance which has nothing to do with the proceedings initiated for income escaping assessment in respect of the transaction entered into with Sri Kutty which was a sham transaction and, as such, the petitioner cannot challenge the notice issued in terms of section 148 of the Act. In support of his contention, Mr. Jhunjhunwala has relied upon the decision in the case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. Income Tax Officer (1993) 203 ITR 456 (SC). It is further submitted that the basic purpose of section 147 is to ensure that the assessee cannot escape liability by wilfully making a false or incorrect statement at the time of passing original assessment. If such falsity comes to the notice of the authority the assessee cannot be allowed to say that since the said wilful false statement was accepted by the respondent authority and, as such, the same cannot proceed in terms of section 147 of the Act. He relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 297 (SC). On the question of limitation Mr. Jhunjhunwala submits that the limitation for issuance of such notice is governed under section 149 of the Act and, as such the notice in terms of section 148 has rightly been issued. For the purpose of limitation, the proviso to section 147 of the Act is to be read along with section 149 and not in isolation. According to Mr. Jhunjhunwala the notice under section 148 was legally issued on 13-3-2000, but till date no return has been filed by the petitioner. According to Mr. Jhunjhunwala, there is no provision in the law or in the rules framed thereunder to communicate the reasons recorded by the assessing officer. However, the reasons can be communicated to the assessee only after filing of the return in terms of notice issued tinder section 148 of the Act. Mr. Jhunjhunwala further submits that though the notice was issued on the basis of the enquiry conducted by the predecessor of the respondent-joint Commissioner albeit such notice can be issued in terms of the order passed by the respondent-Commissioner (Appeals). In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon a decision in the case of Saurabh Kumar Pandey v. CIT (1999) 235 ITR 150 (Pat). The Patna High Court in the case of Usha Beltron Ltd. v. Jt.. CIT (2000) 14 DTC 355 (Pat-HC) : (1999) 240 ITR 728 (Pat), has held the same view. The Apex Court in the case of Income Tax Officer v. Purushottam Das Bangur (1997) 224 ITR 362 ((SC), at page 369, observed as follows :

"On the basis of the information contained in the letter of Shri Bagai and the documents annexed to it, the Income Tax Officer could have had reason to believe that the fair market value of the shares was far more than the sale price and the market quotations from the Calcutta Stock Association shown by the assessee at the time of original assessment were manipulated ones and as a result income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. It could not be said that the information that was contained in paragraph 2 of the letter of Shri Bagai was not definite information and it could not be acted upon by the Income Tax Officer for taking action under section 147(b) of the Act."

3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a partnership firm which is being assessed for the last 30 years. On 13-12-1990, the petitioner as required under section 139 of the Act filed its return for the assessment years in question, along with duly audited accounts and audit report in the prescribed form. The petitioner in the course of execution of works contracts had regularly engaged some sub-contractors every year for execution of the contracts. Admittedly, the petitioner engaged a subcontractor, namely, Sri K. N. Kutty, and paid a certain amount. It is alleged that the petitioner has filed the returns for the years in question which were duly accepted and, accordingly, assessed under section 143(1) of the Act as per the return of income filed by the petitioner for the assessment years in question. The assessment order was, accordingly, passed. It is further alleged that in February, 1991, an order in terms of section 154 of the Act was passed by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Special Range, Ranchi, whereby the demand of income-tax was rectified and. accordingly, notice under section 156 of the Act was issued demanding a sum of Rs. 23,174 as income-tax. Thereafter, further notice was issued in March, 1991, under section 143(2) of the Act asking the petitioner or its representative to appear before him as the authority wanted some more information with reference to the return filed by the petitioner for the year in question. Again a notice under section 142(1) of the Act was issued directing the petitioner to produce the relevant document which has been produced by the petitioner. It is alleged that the petitioner again on 13-1-1993, filed a revised return of income for the period in question, claiming deduction of investment allowance as per section 32A of the Act and filed a revised balance-sheet, revised profit and loss account and other related documents and, accordingly, a claim was made to the tune of Rs. 5,71,980 on account of investment allowance under section 32A. It is alleged that in terms of the notice under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act, the petitioner appeared along with the relevant documents and disclosed fully and truly material facts before the respondent Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax. The petitioner during the course of hearing filed material evidence, the statement showing the details of the expenses including the payment made to Sri Kutty which was verified by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax and after having been satisfied, accepted the transaction entered into by the petitioner with the said Kutty and, accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order of assessment under section 143(3) of the Act after full examination and verification of the entire evidence on record maintained during the regular course of his business. In the premises, therefore, it is submitted that once the petitioner has disclosed fully and truly the materials before the auth6rity and the respondent authority after having accepted the same passed the order in terms of section 143(3) of the Act and, as such, proceedings cannot be initiated for the purpose of reopening the assessment in terms of section 147 of the Act.

