S.B Sinha, J.:—In this writ application the petitioners challenge the various orders as contained in Annexure 6 to the writ application and pray that they be put back in possession in respect of the building situated in the town of Hazaribagh, commonly known as ‘Valley View’ where from she was forcibly dispossessed.

2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.

3. The ancestors of the petitioners took lease in respect of various plots of land being plot. Nos. 1653, 1655, 1657, 1658 and 1661 measuring an area of 0.94-decimal situated in village Hurhuru in the district of Hazaribagh from the Khas Mahal authority.

4. The said lease was granted in the year 1945 initially for a period of three years and thereafter the original lessee, Debendra Nath Dutta with the sanction of the State Government constructed a house thereon, which is a double storeyed building, in the year 1945-1946. It is admitted that Sri Debendra Nath Dutta and his family hail from Calcutta and as such they constructed the aforementioned house for the purpose of using the same during holidays. It is further stated that the aforementioned building was commonly known as ‘Valley View’. The petitioner further stated that the aforementioned lease was renewed for a period of 30 years pursuant to an application for renewal filed by the said Sri Debendra Nath Dutta.

5. It is further stated in the writ petition that pursuant to Clause 14 of the terms and conditions of the lease as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application, the heirs of late Debendra Nath Dutta made an application for renewal of the aforementioned deed of lease on or before 28th December, 1977 for a further period of thirty years.

6. It be mentioned here that the heirs of aforementioned Sri Debendra Nath Dutta also got their names mutated in the office of the State of Bihar which took place in the year 1974. The petitioners categorically stated in paragraph 24 of the writ application that the aforementioned application for renewal of the lease has not yet been disposed of by the concerned authority. The petitioner has further alleged mala fide on the part of the authority concerned.

7. From a perusal of the various orders impugned in this petition as contained in Annexure 6 to the writ application, it appears that the same depicts a sordid state of affairs. From the order dated 18-9-1980 it appears that the Khas Mahal Officer recommended that the application for renewal of the lease be rejected and the matter was ordered to be put up before the Deputy Commissioner who is the competent authority to reject the application for renewal of the said lease and thereafter, it appears that the Deputy Commissioner directed to issue a notice upon the lessee to show cause as to why the lease shall not be cancelled. This order of Deputy Commissioner is dated 19.9.1980 However, by the order of the same date it appears that one N.S Madhawaa directed that four Home Guards be deputed for the purpose of occupying the building and further directed the Sub-divisional Officer to depute a Magistrate for that purpose. In the said order it was further mentioned that S.P Hazaribagh may also be requested to send a Hawaldar for the purpose of being the incharge of the force. By the said order it was also directed that the Nazarat would check up and seal all the rooms.

8. From the order sheet dated 3.10.1980, it appears that the Khas Mahal Officer in a note placed before the Additional Collector reported that all the rooms of the building in question have been locked up and the Home Guards had also been deputed for the purpose of looking after the same. It appears that the aforementioned order for resumption of the building was recalled by an order dated 7.10.1980 Thereafter, an application for review was filed for the purpose of recalling the aforementioned order of taking possession of the building in question. The said application was ultimately taken up for hearing by the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh on 2.9.1981

9. From a persual of the order dated 2.9.1981, it appears that the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh based his decision mainly on two counts, firstly he held that the building is not occupied by the petitioner throughout the year; secondly, he on a purported reliance of a report made to him by Inspector of Police, Hazaribagh came to the conclusion that the house in question is visited by the anti-social elements.

10. It is admitted by the parties that prior to the passing of the aforementioned order dated 2.9.1981 neither any notice to show cause was issued by me Deputy Commissioner nor copy of the purported repeat of the Inspector of police was furnished.

11. It is apparent from the records that the respondents purported to be pursuant to and in furtherance of the said order took forcible possession of the building in question.

12. In this case a counter affidavit has been filed wherein the respondent's have stated that they are in possession of the building in question and the same is being used as rest house for the officers of the Department of Tourism of the Government of Bihar.

13. From a perusal of the writ application and the counter affidavit, there cannot be any doubt that the respondents have acted absolutely arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in the case.

14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents when questioned, admitted that there is no condition in the lease to resume possession of the leasehold only because the house is not occupied by the lessee throughout the year. It is also admitted that under the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual it is obligatory on the part of the authority to take recourse to the remedy of a civil suit instituted in a civil court for taking possession of the building after the same is directed to be resumed. Admittedly, no such civil suit has been filed and further admittedly the building in question was occupied by the respondents, in the manner as stated hereinbefore. The respondents, therefore, evidently did not follow the rule of law nor the proceeding was conducted fairly and reasonably.

15. It is now well settled by the various decisions of the Supreme Court that arbitrariness is antithesis of equality and any action which cannot stand the test of reasonableness would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this, connection may be made in E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555, in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1918 SC 597 as also the decision in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Suhravardi ((1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487)

16. From the facts, as stated hereinbefore, it would further appear that the respondents have failed to lake recourse to law and have acted not only arbitrarily but also whimsically. The procedures for cancellation of the lease have been thrown to the winds.

