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Smt. Savitri Devi & Ors. v. Smt. Indu Bhushan Saran & Ors.

Patna High Court
Feb 13, 1989
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit filed by the opposite parties against the petitioners was dismissed for default on 6-2-1975. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed an application for restoration on 6-3-1975, which led to the registration of Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1975. On 7-3-1975, another application was filed for restoration purportedly under Order IX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but effectively under Order IX, Rule 9. This application contended that the suit was dismissed for default due to the conduct of plaintiff No. 4, who was inimically disposed towards plaintiff No. 1.

The petitioners did not file any objection to this application. One witness (A.W 1) was examined in support of the application. Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 1975 arose from this application, while Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1975 was later dismissed for default.

By an order dated 5-8-1978, the application was dismissed by Shree D. Kishku, 4th Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna. The opposite parties appealed this order, registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1966 of 1978. The lower appellate court, by a judgment dated 13-9-1985, allowed the appeal and restored the suit to its original file.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lower appellate court misdirected itself in relying upon the evidence of A.W 1, who was argued to be an incompetent witness to depose on how and under what circumstances the suit was dismissed for default.
  2. Whether the evidence of A.W 1 was sufficient to set aside the order dismissing the suit for default.
  3. Whether the High Court should exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with the appellate court's decision.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The lower appellate court erred in relying on the testimony of A.W 1, as he was not competent to depose on behalf of plaintiff No. 1 regarding the circumstances of the suit's dismissal.
  • A.W 1 only made pairvi on behalf of plaintiff No. 1 in the miscellaneous case and did not participate in the main suit, rendering his evidence inadmissible for restoring the suit.
  • Reliance was placed on the precedent of Vinod Kumar Arora v. Surjit Kaur to support the contention regarding witness competency.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The statements made in the restoration application on behalf of plaintiff No. 1 were not controverted by the petitioners, making it unnecessary for plaintiff No. 1 to be examined personally.
  • The petitioners did not adduce any evidence to contradict the testimony of A.W 1.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vinod Kumar Arora v. Surjit Kaur, (1987) 3 SCC 711 : AIR 1987 SC 2179 Competency of witnesses and credibility of evidence in restoration applications. The court distinguished the facts from this precedent, noting that unlike in that case, evidence was adduced here and the petitioners did not controvert it, justifying reliance on A.W 1's testimony.
Major S.S Khanna v. Brig F.J Dillon, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 497 High Court's revisional jurisdiction should not be exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The court cited this to emphasize restraint in interference with lower court decisions.
Brij Gopal Mathur v. Kishan Gopal Mathur, (1973) 1 SCC 635 : AIR 1973 Supreme Court 1096 Principle limiting the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. Reinforced the principle that the High Court should not interfere lightly with appellate decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that A.W 1 might not have been a competent witness to depose on behalf of plaintiff No. 1 regarding the dismissal of the suit. However, since the petitioners did not controvert the allegations made in the restoration application or adduce any evidence to challenge A.W 1's statements, the lower appellate court was justified in relying on this testimony.

The court distinguished the cited precedent of Vinod Kumar Arora, noting that the present case involved actual evidence and was not decided on surmises or conjectures, unlike the precedent. Furthermore, the court emphasized the well-settled legal principle that courts favor deciding suits on their merits and that a party showing sufficient cause for non-appearance should be given an opportunity to contest the case.

Considering these principles, the court found no illegality in the lower appellate court's decision to restore the suit. It also underscored the principle that the High Court should exercise its revisional jurisdiction sparingly and not merely because it has the power to do so.

Holding and Implications

The court dismissed the civil revision application filed by the petitioners, thereby upholding the lower appellate court's order restoring the suit to its original file.

The direct effect of this decision is that the suit dismissed for default is reinstated, allowing the parties to proceed with the case on its merits. No new precedent was established, and the decision reflects the application of established principles favoring adjudication on merits and cautious exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.:— This application is directed against a judgment dated 13-9-1985 passed by Shree A.G Dutta, 4th Additional District Judge, Patna in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 196 of 1978, whereby and whereunder, the said learned court reversed an order dated 5-8-1978 passed by Shree D. Kishku, 4th Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna, in Miscellaneous case No. 3 of 1975 and thus allowed an application filed by the opposite-parties under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. The facts of this case are not much in dispute. The suit filed by the opposite parties against the petitioners was dismissed for default on 6-2-1975. An application for restoration was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs on 6-3-1975. A copy of the said application has been marked as Exhibit A. upon the said application, Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1975 was registered.