3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a partnership firm which is being assessed for the last 30 years. On 13-12-1990, the petitioner as required under section 139 of the Act filed its return for the assessment years in question, along with duly audited accounts and audit report in the prescribed form. The petitioner in the course of execution of works contracts had regularly engaged some sub-contractors every year for execution of the contracts. Admittedly, the petitioner engaged a subcontractor, namely, Sri K. N. Kutty, and paid a certain amount. It is alleged that the petitioner has filed the returns for the years in question which were duly accepted and, accordingly, assessed under section 143(1) of the Act as per the return of income filed by the petitioner for the assessment years in question. The assessment order was, accordingly, passed. It is further alleged that in February, 1991, an order in terms of section 154 of the Act was passed by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Special Range, Ranchi, whereby the demand of income-tax was rectified and. accordingly, notice under section 156 of the Act was issued demanding a sum of Rs. 23,174 as income-tax. Thereafter, further notice was issued in March, 1991, under section 143(2) of the Act asking the petitioner or its representative to appear before him as the authority wanted some more information with reference to the return filed by the petitioner for the year in question. Again a notice under section 142(1) of the Act was issued directing the petitioner to produce the relevant document which has been produced by the petitioner. It is alleged that the petitioner again on 13-1-1993, filed a revised return of income for the period in question, claiming deduction of investment allowance as per section 32A of the Act and filed a revised balance-sheet, revised profit and loss account and other related documents and, accordingly, a claim was made to the tune of Rs. 5,71,980 on account of investment allowance under section 32A. It is alleged that in terms of the notice under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act, the petitioner appeared along with the relevant documents and disclosed fully and truly material facts before the respondent Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax. The petitioner during the course of hearing filed material evidence, the statement showing the details of the expenses including the payment made to Sri Kutty which was verified by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax and after having been satisfied, accepted the transaction entered into by the petitioner with the said Kutty and, accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order of assessment under section 143(3) of the Act after full examination and verification of the entire evidence on record maintained during the regular course of his business. In the premises, therefore, it is submitted that once the petitioner has disclosed fully and truly the materials before the auth6rity and the respondent authority after having accepted the same passed the order in terms of section 143(3) of the Act and, as such, proceedings cannot be initiated for the purpose of reopening the assessment in terms of section 147 of the Act.

4. The only question that falls for consideration is as to whether the instant proceeding initiated in terms of section 147 of the Act and the notice issued under section 148 is legally sustainable in the eye of law. In Sheo Narain Jaiswal's case (1989) 176 ITR 352 (Patna), this court has held that such proceeding cannot be initiated at the behest of the superior authority if the Income Tax Officer fails to form his own belief. In the instant case, the proceeding was not initiated at the instance of the superior officer but on the basis of the materials collected during the course of enquiry, as stated above. It is true that the respondent-Commissioner (Appeals) held that the transaction with the said Sri Kutty was a sham transaction. The assessing officer shall, reopen the assessment for earlier years. In that view of the matter, the decision relied upon by Mr. Poddar, learned counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the case of Peico Electronics and Electricals Ltd. (1994) 210 ITR 991 (Cal) it has been held that the reassessment proceeding were initiated because of failure of the Income Tax Officer to consider the materials produced by the assessee. In that case it has been held on the facts of that case that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose any material fact. There is no dispute as to the principles laid clown in the case that the proceeding under section 147 of the Act cannot be initiated on account of *failure of the assessing authority but, in the instant case, as stated above, the material evidence for the purpose of reopening the assessment already completed has been brought to the notice of the authority during the course of enquiry and, as such, it cannot be held that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts at the time of making assessment in terms of section 143(3) of the Act. The decision relied upon by Mr. Poddar, therefore, will not help him as the facts of this case are entirely different. On the question of limitation, learned counsel has relied upon a decision in Arvind Mills Ltd.'s case (2000) 242 ITR 173 (Guj) and submits that the initiation of the proceeding in terms of section 147 of the Act after a lapse of four years is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. As stated above, for the purpose of counting limitation, the proviso to section 147 is to be read along with section 149 of the Act which empowers the authority to issue notice reopening the assessment made under section 143(3) beyond four years if the income escaped from tax by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee. Explanation 2(c) appended to section 147 of the Act envisages where an assessment has been made but (i) income chargeable to tax has been under assessed, or (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate, or (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under this Act has been computed." It appears from the aforesaid provision that even after assessment is made in terms of section 143(3), notice under section 148 can be issued for income escaping assessment. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (1993) 203 ITR 456 wherein it has been held as follows (headnote): "One of the purposes of section 147 is to ensure that a party cannot get away by wilfully making a false or untrue statement at the time of the original assessment and when that falsity comes to notice, to turn around and say : 'you accepted my lie, now your hands are tied and you can do nothing.' It would be a travesty of justice to allow the assessee that latitude." learned counsel has also relied upon a decision in the case of Hemraj Munshi Ram (2000) 245 ITR 155 (Patna). As stated above, for the purpose of counting limitation, the proviso to section 147 is to be read as a whole, in other words section 147 is to be read as a whole in view of Explanation 1 appended to the proviso to section 147. Section 147 deals with income escaping assessment subject to the Provision of sections 148 and 153 of the Act. The proviso to section 151 makes it abundantly clear that notice under section 148, including a proceeding under section 147, can be initiated after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year with the prior approval of the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax or Commissioner of Income-tax. In the instant case, as stated above, the Commissioner of Income-tax has approved the reopening of the assessment proceeding. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision reported in Gauri Shankar Choudhary v. Addl. CIT (1998) 5 DTC 507 (Pat-HC) : (1998) 234 ITR 865 (Pat). Reference may also be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahadeo Prasad Rais v. Income Tax Officer (1991) 192 ITR 402 (SC). In this case reassessment proceedings were initiated for the assessment years 1953-54 to 1963-64 but the appeal however was restricted to the assessment years 1953-54 to 1961-62 which was challenged on the ground of limitation. The apex court rejected the contention in view of the proviso contained in section 151 of the Act. In the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 297 (SC), the question for consideration was: "where an item unconnected, with the escapement of income has been concluded finally against the assessee, how far in reassessment on an escaped item of income is it open to the assessee to seek a review of the concluded item for the purpose of computation of the escaped income ?" The Supreme Court has answered the question in the following terms: "Therefore, our answer to the question formulated by the High Court and noticed in the earlier part of this judgment is that, in the reassessment proceedings, it is not open to an assessee to seek a review of the concluded item, unconnected with the escapement of income, for the purpose of computation of the escaped income." Thus, the assessee cannot challenge the notice initiating the proceeding in terms of section 147 of the Act merely on the ground that the completed assessment cannot be reopened which is devoid of principle of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case aforesaid. In the case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (supra), the Apex Court has held that subsequent information which is definite, specific and reliable can be a basis for initiating reassessment proceedings. It has also been held that sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief is not for the court to judge. Similar is the view taken by the apex court in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1999) 236 ITR 34 (SC) and in the case of Purushottam Das Bangur (supra). In the case of Usha Beltron Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (supra) this court has held that the finding recorded during the course of investigation that depreciation had been claimed an a non-existent asset and reopening was held to be quite legal.

