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General Manager (H),... v. Anjan Banerjee And A...

Patna High Court
Aug 22, 1989
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Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Hazaribagh, alleging that on 3.10.1986 he was injured when a bus (registration B.R.M 8463) owned by appellant No. 1 and driven by appellant No. 2 struck him while he was walking on Pugmal Road. The respondent claimed Rs. 3,84,000 by way of compensation and alleged severe injuries (legs crushed under wheels).

By judgment and award dated 12.5.1987 in Misc. Claim Case No. 6 of 1987, the Additional Claims Tribunal, Hazaribagh awarded Rs. 2,57,800 to respondent No. 1. The owners/driver (appellants) appealed to the High Court under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act (Misc. Appeal No. 64 of 1988 (R)). A learned single Judge of the Patna High Court dismissed that appeal in limine by order dated 11.10.1988 without assigning reasons.

The present letters patent appeal challenges the single Judge's order of 11.10.1988. The appellants also sought a stay of realization; the High Court treated the matter “for orders” and chose to dispose of the appeal on its merits. The appeal was posted and heard in July 1989 and the present judgment disposes of the letters patent appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a letters patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court lies to a Division Bench from a judgment of a single Judge when that judgment arises out of an appeal under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 — i.e., where the underlying decision comes from a tribunal constituted under a self-contained code.
  2. Whether an order dismissing an appeal in limine by a single Judge constitutes a "judgment" for the purposes of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (and thus attracts an intra-court appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained code and thus the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a tribunal; Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court does not apply to appeals arising under such a self-contained code.
  • Reliance was placed on Upadhyaya v. Dhirendra Singh (Supreme Court) to support the proposition that where a statute confers special jurisdiction and a specific appellate scheme, a letters patent appeal may be barred by necessary implication.
  • It was submitted that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a tribunal and not a court (relying on Hari Nagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder).
  • The right of appeal to the High Court under the Motor Vehicles Act is conferred by statute and is limited/restricted (for example, insurer appeals limited, no appeal below awards under Rs. 2,000), so the appellate right is statutory and not governed by general law.
  • Some provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable only partially to tribunal proceedings (reference to proviso to Section 110 and Rule 20 of the Bihar Rules), supporting the submission that the Act provides its own procedural framework.
  • Certain Division Bench decisions (Jaimangal v. State and Naya Dawakhana v. State) were relied upon to show that statutory tribunals are not “courts” for the Limitation Act and related provisions.
  • It was argued that Sections 110 to 110F are merely procedural (relying on New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt Shanti Misra), and that the word “judgment” in Clause 10 should be given the narrower CPC meaning under Section 2(9), so an in limine dismissal is not a “judgment” for Clause 10 purposes.

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The High Court, when exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, acts as a "court" and therefore Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applies to judgments of a single Judge in such appeals.
  • Reliance was placed on decisions (Full Bench and others) such as Delhi Municipality v. Kuldip, Shanti Devi v. Haryana Roadways, N.S. Thread Company v. James Chardwick & Brothers and other authorities to support the proposition that a letters-patent appeal lies where the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction under a statute that gives it an appellate right but does not exclude intra-court appeals under the Letters Patent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Upadhyaya v. Dhirendra Singh (1988) 2 SCC 1 : A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 915 Held that, in the election law context with Article 329(b) and special statutory scheme (Section 116A), letters-patent appeal may be barred by necessary implication due to a special appellate route to the Supreme Court. The court distinguished the present case from Upadhyaya because the Motor Vehicles Act's Section 110D does not contain a non-obstante provision or an express curtailment of intra-court appeal rights; Upadhyaya was therefore not applicable here.
Hari Nagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1969) Authority relied upon to support the proposition that certain statutory tribunals are tribunals and not courts. Cited by respondents' counsel to argue that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a tribunal (not a court); the court noted the reliance but did not decide the tribunal-vs-court question as germane to maintainability of letters-patent appeal.
Jaimangal v. State (1989 B.B.C.J. 245 : 1989 P.L.J.R.L. 231) Held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before statutory tribunals (i.e., statutory tribunals are not "courts" within Limitation Act). Referred to by respondents' counsel for the proposition about the Limitation Act; the court held these decisions were not decisive on the letters-patent question and had no application to the maintainability issue here.
Naya Dawakhana v. State (1989 B.B.C.J. 253) Similar proposition as Jaimangal concerning non-application of Section 5 Limitation Act to statutory tribunals. Same application as above — relied on by respondents; court observed limited relevance and held they did not affect letters-patent maintainability.
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC 840 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 237 Authority cited for the proposition that Sections 110–110F of the Motor Vehicles Act are merely procedural rather than substantive. Relied upon by respondents' counsel to argue the statutory appellate regime is procedural; the court noted the reliance but later observed that other Supreme Court authority takes a different view.
Delhi Municipality v. Kuldip (1970 Delhi) Held that a letters-patent appeal lies to a Division Bench under clause 10/15 of Letters Patent from a single Judge's judgment when the High Court is exercising appellate jurisdiction under a statute. Adopted by the court as supporting the proposition that when the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction it acts as a "Court" and the single Judge's judgment falls within the scope of Clause 10.
Shanti Devi v. E.M. Haryana Roadways (1972 Punjab) Similar holding to Delhi Municipality: letters-patent appeal maintainable against single Judge's judgment arising from statutory appeal. Noted by the court as supporting the position that clause 10 applies where the High Court is exercising appellate jurisdiction under the statute.
N.S. Thread Company v. James Chardwick & Brothers (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 357) Considered whether letters-patent appeal (clause 15 Bombay Letters Patent) is maintainable when High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act where the Act confers a right of appeal but is silent about procedure. The Supreme Court held the High Court will exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as other appellate jurisdiction and thus judgments of a single Judge are subject to letters-patent appeal; this decision was relied upon to support maintainability here.
South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1442) Constitution Bench: clause of the Letters Patent applied irrespective of whether the High Court's appellate jurisdiction was derived from a Court or Tribunal; letters-patent appeal maintainable unless expressly/statutorily excluded. Used by the court as a key authority establishing that where a statute confers an appeal to the High Court but does not exclude intra-court appeal by letters patent, the letters-patent appeal remains available.
Umaji v. Radhika Bai (1986 S.C. 1272) Considered scope and historical origin of letters-patent appeal and held letters-patent appeal applies to Article 226 proceedings and that the right of intra-court appeal continues unless excluded by letters patent or statute. Cited to support the proposition that a letters-patent appeal continues to govern matters before the High Court unless specifically excluded; the court relied on its analysis of rule-making and charters.
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Raman Bhai & Prabhat Bhai (1987) 3 SCC 234 : A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1690 Held that Sections 110–110F of the Motor Vehicles Act refer not only to procedural matters but also affect substantive rights. The court relied on this authority to note that the provisions in Sections 110–110F may be substantive as well as procedural, but nonetheless concluded letters-patent appeal is maintainable.
Bishan Devi v. Sirbaksh Singh (1980) 1 SCC 273 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1862 Noted for the Supreme Court's observations about long delays in Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal proceedings and the hardship caused to dependents/claimants. The court took judicial notice of the Supreme Court's expressed anguish at delays and cited the case to underscore the need for expeditious disposal of appeals involving permanently disabled claimants.
Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan (citation as in opinion) Referenced in context of suggestions by High Courts about social insurance and shifting blanket liability to insurers. Cited by the court in the discussion of systemic difficulties faced by claimants and the suggestion for social insurance; used illustratively rather than for a procedural rule.
Kesavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer (Kerala High Court — cited) Kerala High Court's expression that a blanket liability should be cast on insurers to mitigate claimants' hardships. Referred to by the court as part of the survey of judicial suggestions for social insurance to aid claimants; not applied to the maintainability issue.
Ruby Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Goviadaraj (Madras High Court — cited) Madras High Court suggested the necessity of social insurance to provide limited cover to claimants irrespective of proof of negligence. Referred to in the court's discussion of broader policy concerns affecting claimants and delay; cited to urge legislative consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the central question by applying established principles about the nature of appellate rights and the operation of letters-patent appeals. The analysis proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the statements and authorities set out in the opinion:

  1. Foundational principle: a right of appeal is a creature of statute and cannot ordinarily be taken away except by express provision or necessary implication in statute or charter.
  2. Examined Clause 10 of the Patna Letters Patent and noted that it permits an intra-court (letters-patent) appeal to a Division Bench from a judgment of a single Judge when the single Judge is exercising appellate jurisdiction.
  3. Considered the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the point, particularly N.S. Thread Company v. James Chardwick & Brothers and the Constitution Bench decision in South Asia Industries v. S.B. Sarup Singh, which establish that where a statute gives a right of appeal to the High Court but is silent about procedure, the High Court will exercise that appellate jurisdiction under its ordinary rules and practice — and judgments of single Judges will therefore be subject to letters-patent appeal unless the statute or charter expressly or by necessary implication excludes such an appeal.
  4. Distinguished Upadhyaya v. Dhirendra Singh: in that case (an election-law context), special constitutional/statutory provisions (Article 329(b) and Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act with a non-obstante clause) and a limited route of appeal to the Supreme Court led to the conclusion that letters-patent appeal was barred by necessary implication. The court held that the present case is unlike Upadhyaya because Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act does not contain such an exclusion or non-obstante provision and does not curtail further appellate rights.
  5. Addressed the respondents' contention that the Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained code and that tribunal status of the Claims Tribunal removes the operation of Clause 10: the court observed that previous Supreme Court decisions indicate that the existence of a tribunal under a statute does not, by itself, exclude letters-patent appeals — what matters is whether the statute or charter excludes such intra-court appeals.
  6. Interpreted the term "judgment" in Clause 10 expansively (broader than the CPC Section 2(9) definition): a judgment, for Clause 10 purposes, means an order whereby the rights of parties are finally decided. Consequently, an order dismissing an appeal in limine constitutes a "judgment" under Clause 10 because it finally disposes of the parties' rights unless set aside by an appellate court.
  7. Considered subsidiary authorities and procedural rules (e.g., Bihar Rules) and noted that tribunal rules do not lay down the procedure of appeal in detail; they require only that appeals be in form of a memo with concise grounds and a copy of the judgment and award. This reinforces the view that the High Court's ordinary practice of intra-court appeals is not displaced.
  8. Dealt with an apparent conflict in authorities about whether Sections 110–110F are purely procedural: the court noted that Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Raman Bhai & Prabhat Bhai holds these provisions affect substantive rights as well. Nevertheless, the court concluded that nothing in Section 110D operates to curtail the letters-patent appeal right.
  9. On the merits of the particular appeal, the court observed that the single Judge dismissed the appeal in limine without assigning reasons; the appellants (owners and driver) had an uncircumscribed right to appeal and therefore should have been given an opportunity to be heard on the merits with reference to the Tribunal record.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The letters-patent appeal is maintainable; the appeal is allowed, the single Judge's order dated 11.10.1988 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 64 of 1988 (R) is set aside, and the appeal is admitted for hearing.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The intra-court (letters-patent) appeal under Clause 10 of the Patna Letters Patent lies from a judgment of a single Judge disposing of an appeal under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, because Section 110D does not expressly or by necessary implication exclude such an intra-court appeal.
  • The order of the single Judge dismissing the appeal in limine is treated as a "judgment" for Clause 10 purposes and is therefore subject to a letters-patent appeal to a Division Bench.
  • On the facts, because the single Judge gave no reasons and the appellants' right to appeal was not statutorily circumscribed, the appellants must be given an opportunity to have the appeal heard on merits; the matter is admitted for hearing before the Court.
  • The court directed that the appeal be disposed of expeditiously, noting the particular sensitivity where the award benefits a person who is alleged to be permanently disabled.
  • The court made no order as to costs in the result.
  • Broader policy note: the court recorded its hope that Parliament may consider amending the Motor Vehicles Act to make appellate orders final so as to bar further letters-patent appeals, given delays and hardships experienced by claimants — but no legislative change was ordered by the court.

This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond those contained in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.:—This appeal raises a question as to whether a letters patent appeal lies to this Court in terms of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court before a Division Bench from the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court, when the same arises out of a decision of a Tribunal or Court constituted under a self-contained code.

2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass, Respondent No. 1 had filed an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Hazaribagh in terms of Section 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as “the said Act”) alleging, inter alia, therein that while he was walking on Pugmal Road in the town of Hazaribagh at about 3.30 P.M on 3.10.1986, a bus bearing registration No. B.R.M 8463 owned by the appellant No. 1 and driven by appellant No. 2, came in a high speed and owing to rash and negligent driving on the part of appellant No. 2, an accident occurred as a result whereof, respondent No. 1 fell down and suffered bodily injuries.

3. According to the said respondent, his legs were crushed under the wheels of the vehicle. The respondent claimed a sum of Rs. 3,84,000/- by way of compensation.

4. Shri Bharat Prasad Sharma, Additional Claims Tribunal, Hazaribagh by his judgment and award dated 12.5.1987 passed in Miscellaneous Claim Case No. 6 of 1987 on the basis of the evidence on record, awarded a sum of Rs. 2,57,800/- in favour of respondent No. 1 by way of compensation for the bodily injuries suffered by the said respondent in the aforementioned accident.

5. The appellants being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and award, preferred an appeal in this Court in terms of section 110D of the said Act which was marked as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 64 of 1988 (R).

6. By an order dated 11.10.1988, a learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the said appeal in limine without assigning any reason.

7. This letters patent appeal has been preferred against the said order of the learned single judge dated 11.10.1988 passed in the aforementioned Misc. Appeal No. 64 of 1988 (R).

8. In this appeal, the appellants filed an application for stay of realisation of the awarded amount pending in Certificate Case Ne. 1/1989-1990 of the Court of the District Certificate Officer, Hazaribagh, which came under the heading “for orders” and by order dated 18.7.1989 in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was considered desirable to dispose of the entire appeal on its merits.

9. By order dated 18.7.1989, this appeal was posted for hearing on 26.7.1989 Thereafter the appeal was heard on merits and is being disposed of by this judgment.

10. In this appeal, a question has been raised as to whether the said Act being a self-contained Code, a Letters Patent Appeal in terms of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court is maintainable.

11. Mr. B.K Dey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 and Mr. G. Mustafa learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 contended that the said Act beings a self-contained Code and the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal, being a tribunal, the provisions contained in clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court cannot be said to have any application whatsoever. Learned counsel in this connection placed strong reliance upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Upadhyaya v. Dhirendra Singh reported in (1988) 2 SCC 1 : A.I.R 1988 S.C 915.

12. Mr. B.K Dey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 further submitted that a Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal is tribunal, and not a court. In this connection the learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder reported in A.I.R 1961 S.C 1969 and 1980 Accident Claims Journal 287.

13. He has further submitted that the right of appeal from a judgment and award passed by the tribunal has been conferred upon this court by reason of the provisions of the said Statute, and not under the general law. Learned counsel further pointed out that even a right of appeal under the said Act is not absolute one, but a restricted one in the sense that an insurer can prefer an appeal only on limited grounds and no appeal lies from the judgment and award below a sum of Rs. 2000/- awarded by way of compensation.

14. The learned counsel has further pointed out that even the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable in their entirety as in a proceeding before the Tribunal, only some provisions thereof have been made applicable in terms of proviso to section 110 of the Act and Rule 20 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1961.