17. The procedures for resumption of the building and/or of cancellation of lease are engrafted in various provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual. The respondents who are public authorities and were invested with wide powers even to deprive a person from his right to property, were expected to exercise such powers, with extreme care and caution. It was their duty to see that the power conferred upon them be not exceeded or abused. The respondents were required to keep themselves within the limits of the authority committed to it; to act in good faith and reasonably.

18. In a recent decision in R. v. Inner London Education Authority, exparte Westminster City Council reported in (1986) I AER 19 the following passage from the judgment of Hanks v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (1963) 1 AER 47 has been quoted with approval:—

“I confess that I think confusion can arise from the multiplicity of words which have been used in this case as suggested criteria for the testing of the validity of the exercise of a statutory power. The words used have included “object”, “purpose”, “motives” “motivation”, “reasons” “grounds”, and “considerations”. In the end, it seems to me, the simplest and clearest way to state the matter is by reference to “consideration”. A “consideration”, I apprehended, is something which one takes into account as factor in arriving at a decision. I am prepared to assume, for the purposes of this case, that if it be shown that an authority exercising a power has taken into account as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take info account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power, then the exercise of the power, normally at least, is bad. Similarly, if the authority fails to take into account as a relevant factor something which is relevant, and which is or ought to be known to it, and which it ought to have taken into account, the exercise of the power is normally bad.”

19. It may be mentioned here that from the Khas Mahal Manual as also the terms of the lease it appears that the right of renewal conferred upon the lessee is a very valuable right and the renewal of lease is to be granted almost automatically unless and until the lessee is guilty of violation of the condition of lease or any of the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual.

20. It is now well known in view of the decision on the Supreme Court in D. Nataraja Mudaliar v. State Transport Authority, Madras, (1978) 4 SCC 290 : AIR 1979 SC 114 that the right of renewal is a very valuable right.

21. From the order-sheet as contained in Annexure 6 to the writ petition it is evident that although a notice for cancellation of the lease was proposed to be issued, no such notice in fact was issued for the petitioners at any point of time and they were not apprised as to what condition or conditions of the lease has been violated by them. The petitioners were, to say the least, entitled to the minimal requirement of the principles of natural justice. The respondents evidently did not consider the light of the petitioners get their lease renewal objectively. In Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, ((1985) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1987 SC 454) the Supreme Court has succinctly laid down the law in the following terms:—

“We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be judged in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting. The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially but whether there is a real likelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power strict sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to ??? at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of the parties Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of rule of law in a welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner.”

22. Even assuming that the respondent No. 2 or the Deputy Commissioner had the discretion to renew or not to renew the said lease but even the right to exercise discretion has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically or capriciously.

23. “Discretion” as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wakes (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at 2539, means sound discretion governed by rule not by rum our; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful.

24. In Lallu Yashwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, (AIR 1968 SC 620) Supreme Court quoted with approval the celebrated case of Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narain Roy, (51 Indian Appeals 293) in the following terms:—

“In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court.”

25. From the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court it is absolutely clear that rule of law prevailing in this country is that no body should take forcible possession from another. The public authorities are also bound to follow the rule of law.

26. In my opinion if forcible possession takes place at the instance of the State, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article, 226 of the Constitution, as in such a case the aggrieved party would not even be able to institute a suit in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

27. Mr. M.P Sinha, the learned junior counsel to Standing Counsel No. 1 has drawn my attention to the fact, as stated hereinbefore, that the possession of the premises in question has already been taken ever by the respondents.

28. As I have held hereinbefore that the action on the part of the respondents in taking forcible possession of the premises in question was wholly illegal and arbitrary in my opinion, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ??? issue a direction upon the respondents commanding upon them to restore back possession of the premises in question to the petitioner if the same has already been taken over by the respondents.

29. The question with regard to the Court's jurisdiction to restore possession in favour of an aggrieved party is so longer res integra. This Court in various decisions, Indrasan Rai v. Enayat Khan, AIR 1952 Pat 316 and in Mahendra Prasad Sajuja v. Mostt. Sudarsan Devi Khanna, 1976 BBCJ 190 categorically held that such power can be exercised by the High Court. The aforementioned decisions have been quoted with approval by a recent Full Bench decision in Rajiv Bharti alias Anil Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, reported in 1985 BLJ 312 : 1984 PLJR 719 (FB).

30. In the result, this writ application is allowed and the order as contained in Annexure re 6 to the writ application is hereby quashed and the respondents are directed to restore back possession of the premises in question situated in plot Nos. 1653, 1654, 1655, 1656, 1657, 1658 and 1661 commonly known as ‘Valley View’ to the petitioner within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

31. However, if it observed that if the petitioner have committed violation of any terms and conditions of the case or if is found that the properties in question should be resumed in public interest, the respondents would be at liberty to take such action as against the petitioner as is permissible in law.

32. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners are also entitled to costs which is quantified at Rs. 2,000.

33. A copy of the judgment may be handed over to Mr. M.P Sinha, Junior Counsel to S.B Gadodia, Standing Counsel No. 1 for its communication to the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh.