M.Y Eqbal, J.:— In this application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 26.11.1996 passed by Special Judge, C.B.I, Patna whereby and where under the petitioner has been remanded into judicial custody under the provision of Section 167 of the Code in Special Case No. 22 of 1996 and for release of the petitioner from custody in the aforesaid case. The petitioner also seeks a declaration that the modus operandi adopted by the Central Bureau of Investigation of arresting and seeking remand of the petitioner in only one case out of several special cases, in which he figures as an accused at a time, relating to Animal Husbandry Scam and only upon near completion of the statutory period of 90 days of custody in that case arresting afresh the petitioner and seeking his remand under Section 167 of the Code in the second case and again repeating the process on near completion of 90 days of confinement is an abuse and misuse of the power conferred by Section 167 of the Code and is also violative of the guaranteed right of the petitioner, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

2. The petitioner is accused in a few cases out of several cases registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation in the State of Bihar in connection with alleged large scale illegal withdrawal of huge amount from various Treasuries of the Government of Bihar in relation to supply of fodder, medicine etc. to the Department of Animal Husbandry which is commonly known as Animal Husbandry Scam. It appears that in the month of February, 1996, various cases were filed by the State Police spread over several districts of the State relating to the aforesaid Animal Husbandry Scam including the cases which later on were registered aftesh as Special Case Nos. 49 of 1996, 33 of 1996 and 22 of 1996 in the court of Special Judge, C.B.I, Patna. The investigation in 46 odd cases were taken up by the Officers of the various Police stations concerned. While investigation in various cases relating to the said scam were going on writ application by way of Public Interest Litigation was filed in this Court and a Division Bench of this Court directed the C.B.I to take up investigation relating to fraudulent drawals in Animal Husbandry Department, Government of Bihar during the period 1977-1978 to 1995-1996 and lodge case where drawls are found to be fraudulent in character and to conclude investigation within a specified period. This Court by the said Order, suspended investigation by the State Police already instituted by it. It further appears from the record that against the aforesaid order the State of Bihar preferred appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and the said appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. However, the apex Court modified the order of this Court to the effect that the investigation by the State Police in cases already instituted shall remain suspended and directed the C.B.I to take over the investigation of the cases including the F.I.R, arrests and attachments already made therein and deal with them appropriately. Thus, according to direction of the apex Court the C.B.I took over the investigation of all the 40 odd cases instituted till the date of passing of the order and those cases were afresh registered as R.C Cases and were registered in Special Judge, C.B.I Patna and were assigned various Special Case numbers. According to petitioner, all the three special cases in which the petitioner has been arrested one after another were registered as Special Case Nos. 49 of 1996, 33 of 1996 and 22 of 1996.

3. As regard the case of the petitioner, as stated in this application, is that in all the aforesaid three Special Cases in which the petitioner has been arrested, have common patterns and features which had taken place over period of time in almost all the districts of the State. It is stated that in all the three cases the allegation is of excess fraudulent drawls made by the Animal Husbandry Department from concerned treasury pursuant to alleged criminal conspiracy hatched between the Officers of the Animal Husbandry Department, supplier firms and others and in pursuance of such conspiracy on the basis of forged supply order, fake supplies, with drawls were made which were in excess of budgetary allotment. The petitioner further contended in the application that various cases were registered on the basis of territorial jurisdiction of different Police Stations in which withdrawls took place and on the basis of year of withdrawl though as per prosecution case itself all are allegedly transaction effected pursuant to the same larger conspiracy and all the cases have been entrusted to the same agency and are being investigated by the said agency namely, C.B.I According to petitioner, he joined the Bihar Veterinary Service in the year 1968. He was transferred to Ranchi in the year 1974 as Roving Veterinary Officer and thereafter, he was posted as Assistant Director, Animal Husbandry (Planning) in Ranchi Range in the year 1987 and he has been working as such till March-April, 1996 when the petitioner was put under suspension. The petitioner's further case was that he has a clean record of service stretching over two and half decades during which he has been discharging his duties to the satisfaction of one and all. Since the petitioner was made accused in various cases, in some of them he has been named as an accused and in other cases by virtue of the office he has been implicated. However, the petitioner said to have surrendered on 14.6.1996 before the C.B.I authorities at Ranchi in all the cases in which he figured as an accused but the C.B.I in the teeth of the provisions of the Code vide its requisition dated 15.6.1996 produced the petitioner before the Magistrate, namely, C.J.M, Ranchi showing him to be arrested and produced in Special Case No. 49 of 1996 only. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by its order dated 15.6.1996 granted transit remand of the petitioner for being produced before the Special Judge, C.B.I Patna who on the requisition of C.B.I granted police custody of 7 days by his order dated 17.6.1996 It further appears from the instant application that while the petitioner was in custody under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he made an application for bail in a Special Case no. 49 of 1996 vide Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 11853 of 1996 and in that case C.B.I filed a counter affidavit opposing the prayer of bail on various grounds. However, on the basis of requisition dated 10.9.1996 a prayer was made by C.B.I for remand of the petitioner in judicial custody in another case namely, Special Case No. 33 of 1996. The Special Judge, C.B.I by its order dated 12.9.1996 passed an order for remand of the petitioner into custody in the aforementioned Special Case No. 33 of 1996. It further appears that a fresh requisition was made in a Special Case No. 22 of 1996 and remand of the petitioner was sought in the aforementioned case on the ground mentioned therein and the learned Special Judge despite the objection raised by the petitioner that such successive remand was an abuse of process of Court, has passed the impugned order dated 26.11.1996 and remanded the petitioner into judicial custody under the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said order dated 26.11.1996 is impugned in this application.