4. The only question that falls for consideration is as to whether the instant proceeding initiated in terms of section 147 of the Act and the notice issued under section 148 is legally sustainable in the eye of law. In Sheo Narain Jaiswal's case (1989) 176 ITR 352 (Patna), this court has held that such proceeding cannot be initiated at the behest of the superior authority if the Income Tax Officer fails to form his own belief. In the instant case, the proceeding was not initiated at the instance of the superior officer but on the basis of the materials collected during the course of enquiry, as stated above. It is true that the respondent-Commissioner (Appeals) held that the transaction with the said Sri Kutty was a sham transaction. The assessing officer shall, reopen the assessment for earlier years. In that view of the matter, the decision relied upon by Mr. Poddar, learned counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the case of Peico Electronics and Electricals Ltd. (1994) 210 ITR 991 (Cal) it has been held that the reassessment proceeding were initiated because of failure of the Income Tax Officer to consider the materials produced by the assessee. In that case it has been held on the facts of that case that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose any material fact. There is no dispute as to the principles laid clown in the case that the proceeding under section 147 of the Act cannot be initiated on account of *failure of the assessing authority but, in the instant case, as stated above, the material evidence for the purpose of reopening the assessment already completed has been brought to the notice of the authority during the course of enquiry and, as such, it cannot be held that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts at the time of making assessment in terms of section 143(3) of the Act. The decision relied upon by Mr. Poddar, therefore, will not help him as the facts of this case are entirely different. On the question of limitation, learned counsel has relied upon a decision in Arvind Mills Ltd.'s case (2000) 242 ITR 173 (Guj) and submits that the initiation of the proceeding in terms of section 147 of the Act after a lapse of four years is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. As stated above, for the purpose of counting limitation, the proviso to section 147 is to be read along with section 149 of the Act which empowers the authority to issue notice reopening the assessment made under section 143(3) beyond four years if the income escaped from tax by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee. Explanation 2(c) appended to section 147 of the Act envisages where an assessment has been made but (i) income chargeable to tax has been under assessed, or (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate, or (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under this Act has been computed." It appears from the aforesaid provision that even after assessment is made in terms of section 143(3), notice under section 148 can be issued for income escaping assessment. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (1993) 203 ITR 456 wherein it has been held as follows (headnote): "One of the purposes of section 147 is to ensure that a party cannot get away by wilfully making a false or untrue statement at the time of the original assessment and when that falsity comes to notice, to turn around and say : 'you accepted my lie, now your hands are tied and you can do nothing.' It would be a travesty of justice to allow the assessee that latitude." learned counsel has also relied upon a decision in the case of Hemraj Munshi Ram (2000) 245 ITR 155 (Patna). As stated above, for the purpose of counting limitation, the proviso to section 147 is to be read as a whole, in other words section 147 is to be read as a whole in view of Explanation 1 appended to the proviso to section 147. Section 147 deals with income escaping assessment subject to the Provision of sections 148 and 153 of the Act. The proviso to section 151 makes it abundantly clear that notice under section 148, including a proceeding under section 147, can be initiated after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year with the prior approval of the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax or Commissioner of Income-tax. In the instant case, as stated above, the Commissioner of Income-tax has approved the reopening of the assessment proceeding. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision reported in Gauri Shankar Choudhary v. Addl. CIT (1998) 5 DTC 507 (Pat-HC) : (1998) 234 ITR 865 (Pat). Reference may also be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahadeo Prasad Rais v. Income Tax Officer (1991) 192 ITR 402 (SC). In this case reassessment proceedings were initiated for the assessment years 1953-54 to 1963-64 but the appeal however was restricted to the assessment years 1953-54 to 1961-62 which was challenged on the ground of limitation. The apex court rejected the contention in view of the proviso contained in section 151 of the Act. In the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 297 (SC), the question for consideration was: "where an item unconnected, with the escapement of income has been concluded finally against the assessee, how far in reassessment on an escaped item of income is it open to the assessee to seek a review of the concluded item for the purpose of computation of the escaped income ?" The Supreme Court has answered the question in the following terms: "Therefore, our answer to the question formulated by the High Court and noticed in the earlier part of this judgment is that, in the reassessment proceedings, it is not open to an assessee to seek a review of the concluded item, unconnected with the escapement of income, for the purpose of computation of the escaped income." Thus, the assessee cannot challenge the notice initiating the proceeding in terms of section 147 of the Act merely on the ground that the completed assessment cannot be reopened which is devoid of principle of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case aforesaid. In the case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (supra), the Apex Court has held that subsequent information which is definite, specific and reliable can be a basis for initiating reassessment proceedings. It has also been held that sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief is not for the court to judge. Similar is the view taken by the apex court in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1999) 236 ITR 34 (SC) and in the case of Purushottam Das Bangur (supra). In the case of Usha Beltron Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (supra) this court has held that the finding recorded during the course of investigation that depreciation had been claimed an a non-existent asset and reopening was held to be quite legal.

5. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the materials on record including the decisions cited at the Bar, I am of the view that the assessing authority has rightly issued notice in terms of section 148 of the Act for initiating reassessment proceedings and, as such, I am not inclined to interfere with the same.

5. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the materials on record including the decisions cited at the Bar, I am of the view that the assessing authority has rightly issued notice in terms of section 148 of the Act for initiating reassessment proceedings and, as such, I am not inclined to interfere with the same.

In the result, these writ applications are dismissed.