15. Learned counsel in this connection has also relied upon two division Bench decisions in the case of Jaimangal v. State, reported in 1989 B.B.C.J 245 : 1989 P.L.J.R.L 231 and in the case of Naya Dawakhana v. State reported in 1989 B.B.C.J 253, and submitted that in these decisions, it has been clearly held that section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in a proceeding before a statutory Tribunal, as the said statutory tribunals are not courts within the meaning of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963.

16. The learned counsel further submitted that the provisions contained in section 110 to 110-F of the Act are merely procedural and not substantive. For this proposition, the learned counsel relied upon a decision of the New India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Smt Shanti Misra, Adult reported in (1975) 2 SCC 840 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 237.

17. He further submitted that the word “Judgment” for the purpose of clause 10 of the Letter Patent Appeal must be given the same meaning as defined in section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as in the instant case, the appeal preferred by the appellants, has been dismissed in limine the same being not a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the aforesaid provisions, this appeal is not maintainable.

18. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, on the other hand submitted that the High Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction in terms of section 110D of the said Act is a court and, as such, clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court shall apply in the instant case.

19. The learned counsel, in this connection, has placed strong reliance upon a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi Municipality v. Kuldip, reported in 1970 Delhi page 37, and in Shanti Devi v. Haryana Roadways 1972 Punjab Page 65, and in N.S Thread Company v. James Chardwick & Brothers reported in A.I.R 1953 S.C 357; 1979 Transport & Accidents (T.A.C) Page 150 and 1973 Labour Industrial Cases 1555: Southern Roadways v. E.S.I Corporation.

20. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court reads as follows:—

“And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February, One thousand nine hundred and twenty nine in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court shall be to Us. Our Heirs ??? Successors in our or their Privy Council, as hereinafer provided.”

21. The aforementioned provision is in pari materia with clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court, and similar provisions of the Letters Patent of different High Courts.

22. From a bare perusal of aforementioned provision, it is clear that an appeal lies before a Division Bench of this Court from a judgment of a single Judge, if an order has been passed in terms of section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915-17. It is not in dispute that in this case, the exceptions provided for in clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court are not applicable.

23. In the case of Delhi Municipality v. Kuldip (supra), it was held that an appeal lies to a Division Bench in terms of clause 10 of the Letters Patent from a judgment of a single Judge passed under section 110D of Motor Vehicles Act, as the same comes within the purview of the word ‘Judgment’ within the meaning of clause 10 of its Letters Patent. It was held in that case that while hearing an appeal, the High Court acts as a Court and not as a Tribunal.

24. Similarly, the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Shanti Devi v. E.M Haryana Roadways (supra), held that a letters-patent appeal will be maintainable before a Division Bench against the judgment passed by learned single Judge of the High Court in terms of clause 10 of its letters-patent.

25. As mentioned hereinbefore, the aforementioned two decisions proceed on-the basis of the High Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Clause 110D of the Act acts as a Court, and as such an appeal against the judgment passed by the learned single Judge is maintainable before a division Bench.

26. However, in these cases the question as to whether a letters patent appeal is maintainable when a right of appeal is provided to High Court by reasons of the provisions of a self contained Code has not been considered. But in view of various decisions of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, it is not necessary for us to consider the said question in great details.

27. Aright of appeal is a creature of statute. Such a right cannot ordinarily be taken away unless exclusion thereof has been made expressly or by necessary implication under a statute.

28. Section 103 of the Government of India Act reads as follows:—

Each High Court may by its rules must provide as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more Judges, or by division courts, constituted by two or more judge of the High Court, of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court.

29. It is well known that the said provision is saved by reason of section 8 of the General Clauses Act as also in terms of the provisions of the Interpretation Act, and Rules of the High Court can now be framed in terms of the provisions of Article 225 of the Constitution of India.

30. The Supreme Court in the case of National Savings & Thread Company Ltd. v. James Chardwicks & Brothers reported in A.I.R 1953 S.C 357 has considered the question as to whether a letters-patent appeal will be maintainable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court when it exercises an appellate jurisdiction under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 from an order passed by the Registrar of the Trade Marks.

Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 reads as follows:—

“Save as expressly provided in the Act an appeal shall lie, within the period prescribed by the Central Government, from any decision of the Registrar under this Actor the rules made thereunder to the High Court having the jurisdiction.”

31. The Supreme Court took into consideration that the Trade Marks Act does not provide or lay down any procedure for future conduct of that appeal in the High Court, and as such the High Court while adjudicating upon such an appeal acts as a High Court to like any other matter which comes before it in its original or appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in that case clearly held that an appeal under Section 78 of the Trade Marks Act shall also be regulated by the Rules framed by the High Court as in the case of other appeals of civil nature.

32. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case laid down the law in the following terms:

“Though the facts of the cases laying down the above rules were not exactly similar to the facts of the present case, the prinple enunciated therein is one of general application and has an apposite application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Section 76, Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by S. 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act.”

33. It was further held in that decision that a judgment delivered in an appeal under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act is also passed pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act.

34. Whatever doubt could have been raised in the decision in the N.S & Thread Company Ltd. v. James Chardwick & Brothers, (supra), the matter was clarified and set at rest by the Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries Private Limited v. S.B Sarup Singh reported in A.I.R 1965 S.C 1442.

35. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision held that clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court applied irrespective of the fact whether the High Court had been exercising its appellate jurisdiction from an order passed by the Court or a Tribunal The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case held as follows:—

“The following legal position emerges from the said discussion. A Statute may give a right of appeal from an order of tribunal or a Court to the High Court without any limitation. The appeal to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in the High Court. Under the Rules made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under S. 108 of the Government of India Act, Act, 1915, an appeal under the S. 39 of the Act will be heard by a single Judge. Any judgment made by the single judge in the said appeal will, under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to that Court. If the order made by a single Judge is a Judgment and if the appropriate Legislature has, expressly or by necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal the conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of single Judge under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the Single Judge to the High Court.”

It was also held:—

“In the view we have expressed it is not necessary to consider the question whether the Tribunal is a court or not, for as we have pointed out earlier it is not germane to the question of maintainability of the Letters Patent appeal.”

36. The Supreme Court in the case of Umaji v. Radhika Bai Reported in 1986 S.C 1272 while considering the question as to whether an appeal lies against an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, considered the conspectus of law as to how the letters-patent came into being by referring to various charters issued by the King or the Queen, as the case may be from time to time, in England as also the provisions of High Courts Act, 1861, the Government of India Act, 1915, Government of India Act, 1935 and other legislations whereby and whereunder the High Courts were constituted and came to the conclusion that the provisions of appeal under the letters patent to a High Court applies to Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

37. It was held in the said decision that the right of appeal unless excluded by a letters patent of the High Court or by statutory provisions, would continue to govern the matters be-fore the High Court. The Supreme Court further held that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and thus, where an appeal is provided by the letters patent, the same shall insure to the benefits of the litigants. In that case the Supreme Court held as follows:—

“109—The question whether an intra Court appeal lay against the judgment of a single judge in petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution was not before the Court in Shah Bib Lal Khimji's case and did not fall to be decided in it. In fact, as stated in the above passage, the Court refrained from expressing any opinion with respect to the nature of an order passed in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Statement in the above passage that such proceedings are governed by rules framed under the Code of Civil Procedure and not by Letters Patent was merely a casual and passing observation and not intended to be a statement of the law on the point. In fact, proceeding under Article 226 cannot be governed by rules made by the High Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Under sections 122 and 125 of the Code, the High Courts are conferred the power to make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of the Civil Courts subject to their superintendence and they can by such rules annul, after or add to all or any of the rules in the first Schedule to the Code These rules are, therefore, intended to regulate the exercise of procedure in respect of matters to which the Code applies. The Code deals with suits and appeals, reference, review and revision arising out of orders and decrees passed in suits. Under section 141, the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits is to be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction. The Explanation to that section inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 provides as follows:—