4. Mr. D.D Thakur, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner made a very exhaustive argument with regard to object and scope of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). The learned counsel firstly submitted that the modus operandi adopted by the C.B.I in not seeking remand of the petitioner in all the cases at a time in which he figures as an accused and adopting a procedure of arresting the petitioner in one after another case only upon near expiry of the maximum statutory period of detention permissible under Section 167 of the Code amounts to gross misuse and abuse of the process of the Court and is violative of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel further submitted that the requisition dated 13.1.1996 submitted by the C.B.I is primarily and predominantly for ensuring indefinite incarceration of the petitioner and not for the purpose for which Section 167 of the Code has been enacted and, therefore, the action of C.B.I is arbitrary and ultra vires the provisions and mandates of provisions of Section 167 of the Code. The learned counsel put strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in C.B.I Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni (AIR 1992 SC 1768) and developed his argument by referring the series of facts and various documents. According to the learned counsel, even as per the investigating agency, the several cases of transactions commonly coined as Animal Husbandry scam are different transactions executed and effected pursuant to a single larger conspiracy allegedly entered into between various Officers, suppliers and others to fraudulently misappropriate the public money then the repeated/successive remand of the petitioner is in sheer contravention of spirit of Section 167 of the Code and against the mandate of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Consequently the impugned orders dated 26th November, 1996 and 9th December, 1996 are illegal and the continued detention of the petitioner in custody is unauthorised in law. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to the three First Information Reports lodged by the respondent State on two different dates i.e, two F.I.Rs were lodged on 4.2.1996 and one F.I.R was lodged on 20.2.1966 According to the learned counsel, when the petitioner had surrendered before the C.B.I on 14th June, 1996, it was not permissible in law for the C.B.I to choose to arrest the petitioner in only one case at a time so that the petitioner may be detained in custody by adopting the illegal method of seeking remand in other cases one by one just prior to expiration of maximum period of custody in the earlier case. Mr. Thakur, learned senior counsel further submitted that even as per C.B.I own case all these defalcations, misappropriations and illegal withdrawls of money were committed pursuant to a single conspiracy by all the officers, including the petitioner in connivance with the suppliers, transporters and other agencies. According to the learned counsel, from the hierarchy of the officers in the Animal Husbandry Department, it will appear that the Department is having one Directorate headed by Director under whom there are Regional Directorate. In the Regional Directorate, there are two wings, namely, the Farms and the Districts. The Farm consists of poultry farm, dairy farm and pigery farm. All the three farms are under the control of one General Manager who is the drawing and disbursing Officer in the District. Whereas each district is headed by District Animal Husbandry Officer who is the Drawing and Disbursing Officer upto a particular amount. According to the learned counsel, in the said Directorate of Animal Husbandry Department, the Regional Director, the Regional Joint Director, the District Animal Husbandry Officer and General Manager of the farm are the Drawing and Disbursing Officers. All of them are principal accused since they are alleged to have drawn the money or approved the payment or issued bank drafts. If that is the position, then, it cannot be said that the illegal with drawl of money in different districts for which different cases have been instituted, was not the result of a single conspiracy. In that view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, the successive remand of the petitioner in the cases one after another is unwarranted in law and is mala fide. In this connection, the learned counsel relied upon a catena of decisions, viz., State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara (1964 3 SCR 297); Srichand K. Khetwami v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 450); Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S Dalipsinghji etc. (1996) 3 SCC 429 and Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujrat (AIR 1984 SC 151). The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that from the allegations made in the FIR in all the three cases, so far the petitioner is concerned, there is no question of excluding the petitioner from all conspiracy. Referring to the various provisions of the Code, the learned counsel lastly submitted that in view of the nature of allegations made in the F.I.R and the modus operandi adopted by C.B.I in invoking the provisions of Section 167 of the Code, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kulkarni's case (supra) fully applies and, therefore, the impugned order of detention of the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.

