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Ram Kishun Sao v. State Of Bihar And Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner purchased the land in question (out of khata no. 8, village Matpuri) by a registered sale deed dated 15.2.1988 from respondent no. 8. The petitioner took possession and began construction. Respondent nos. 5 to 7 (who claimed to be co-sharers and adjoining raiyats of respondent no. 8) filed a petition for pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 ("the Ceiling Act") on 6.12.1988.
The Deputy Collector (respondent no. 4) after hearing rejected the pre-emption petition by order dated 29.6.1989. Respondent nos. 5 to 7 appealed to respondent no. 3 (Land Ceiling Appeal No. XV/8/89-90), and respondent no. 3 dismissed that appeal by order dated 2.4.1990, confirming the Deputy Collector. Respondent nos. 5 to 7 then filed a Revision (Case No. 378/90) before the Member, Board of Revenue (respondent no. 2). The Member, Board of Revenue issued a Resolution dated 21.4.1993 setting aside the orders of the authorities below and accepting the claim of pre-emption. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to quash that Resolution dated 21.4.1993.
A notable factual sequence for dates: the first questioned sale deed was executed 15.2.1988 and recorded as registered on 2.11.1988; the pre-emption petition was filed 6.12.1988; the petitioner appeared and took several adjournments (26.12.1988, 18.1.1989, 8.2.1989, 21.2.1989 and 15.3.1989); while the pre-emption petition was pending the petitioner executed a subsequent purchase (sale deed dated 27.1.1989, registration later) of part of adjoining land and thereby claimed to have become an adjoining raiyat.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Revision before the Board of Revenue (Case No. 378/90) was time-barred and, relatedly, whether notice was required before admitting a time-barred revision.
- Whether the Board of Revenue in revision had jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower authorities (i.e., whether the Member exceeded jurisdiction by setting aside concurrent findings).
- Whether the courts below erred in not determining the category of the land (agricultural land vs. homestead land) for the applicability of Section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act.
- Whether a purchaser against whom pre-emption is claimed can defeat the pre-emption claim by acquiring (during the pendency of the pre-emption proceedings) the status of an adjoining raiyat or co-sharer by a subsequent purchase made within the three-month window prescribed by Section 16(3).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Srivastava)
- No notice was given by the Revisional Court in admitting the revision which the petitioner contended was time-barred; there was also no order condoning limitation.
- The Board of Revenue, exercising revisional jurisdiction, had no authority to interfere with concurrent findings of the two fact-finding authorities (i.e., the Member exceeded jurisdiction in interfering with concurrent findings).
- The courts below failed to determine whether the land was Homestead or agricultural land; Section 16(3) does not apply to Homestead land.
Contesting Respondents' Arguments (Represented by Mr. Allam)
- The Revision was not barred by limitation; the revisional court's order-sheet was not produced to demonstrate a limitation bar, and absent such proof the writ court should not entertain the limitation challenge.
- Even if the petitioner obtained adjoining raiyat status by subsequent purchase, if the pre-emptors had acquired a right of pre-emption on the date of registration of the first transfer and the pre-emption petition was filed within the statutory period, a subsequent purchase would not defeat the pre-emptor's right; the pre-emptor's right subsists if properly invoked within the statutory period.