“Explanation.—In this section, expression “proceedings” includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

38. The power of a High Court to make rules, of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and members thereof sitting single or in Division Courts is to be found, in its Charter, whether it be a statute or is Letters Patent. The position with respect to existing High Courts has already been set out in detail above. So far as High Courts which came into existence after the commencement of the Constitution are concerned, whenever new High Courts were set up the relevant statute made provisions in that behalf for instance, the Andhra State Act, 1953, the State Re-organisation Act, 1956, the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1980, the Delhi High Court Act, 1970. It is the charter of the High Court which generally confers a right of intra court appeal and it is the rules made under the rule-making power of the High Court which generally provide which matters are to be heard by a single judge and which by a Division Bench though at times statutes may also do so, as for example, the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, and the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. Whereby the charter of a High Court matters are not required to be heard by any particular number of judges and such charter provides for an intra court appeal from the decision of a single Judge, Whether such an appeal would lie or not would depend upon whether by the rules made by the High Court in the exercise of its rule-making power the matter is heard by a single judge or a Division Bench subject to the condition that such right of appeal is not otherwise excluded.”

39. It is, therefore, clear from the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court that a right of appeal provided for under clause 10 of the Letters Patent cannot be curtailed, unless the same is excluded either by a Charter or by statutory provisions.

40. In view of the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions, it is not necessary to consider the other decisions as referred to by Shri Debi Prasad, as in the said decisions, similar views have been taken.

41. There is no doubt that a right of appeal provided for under section 110D of the Act is restricted, but while an appeal is maintainable and is decided in terms of section 110D of the said Act, there can be no doubt that the same becomes a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

42. The Bihar Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal Roles also do not lay down the procedure of appeal except that an appeal against the award of a Claims Tribunal shall be preferred in the form of a Memo, stating concisely the grounds on which appeal is preferred, and the same shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and the award appealed against.

43. A judgment as defined in section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure is meant to apply in respect of judgments rendered under the said Code. A judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court must be given a broader meaning so as to mean an order whereby and whereunder the right of a party has been decided.

44. An order dismissing an appeal in limine would also be judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, inasmuch as thereby the right of the parties is finally decided, unless the said order is set aside by an appellate court or by the Supreme Court of India, and the same shall be final and binding between the parties.

45. In the case of Upadhaya v. Dbirendra Singh, (1988) 2 SCC 1 : A.I.R 1988 S.C 915, the Supreme Court was considering an election matter. The right to adjudicate upon a dispute arising out of an election matter has been conferred upon the High Courts by reason of Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the Representation of the Peoples Act.

46. In terms of Section 116 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court.

47. The said provision contain a non-obstante clause and is in the following terms:—

“Section 116A: Appeals to Supreme Court:

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court on any question whether of law or fact from every order made by a High Court under Section 8 or section 99.

(2) Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99:

Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.”

48. The Supreme Court in the Upadhaya's case (supra) had been considering a case as to whether an L.P.A lies to a division Bench from an interlocutory order passed by a learned single Judge. In that case, it was held that the High Court while adjudicating upon an election dispute exercises its special jurisdiction conferred by virtue of Article 329(b) of the Constitution and having regard to the historic legislations and the limited extent of an appeal expressly provided by section 116A of the said Act, it was held that the right to prefer a Letters Patent is barred by necessary implication. Such is not the case here.

49. In terms of section 110D of the said Act, neither a finality has been given to an appellate order, nor the right of further appeal has been curtailed in any manner whatsoever.

50. Francis Reunion in his Statutory Interpretation at page 747 states the law thus:—

“unless contrary intention appears, an enactment by implication merit in principle, or rule relating to jurisdiction, evidence or procedure (whether statutory or non-statutory) which prevalis in the territory to which every enactment extends and is relevant to the operation of the enactment in that territory.”

51. So far as the case of this court reported in 1989 R.B.C.J 245 and 1989 B.B.C.J 253 are concerned, the same have no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. In these cases, it was merely held that section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in an appeal before the statutory authorities.