5. On the other hand, Mr. Rakesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of C.B.I firstly submitted that the impugned order dated 26th November, 1996 was passed in Special Case No. 22 of 1996 by the Special Judge, on the basis of materials available on record and the case diary and after having been satisfied with the accusation against the petitioner as well founded. The learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was taken on remand as and when his complicity transpired in one or the other case, as there was no question of taking the petitioner on remand in other cases on 17th June, 1996, when he was taken on remand in Case No. 49 of 1996. The learned counsel referring to various documents submitted that all the transactions of withdrawl of money in different districts are different and different accused persons figured in different cases, registered by the C.B.I However, the contention of the accused petitioner that all transactions are part of larger conspiracy of the apex, is yet under investigation. It is further submitted that the plea of larger conspiracy raised by the petitioner needs investigation to come to a conclusion regarding the embezzlements that took place. The learned counsel relied upon the decision in Billa Manemma v. State of A.P (1996 Cr. L.J 3404), and submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, successive remands under Section 167 of the Code is permissible in law.

6. Before appreciating the rival contention made by the learned counsels appearing for the parties, it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions of law, including the constitutional guarantee provided to a citizen under the Constitution. In this regard, Articles 21 and 22 are worth to be noticed which read as under:

7. Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Article 22: Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. —(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, on the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.

(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.

(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply-

(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or

(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.

(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless—

(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:

Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or

(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).

8. The scope and the extent of “personal liberty” under Article 21 of the Constitution has been time and again examined by the apex Court in number of cases beginning from A.K Gopalan's case (AIR 1950 SC 27) including the case of Maneka Gandhi (AIR 1978 SC 597). Prioir to the decision in Maneka's case (supra) Article 21 was construed narrowly only as a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law but Maneka's case opened up a new dimension and laid down that it imposed a limitation upon law making as well i.e while prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of his life or personal liberty, it must prescribe a procedure which is reasonable, fair and just. Hence, in each case where a person complains of the deprivation of his life or personal liberty, the Court, in the exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review, has to decide whether there is a law authorising such deprivation and whether, the procedure prescribed by such law is reasonable, fair and just, and not arbitrary, whimsical and fanciful.

9. In the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra) the question falls for consideration before the apex Court was as to whether the power conferred to the authorities under the Passports Act, 1967, for impounding a passport in the interests of the general public is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and whether Section 10(3)(c) of the said Act is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution since it does not prescribe for procedure within the meaning of that Article and the apex Court held as under:—

“We may at this stage consider the inter-relation between Article 21 on the one hand and Articles 14 and 19 on the other. We have already pointed out that the view taken by the majority in A.K Gopalan's case (AIR 1950 SC 27) was that so long as a law of preventive detention satisfies the requirements of Article 22, it would be within the terms of Article 21 and it would not be required to meet the challenge of Article 19. This view proceeded on the assumption that “certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters and where the requirments of an Article dealing with the particular matter in question are satisfied and there is no infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by that article, no recourse can be had to a fundamental right conferred by another article.”

10. It is obvious that Article 21, though couched in negative language, confers the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. So far as the right to personal liberty is concerned, it is ensured by providing that no one shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law.

11. In the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (AIR 1981 SC 746) again the question with regard to scope of Article 21 came for consideration before the apex Court and it was held as under:—

“Our Constitution does recognise the existence of this power, but it is hedged in by various safeguards set out in Articles 21 and 22. Article 22 in clauses (4) to (7) deals specifically with safeguards against preventive detention and any law of preventive detention or action by way of preventive detention taken under such law must be in conformity with the restrictions laid down by those clauses in pain of invalidation. But apart from Article 22, there is also Article 21 which lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. Until the decision in this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; (AIR 1978 SC 597) a very narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in Article 21 and that article was understood to embody only that aspect of the rule of law, which requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without the authority of law. It was construed only as a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law. So long as there was some law, which prescribed a procedure authorising deprivation of life or personal liberty, it was supposed to meet the requirement of Article 21. But in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra), this Court for the first time opened-up a new dimension of Article 21 and laid down that Article 21 is not only a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law, but is also a restriction on law making. It is not enough to secure compliance with the prescription of Article 21 that there should be a law prescribing some semblance of a procedure for depriving a person of his life or personal liberty, but the procedure prescribed by the law must be reasonable, fair and just and if it is not so, the law would be void as violating the guarantee of Article 21.”

12. In order to appreciate the duties of the police, in the matter of investigation of offences, it is necessary to refer to the provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Code. That chapter deals with ‘Information to the Police and their powers to investigate” and it contains various sections beginning from Section 154, and ending with Section 176. Section 154 deals with information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, and the procedure to be adopted in respect of the same. Section 155, similarly deals with information in respect of non-cognizable offences. Sub-section (2) of this section prohibits a police officer from investigating a non-cognizable case, without the order of a Magistrate. Section 156 authorises a police officer in-charge of a police station, to investigate any cognizable case, without the order of a Magistrate. Therefore, it will be seen that large powers are conferred on the police, in the matter of investigation into a cognizable offence. Sub-section (3) of Section 156, provides for any Magistrate, empowered under Section 190, to order an investigation. Section 157 lays down the procedure for investigation. In cases where a cognizable offence is suspected to have been committed, the Officer-in-Charge of a police station, after sending a report to the Magistrate, is entitled under Section 157 to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and also to take steps for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Clause (b), of the proviso to Section 157(1), gives a discretion to the police officer not to investigate the case, if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation. Section 158 deals with the procedure to be adopted in the matter of a report to be sent, under Section 157. Section 159 gives power to a Magistrate on receiving a report under Section 157, either to direct an investigation, himself or through another Magistrate subordinate to him, to hold a preliminary enquiry into the matter, or otherwise dispose of the case, in accordance with the Code. Section 160 deals with the power of the police to require attendance of witnesses. Section 161 empowers the police officer to examine witness during investigation and record statements. Sections 165 and 166 deal with the power of police officers, in the matter of conducting searches during an investigation, in the circumstances mentioned therein. Section 167 provides for the procedure to be adopted by the police, when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours. Section 168 provides for a report being sent to the Officer-in-charge of a police station, about the result, of an investigation, when such investigation has been made by a subordinate police officer. Section 169 authorises a police officer to release a person from custody, on his executing a bond, to appear, if and when so required before a Magistrate, in cases when on investigation it appears to the officer-in-charge of the police station, or to the police officer making the investigation, that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate. Section 170 empowers the officer-in-charge of a police station, after investigation if it appears to him that there is sufficient evidence, to forward the accused, under custody, to a competent Magistrate or to take security from the accused for his appearance before the Magistrate, in cases where the offence is bail able. Section 172 makes it obligatory on the police officer making an investigation, to maintain a diary recording the various particulars therein and in the manner indicated in that section. Section 173 provides for an investigation, to be completed, without unnecessary delay and also makes it obligatory, on the Officer incharge of the police station to send a report to the Magistrate concerned in the manner provided therein, containing the necessary particulars. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 empowers the police officer to make further investigation in respect of an offence even after a report under sub-section (2) is forwarded to the Magistrate.

13. From the perusal of the above sections it appears that very elaborate provisions have been made for securing that an investigation takes place into a reported offence and the investigation is carried out within the limits of the law, without causing any harassment to the accused and is also completed without unnecessary or undue delay. It further shows that the investigation aforesaid takes in several aspects, and stages, ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police as to whether, on the material covered and collected a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge-sheet or a final report is dependent on the nature of the opinion, so formed of the said opinion, by the police, is the final step in the investigation, and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority.

14. The relevant section, the scope and application of which is under sonsideration is Secion 167 of the Code which reads as under:—

“Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. — (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigaion, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has no jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole, and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that—

(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding—

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter.

(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him;

(c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.

Explanation I.—For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.

Explanation II.—If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under paragraph (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention.

(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the officer in-charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub-inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate, or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and where an order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2):

Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be.

(3) A Magistrate authorising under the section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing.

(4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

(5) If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary.

(6) Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5) the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify.”