- Respondents also contended the second sale was not registered in January 1989 (registration occurred later) and thus might not be a completed sale; the court rejected this submission as unconvincing.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1958 S.C. 838 — Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh | The opinion quoted and relied on the Supreme Court's exposition that: (1) The right of pre-emption is a primary/right to offer and a weak/right of substitution; (2) It is a remedial right to follow the thing sold; (3) It can be defeated by legitimate methods; and (4) The principle of lis pendens (Section 52 T.P. Act) does not apply to pre-emption suits. | The court used these principles to hold that the pre-emptory right is a weak statutory right which can be defeated by legitimate methods; because lis pendens does not apply, a subsequent purchase that places the vendee on equal footing with the pre-emptor can defeat the right when interim possession under subsection (ii) was not given. |
| AIR 1971 Patna, p.302 — Ram Chandra Srivastava v. Parsidh Narain Singh (Full Bench) | The opinion cited the Full Bench's treatment of pre-emption law as recognizing the pre-emptor's right as a statutory (weak) right enforceable when statutory formalities are complied with. | The court referenced this authority for the proposition that a statutory pre-emptor's right is weak but enforceable if the formalities prescribed by Section 16(3) are complied with. |
| 1985 PLJR, p.554 — Yugal Kishore Singh v. State of Bihar (Full Bench) | The provided opinion cited this case but did not state any specific rule or principle from it in the text made available. | The opinion listed this case among the authorities considered; no specific application of this precedent was described in the provided opinion. |
| 1985 PLJR, p.662 — Smt. Priyambada Devi v. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna | The opinion cited this case but did not specify the rule or principle quoted from it in the provided text. | The opinion included this case in the list of rulings considered; the provided opinion does not explain a particular application of this precedent. |
| 1985 PLJR, p.215 — Raju Kumar Prasad v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna | The opinion cited this decision but did not detail the legal principle from it in the excerpt provided. | Listed among authorities considered; no explicit description of how it was applied appears in the provided opinion. |
| AIR 1986 Patna, p.7 — Saryug Prasad Singh v. Sar-jug Singh (Single Bench) | The provided opinion cited the case but did not articulate a contained rule or principle from it. | Included among the cases the court considered; the specific role of the precedent is not described in the provided text. |
| AIR 1962 Patna, p.125 — Sheo Kumar v. Smt Sudama Devi (Full Bench) | The opinion cited this Full Bench decision; no specific principle from it is stated in the provided excerpt. | Cited as one of the authorities considered; the provided opinion does not detail its particular application. |
| 1970 PLJR, p.579; AIR 1971 Patna, p.302 — Ram Chandra Srivastava v. Prasidh Narain Singh (Full Bench) | The opinion references this Full Bench authority (see entry above) and did not separately specify additional principles in the provided text. | Listed among authorities considered; no distinct additional application is explained in the provided portion of the opinion. |
| 1973 PLJR, p.534 — Smt. Sudama Devi v. Parmeshwar Narain Singh (Division Bench) | The opinion cited the case but did not recount any specific principle from it in the provided opinion. | Included among cited authorities; the provided text does not describe how it was applied to the facts. |
| 1993 BBCJ, 338 — Ram Briksh Yadav v. Rameshwar Yadav (Division Bench) | The opinion cites this decision without stating any particular rule from it in the provided text. | Listed as one of the rulings considered; the provided opinion does not explain its concrete application. |
| 1968 BLJR, 33 — Raj Kishore Singh v. Bhuneshvvari Singh (Division Bench) | The opinion included this citation but did not describe a rule or principle drawn from it in the excerpt provided. | Cited among the cases considered; no specific application is described in the provided opinion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in discrete, fact-centered steps and focused primarily on the temporal interplay between the statutory three-month window under Section 16(3) and the sequence of events (filing of the pre-emption petition and the purchaser's subsequent acquisition).
1. Jurisdiction/limitation challenge: The court accepted the contesting respondents' contention that there was no material before the writ court to show that the Revision was barred by limitation. The judge found force in the submission that without documentary proof of a limitation bar the matter was not properly open for relief under the writ jurisdiction on that ground.
2. Land classification: The court noted that none of the courts below had decided whether the land had become Homestead land (to which Section 16(3) would not apply). Although the revenue records showed the land categorized as agricultural, the court declined to decide this factual controversy because the petition could be disposed of on the other legal aspect (the temporal/pre-emption point).
3. Textual analysis of Section 16(3): The court set out the exact provisions of Section 16(3), observing especially sub-section (ii) which entitles a co-sharer or raiyat (who makes the required deposit) to be put in possession notwithstanding that the application under clause (i) is pending. The court noted that in this case sub-section (ii) had not been utilized — interim possession was not given to pre-emptors.
4. Temporal facts and legal consequence: The court emphasized the chronology: the first sale was executed 15.2.1988 (registered 2.11.1988); pre-emption petition filed 6.12.1988; petitioner appeared and took adjournments; petitioner purchased adjoining land by deed dated 27.1.1989 (registration later), thereby acquiring the status of adjoining raiyat. The courts below had treated that subsequent purchase as creating parity between the parties and therefore defeating pre-emption.
5. Precedential principle applied: Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's ruling in Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh (AIR 1958 S.C. 838), the court reiterated that a pre-emptory right is a weak statutory right, susceptible to being defeated by legitimate methods, and that the doctrine of lis pendens (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act) does not apply to pre-emption suits. Consequently, a vendee who acquires an equal right by legitimate subsequent act may defeat the pre-emptor's claim.
