Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Ramji Prasad v. State Of Bihar And Ors.

Patna High Court
Jan 18, 1991
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The application sought quashing of assessment orders dated 17-5-1988 (Annexures 3, 3/A and 3/B) relating to assessment years 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85. Those assessment orders were passed by Mr. R. K. Srivastava, I.A.S., described as Special Officer of the respondent Market Committee. The petitioner challenged the orders inter alia on the ground that Mr. Srivastava was not empowered under S. 9(5) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 to make orders of assessment.

The Market Committee had been constituted by Annexure 5 dated 12-3-1983 and, it is alleged, ceased to exist on 12-9-1986. Subsequent notifications appointed persons as special officers for various periods: Sudhir Kumar Rakesh (6-10-1986 to 11-3-1987 — Annexure 5A; and 12-3-1987 to 11-9-1987 — Annexure 5B) and Ravindra Kumar (22-9-1987 to 21-3-1988 — Annexure 5/C). The petitioner contended that after these appointments there was no valid notification under S. 9(5) to empower any person to make orders under Section 27A of the Act, and therefore Annexures 3, 3/A and 3/B should be quashed.

No counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Market Committee or the State. The Court called for a report from Mr. R. K. Srivastava concerning his competency to make the assessment orders. In his report he stated that a notification under Section 37 had conferred powers of the Chairman on Mr. Sudhir Kumar Rakesh for 12-9-1987 to 15-11-1988 and on Mr. Purn Chand Rai for 16-11-1988 to 11-3-1989; a corrigendum stated that the name of Mr. R. K. Srivastava should be read in place of Mr. Sudhir Kumar Rakesh. Respondents relied on that material to urge that Mr. Srivastava was competent to make the assessment orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Mr. R. K. Srivastava, acting under a notification said to operate through Section 37 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, was empowered to make orders of assessment under Section 27A of the Act.
  2. Whether a notification under Section 37 (conferring powers of the Chairman) can substitute for a notification under Section 9(5) when the Market Committee is not in existence, so as to enable a person to exercise powers under Section 27A.
  3. Whether, in a situation where the Market Committee is not in existence, only a person notified under Section 9(5) of the Act can exercise powers under Section 27A.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The assessment orders (Annexures 3, 3/A and 3/B) were invalid because Mr. R. K. Srivastava was not empowered under S. 9(5) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 to make assessments under Section 27A.
  • The Market Committee had ceased to exist on 12-9-1986, and after that date there was no valid notification under S. 9(5) to authorize anyone to make the assessments impugned.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Mr. Srivastava reported that a notification under Section 37 conferred the powers of the Chairman on certain officers for specified periods, and a corrigendum substituted Mr. R. K. Srivastava's name; on that basis respondents contended Mr. Srivastava was competent to make the assessment orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the statutory scheme and the notifications relied upon. It analyzed Section 37 of the Act and concluded that Section 37 empowers the Board to make arrangements for performance of the duties and functions of the Market Committee and the Chairman in certain cases where the Market Committee exists but is unable or not competent (for example due to a court order) to perform its duties. Section 37, the Court held, does not contemplate a situation where the Market Committee is not in existence at all.

Because the Market Committee was admittedly not in existence during the relevant period, Section 37 could not be invoked to fill the void. The notification relied on by respondents conferred only the powers of the Chairman on Mr. Srivastava (through corrigendum), and the Court noted that the Chairman himself is not competent to make orders of assessment under the Act. Since no powers of the Market Committee were conferred on Mr. Srivastava, the notification under Section 37 did not empower him to make orders under Section 27A.

The Court further stated that when the Market Committee is not in existence, the only persons who can exercise powers under Section 27A are those notified for the purpose under Section 9(5) of the Act. Because there was no valid notification under Section 9(5) authorizing Mr. Srivastava to make the assessments, his assessment orders were held to be invalid.