15. From reading of the provision of Section 167 together with Section 57 of the Code it is clear that the police officer cannot detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for more than 24 hours and an investigation by the police ought to be completed within 24 hours. Section 167(1) comtemplates that if it appears to the police officer that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours fixed by Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there are grounds for believing that the accusation is well founded, the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer making investigation shall forthwith transmit the accused to the nearest Judicial Magistrate. The Magistrate to whom the accused person is forwarded can authorise the detention of the accused for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. However, under proviso to the aforesaid section a Magistrate can authorise the detention in judicial custody beyond the period of fifteen days but not exceeding more than ninety days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisoment for a term not less than ten years and sixty days where the investigation relates to any other offence. On the expiry of the aforementioned period the accused person has to be released on bail if he is prepared to furnish bail. The power of the police officer under Section 167 of the Code and its scope has been considered by the apex Court at length in Kulkarni's case (supra) and the law has been settled by the apex Court in this regard. It has been held by the apex Court that the Magistrate under this section can authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit but it should not exceed fifteen days in the whole. It is further held that the Magistrate is empowered to authorise the detention of accused in custody during investigation for a period of ninety days in cases relating to major offences and in other cases sixty days. This provision for custody of ninety days is intended to remove difficulties which actually arise in completion of the investigation of an offence of serious nature. However, their Lordships have answered the question involved in this writ application at paragraph 11 of the judgment which reads as follows:

“A question may then arise whether a person arrested in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him during an occurrence can be detained again in police custody in respect of another offence committed by him in the same case and which fact comes to light after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days of his arrest. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that as a result of the investigation carried on and the evidence collected by the police the arrested accused may be found to be involved in more serious offences than the one for which he was originally arrested and that in such a case there is no reason as to why the accused who is in magisterial custody should not be turned over to police custody at a subsequent stage of investigation when the information discloses his complicity in more serious offences. We are unable to agree. In one occurrence it may so happen that the accused might have committed several offences and the police may arrest him in connection with one or two offences on the basis of the available information and obtain police custody. If during the investigation his complicity in more serious offences during the same occurrence is disclosed that does not authorise the police to ask for police custody for a further period after the expiry of the first fifteen day. If this is permitted then the police can go on adding some offence or the other of a serious nature at various stages and seek further-detention in police custody repeatedly, this would defeat the very object underlying Section 167. However, we must clarify that this limitation shall not apply to a different occurrence in which complicity of the arrested accused is disclosed. That would be a different transaction and if an accused is in judicial custody in connection with one case and to enable the police to complete their investigation of the other case they can require his detention in police custody for the purpose of associating him with the investigation of the other case. In such a situation he must be formally arrested in connection with other case and then obtain the order of the magistrate for detention in police custody.”

16. In the light of the principle laid down by the apex Court in Kulkarni's case (supra) I have only to examine the facts and allegations made in the three F.I.Rs which gave rise to three special cases, so far as the petitioner is concerned, to come to a finding as to whether the above three occurrences are different in which complicity of arrested accused is disclosed and the same form separate transactions.

17. Before discussing the allegations made in the three F.I.Rs it is necessary to mention here that out of three F.I.Rs two have been lodged on the same date, i.e, 4.2.1996 but in two different police stations. One F.I.R was lodged by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi Sadar police station, Ranchi which was registered as Sadar Police Station Case No. 016 of 1996 and it was ultimately registered as Special Case No. 33 of 1996. The second F.I.R was lodged by Additional District Magistrate (Law and Order), Ranchi in Doranda Police Station which was registered as Doranda Police Station Case No. 44 of 1996 and the same was ultimately registered as Special Case No. 49 of 1996. The third F.I.R was lodged on 20.2.1996 by the District Magistrate, Singhbhum (West), Chaibasa in Singhbhum Police Station, Chaibasa which was registered as Singhbhum Police Station Case No. 12 of 1996 and the same was ultimately registered as Special Case No. 22 of 1996. I shall refer these cases as Special Case No. 33 of 1996, 49 of 1996 and 22 of 1996. It is, therefore, clear that two cases were instituted in two different police stations in the District of Ranchi by two officers, namely, Deputy Commissioner and Additional District Magistrate (Law and Order), Ranchi. The third case was registered in another district of Singhbhum, Chaibasa.

18. In the first report of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi reference has been made to the Fax message dated 19.1.1996 received from the Finance Department, Government of Bihar, whereby information was sought for in respect of withdrawl made by Animal Husbandry Department in the month of November and December, 1995 from Ranchi and Doranda Treasury under diffident heads. After collecting information from Ranchi and Doranda Treasury for the aforesaid month in the different heads it transpired that in the month of November, 1995 a sum of Rs. 93,27,393.85 and in the month of December, 1995 a sum of Rs. 18,64,922/- was withdrawn from Ranchi Treasury. Similarly, in the month of November, 1995, a sum of Rs. 3,03,95,324 and in the month of December, 1995, Rs. 10,57,59,085/- was withdrawn from Doranda Treasury. It was further reported that after getting information regarding the aforesaid huge withdrawal, it was necessary to immediately collect the allotment letter, bill books, treasury register etc. from the relevant officers. The concerned officers were not found in the office of General Manager, Milk and Dairy Project, Hotwar, Ranchi. However, the office have been sealed and police force have been deployed in the said office. In the report the details of withdrwal from Ranchi Treasury have been given from May, 1995 to December, 1995 and it is reported that during this period a sum of Rs. 8,64,85,238 was withdrawn. It is further stated in the said report that from the letters referred therein it transpired that for the year 1995-1996 only a sum of Rs. 2000/- was allotted to the General Manager, Milk Supply and Dairy Project, Hotwar, Ranchi against the supply of materials and a sum of Rs. 6,97,000/- was allotted by the Department for purchase of fodder and feed. The details of allotment have been given in the said report and it is said that Dr. Ram Prakesh Rai, General Manager, Milk Supply and Dairy Project, Hotwar, Ranchi has withdrawn Rs. 8,51,66,238 from Ranchi Treasury in excess to the budget provision and the marked allotment by Animal Husbandry and Fishery Department to the said General Manager. From the details collected from Ranchi Treasury, State Bank of India and Accountant General Office of Ranchi, it further transpired that withdrawl of huge amount by Dr. Rai, General Manager has been made and the same has been disbursed to different persons/firms. It was further reported that in most of the bills, supply order has been issued by the Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, South Chhota Nagpur Region, Ranchi to different firms/institutions and that, as a matter of fact, neither the materials were supplied nor the same were, in fact, received and only there has been paper transaction. Besides other allegations it has been said in the report by the Deputy Commissioner that the General Manager, Milk Supply, Hotwar, Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, Ranchi, Manager, Bhigro Development Unit No. 10, Hotwar in connivance with proprietor of. Trishul Enterprises misappropriated Government money on the basis of forged bills from the Treasury. In a nutshell by this report of the Deputy Commissioner lodged with the Sadar Police Station, Ranchi, huge amount of misappropriation of Government money has been alleged in the Milk Supply and Dairy Farm Region, Hotwar. In other words, this F.I.R relates to illegal withdrawl and misappropriation of Government money by the different units of Milk Supply and Dairy Farm, Hotwar, Ranchi.

19. Another F.I.R dated 4.2.1996 which was lodged by Additional District Magistrate (Law and Order), Ranchi with the Doranda Police Station (Doranda Police Station Case No. 44 of 1996.Special Case No. 49 of 1996), relates to illegal withdrawal of money from the Treasury by the officers of different Regional and District levels of the Animal Husbandry Department situated at Ranchi. From this F.I.R it appears that when it came to the notice of the Government that in the month of November, 1995, a sum of Rs. 93,27,393.85 and in the month of December, 1995, a sum of Rs. 18,64,922 was withdrawn from Ranchi Treasury and a sum of Rs. 3,03,25,324 and Rs. 10.57.59.085 was withdrawn in the aforesaid two months from Doranda Treasury, an enquiry was conducted and on account of non-availability of officers all the papers and documents were seized and the offices were locked. On further enquiry it was found that Mr. R.R Sahay, Regional Joint Director, South Chhota Nagpur Region, Ranchi withdrew a sum of Rs. 19,81,66,460/- during the period September, 1995 to December, 1995. It is reported that Mr. Junul Bhengraj was posted as Regional Director, Animal Husbandry Department, South Chhota Nagpur Region, Ranchi and Dr. R.R Sahay was posted in his office as Regional Joint Director, South Chhota Nagpur Region, Ranchi. Dr. Krishna Mohan Prasad, the petitioner was posted as officer in that office. It also transpired that the Government has declared Regional Director as Drawing and Disbursing officer but he had authorised it to the Joint Director. It was further reported that although the withdrawal of the money against the bills were done by the Regional Joint Director but in the vouchers attached with the bills, acceptance orders were given by the Regional Director, Animal Husbandry Department, South Chhota Nagpur Region, Ranchi in the year 1995-1996. It has also been reported that in the year 1995-1996 the Government of Bihar allotted Rs. 1,50,000/- for materials distribution and as against it Rs. 19.80 crores extra was withdrawn from Doranda Treasury. In the said F.I.R the details of the illegal withdrawal of money by the Regional Director and disbursement of the same to different suppliers have been given. During enquiry huge amount of assets in the shape of cash, gold, deposits and securities have been found in the name of different persons who were involved in the withdrawl and misappropriation of Government money. The report further gave details of the huge amount of money disbursed to different persons against forged and fake bills and vouchers. In the concluding portion of the report it is said that the aforesaid illegal withdrawl of Government money had been made in connivance and conspiracy by 17 officers named in the said report including the top 4 officers, namely, Dr. Bhengraj, Regional Director, Dr. K.N Jha, Ex-Regional Director, Dr. R.R Sahay, Regional Joint Director and the petitioner, Dr. Krishna Mohan Prasad, Assistant Director (Planning).