6. Effect of non-enforcement of subsection (ii): Because sub-section (ii) (interim possession on deposit) was not enforced by the original court at the time the pre-emption application was filed, and because during adjudication the petitioner acquired equal status by a second purchase within the three-month window, the court held there was no scope to enforce pre-emption against the petitioner.
7. Registration-point rejected: The court rejected the respondents' contention that the second sale was ineffective because registered later; the court held that registration is a formality that relates back to execution, and sale becomes valid on execution; the opinion stated there was no claim in the record that the second sale had not been registered at all.
8. Conclusion on Member, Board of Revenue's approach: The court found the Member, Board of Revenue committed an error of law in allowing pre-emption on a technical ground that the petitioner had delayed proceedings by taking adjournments and therefore could not defeat the pre-emptors. The court regarded this conclusion as improper and unjustified because the original court could instead have availed itself of subsection (ii) to protect the pre-emptors when they filed their petition.
9. Additional policy observation: The court noted an anomalous consequence that, if reconveyance were ordered to the pre-emptors, the petitioner (having become co-sharer by his second purchase) could in turn seek pre-emption against that reconveyance — a circular anomaly the court highlighted as a further reason against allowing pre-emption in these circumstances.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The writ petition was allowed. The court set aside the Order/Resolution dated 21.4.1993 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue (respondent no. 2) (Annexure-A) and confirmed the orders of the authorities below — the Deputy Collector (respondent no. 4) and respondent no. 3 — as contained in Annexures-5 and 5.A.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The petitioner's title and the decisions of the authorities below rejecting pre-emption are confirmed; the Board of Revenue's acceptance of pre-emption is quashed. Practically, the petitioner retains the benefit of the earlier orders dismissing the pre-emption claim.
- Legal consequences: The court applied established principles (notably from Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh) that a statutory pre-emptory right is weak and may be defeated by legitimate methods; where interim possession under Section 16(3)(ii) was not granted and the purchaser legitimately acquires parity during the statutory period, pre-emption cannot be enforced against that purchaser. The court emphasized proper procedural use of subsection (ii) to protect pre-emptors at the relevant time.
- Precedential effect: The provided opinion does not state that it establishes a novel legal precedent beyond application of existing authorities; the judgment reverses the Board of Revenue on the facts and confirms the earlier orders rather than announcing a new rule of law.
In the present writ application, the petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order contained in Resolution dated 21.4.1993 passed by respondent no. 3 in Case No. 378 of 1990 (Annexure-6), whereby the respondent no. 2 has allowed the revision after setting aside the order dated 2.4.1990 passed by the respondent no. 3 in Land Ceiling Appeal No. XV/8/89-90.
2. The admitted position remains that the petitioner purchased the land in question out of khata no. 8 of village Matpuri, P.O Tarhasi, P.S Manatu, District-Palamau by virtue of a registered deed of sale no. 1883 dated 15.2.1988 for a consideration from respondent no. 8 who acquired the said land in an amicable family partition. According to the petitioner, he had purchased the aforesaid land for construction of his dwelling house and he took over the possession of land immediately after the execution of the sale deed and started construction and collected materials for the said purpose. The respondent nos. 5 to 7 filed an application for preemption u/s. 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter shall be called as ‘the Ceiling Act’) on 6.12.1988 claiming themselves to be co-sharers and adjoining raiyat of respondent no. 8. The petitioner filed rejoinder to the petition filed by the respondent nos. 5 to 7 after taking some adjournments and it was contended that the land in question did not remain an agricultural land and the same became Homestead land and as such Section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act was not applicable. Further contention of the petitioner in the rejoinder was that the petition was barred by limitation as the land was purchased long back on 15.2.1988 when the petition u/s. 16(3) of the Ceiling Act was filed only in the month of December, 1988. It was also contended that the petitioner also subsequently purchased vide registered deed of sale dated 27.1.1989, a portion of the adjacent land out of khata in question and as such he became an adjacent raiyat and no pre-emption can be available against him. The respondent no. 4 i.e the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Sadar at Daltonganj, after hearing the parties rejected the petition of pre-emption vide order dated 29.6.1989 which is contained in Annexure-5 to this application. Then the respondent nos. 5 to 7 preferred an appeal before the respondent no. 3 against the order as contained in Annexure-5 which was registered as Land Ceiling Appeal no. XV/8/89-90. The respondent no. 3 vide its order dated 2.4.1990 dismissed the appeal confirming the order passed by the respondent no. 4. The respondent nos. 5 to 7 then preferred a Revision before the Member, Board of Revenue i.e respondent no. 2 against the order passed by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 and the same Revision was numbered as Case No. 378/90. According to the petitioner, the said Revision was time barred and no notice was given to the petitioner before admitting the same. After hearing the parties, the Member Board of Revenue vide its Resolution dated 21.4.1993 set aside the orders passed by the authorities below accepting the claim of pre-emption of respondent nos. 5 to 7, which has been impugned in the present writ application.
