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Champaran Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Joint Labour Commissioner And Appellate Authority And Others

Patna High Court
Nov 11, 1986
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Full Bench Opinion Summary — Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Champaran Sugar Company Limited, employed respondent No. 3, Sri Kamlakant Gupta (referred to in the opinion as the respondent-workman), who superannuated on 1 July 1976 with a last drawn wage of Rs. 605.29 per month. The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 became applicable to the petitioner in 1974. The company alleged the employee failed to deliver vacant possession of allotted residential quarters; consequently a clearance certificate was not issued and gratuity was not paid immediately.

The employee wrote to the company on 2 May 1980 and filed an application before the Controlling Authority on 5 May 1980 under Section 7 of the Act. On 31 October 1981 the Controlling Authority awarded Rs. 13,980 as gratuity for forty years' service and directed payment within 30 days; the Controlling Authority did not expressly mention interest. The company appealed to the Joint Labour Commissioner (the Appellate Authority), which dismissed the appeal and directed payment of the gratuity amount "plus usual interest due thereon." The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging, primarily and solely, the appellate direction to pay interest on the gratuity.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 envisages the grant of interest on delayed payments of gratuity to an employee.
  2. If interest is envisaged, whether such interest can be granted in the absence of an express claim for interest in the employee's application before the Controlling Authority.
  3. Whether the contrary view expressed in Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C No. 14 of 1985) is correct.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Champaran Sugar Company Ltd.)

  • The Act does not, in terms, envisage payment of interest on delayed gratuity; therefore interest cannot be awarded.
  • In the alternative, if Section 8 is so construed, interest is payable only in the coercive recovery process when a certificate is issued to the Collector (i.e., the 9% compound interest in Section 8 applies only on issuance of a certificate and recovery as arrears of land revenue).
  • Interest could not be granted where the employee did not expressly claim interest in his application before the Controlling Authority; the Controlling Authority or appellate authority could not award interest absent such a claim.
  • Primary reliance was placed on Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar for the proposition that no interest on gratuity is payable.

Respondent / Workman's Arguments

  • The correctness of Patna Electricity Undertaking was assailed; the respondents contended interest on delayed gratuity is payable.
  • In the alternative, reliance was placed on Section 4 of the Interest Act, 1968 to support a direction to pay interest on the gratuity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C No. 14 of 1985) Short order taken to indicate that no interest on gratuity was payable (relied upon by petitioner). The Full Bench found the short order was rendered at admission without adequate consideration of Sections 4 and 8 and the rules, described it as virtually per incuriam, and expressly overruled it.
K.R. Erry v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 Punj 279) Full Bench holding that pensionary benefits are not a bounty but a legal right. Used as part of the doctrinal background to show a shift in law treating pensionary/retiral benefits as enforceable legal rights rather than discretionary bounty, supporting entitlement to compensation for delay.
State of Punjab v. K.R. Erry and Sobhag Rai Mehta (AIR 1973 SC 834; 1973 Lab IC 440) Affirmation that pensionary benefits are legal rights, not bounty. Relied upon to reinforce that pensionary rights (and by analogy gratuity) are enforceable rights entitling the employee to remedies for delay.
State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair (AIR 1985 SC 356; 1985 Lab IC 664) Authority stating pension and gratuity are valuable rights and culpable delay must be visited with penalty of interest at current market rate until payment; discussion of appropriate quantum (reference to 12% vs 6%). The Full Bench cited this as authoritative support for awarding interest for delayed payment of retiral benefits and to show courts have awarded substantial interest (even 12% in principle) as compensation for delay.
State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya (AIR 1961 SC 751) Principle that statutory rules validly framed become part of the statute and have the same force of law. Applied to treat the Payment of Gratuity Rules (Central and Bihar) as integral to the Act for purposes of interpretation (e.g., "prescribed" time, procedural rules).
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar, Patna v. Prayaglal Agarwala & Co., Jharia (1986 Pat LJR 807; 1986 Tax LR 1511) Construction that statutory payment of interest for delayed tax is compensatory and not penal; "penal interest" terminology is loose. Used by analogy to show that interest for delayed statutory payments serves compensatory purposes and is not penal; this supported construing Section 8 interest as compensatory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench approached the matter in the context of a modern doctrinal shift: pensionary and retiral benefits (including gratuity) are treated as enforceable legal rights rather than discretionary bounties. The Court relied on prior authorities to establish that delay in payment of such benefits attracts an obligation to pay interest as compensation for deprivation of funds to which an employee was entitled.