3. On 7-3-1975 another application was filed for restoration of the said suit purported to be under Order IX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was, however, in effect and substance an application under Order IX, Rule 9 thereof. In the said application, it was contended that the suit was allowed to be dismissed for default at the instance of plaintiff No. 4 who was inimically disposed of towards the plaintiff No. 1.

4. However, the petitioners here of did not file any objection to the said application.

5. In support of the said application one witness was examined who supported the case of the applicant opposite-party.

6. The said application dated 7-3-1975 gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 1975. However, later on the aforementioned Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1975 was dismissed for default.

7. By an order dated 5-8-1978 Shree D. Kishku, 4th Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna dismissed the said application. The opposite party preferred an appeal against the said order dated 5-8-1978 which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1966 of 1978.

8. By the impugned order, the learned lower appellate court had allowed the said appeal and restored the suit to its original file.

9. Mr. Shree Nath Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, raised a very short question. According to the learned counsel the learned lower appellate court misdirected himself in allowing the appeal in so far as it relied upon the evidence of A.W 1 although he could not have examined himself in support of the application dated 7-3-1975. According to the learned counsel as A.W 1 did not make any pairive in the suit and made pairvi on behalf of the plaintiff No. 1 only in the aforementioned miscellaneous case, he was not a competent witness to depose as to how and in what circumstances, the main suit was dismissed for default. The learned counsel, therefore, suggested that as the said A.W 1 was not a competent witness to depose on behalf of the plaintiff opposite-party No. 1, the learned lower appellate court could not have relied upon his testimony and acting on the basis thereof could not have set aside the order of dismissal of the suit for default.

10. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed strong reliance in Vinod Kumar Arora v. Surjit Kaur., reported in (1987) 3 SCC 711 : AIR 1987 SC page 2179.

11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, on the other hand, drew my attention paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment and submitted that as the statements made in application hied on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party No. 1 were not controverted by the petitioner and thus it was not necessary for the plaintiff No. 1 to examine herself. According to the learned counsel, even the petitioner had not adduced any evidence to controvert the statement made by A.W 1.

12. True it is as suggested by Shree Singh that A.W 1 might not have been a competent witness to depose on behalf of the plaintiff opposite-party No. 1 but in the instant case as noticed hereinbefore the petitioner hereof even did not controvert the allegations made by plaintiff No. 1 in her application for restoration of the suit.

13. In this circumstances, in my opinion, the learned lower appellate court cannot be said to have committed any illegality in relying upon the statements made by A.W 1.

14. In Vinod Kumar Arora's case (supra). The Supreme Court while considering the decision of the High Court which did not lay any credence to the findings of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller on the ground that their findings have been passed on surmises and conjectures and relevant pieces of evidence have been lost sight of by the said court. It is not the situation obtaining in this case as evidence has been adduced on behalf of plaintiff-opposite-party.

15. Further, is now a well settled principle of law that courts always lean in favour of the decision of a suit on merits. A party, however, negligent he may be, if he shows sufficient and good cause for his non-appearance on the day when the suit was dismissed for default, should be given an opportunity to fight out the case on merits. This being the positition in law, in my opinion, even if in a case of interference by the petitioner, has been made out, I should not exercise my discretion under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

16. It is now well settled that the High Court should not exercise its revisional jurisdiction on only because it will be lawful to do so. Reference in this connection may be made in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig F.J Dillon, reported in AIR 1964 Supreme Court 497 and in Brij Gopal Mathur v. Kishan Gopal Mathur, reported in (1973) 1 SCC 635 : AIR 1973 Supreme Court page 1096.

17. Taking into consideration these aspects of the matter in my opinion, there is no merit in this civil revision application, which is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and the circumstances of this case, there shad be no order as to costs.

Petition allowed.