3. On being noticed the respondent nos. 5 to 7 appeared and filed counter affidavit supporting the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue. Both parties have cited various judgments of this Court and that of the Supreme Court in support of their respective contentions.
4. Mr. Srivastava, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has taken following points in attacking the impugned Resolution of the Board of Revenue, namely;
(i) No notice was given by the Revisional Court in admitting the revision when the same was time barred and that there was no order regarding condonation of the limitation
(ii) That the Board of Revenue under the Revisional jurisdiction had no authority to interfere with the concurrent findings of two fact finding courts and as such the Member concerned had exceeded his jurisdiction; and
(iii) There was no finding regarding the category of the land as to whether it was Homestead land or the agricultural land.
5. Mr. Allam, appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents, on the first point submitted that the Revision was never barred by limitation, as the order-sheet of the Revisional court had not been submitted to show that the same was barred by limitation. According to him, the Revision was preferred within the period and when no documents are there to substantiate that the Revision was barred by limitation there is no scope of entering into that arena under the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
6. I find much force in the submission of Mr. Allam on this score.
7. About the last point regarding agricultural land or Homestead land, it appears that none of the courts below had decided that matter, although, admittedly Section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act has got no application in respect of Homestead land. As per the Revenue records as it transpires the land remained in the category of agricultural land but by the go of day, it might have been transformed into a Homestead land as averments of the sale deed infer so. But, when there is no decision to that effect, I am not inclined to enter into that controversy, when this petition can be disposed of on other aspect i.e the vital point as to whether right of pre-emption existed on the date of order being passed for the purpose of pre-emption.
8. Dates are very relevant in the case. The sale deed which has been questioned by way of pre-emption was executed on 15.2.1988 in favour of the petitioner and the same was registered on 2.11.1988 This finds mention in the order dated 21.4.1993 as contained in An-nexure-6. On 6.12.88 the petition u/s. 16(3) of the Act was filed by the respondent nos. 5 to 7 who were admittedly co-sharers and adjoining raiyats of the vendor of the petitioner. The requisites necessary for the purpose of filing of the pre-emption petition had been fulfilled from the side of the respondent nos. 5 to 7. On 26.12.1988 notice was issued to the petitioner by respondent no. 4 and he appeared on 26.12.1988 and took adjournments on 18.1.1989, 8.2.1989, 21.2.1989 and 15.3.1989 and then filed his reply to the show cause. When such adjournments were being taken the petitioner had purchased a share and became the raiyat of the adjoining land by a sale deed dated 27.1.1989, although registration was done on a later date. The courts below than the Review Board had held that when the petitioner had already become adjoining raiyat by purchase within three months from the date of registration of his earlier deed which was questioned in the pre-emption petition then his possession remained at par with that of the respondent nos. 5 to 7 and as such by purchase the petitioner could be able to defeat the claim of pre-emption as per Section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act.
9. The legal question is whether after a pre-emption application has been filed the person against whom such pre-emption has been claimed could be able to defeat the claim of pre-emption by a subsequent purchase during the pendency of adjudication of the pre-emption application or not, even though such purchase was made within the period of three months application under the Statute for filing of pre-emption petition from the date of registration of the prior purchase. In this connection, first of all the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Act is to be enumerated for the purpose of considering the legal question as raised. Section 16(3) of the Act reads as follows:
Section-16(3)
“16(3)(1) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of this Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document of the transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed:
Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period.
(ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision:
Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat as the case may be, shall be evicted from land and possession thereof shall be restored to the transferor and transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten percent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause (i)
(iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure prescribed in Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be, followed.
