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Sri Ramroop Tanti v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.

Patna High Court
Jan 20, 1993
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, who passed the secondary school examination in 1968 and allegedly passed a teacher's training examination in 1970, produced a marks-sheet (Annexure-1.A) which he relied on for appointment. Pursuant to an advertisement he applied and, by an order dated 10-12-1981 (Annexure-2), he and 13 others were appointed as Matric trained Assistant Teachers on a temporary basis. The petitioner drew salary from January 1982 to November 1985. Payment was then stopped on the ground that his teacher's training certificate was false. An inquiry allegedly found the certificate genuine and by order dated 2-6-1986 the earlier stoppage (order dated 14-10-1985) was revoked; the petitioner rejoined on 2-6-1986.

Payment of salary was later stopped again from July 1988 to May 1989. After the petitioner filed a representation, respondent No. 2 issued an order dated 15-5-1989 (Annexure-7) directing that the petitioner's salary be stopped and that he be removed from service. The petitioner contended that no show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded and that a criminal case had been instituted against him.

In the counter-affidavit the respondents alleged that a detailed inquiry (Annexure A to the counter-affidavit) found the training certificate to be forged and that the petitioner was therefore not entitled to salary. The counter-affidavit also states that a letter dated 16-3-1989 (Annexure B) asked the petitioner to produce the original certificate and that a criminal complaint was filed (Annexure C). The petitioner replied, asserting res judicata based on the earlier exoneration, challenging the later inquiry report as made behind his back, and disputing the District Magistrate's power to terminate services.

By order dated 3-11-1992 the Bihar School Examination Board was impleaded as respondent No. 4. The Board produced the original tabulation register and submitted that the petitioner's name did not appear; there was no exam centre at Munger in the relevant year; only 116 candidates sat the training examination whereas the petitioner claimed roll number 207; and the duplicate certificate produced by the petitioner bore indicia (use of the word "Dwitiyak" and omission of a correct series identifier) inconsistent with Board practice (Annexure 8 to the reply), suggesting forgery.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's appointment and continued service were vitiated by obtaining employment on the basis of a forged training certificate and marks-sheet.
  2. Whether the requirements of the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) apply where an appointment/benefit is obtained by submission of a forged certificate.
  3. Whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant relief to the petitioner in view of the findings of prima facie forgery and a pending criminal case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted that he possessed a genuine teacher's training certificate (Annexure-1.A) and that he had been appointed legitimately on 10-12-1981 (Annexure-2).
  • He contended that prior to the impugned order dated 15-5-1989 he was not served with any show-cause notice nor given an opportunity of hearing.
  • The petitioner relied on an earlier inquiry that allegedly exonerated him and argued the impugned order was barred by the principle of res judicata.
  • He further contended that the later inquiry report was obtained without his knowledge and that the District Magistrate had no power to terminate his services.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that a detailed inquiry (Annexure A to the counter-affidavit) established that the training certificate submitted by the petitioner was forged.
  • They alleged the petitioner had initially influenced an enquiring officer to obtain a favourable remark, but that a subsequent detailed inquiry exposed the forgery.
  • The respondents asserted that the petitioner was asked by letter dated 16-3-1989 (Annexure B) to produce original certificates but failed to do so, and that a criminal case was instituted (Annexure C).
  • The Bihar School Examination Board produced the tabulation register and argued the petitioner’s name and roll number do not appear, that there was no exam centre at Munger that year, and that the duplicate certificate bore features inconsistent with Board practice (e.g., the use of the word "Dwitiyak" and improper series notation), indicating forgery.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.P. Junior Doctor's Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, (1990) 4 SCC 633 : AIR 1991 SC 909 When an admission (or benefit) is obtained on the basis of a forged certificate, principles of natural justice need not be complied with. The Court relied on this precedent to support the proposition that natural justice need not be observed where employment was obtained by forgery and applied it to the petitioner's case.
Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 398 : AIR 1985 SC 1416 Explains the development of the principles of natural justice and their relation to Article 14; violation of natural justice can amount to arbitrariness under Article 14. The Court cited Tulsiram Patel to set out the constitutional context and scope of natural justice and to note that observance can be excluded by statute or other considerations.
Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1971 SC 40 Where a statutory provision excludes natural justice expressly or by necessary implication, courts cannot read natural justice into it; applicability depends on the provision, nature and purpose of the power. The Court cited this to emphasize that the applicability of natural justice depends on statutory context and nature of power, supporting examination of whether natural justice must be applied in the present circumstances.
R.S. Dass v. Union of India, 1986 Supp. SCC 617 : AIR 1987 SC 593 The opinion references this authority in the context of the broader jurisprudence on natural justice. The Court listed it among authorities relevant to principles of natural justice; the opinion does not elaborate a specific rule from this case beyond its citation.
Maharashtra Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716 Applicability of natural justice depends on facts, nature of inquiry and effect of decision; omission to record reasons does not necessarily vitiate an order. The Court cited it to demonstrate that natural justice is not a rigid rule and its applicability is fact-dependent.
Ex-Capt. K. Balasubramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1991) 2 SCC 708 Principles of natural justice need not be complied with when an order does not involve civil consequences. The Court referenced it as an example of an exception to the application of natural justice rules.
Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299 Held that principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with in a case of compulsory retirement (as an illustrative exception). Cited to show circumstances in which natural justice may be dispensed with; used as part of the line of authorities on exceptions.
Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P., (1992) 2 SCC 620 Illustrates circumstances where hearing may be dispensed with to neutralize unfair advantage gained by abuse of process; courts may refuse hearing where it would be a mere formality. The Court quoted and relied on this authority to illustrate that where a party has obtained an undeserved advantage or where continued hearing would merely be procedural with no tangible result, natural justice requirements may be relaxed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the documentary and factual material produced by respondent No. 4 (the Bihar School Examination Board) and the respondents' counter-affidavit. The Board produced its original tabulation register, and from that and related evidence the Court accepted the Board's submissions that:

  • The petitioner's name did not appear in the tabulation register for the relevant year;
  • There was no examination centre at Munger in the relevant year;
  • Only 116 candidates were recorded as having appeared in the training examination, yet the petitioner alleged roll number 207;
  • The duplicate certificate produced by the petitioner bore features inconsistent with the Board's practice (for example, use of the term "Dwitiyak" and absence of a proper series identifier), which were indicia of forgery (Annexure 8 to the reply).

On these bases the Court concluded that the petitioner obtained employment by presenting a forged and fabricated document. The Court treated that finding as establishing that the petitioner had committed a fraud upon the appointing authority and noted the established legal proposition that a right founded upon fraud does not confer a legal entitlement to continue in employment.

The Court then addressed whether the principles of natural justice required compliance before taking action. It relied on authorities (in particular U.P. Junior Doctor's Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani) holding that when entry or benefit is obtained by submission of a forged certificate, the rules of natural justice need not be applied. The Court situates that authority within the broader jurisprudence (including Tulsiram Patel and other cited decisions) explaining that although natural justice is an important constitutional concept often read into Article 14, its applicability is fact-dependent and there are recognised exceptions.

Having found prima facie that the petitioner obtained employment by forgery, and noting that a criminal case was pending, the Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to grant relief. The Court explicitly stated that its refusal to grant relief was based on a prima facie finding of forgery and was made so as not to prejudice the pending criminal proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is DISMISSED.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The impugned order dated 15-5-1989 (which stopped salary and directed removal from service) stands, as the petitioner's challenge to that order was dismissed.
  • The Court found that the petitioner obtained employment on the basis of a forged marks sheet and certificate, held that such conduct constituted fraud that did not confer a legal right to continue in employment, and therefore declined to grant relief under Article 226.
  • The dismissal was on the basis of a prima facie finding of forgery; the Court made clear that this finding is confined to the context of the writ petition and stated it should not prejudice the pending criminal trial.
  • No order as to costs was made.

The opinion applies existing precedent rather than announcing a novel rule. It does not purport to set new precedent beyond applying and synthesising established authorities on the limited question whether natural justice must be observed where benefits were obtained by forged documents and whether the High Court should exercise equitable writ jurisdiction in such circumstances.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.:— This application is directed against an order dated 15-5-1989 issued by the respondent No. 2 whereby the services of the petitioner had been terminated and a direction has been issued for recovery of total salary drawn by him.

2. The fact of the case lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioner passed secondary school examination in the year 1968. He allegedly passed his teacher's training examination in the year 1970. The marks-sheet issued to the petitioner allegedly by the Bihar School Examination Board in the teacher's training examination is contained in Annexure-1.A to the writ application.

3. According to the petitioner, an advertisement was issued for appointment in the post of teacher pursuant whereof he filed an application and by an order dated 10-12-1981 he and 13 other persons were appointed on the post of Matric trained Assistant teachers on temporary basis. The said order dated 10-12-1981 is contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. The petitioner stated that he has drawn his salary from January, 1982 to November, 1985. Thereafter payment of his salary was stopped on the ground that he has filed a false teacher's training certificate. According to the petitioner, an inquiry was made and the said certificate was found to be a genuine one. Thereafter by an order dated 2-6-1986 the earlier order dated 14-10-1985 was revoked and the petitioner was directed to be paid his salary pursuant whereof he joined again on 2-6-1986. The petitioner as alleged that payment of his salary, was again stopped from July, 1988 to May, 1989. The petitioner filed a representation. By reason of an order dated 15th of May, 1989 as contained in Annexure 7 to the writ application, the salary payable to the petitioner was directed to be stopped and he was directed to be removed from services.

4. The petitioner has contended that prior to issuance of the said order neither any show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner nor he was given an opportunity of hearing. A criminal case had also been instituted against the petitioner.

5. In this case a counter-affidavit has been filed wherein it has inter alia, been contended that an inquiry was made and in the said inquiry, it has been found that the training certificate filed by the petitioner was a forged one. The said inquiry report is contained in Annexure A to the counter-affidavit. It has been contended that the petitioner was appointed on a forged training certificate and thus he was not entitled to any salary. It has further been contended that in the first inquiry the petitioner influenced the enquiring officer and managed to obtain a clear remarks from him but when a detailed inquiry was made, the training certificate submitted by him was found to be a forged one. It has further been submitted that it is not correct that no show-cause notice was served upon him. By a letter dated 16-3-1989 as contained in Annexure B to the counter-affidavit, the petitioner was asked to produce his original certificate but he did not do so and thereafter a criminal case was instituted against him, a copy whereof is contained in Annexure C to the counter-affidavit.

6. The petitioner has filed a reply to the said counter-affidavit wherein it has been inter alia contended that as the petitioner was exonerated in the earlier inquiry; the impugned order as contained in Annexure 7 to the writ application is barred under the principle of res judicata. With regard to the inquiry report which is contained in Annexure A to the counter-affidavit, it has been submitted that the same has been obtained behind the back of the petitioner where for he had not been given any information. It has also been contended that the District Magistrate has no power to terminate his services.

7. As, the matter related to the alleged grant of a training certificate by Bihar School Examination Board, by an order dated 3-11-1992, the Bihar School Examination Board was permitted to be added as respondent No. 4 in this writ application. On that date Mr. Krishna Mohan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner handed over a copy of the duplicate certificate to Mr. Parbat appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4. By reason of the said order Mr. Parbat was directed to see as to whether the duplicate certificate granted to the petitioner is genuine or not.

8. At the hearing of this application Mr. Y.V Giri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 produced before us the original tabulation register and submitted that the petitioner's name does not appear therein. Mr. Giri submitted that from the tabulation register, if Would appear that in the relevant year there was no examination centre at Munger. It has been submitted that only 116 candidates appeared in the training examination in 1970 but the petitioner has shown his roll number as 207 which is evidently false. It has further been submitted that the duplicate certificate produced by the petitioner is also a forged document as contained in Annexure 8 to the reply of the counter-affidavit as the Bihar School Examination Board does not use the word ‘Dwitiyak’. He further submitted that the Bihar School Examination Board always in describing the serial number on the certificate mention the series thereof as A, B, C or D but no number of series in certificate has been mentioned. In Annexure 8, which also is a pointer to the fact that the said certificate is a forged one.

9. In view of the submissions made by Mr. Giri, learned counsel appearing for the Board, we are satisfied that the petitioner has obtained employment on the basis of a forged and fabricated document.

10. In U.P Junior Doctor's Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, (1990) 4 SCC 633 : AIR 1991 SC 909, it has been held that when an admission was obtained on the basis of a forged certificate, the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with. It was held as follows:

“In such a case, the circumstances in which such benefit was taken by the candidates concerned would not justify attraction of the application of rules of natural justice of being provided an opportunity to be heard.”

11. The principles of natural justice, as is well-known, is based upon two basic principles viz. audi alteram partem and nemo debitro esses judex in propriea causa. The principles of natural justice have been developed by the Apex Court from time to time adding new concepts therein. In some decisions the Apex Court has gone to the extent of holding that the principles of natural justice are embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

12. The Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 398 : AIR 1985 SC 1416 dealt with the history of the principles of natural justice in paragraphs 72 to 80 of the judgment and thereafter, discussed various principles involved therein in paragraphs 81 to 82 thereof. The Supreme Court thereafter proceeded to consider the question as to how the said provisions have been interpreted by the Courts.

13. The Supreme Court held:

“The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic, interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which the subject-matter of that article Shortly, put the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination where discrimination is the result of State Action. It is a violation of Article 14. Article 14 however is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of ‘State’ in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.”

14. However, it was also held that observance of principles of natural justice can be excluded by a statute either expressly or by necessary implication.

15. In Union of India v. J.N Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1971 SC 40, it has been held:

“But if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specific or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature of the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purposes for which it is conferred and the effect of exercise of that power.”

16. Reference in this connection may also be made to R.S Dass v. Union of India, 1986 Supp SCC 617 : AIR 1987 SC 593.

17. However, it is well-known that there are certain exceptions to the principles of natural justice. In the case of Maharashtra Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716, it has been held:

“From this perspective, the question is whether omission to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The omnipresence and omniscience (sic) of the principles of natural justice Acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary decision in flagrant infraction of fairplay. But the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a strait-jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order-decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances.”

18. In Ex-Copt. K. Balasubramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1991) 2 SCC 708, it has been held that the principles of natural justice need not be complied with when the order does not involve civil consequences.

19. In Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299, it has been held that the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with in a case of compulsory retirement.

20. In Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P, (1992) 2 SCC 620, it has been held:

“The 50 operators including the appellants/private operators have been running their stages carriages by balatant abuse of the process of the Court by delaying the hearing as directed in Jewan Nath Wahal's case and the High Court earlier thereto. As a fact on the expiry of the initial period of grant after September 29, 1959 they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending hearing of the objections. This Court in Grind-lays Bank Ltd. v. T.T.O held that the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 the interest of justice requires that any underserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must by neutralised. It was further held that the institution of the litigation by it should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. In the light of that law and in view of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete justice and neutralise the unfair advantage gained by the 50 operators including the appellants in dragging the litigation to run the stage carriages on the approved route of area or promotion thereof and forfeited their right to hearing of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme dated February 26, 1959. Moreover, since this Court in Jewan Nath Wahal's case upheld the approved scheme and held to be operative, the hearing of their objections would be a procedural formality with no tangible result. Therefore, the objections outlived their purpose. They are, therefore, not entitled to any hearing before the hearing authority.”

21. As the petitioner has been found to have obtained his employment on the basis of a forged marks sheet and certificate, he evidently committed a fraud upon the appointing authority. An action based upon a fraudulent acts does not confer any legal right. The petitioner, thus, did not derive any legal right to continue to be in employment in terms of the appointment letter.

22. In view of his conduct, therefore, he is also not entitled to any relief from this Court.

23. For the reasons aforementioned, I am not inclined to exercise our jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As a criminal case is pending as against the petitioner, I wish to make it clear that I have refused to grant any relief to the petitioner only on the basis of a finding of a prima facie case against him which may not prejudice him in the criminal trial.

24. This application is, therefore, dismissed with the aforementioned observations, but without any order as to costs.

25. G.C Bharuka, J.:— I agree.

Application dismissed.