20. In the third F.I.R lodged by the Deputy Commissioner (West) Singhbhum, Chaibasa (Sadar Thana Chaibasa Police Station Case No. 12 of 1996.Special Case No. 22 of 1996), the large scale irregular and forged defalcation of Government money from the Treasury has been reported during the period 1995-1996. In the said report it is said that in the financial year 1994-1995 Dr. B.N Sharma, District Animal Husbandry Officer (West) Singhbhum, Chaibasa, made withdrawl for contingency expenses and disbursed huge amount to different firms. According to the report submitted by the committee Dr. Sharma had made payment of Rs. 35,66,42,083 to different firms named in the said report. It was also reported that payments have been made as against the receipt of supply of materials by the officers who were posted as Assistant Director, Hotwar Region, Mobile Animal Husbandry Officers, Chaibasa, Assistant Poultry Officer and Manager, Government Animal Fertility Region, Saraikella. The persons who were posted in those posts have also been named in the said report. The details of the irregularities and withdrawal of money have been given in the said report and it is said that payments been made by way of filing of forged allotment and bills without any application. It is also reported that bills which have been passed in district treasury under the head 2403 Animal Husbandry have not been mentioned in subject head and minor head of 2403. The Treasury Officer, Accounts Incharge, Assistant have not enquired about the huge allotment without subject head and minor head. The illegality and irregularity in the supply of receipt and materials have also been mentioned in the said report. In the concluding portion of the report it is said that Dr. B.N Sharma, who was posted as District Animal Husbandry Officer, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa along with Dr. Mukesh Kumar, Dr. Harendra Kumar Verma, Dr. Nand Kishore Rai, Dr. Dub Rai, Dr. Gaya Prasad Tripathy and several other persons who were subordinate to District Animal Husbandry Officers, Chaibasa and the Treasury Officers have joined together in the commission of defalcation and misappropriation of huge amount of Government money.

21. From the three reports aforesaid made by three different officers in three different police stations it appears that in one of the report the petitioner, Dr. K.M Prasad has been shown as directly involved in the commission of the offence. It further appears that one F.I.R relates to illegal withdrawal and defalcation/misappropriation of Government money by the Regional Director, Joint Regional Director, Assistant Director and other officers of the Animal Husbandry Department of South Chhota Nagpur Region in different units of the district of Ranchi. The second F.I.R relates to illegal withdrawal and defalcation/misappropriation of Government money by the General Manager of Milk Supply and Dairy Project (Farm House), Hotwar, Ranchi in connivance with other officers of the said department at Ranchi and the third F.I.R relates to illegal withdrawl and defalcation/misappropriation of Government money by the District Animal Husbandry Officers in connivance and conspiracy with other officers of the said department posted at Chaibasa. From the third F.I.R it appears to me that the conspiracy of different Officers have been reported. It is also evident from the said report that modus operandi adopted by the officers for the withdrawal of money are same but the occurrences are different and the officers and suppliers/transporters are different. The transaction took place in different places and under different heads of allotment. For example, in the Ranchi District one F.I.R relates to withdrawal of money by the General Manager, Milk Supply and Dairy Project (Farm House) while another was in the different Animal Husbandry Department in the district. The third occurrence took place in the district of Chaibasa at the level of District Animal Husbandry Officers. It also appears to me that different accused persons figured in different cases instituted by the police. However, it was submitted by Mr. Thakur, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that all transactions in different districts are part of larger conspiracy of the officers posted in the Directorate level. The submission of the counsel may be appreciated but not at this stage when the matter is yet under investigation. The investigation is going on and at this stage, it is not for the Court to form an opinion as to whether all these withdrawls and defalcations of Government money had arisen by way of larger conspiracy at the highest level. In other words, this Court can not form opinion that all the embezzlement took place under the direction of larger conspiracy by a few people at the apex.