10. From the above provision, it is clear that when such a petition of pre-emption is filed and necessary deposits being made the co-sharer or the raiyat are entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under Clause (i) is pending for decision. Proviso has also been made, in the case the petition is rejected, there should be restoration of possession in favour of the original purchaser against whom pre-emption has been claimed, in the present case, sub-section (ii) of Section 16(3) has not been implemented nor interim possession had been given pending decision of the pre-emption petition in favour of the respondent nos. 5 to 7, rather by the courts below, after adjudication claims of pre-emption had been rejected holding that the petitioner against whom pre-emption petition had been filed had already got the status of adjoining raiyat by a subsequent purchase within three months from the date of registration of the earlier purchase deed on the basis of which pre-emption has been claimed.
11. It is the submission of Mr. Allam that if a co-sharer or a raiyat has subsequently by purchase has got the status of co-sharer or a raiyat holding land of adjoining transferred land would not defeat the claim of pre-emption u/s. 16(3) of the Act as on the date of execution and registration of the document of transfer, respondent nos. 5 to 7 had already acquired the right of pre-emption and his such right remained in vogue also on the date of application, when such application has been made within the period mentioned in the Statute itself. Then subsequent purchase giving the status of adjoining raiyat or co-sharer would not defeat the claims of the preemptor. The right of respondent nos. 5 to 7 can only be defeated if such purchase would have been made before the date of application.
12. In this connection, he has referred to a decision of Full Bench of this Court as reported in AIR 1971 Patna, page-302 (Ram Chandra Srivastava v. Parsidh Narain Singh). Now, the position of law being interpreted by different Benches and also by the Full Bench of this Court remained that although the preemptor right is a weak right but it being a statutory right under the Ceiling Act, it can be enforced, if all formalities required under the provisions are being complied with.
13. Thus, if the preemptor has got the existent right on the date of registration and also within the period of, as given by the Statute till a petition is filed u/s. 16(3) of the Ceiling Act then subsequent purchase made by the purchaser from the real owner giving him the status of adjoining raiyat or co-sharer would not defeat the claim of preemptor. Then the point poses that if as is happened in the present case, the purchaser had made a second purchase getting the status of adjoining raiyat or co-sharer within the period of three months from the date of registration of earlier purchase and the period being provided for implementing the right of pre-emption but the petition for pre-emption had been filed within the period but before the second purchase is made then what would happen whether this would cause defeat of the preemptor's right or not.
14. I have searched of myself various judgments passed by this Court on earlier occasions including that of Full Bench and of the Supreme Court, the list of which would be supplied below, but I could not find any decision to be arrived at uptil now in such position as that of the present case.
15. Let me now elaborate the legal position. The right of preemptor accrued in the month of November, 1988 and he had the option to file petition under Section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act till the month of January, 1989 but before that period is expired which he has got every right to do, he had filed a petition in the month of December, 1988 and after filing of this petition and notices being served, the petitioner i.e the purchaser had made a purchase in the month of January, 1989 before the expiry of three months and then took the plea that right of pre-emption of respondent nos. 5 to 7 has been defeated as he has also come at par and of equal status as that of the respondent nos. 5 to 7 i.e preemptors by his second purchase. Period of limitation for filing the pre-emption petition was still there when the second purchase was made by the petitioners at the time of adjudication, definitely the petitioner and respondent nos. 5 to 7 were standing at par and this has been observed by the Member Revenue Board also. When they were at par then definitely no order for pre-emption could be passed against the petitioner on the date order was made. If on the date of application, if sub-section (ii) of Section 16(3) would have been taken recourse of by the original court by giving possession to the preemptor on deposit of the price money including that of 10 per cent as required under the provisions then perhaps the position would have been otherwise, but in the present case, that has not been done. Now, the only question remains whether the right of pre-emption can be defeated, when the petition for pre-emption was already pending by the second purchase of the petitioner as the same is hit by the principle of lis pendens. On this point, I could find out a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1958 S.C Page-838 (Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh). That case was on the basis of Punjab pre-emption Act. The provisions of Section 16(3) of the Bihar Ceiling Act was alike that of the pre-emption provisions under the Punjab Preemption Act. In para-11 of that judgment, how the right of pre-emption can be defeated and in which circumstances, the same may happen has ben enumerated, when it was summarised as follows:
“(1) The right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right.
(2) The preemptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold.
(3) It is a right of substitution but not of re-purchase i.e the preemptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee.
(4) It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of the property sold.
(5) Preference being the essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his place.