52. The Limitation Act applies only to the civil courts and the courts exercising criminal jurisdiction and as such the statutory authorities which are neither the civil courts nor the criminal courts, the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application in relation thereto.

53. Similarly, in view of the fact that a Letter Patent Appeal also lies before the High Court from an order passed by the High Court in an appeal from the order of the Tribunal, it is not necessary for us to decide the question as to whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110D of the Act is a Court or a Tribunal.

54. However, it may be mentioned here that in the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Raman Bhai & Prabhat Bbai reported in (1987) 3 SCC 234 : A.I.R 1987 S.C 1690, it has also been held that section 110 to 110F not only refers to procedural matters, but also deals with substantive rights.

55. In this view of the matter, it must be held that the Letters Patent appeal is maintainable.

56. Coming to the merits of this case, it appears that the appeal had been preferred by the owners and the drivers of the vehicles. There is no doubt that the right of an appeal at the instance of the owners and the drivers of the vehicles is not circumscribed by any statutory provisions. Further the learned single Judge has also not assigned any reason whatsoever white dismissing the appeal in limine.

57. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and the points involved in the appeal, in my considered opinion, the appellants ought to have been granted an opportunity of being heard on merits of the case with reference to the records of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and therefore, the matter requires re-consideration at the hands of this court again.

58. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order dated 11.10.1988 passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 64 of 1988 (R) is set aside and the said appeal is admitted for hearing. However, keeping in view the fact that the appeal has been filed against the award passed in favour of a person who has allegedly become a permanently disabled person, we hope and trust that the appeal would be disposed of expeditiously.

59. Before parting with this case, we may mention that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that final disposal of the claim petitions fates a long time. In this connection, it would be apposite to note the anguish expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bishan Devi v. Sirbaksh Singh reported in (1980) 1 SCC 273 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 1862 in the following terms:—

“1—The instant case brings into focus the difficulties experienced dependents in obtaining relief before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The victim in this case Bhgwan Das was run over by a Motor vehicle on the night between July 8 and 9, 1961, leaving behind him his wife Bishan Devi and four minor children. For eighteen long years they have been before courts asking for some compensation for the death of their bread-winner due to rash and negligent driving of a motor vehicle. One is tempted to remark that they would have been better off but for their hope of getting some relief in courts. They not only had to spend their time in courts but to borrow to fight for their rights. It is common knowledge that such helpless and desperate condition is exploited by unscrupulous persons who manage to get away with the bulk of the compensation money if and when the claimant succeeds in getting it.

Due to inordinate delay in disposal of she claim petitions before the Motor Claims Tribunal the badly needed relief to the claimants is not available for several years. Further time is takes in appeals. All along the dependents will have to carry on without any relief. It has been time and again pointed out by courts that insistence of proof of rash and negligent driving causes considerable hardship on the claimants.

We may point out that repeated suggestions have been made by this court and several High Courts expressing the desirability of bringing a social insurance which would provide for direct payment to the dependents of the victim. This court in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan has referred to the decision of the Kerala High Court in Kesavan Nair… v. State Insurance Officer…. where the High Court expressed itself thus:

“Out of a sense of humanity and having due regard to the handicap of the innocent victim in establishing the negligee of the operator of the vehicle a blanket liability must he cast on the insurers.”

“The Madras High Court in Ruby insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Goviadaraj has suggested the necessity of having social insurance to provide cover for the claimants irrespective of proof of negligence to a limited extent say Rs. 250 to 200 a month.”

60. The Supreme Court thereafter referred to various other observations made by the different High Courts with regard to the difficulties faced by the claimants who had filed claim applications under the Motor Vehicles Act.

61. Taking thus this aspect of the matter into consideration, we hope and trust that the Parliament may take notice of the fact and make suitable amendments in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 making the appellate order a final one so as to bar a further appeal under the Letters Patent of the High Court.

62. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there will be no order as to costs.