22. In this connection it is worth to quote the observation made by Lord Porter in the case of King Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed (1945 PC 18) which is as follows:

“Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged. So it is of utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance, of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own functions, always of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 492 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then.”

23. As stated above, the petitioner was firstly remanded in connection with one case (Special Case No. 49 of 1996) in which direct involvement of the petitioner was alleged. Subsequently, when the involvement of the petitioner in other cases came into light during investigation then his remand in other cases were sought for by the C.B.I In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the remand of the petitioner in different cases separately cannot be said to be illegal in view of the circumstances clarified by the apex Court in Kulkarni's case (supra). I must repeat again that part of the observation under which the case of the petitioner falls and the said observation reads as under:—

“However, we must clarify that this limitation shall not apply to a different occurrence in which complicity of the arrested accused is disclosed. That would be a different transaction and if an accused is in judicial custody in connection with one case and to enable the police to complete their investigation of the other case they can require his detention in police custody for the purpose of associating him with the investigation of the other case. In such a situation he must be formally arrested in connection with other case and then obtain the order of the magistrate for detention in police custody.”

24. In the case of Billa Manemma v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996 Cr. L.J 3404) a similar question came for consideration before the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The question that arose before their Lordships for consideration was where a person is accused in many cases of various Police Stations and is lodged in jail pursuant to the order of remand passed in some of the cases, even though he was released in some other cases, can his detention in jail be treated as illegal detention? The Division Bench of the said High Court while interpreting Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also sub-section (2A) as inserted by Act 45 of 1978 held as under:

“Para 16. Thus in case where a person is accused in more case than one, the Officer in Charge of the Police Station or the Investigating Officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, has to produce the accused in each case and obtain order as to remand in the police custody or otherwise. In our view the above provisions cannot be so construed as to enjoin the Police Officer to produce the accused in all the cases at one and the same time and obtain one order of remand; in some cases even it may not be beneficial to the accused himself. Where the offences are committed within the jurisdiction of various Police Stations or where a single agency like the Anti Dacoity Cell, is entrusted with the task of investigation and prosecution of the accused persons, no different principle for production of the accused person or obtaining order or remand can be laid down. Where the accused person is lodged in jail pursuant to an order passed by any Magistrate and his application for bail is rejected in a case or in one of the several cases filed against him or where he does not obtain or apply for bail, his detention in jail commonly known as ‘judicial custody’ cannot be held to be illegal.”

“Para 17. Reverting to the facts of this case, the alleged detenu is said to be involved in 15 cases; out of these cases he was remanded to judicial custody in six cases. Though he was granted bail in five of the six cases, in the sixth case his bail application was rejected both by the learned Magistrate as well as the learned Sessions Judge. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the alleged detenu who is lodged in jail, is in illegal custody.”

25. Learned Special Judge, Patna in his order dated 26.11.1996 has taken into consideration the materials came during investigation to the effect that in Special Case No. 22 of 1996 also well founded accusation came against the petitioner with other persons in as much as by reason of conspiracy entered into between four accused persons including the petitioner of withdrawal of Rs. 35 crores was made on the basis of fake supply orders. Learned Special Judge has taken into consideration the submission of the counsel for the C.B.I that the documents relating to supply order of this case were seized in connection with some other cases and the said documents were received by Investigating Officer of the case only on 31.10.1996 and the Investigating Officer on scrutinizing the files and other documents found as to whether accusation against them. The learned Special Judge, therefore, after taking into consideration the evidence ordered for remand of the petitioner in that case. I do not find any infirmity in the said order as I have noticed the case in which the impugned order of remand has been passed by the Special Judge relating to Chaibasa District where huge amount of illegal withdrawl of Government money was reported at the instance of the Officers posted there. During investigation, that the complicity of the petitioner has been disclosed. At this stage, the transaction took place at Chaibasa cannot be said to be connected with the offence committed at Ranchi because of a larger conspiracy which is the case of the petitioner.

26. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the apex Court, the impugned order of remand passed by the Special Judge, Patna cannot be said to be illegal or in the teeth of the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

27. In the result, there is no merit in this application which is, accordingly, dismissed. However, it is observed that the respondent C.B.I shall take all endeavours to conclude the investigation and file the chargesheet, in the instant case, as expeditiously as possible.