Holding and Implications

Application allowed; Annexures 3, 3/A and 3/B quashed.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The impugned assessment orders dated 17-5-1988 (Annexures 3, 3/A and 3/B) are quashed for want of jurisdiction in the Officer who made them.
  • The Market Committee is now in existence and is directed to proceed to assess the petitioner for the years in question in accordance with law.
  • The Court directed that it will not be necessary for the Committee to issue a fresh notice to the petitioner; the petitioner is to appear before the Committee on 20th March, 1991 with the documents on which he relies. On that date the Committee may either make the assessment after hearing him or adjourn to a future date.
  • No broader precedent or broader implications are discussed in the opinion; the decision operates to correct the jurisdictional defect in the assessments and requires reassessment by the duly constituted Committee.
Show all summary ...

ORDER

1. Prayer in this application is to quash the assessment orders passed on 17-5-1988 vide Annexures 3, 3/A and 3/B for the years 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85 respectively. The assessment orders were passed by Mr. R. K. Srivastava, I.A.S., Special Officer of respondent-Market Committee. They have been challenged inter alia on the ground that Sri Srivastava, who was the special officer of the respondent-Market Committee was not empowered under S. 9(5) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 to make any order of assessment. It is said that Market Committee was constituted by Annexure 5 dated 12-3-1983 and on account of lapse of time it ceased to exist on 12-9-1986. Thereafter one Sudhir Kumar Rakesh, Sub-Divisional Officer, Bettiah was appointed as special officer of the Committee for the period beginning from 6-10-1986 to 11-3-1987 vide Annexure 5A. There was another notification issued appointing the same officer for the period beginning from 12-3-1987 to 11-9-1987 vide Annexure 5B. The third notification issued under Section 9(5) of the Bihar Agriculture Produce Market Act (hereinafter to be referred to as th Act appointing Mr. Ravindra Kumar, Sub-Divisional Officer, Bettiah as special officer for the period beginning from 22-9-1987 to 21-3-1988 vide Annexure 5/C. It is said that thereafter there was no notification under Section 9(5) of the Act to enable any person to make order of assessment under Section 27A of the Act. On these facts prayer is to quash Annexures 3, 3A and 3B. No counter-affidavit has been filed either on behalf of Market Committee or on behalf of State. A report, however, was called for from Mr. Srivastava regarding his competency to make orders of assessment. In his report it is said that a notification was issued under Section 37 of the Act conferring powers of the Chairman on Mr. Sudhir Kumar Rakesh, S.D.O., Bettiah for the period beginning from 12-9-1987 to 15-11-1988 and on Mr. Purn Chand Rai, S.D.O., Bettiah for the period beginning from 16-11-1988 to 11-3-1989. He has also annexed a photo copy of corrigendum stating that name of Mr. R. K. Srivastava should be read in the aforesaid notification in place of Mr. Sudhir Kumar Rakesh. On that basis it has been urged on behalf of respondents that Mr. R. K. Srivastava was competent to make orders of assessment. It is not possible to accept this contention. Section 37 of the Act gives power to the Board to make arrangements for the performance of the duties and functions of the Market Committee and the Chairman in certain cases, but Section 37 of the Act comes into play where Market Committee is in existence and is unable or not competent due to any order or decision of a Court or any other reasons to perform his duties. This section does not contemplate the situation where the Market Committee is not in existence at all. Here admittedly the Market Committee was not in existence. Therefore, there was no question of Committee being unble or being not competent to perform its duties. Further by this notification only powers of Chairman of the Board was conferred on Mr. Srivastava and not of the Committee. Admittedly the Chairman is not competent to make any order of assessment. Since.no powers of the Committee was given to Mr. Srivastava, therefore, under this notification Mr. Srivastava was not competent to make any order of assessment. We may also add that in a situation where Committee is not in existence then the only persons who can exercise powers under Section 27A of the Act is a person, who is notified for the purpose under Section 9(5) of the Act. In that view of the matter we allow this application and quash Annexures 3, 3/A and 3/B. Admittedly the Committee is now in existence. It will now proceed to assess the petitioner for the years in question in accordance with law. It will not be necessary for the Committee to issue notice to the petitioner. He will appear before the Committee on 20th of March, 1991 with such documents on which he relies. On that date the committee may either make the assessment after hearing him or may adjourn to some future date.