(6) The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place.”
16. It was also specifically held that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would not come into play in a suit for pre-emption i.e the principle of lis pendens would not be applicable.
17. Now considering all those principles as enunciated by the Apex Court in a proceeding of pre-emption, it can be said that the preemptory right being a weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods and when principle of lis pendens in not applicable in such proceeding of enforcing a week right then if the vendee gets the status of equal right as that of the preemptor then such right can very well be defeated. In the present case, not only the petitioner has acquired the equal status or at par status with that of the respondent nos. 5 to 7 during the pendency of the proceedings rather he had acquired the same within the period on which the right of pre-emption could have been enforced from the side of the preemptors i.e the three months from the date of registration of the first deed. When the second proviso of Section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act had not been enforced in the present case by giving possession to the preemptors on the date of application or immediately after, and during the course of adjudication already the petitioner had acquired the equal right as that of the preemptor then in my view there is no scope to enforce the right of pre-emption.
18. There is another aspect of this matter. If the deed of reconveyance is made in favour of the preemptor on the basis of the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue as per Section 16(3) of the Act then the petitioner being a co-sharer already by the second purchase can also come up for a further pre-emption u/s. (16)(3) against that re-purchase as such re-purchase is also a purchase in the sense of Transfer of Property Act, then a very anomalous position would arise.
19. Mr. Allam has again taken the plea that even if the second purchase is said to be within the stipulated period of three months for enforcing the right of pre-emption is taken to be a valid one for the purpose of defeating the preemptory right in favour of the petitioner then also that deed being not registered in the month of January, 1989 and being registered on a later date (no date has been mentioned by either of the parties) then the sale could not be said to be a completed one and by such execution of sale deed not being registered cannot be said to be a valid sale in the eye of law.
20. I am not convinced with the submission of Mr. Allam. A sale of immoveable property requires registration under the Registration Act itself and Transfer of Property Act, but registration is a formality which some times takes 5-6 months or extend a year even and after registration the same always relates back to the date of execution and not from the date of registration. Sale becomes valid on the date of execution itself and not on the date of registration. Nowhere, it has been said that the second sale in favour of the petitioner by the original owner had not been registered. So, this submission of Mr. Allam has got no force.
21. On consideration of legal aspects of the matter, I come to the finding that the Member, Board of Revenue committed error of law, although he held that the date on which he was going to pass the order for pre-emption both the parties stood at par but still on technical ground that the petitioner had delayed the proceedings by taking adjournments and in the meantime he had purchased a share getting the status of a co-sharer in the suit property and as such he cannot defeat the claim of pre-emption of the respondent nos. 5 to 7, is improper and unjustified. When the petitioner was taking adjournment then there was every right for the respondent no. 4 i.e the original court to enforce the preemptory right by interim order as per provisions as contained in sub-section (ii) of Section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act, but that was not done and when on the date of application the persons stood with same status, there was no scope to pass order of pre-emption.
22. Hence, this writ petition is hereby allowed. The Order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue as contained in Annexure-A is hereby set aside, while the orders passed by the respondent nos. 3 and 4, as contained in Annexures-5 and 5.A are hereby confirmed.
23. The Rulings which were considered by this Court in coming to the above decision are quoted below:
(1) AIR 1958 S.C page-838 (Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh)
(2) 1985 PLJR, page-554 (Yugal Kishore Singh v. State of Bihar) (Full Bench)
(3) 1985 PLJR, page-662 (Smt. Priyambada Devi v. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna)
(4) 1985 PLJR, page-215 (Raju Kumar Prasad v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna)
(5) AIR 1986 Patna, page-7 (Single Bench) (Saryug Prasad Singh v. Sar-jug Singh)
(6) AIR 1962 Patna, page-125 (Full Bench) (Sheo Kumar v. Smt Sudama Devi)
(7) 1970 PLJR, page-579 : AIR 1971 Patna, page-302 (Full Bench) (Ram Chandra Srivastava v. Prasidh Narain Singh)
(8) 1973 PLJR, page-534 (Division Bench) (Smt. Sudama Devi v. Parmeshwar Narain Singh)
(9) 1993 BBCJ, 338 (Division Bench) (Ram Briksh Yadav v. Rameshwar Yadav)
(10) 1968 BLJR, 33 (Division Bench) Raj Kishore Singh v. Bhuneshvvari Singh)
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