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Sumitra Devi v. Executive Engineer, Udar Asthan Irrigation Division, Jahanabad, Gaya
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Nagendra Rai, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was filed under section 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 against the judgment dated 18 March 1980 of the Commissioner (Workmen Compensation Case No. 12 of 1977/6 of 1978) which dismissed the appellant's application for compensation under section 3 of the Act.
The claim arises from the death of Narendra Kumar, who had been appointed as a seasonal Khalasi by the Irrigation Department on 21 July 1975 for a period up to 20 October 1975. On 1 October 1975 he was on duty at Dhawal Bigha Regulator under the Udar Asthan Irrigation Scheme. The appellant (his wife) alleged that he was murdered while on night duty on 1 October 1975 and filed a claim for Rs. 16,800 as compensation under section 3 of the Act.
The respondent (Executive Engineer) contested the claim principally on two grounds: (1) that the deceased was not a “workman” as defined under the Act; and (2) that the deceased did not die by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
Both parties led oral evidence (two witnesses each). Key evidentiary points include admissions by respondent witnesses that the deceased was on duty at the canal at the relevant time and that firing was heard; blood was found near the place of duty but the dead body was not found there. The Commissioner dismissed the application. The case was then placed before the High Court, and the learned Single Judge referred two questions to a Division Bench for determination.
Legal Issues Presented
- Is it open to the appellant to dispute the finding of fact duly arrived at by the Labour Court when section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provides that no appeal shall lie unless a substantial question of law is involved?
- Whether the murder of an employee at the instance of his enemies will bring the case within the course of employment simply because he was murdered at the place of his duty?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The deceased was a seasonal Khalasi on duty on 1 October 1975 at Dhawal Bigha Regulator and was killed while on night duty; she claimed compensation under section 3 of the Act (amount Rs. 16,800).
- Evidence (her testimony and that of A.W.2) supported that the deceased was on duty and was done to death while on duty.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that the deceased was not a "workman" within section 2(n) of the Act.
- Alternatively, the respondent contended that the deceased did not die by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment (the Commissioner found the death to be due to old enmity).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Cardillo Frank A. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (330 U.S. 469) | Observation that the phrase “arising out and in course of employment” is deceptively simple and leads to extensive litigation. | Used to note the conceptual difficulty and litigative complexity of the phrase before turning to authoritative Indian authority. |
| M. Mackenzie v. I.M. Issak ((1969) 2 SCC 607 : AIR 1970 SC 1906) | Explains that to fall within the Act an injury must arise both out of and in the course of employment; “in the course of employment” means work incidental to employment; “arising out of employment” requires a causal relationship—injury resulting from a risk incidental to duties. | The court relied on this formulation to require a causal relationship between the employment and the accident; it applied the test to hold the death arose out of and in the course of employment. |
| Madan Lal v. Mangali (A.I.R. 1961 Rajasthan 45) | Holds the word “and” in the definition of “workman” is conjunctive—both conditions (employment is casual and employed otherwise than for employer's trade or business) must be satisfied to exclude a labourer from being a workman. | The court adopted this view to find the Commissioner erred in excluding the deceased from the definition of “workman” because the employer had not proved both conjunctive conditions. |
| Koju v. Joseph (1980 Lab. I.C. 902 (Ker.)) | Clarifies that “employment of casual nature” refers to the nature of employment (protracted vs. transient) and is distinct from the question whether a person is casually employed. | The court relied on this distinction to determine that guarding the canal was not transitory and therefore the employment could not be characterised as casual in the statutory sense. |
| Superintending Engineer v. Andammal (1983 A.C.J. 286 (Mad.)) | Held that where an employee regulating water was killed at his place of duty by a person against whom he had complained, there was causal and proximate connection between employment and accident. | The court cited the case as analogous authority supporting compensation where death occurred at place of duty from persons encountered because of employment duties. |
| Mohanlal Prabhuram v. Fine Knitting Mills Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 387) | Established that when a workman on duty is assaulted (with outside help) resulting in serious injury, there can be a causal relationship between accident and employment. | Invoked as supporting precedent that assaults occurring while on duty may give rise to employer liability under the Act. |
| Naima Bibi v. Lodhre Colliery Co. ((1977) 50 FJR 252) | Held that a colliery worker assaulted while on colliery premises after performing duty was at the spot because of employment, so the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. | Applied by the court to reinforce that presence at the spot because of employment can establish the necessary causal link for compensation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing the two referred questions and analysing the factual record in the light of statutory definitions and authorities.
1. Scope of appeal under section 30 of the Act
- The court examined section 30 which allows appeals only where a "substantial question of law" is involved. It noted the legislature did not define "substantial question of law."
- The court rejected a narrow reading that would permit only questions of general public importance or issues without settled authority. Instead it adopted a liberal approach: an arguable question of law or a question where there is room for difference of opinion qualifies as substantial.
- The court specified situations that would constitute a substantial question of law for section 30: where the Commissioner overlooked material evidence, relied on inadmissible evidence, applied the law wrongly, based findings on no evidence, relied on conjecture or surmise, or misconstrued statutory provisions. By contrast, mere possibility of a different view on the same facts or insufficiency of material is not a substantial question of law.
- On this basis the court held it is open to the appellant to challenge a finding of fact if it falls within the enumerated errors of law.
2. Whether the deceased was a "workman"
- The court analysed the definition of "workman" in section 2(n) of the Act and emphasised the conjunctive use of "and" (as held in Madan Lal v. Mangali): to exclude a person from the definition both conditions must be satisfied (employment is of a casual nature and employed otherwise than for employer's trade or business).
- The court noted the admitted facts: the deceased was employed as a casual Khalasi and was on duty guarding the canal/regulator at the relevant time, which was engagement "for the purposes of the employer's trade or business."
- Because the employer/respondent did not prove both conjunctive conditions, the Commissioner erred in holding the deceased was not a workman. The court found this to be an error of law of substantial nature.
- The court additionally addressed the meaning of "employment of casual nature" (citing Koju v. Joseph) and emphasised the inquiry is into the nature of employment (protracted vs. transient), not merely the mode of engagement (casual appointment or daily wages). Given the recurrent annual need to guard the canal and the non-transitory nature of that duty, the court concluded the employment could not be classified as casual in the statutory sense.
3. Whether the death arose out of and in the course of employment
- The court applied the test from M. Mackenzie v. I.M. Issak: injury must both arise out of and in the course of employment; there must be a causal relationship between employment and the accident, i.e., injury resulting from a risk incidental to the duties of the service.
- The Commissioner had found the death was due to old enmity and not an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The court held that this finding was based on overlooking material evidence and on hearsay/conjecture: the applicant's wife in cross-examination said the deceased was done to death by an enemy but she was not at the scene and that statement amounted to conjecture/surmise.
- The court noted admitted respondent evidence: respondent witnesses admitted the deceased was on duty, one heard firing, and blood was found near the place of duty though the body was not found there. The respondents produced no material evidence to show the death occurred for reasons unconnected with employment.
- Relying on analogous precedents (Superintending Engineer v. Andammal; Mohanlal Prabhuram; Naima Bibi), the court found a causal and proximate connection between the employment (guarding the regulator) and the assault resulting in death. Because the deceased was at the spot by reason of his employment and was attacked while on duty, the court concluded the death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Commissioner is set aside and the appellant's claim for compensation under section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is allowed. The appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 6% from the date of filing of the application until payment.
Implications: The direct effect is that the appellant (wife of the deceased) succeeds and will receive compensation with interest; the Commissioner's earlier finding denying workmen status and denying compensation was overturned as suffering from errors of law and misappreciation of evidence. The opinion applies existing legal principles (as cited) to find a causal nexus between the employment and the fatal attack; the judgment does not announce that it establishes a new general precedent beyond applying and following cited authorities.
Judge Ashish N. Trivedi concurred with the judgment (short note: "I agree").
Nagendra Rai, J.:—The present appeal has been filed u/s 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the judgment dated 18th March, 1980, passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Patna, in Workmen Compensation Case No. 12 of 1977/6 of 1978, by which the application filed by the appellant for compensation u/s 3 of the Act has been dismissed.
2. The deceased Narendra Kumar was appointed as seasonal Khalasi under the Irrigation Department by the Assistant Engineer, Udar Asthan in the district of Gaya on 21st July, 1975 for a period upto 20th October, 1975. On 1.10.1975 he was on duty at Dhawal Bigha Regulator under Udar Asthan Irrigation Scheme. According to the appellant, her husband Narendra Kumar while on night duty on 1.10.1975 at Dhawal Bigha Regulator was done to death. She filed a claim application u/s 3 of the Act claiming Rs. 16,800/- as compensation.
3. The respondent Executive Engineer contested the claim primarily on two grounds; firstly, that the deceased was not a workman as defined under the Act and, secondly, that the deceased did not die by an accident arising out and in course of his employment.
4. Both the parties examined two witnesses each in support of their cases. Applicant examined herself as A.W 1 and one Aditya Narayan Pandey as A.W 2. The applicant stated that her husband was on duty and he was murdered at the Dhawal Bigha Regulator. In cross-examination she stated that her husband was murdered due to old enmity. A.W 2 stated that the deceased Narendra Kumar was done to death while he was on duty.
5. The respondent has examined P.K Krishna Panikar, Junior Engineer, posted in the Irrigation Department at the relevant time as O.P.W 1 and Binda Singh, Canal Meth, as O.P.W 2. O.P.W 1 has admitted that at the relevant time the deceased was on duty at Canal on Regulator and Chawkidar informed him that he was traceless and then he reported that the deceased perhaps has died. O.P.W 2 has stated that he was sleeping along with the deceased at the place of duty and he woke up on hearing the sound of firing. Thereafter, he fled away.
6. The Commissioner under the Act held that the deceased was not a workman as defined u/s 2(n) of the Act and even assuming that he was a workman, he did not die by an accident arising out and in the course of his employment and, as such, the applicant is not entitled to compensation under the Act.
7. The matter was placed for final hearing before the learned Single Judge of this Court, who has referred the case to a Division Bench, as, according to him, two important questions arise for determination in this case which are as follows:—
(1) Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, provides that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. Is it open to the appellant to dispute the finding of fact duly arrived at by the Labour Court?
(2) Whether the murder of an employee at the instance of his enemies will bring the case in the course, of employment, simply because he was murdered at the place of his duty?
8. The first question to be determined is as to the scope of the appeal u/s 30 of the Act. The relevant portion of Sec. 30 of the Act runs as follows:—
(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:—
(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for lump sum;
(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4-A;
(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment;
(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;
(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12; or,
(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions:
Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees:
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9. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions shows that the appeal lies only on a substantial question of law. The Legislature has not indicated therein as to what is the substantial question of law and, as such, it is neither desirable nor practicable to state as to what are the situations where a substantial question of law will be said to be involved in the appeal. However, this much is clear that if a question of fact has been determined by the Commissioner after taking into consideration the materials on the record and by applying well settled principles of law then this Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact only on the ground that two views are possible or on appreciation of evidence a different view than the view taken by the Commissioner can be taken.
10. The meaning and import of the words “substantial question of law” has been the subject matter of discussion and decision by the various High Courts and the Apex Court. So far as the question of general public importance and the questions where no final decision has been given by the Higher Courts or finally settled by the Supreme Court are concerned, the same have been held to be the questions involving substantial questions of law. However, such questions will arise only in far and few cases and if the Section 30 is interpreted to include only those two situations, in that case, Section 30 will not serve its purpose especially when Section 30 provides for the first appeal against the judgment of the Commissioner. In my view, this section has to be given a liberal meaning. If a question of law arising between the parties is of arguable nature, then that will be a good ground of appeal u/s 30 of the Act. Apart from the aforesaid grounds if the Commissioner while arriving at the finding of fact has over-looked the material evidence or has relied upon inadmissible evidence or has applied the law wrongly or his finding is based on no evidence or is based on only conjecture and surmises or has over-looked the statutory provision or misconstrued the same, then such question for the purpose of Sec. 30 will be said to be the substantial question of law. However, I would like to add that insufficiency of material in arriving at a finding or re-appreciation of evidence on the ground that the different view is possible on the same set of fact cannot be said to be a substantial question of law. For the purpose of Sec. 30 of the Act, if the question of law is fairly arguable or where there is a room for difference of opinion with regard to the question involved, then the question will be treated as substantial question of law. Thus, in my considered view, it is open to the appellant to challenge the finding of facts duly arrived at by the lower court on any of the grounds, mentioned above.
11. So far as the second question formulated by the learned single Judge is concerned, in my view, that question will arise only when the finding of fact arrived at by the Commissioner that the deceased died at the place of duty on account of some old enmity and not by an accident arising out of and in course of his employment is found to be a finding of fact arrived at in accordance with law.
12. As stated above, the Commissioner has negatived the claim of the appellant on the grounds. Now, it has to be seen as to whether the finding arrived at by the Commissioner on the aforesaid two points are finding of fact duly recorded according to law.
13. The “workman” has been defined u/s 2(n) of the Act, which runs as follows:
“Workman” means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is—
(i) a railway servant as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or
(ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II,
whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of (the Armed Forces of the Union); and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependents or any of them.”
14. Admittedly, the deceased was employed as casual Khalasi by a competent authority of the Irrigation Department. It is also an admitted position that at the time when he is alleged to have been murdered he was on duty at Dhawal Bigha Canal Regulator to protect the Canal and the said duty will be treated to be a trade and business in terms of the aforesaid definition read with Schedule II. It is provided therein that the person whose employment is of casual nature and is employed for the purposes of the employer's trade or business will be treated a workman for the purposes of the Act. Before a person will not be treated as a workman, two conditions are to be proved, i.e, his employment is of casual nature and he was not employed for the purpose of employer's trade or business. Both the requirements have to be read conjunctively and both the conditions have to be proved by the employer before employee is denied the benefit under the Act. As the Act has provided for payment of compensation by the employer to their workmen, the onus is on the employer to prove that the particular person claiming compensation is not a workman. In this case, as stated above, it is not disputed that the deceased was on duty and, as such, he was engaged in trade or business in terms of the aforesaid definition, as referred to above. In such a situation, one of the two conditions for denying the claim to the workmen in terms of the definition has not been proved by the employer by any evidence on the record and as the employer has not proved that deceased was not a workman, accordingly, the Commissioner was in error in holding that the deceased was not a workman.
15. In the case of Madan Lal v. Mangali (A.I.R 1961 Rajasthan 45) it has been held that the word “and” used in the definition of “workman” has been used conjunctively and, therefore, in order to take out a labourer from the category of a workman, both the conditions have to be satisfied (1) that the person's employment, should be casual and (2) the employment should be otherwise than in the employer's trade or business. Absence of only one of the conditions will not result in taking out a labourer from the category of workman. I fully agree with the view taken in the aforesaid case and for the reason, stated above, I hold that the Commissioner has committed an error of law of substantial nature in holding that the deceased was not a workman by overlooking the definition of the word “workman”.
16. Even assuming that proving of one of those conditions would be sufficient to deny the benefit to a workman, I am of the view that even the nature of employment of the deceased was considered by wrongly applying the law. The definition requires that the employment should be of a casual nature, it does not speak that the persons should be casually employed. The said definition has been noticed by the Kerala High Court in the case of Koju v. Joseph (1980 Lab. I.C 902 (Ker.)) wherein it has been held that the employment of casual nature denotes a concept different from casually employed for, in one case, the question is as to the nature of the employment while, in the other case, the question is how the person has been employed. As held by the Kerala High Court, it has to be determined as to whether the employment is of casual nature or not. In other words, whether the employment is of a protracted or transient nature or it is very brief and transitory. If the employment is of a longer duration, then, even if, the person is appointed casually he cannot be denied the benefit of the provisions of the Act. Engagement of a workman on permanent basis, temporary basis or on payment of daily wages cannot be a safe criteria to determine as to the nature of the employment. Employment may be of a regular nature, though the incumbent may be engaged on casual basis. In the present case, the duty was to guard the Regulator at the Canal. The nature of employment cannot be said to be a casual nature. In this case, the requirement to guard or protect the Canal is always required every year and that cannot be said to be a transitory in nature. No doubt, the deceased was employed for a particular period of time, but, in view of the nature of his employment, as indicated above, the deceased cannot be said to be in an employment of a casual nature. The Commissioner has failed to appreciate the definition of the word “workman”, as stated above, and, as such, his finding that the appointment of the deceased was of a casual nature is vitiated by an apparent error of law. In my considered view, the deceased was a workman, as defined under the Act.
17. The next point to be determined is as to whether the deceased received injury resulting in his death by an accident arising out of and in course of his employment, because, the liability of the employer to pay the compensation to the employee arises only if the injury or death has occurred by a hapenning or accident in the aforesaid circumstances. The relevant provisions of Section 3 of the Act is as follows:—
“(1) If personal injury is caused to a wrokman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:
Provided that the employer shall not be so liable—
(a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding three days;
(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to—
(i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or
(ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or
(iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen.”
18. In Cardillo Frank A. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (330 U.S 469), the U.S Supreme Court has opined that the words “arising out and in course of employment” are deceptively simple and litiguously prolific.
19. It is not necessary to go into the catena of English cases with regard to the true meaning and effect of the aforesaid words for the reason that the Apex Court had occasion to consider the meaning of the aforesaid words in the case of M. Mackenzie v. I.M Issak ((1969) 2 SCC 607 : AIR 1970 SC 1906) and has held as follows:—
“To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words “in the course of the employment” mean “in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it”. The words “arising out of employment” are understood to mean that “during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered”. In other words, there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression “arising out of employment” is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such—to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents, if by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own impurdent act.”
20. According to the Supreme Court, there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. If in course of the employment an employee has to remain at a particular place and the nature of duties are such that he has to face peril and the accident is caused by reason of the said peril which he has to face then a causal relationship is established between the accident and the employment. In other words, if the nature of employment is such that it has to suffer hazard or risks and the said risks caused injury or death or was one of the ordinary risks of the employment, or reasonably incidental to the employment then the compensation has to be awarded. However, if in course of employment the employee dies for a reason different or unconnected with his employment, then he is not entitled to compensation.
21. In the present case, the finding arrived at by the Commissioner that he died on account of some old enmity and his death was not the result of an accident arising out of and in course of his employment has been arrived at by him by overlooking the material evidence on the record and relying upon a hearsay evidence. It is an admitted case that the deceased was on duty at the Canal. Even the witnesses of the respondents have admitted that the deceased was on duty at the relevant time and one of them heard the sound of firing. The blood was also found near the place of duty but the dead body of the deceased, was not found there.
22. The wife of the deceased has been examined as A.W 1. In examination-in-chief she has made statement to the same effect, however, in cross-examination she has stated that the deceased was done to death at the place of the duty by his enemy. Admittedly, she was not present at the place where the deceased was done to death and her aforesaid statement is only a conjecture and surmises and the Commissioner was wholly unjustified in coming to the conclusion that the deceased was done to death by his enemy, and, as such, the said finding is not binding on this Court and the evidence has to be considered to find out as to whether the deceased died by an accident arising out of and in course of his employment. In view of the admitted fact that while the deceased was on duty at the canal some persons came and fired at him and thereafter he became traceless, it has to be held that he was done to death in course of his employment especially when the respondents have not brought any material to show that he died in a different way. On the basis of the evidence on the record, it is held that the deceased received injury resulting in his death by accident arising out of and in course of his employment.
23. In the case of Superintending Engineer v. Andammal (1983 A.C.J 286 (Mad.), A. Laskar appointed to regulate the flow of water in a branch canal by operating upon the sluices and shutters, was done to death at the place of duty by the person against whom he had made complaint. There was nothing on the record to show that he had added the peril. The Madras High Court in the aforesaid circumstance held that there was casual and proximate connection between the employment and the accident and the accident will be treated to have been arisen out of and in the course of his employment and, as such, the applicant is entitled to compensation.
24. In the case of Mohanlal Prabhuram…Applicant; v. Fine Knitting Mills Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad…Opponent. (A.I.R 1960 Bom. 387), a workman of the Mill while on duty was assaulted by a workman with the help of the out-siders resulting in serious injury to him. It was held that there was a casual relationship between the accident and employment. Similarly, in the case of Naima Bibi v. Lodhre Colliery Co. (1977) 50 FJR 252, a colliery worker while returning after performing his duty was assaulted by unknown persons in the colliery premises, as a result of which he died at the spot. The Calcutta High Court took the view that he had been at the spot because of his employment and, as such, the accident has arisen out of and in the course of his employment and the employer is liable to pay the compensation.
25. The law Laid down in the aforesaid cases fully apply in the present case also, as from the evidence of the witnesses it is found that the deceased was at the spot because of his nature of employment to watch the Regulator at Canal and while he was on duty at the Canal he was done to death by the miscreants. Thus, there was a casual and proximate connection between the accident and the employment. The applicant is entitled to compensation, as prayed for. The Commissioner has committed a serious error of law, as indicated above, in negativing the claim of compensation of the appellant. As the finding of the Commissioner that employee was done to death due to enmity is held to be bad in law, the second question referred to Division Bench does not survive for determination.
26. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Commissioner is set aside and the claim of the appellant is allowed. The appellant is also entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of filing of the application by her till the payment of amount.
Ashish N. Trivedi, J.:—I agree.
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