The Court analysed the statutory text and scheme. It observed that Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act establishes a clear statutory right to gratuity and specifies the occasions on which gratuity becomes payable (superannuation, retirement, resignation, death or disablement). Section 8 was examined in extenso: it prescribes that where gratuity is not paid within the prescribed time, the Controlling Authority shall, on application, issue a certificate to the Collector who shall recover the amount "together with compound interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum, from the date of expiry of the prescribed time, as arrears of land revenue" and pay it to the entitled person.

From the statutory text and the rules (which the Court treated as integral to the Act under established precedent), the Court concluded:

  • The Act places the primary duty to determine and pay gratuity on the employer and prescribes timings by reference to rules; this duty is mandatory and not contingent upon an employee's application.
  • Section 8 contemplates payment of interest for delayed payment, and fixes both the rate (9% compound) and the mode of recovery when coercive recovery is resorted to; but the right to interest itself arises from the employer's default and not from issuance of a certificate or from a procedural step alone.
  • The employee's right to interest accrues by operation of statute on default; it is not dependent on an express claim for interest in the original application to the Controlling Authority.
  • The prescription of interest under Section 8 is compensatory (commercial quid pro quo for money wrongfully withheld) rather than penal; the Court drew analogy from tax interest jurisprudence to underscore this point.
  • The prior short order in Patna Electricity Undertaking was deemed to have failed to consider Sections 4 and 8 and associated rules, was described as per incuriam, and therefore was not followed.
  • Section 7 corroborates the statutory structure: employer must determine gratuity and pay within prescribed time whether or not an application has been made; in a dispute the employer must deposit the admitted amount with the Controlling Authority. Given the employer's duty is independent of an employee's claim, the incidental right to interest for delay likewise does not require an express claim by the employee.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Full Bench held, in answer to the questions posed, that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (a) envisages the grant of interest on delayed payments of gratuity to an employee and prescribes the rate and mode for recovery (Section 8), and (b) such interest can be awarded even in the absence of an express claim for interest in the employee's application before the Controlling Authority.

Direct Consequences in the Case:

  • The writ petition challenging the appellate direction to award interest was dismissed as devoid of merit.
  • The earlier decision in Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar (short order) was held to be per incuriam and overruled on the point.
  • Parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Broader implication indicated by the Court: the opinion reinforces the principle that statutory gratuity obligations carry with them a right to compensatory interest for delay; Section 8 both contemplates interest and prescribes its rate and recovery mechanism. The Court characterised the interest as compensatory rather than penal. The opinion expressly overruled the contrary earlier short order.

Disposition

Petition dismissed. The bench (S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.; S. Ali Ahmad, J.; M.P. Verma, J.) concurred in the result.

Show all summary ...

S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— Whether the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 envisages the grant of interest on delayed payments of gratuity to an employee is the core question in this reference to the Full Bench. If so, whether such interest can be granted in the absence of an express claim therefor in the application of the employee before the Controller? Equally at issue is the correctness of the contrary view in C.W.J.C No. 14 of 1985 (Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar) decided on the 25th of July, 1985.

2. The facts he in a narrow compass and are not in serious dispute. The petitioner Champaran Sugar Company Limited are engaged in the business of manufacturing sugar and own a factory therefor situated at Barachakia in the district of East Champaran. Respondent No. 3 Sri Kamlakane Gupta was admittedly their employee of a long standing, who superannuated on the 1st of July, 1976 and his last drawn wage was Rs. 605.29 per month. It is unnecessary to delve into the applicability of gratuity laws on the sugar industry and it suffices that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter called as the Act) became applicable and binding on all sugar industries of Bihar including the petitioner-company in the year 1974. On the petitioner's own showing, the respondent-employee is alleged to have failed in delivering vacant possession of the residential quarters allocated to him and consequently the requisite clearance certificate was not issued by the authorities and the amount of gratuity payable to him was not paid immediately. The respondent-employee by his letter dated the 2nd of May, 1980, addressed to the petitioner-company, reiterated his claim for gratuity and the same having not been paid or tendered, he preferred an application before the Controlling Authority on the 5th of May, 1980, under S. 7 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The Controlling Authority entertained the said application despite some delay on the ground that the gratuity amount had been illegally withheld by the company. By the order dated 31st October, 1981, the Controlling Authority held that the respondent-workman was entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 13,980/- as gratuity for his forty years of completed service. Necessary directions under R. 17 of the Rules were also issued to the management for payment of the aforesaid amount within 30 days. The Controlling Authority did not in express terms advert to the interest payable for the delayed payment of gratuity and it is the petitioner's stand that the respondent-workman had not in terms claimed any interest on the amount of gratuity admittedly due to him. The petitioner-company thereafter filed an appeal before the Joint Labour Commissioner (the Appellate Authority under the Act). By its order (Annexure 2), the Appellate Authority found no merit in the stand of the petitioner and dismissing the same directed the payment of the gratuity amount plus usual interest due thereon. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition has been filed primarily and indeed, solely directed against the grant of interest on the amount of gratuity due.

3. At the very threshold stage of admission, reliance was primarily placed on behalf of the petitioner on the Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar (Supra) for asserting that no interest on gratuity was payable. The correctness of the judgment was forthwith assailed on behalf of the respondents and in the alternative reliance was placed on S. 4 of the Interest Act, 1968, for the direction to pay interest on gratuity. Noticing the significance of the issues involved, the case was directed to be heard by a Full Bench.

4. Before one gets enmeshed in details, it is apt and indeed is necessary to view the issues in a larger vista. One has to bear in mind the fact that of late a sea change has come in the law with regard to the approach to pensionary and other retiral benefits. Times were that pensionary benefits were viewed not as a matter of legal right but merely a bounty in the discretion of the State or other employers. Such a view was given go-by in the Full Bench judgment in AIR 1967 Punj 279 (K.R Erry v. State of Punjab) which was later affirmed and eulogised by their Lordships in AIR 1973 SC 834 : (1973 Lab IC 440) (State of Punjab v. K.R Erry and Sobhag Rai Mehta) to hold that pensionary benefits are no more a bounty but a well earned legal right to the employee. To my mind, the wheel has turned full cycle with the recent reiteration of the rules by their Lordships in AIR 1985 SC 356 : (1985 Lab IC 664), (State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair) in the terms following:—

“Pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Govt. to its employees on their retirement but have become under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual payment.”

With regard to the quantum of interest due in such circumstances, their Lordships observed as under:—

“4. Unfortunately such claim for interest that was allowed in respondent's favour by the District Court and confirmed by the High Court was at the rate of 6 per cent per annum though interest at 12 per cent had been claimed by the respondent in his suit. However, since the respondent acquiesced in his claim being decreed at 6% by not preferring any cross-objections in the High Court it would not be proper for us to enhance the rate to 12% per annum, which we were otherwise inclined to grant.”

5. To my mind, it is in the light of the aforesaid authoritative enunciation and what is now settled law in this context that the issue in the present case has to be viewed. What has been said in the context of pensionary benefits generally applies to my mind doubly in the context of gratuity expressly provided for by the Act.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner first took up a somewhat tall stand that the Act does not envisage the payment of interest on gratuity at all in terms. In the alternative, it was contended that even if S. 8 of the Act was to be so construed then interest would only be paid in coercive recovery by the issuance of a certificate of the Controlling Authority for what was alleged to be the penal rate of compound interest of 9 per cent thereof and in no other case. Equally, somewhat a technical stand then was that if the amount of interest has not been claimed by the employee in his application before the Controller, he cannot grant the same nor could the appellate authority do so. Inevitably, the sheetanchor of the petitioner's case was the case of Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar (Supra).

7. At the very outset, it calls for notice that barring the brief observation in the aforesaid case, the issues before the Full Bench are as yet res integra. Learned counsel for the parties stated that it would appear that despite the passage of nearly fifteen years from the promulgation of the Act, no detailed judgment specifically covering the issue on either side has been rendered in this view of the matter, the question deserves somewhat detailed and in-depth examination.

8. Inevitably, the threshold issue herein is of the question of the true approach to the interpretative exercise with regard to the provisions of the Act. There is no gainsaying of the fact that this statute is a beneficent piece of legislation expressly drafted in the interest of the employees for the payment of statutory gratuity to them. As its preamble indicates, it is sought to be made applicable to all employees engaged in factories, mines oilfields, plantations, ports, railway companies, shops or other establishments. It also provides for all matters connected therewith or incidental thereto including the expeditious payment of gratuity when it becomes payable. The larger purpose and scheme of the Act is, therefore, not in any doubt and it would be somewhat wasteful to labour the obvious. It would thus suffice to construe the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder against the background aforesaid.

9. Before proceeding further, one may recall the principle authoritatively enunciated in AIR 1961 SC 751 (State of U.P v. Babu Ram Upadhya) that statutory rules validly framed become part and parcel of the Act itself and virtually having the same force of law. Section 15 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government, by notification, to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. In compliance therewith the Central Government have promulgated the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972. Our State has similarly promulgated the Payment of Gratuity (Bihar) Rules, 1972. Without being mathematically precise and perhaps, barring marginal difference, if any, it may be said with confidence that by and large, the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972, are virtually in pari materia with the Bihar Rules. The validity or these rules has not been even remotely challenged and they are thus an integral part of the Act.

10. As one scans the Act, what first necessarily catches the eye is the fact of the statutory liability of the employer to pay gratuity and a corresponding right of the employee to receive it whenever it becomes payable under S. 4 and the relevant part thereof is in the terms following:—

“4. Payment of gratuity.— (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,—

(a) on his superannuation, or

(b) on his retirement or resignation, or

(c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease.”

A plain reading of the aforesaid provision can hardly leave any doubt that the Act now confers a statutory right on the employee. If the requisite conditions are satisfied, the same becomes mandatorily payable to him. Not only that, the provisions aforesaid in terms specify that this becomes payable on the very date of his superannuation or retirement or resignation or death and disablement as the case may be. Both the right to gratuity and the date on which it becomes payable are thus with meticulous details taken care of by the aforesaid provisions and others ancillary thereto.

11. The stage is now set for noticing the crucial provisions of S. 8, which, to my mind, clearly envisage both the grant of interest on delayed payment of gratuity as also the rate on which the same is to be calculated. This is in the following terms:—

“8. Recovery of gratuity.— If the amount of gratuity payable under this Act is not paid by the employer within the prescribed time, to the person entitled thereto, the controlling authority shall, on an application made to it in this behalf by the aggrieved person, issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, who shall recover the same, together with compound interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum, from the date of expiry of the prescribed time, as arrears of land revenue and pay the same to the person entitled thereto.”

It is somewhat manifest from the aforequoted provisions of Ss. 4 and 8 of the Act that it envisages the payment of gratuity either when it becomes payable or within the time prescribed. The very opening part of S. 8 would leave no manner of doubt that the mandatory/statutory duty to pay gratuity is in terms laid down on the employer. It is not made contingent on an application or a claim by the employee. Of course, a procedure is prescribed if the employer defaults in his duty to pay. What, however, deserves reiteration is that the Act in terms repeatedly lays the burden on the employer of tendering or paying the gratuity whenever it becomes payable to the employee within the time prescribed. Section 2(o) lays down that “Prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under the Act and reference hereinafter would follow to the different situations prescribing such time.

12. Now a superficial reading of the rule therein on first impression, tended to indicate a hiatus or lacuna in so far as they did not inflexibly prescribe the time within which the gratuity is to be tendered or actually paid. However, a more meticulous reading of the different rules would clearly indicate that different time is prescribed by relevance to different termini from the date when gratuity would actually become payable. It has thus probably to be determined in each individual case depending on whether the employer in the very beginning tendered the same or deposited it or by virtue of a dispute or issuance of notices it has to be delayed or the terminus may have relevance to the date of the order of the Controlling Authority or even of the appellate authority. It would appear that the rules tend to cover different eventualities. It may not be practically possible to have a fixed base of prescribed time in varying eventualities. It is not necessary here to finally pronounce on the same. But it would appear that if the case does not come within the expressly prescribed period of time, then probably there would be little choice but to fall back on the date when gratuity becomes payable as equally the prescribed date for its payment.

13. Having thus laid the duty at the door of the employer to pay gratuity within the prescribed time, S. 8 also provides the sanction for such payment and the methodology for its recovery with interest for the delay in payment caused by the default of the employer. The Act is itself specific that the Controlling Authority in such cases would recover the gratuity with compound interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum by the coercive process of the issuance of a certificate recoverable as arrears of land revenue by the Collector. Not only that, the terminus for calculating the same is fixed at the date of the expiry of the prescribed time.

14. It would seem somewhat plain from the above that the payment of interest is the mandate of the law itself and not dependent on an express claim by the employee therefor. Herein the employee's right to interest accrues from the failure of the employer to perform his statutory duty to tender and pay gratuity and not from any formal demand therefor by the employee. Similarly, the liability to pay interest does not stem from the certificate of the Controlling Authority but from the default in the performance of his duty by the employer. The Certificate proceedings are a procedural mode of recovery and not the source of a substantive right to interest. Herein, a patent misconception may perhaps be cleared.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner had attempted to contend that under S. 8, the payment of interest was a penal provision and arises only when a certificate is issued. Such a stand, to my mind, is now untenable both on principle and precedent. One does not see anything penal in the grant of interest for a delayed payment of moneys legally due and made mandatorily payable by the employer. Nor can one see anything oppressive in the prescription of 9 per cent compound interest. Indeed, reference should be made to M. Padmanabhan Nair (1985 Lab IC 664) (Supra) wherein even in the absence of any statutory sanction, their Lordships were inclined to take the view that 12 per cent interest would be a just rate. In the present day world, it is nothing but the commercial equivalent of moneys wrongly withheld. Whilst in the absence of such a payment the employer has the benefit and advantage of the use of the money which was rightfully due to and should have been in the pocket of the employee, the former could well earn interest on the said amount, whilst correspondingly the latter is deprived of the same, if it were in his hand. The prescription of interest is thus not to be viewed through coloured glasses as a penal provision but in the context of a beneficial statute it must be looked upon as a just compensation, for money wrongfully withheld. This view is now buttressed by way of analogy by the recent Full Bench in 1986 Pat LJR 807 : (1986 Tax LR 1511) (Commr. of Income-tax, Bihar, Patna v. Prayaglal Agarwala and Co., Jharia). Therein the statutory payment of interest for delayed payment of tax due was rightly construed as not penal in nature but compensatory in essence. Section 8 in the context of the employer and employee relation is thus no more than a similar compensatory provision. In the case, aforesaid, it was observed as under:—

“8. ………..Indeed, the fallacy herein stems from a loose terminology labelling the same as penal interest. In fact and in law, it is not so. The penal provisions in the context of a delayed return are expressly laid out in S. 271(1)(a). The liability to pay the statutory interest under S. 139, therefore, is nothing more or less than a commercial compensation for the delayed payment of tax which would inevitably result from delayed filing of the return. Herein this interest is a simple quid pro quo for the delayed tender of tax in the treasury and, in ordinary commercial terms, to pay interest for the money so withheld. This appears to be well settled on principle……”

16. It now remains to advert to the sheet-anchor of the petitioner's stand in Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar (Supra). A plain reading of the said short order at the admission stage itself would indicate that counsel were somewhat remiss in not adequately canvassing and debating the matter before the Division Bench. Equally, it shows the inherent pitfalls in deciding significant legal issues at the threshold stage. Indeed, Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the present case, who in a transposed role was the counsel for the workman in Patna Electricity Undertaking v. State of Bihar (Supra), very candidly conceded that therein he missed citing the detailed relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Consequently, the learned Judges noticed that the learned, counsel for the respondent-workman could not point out any provision under the Act under which the appellate authority could have awarded any such interest. It would thus appear that the judgment has been virtually rendered per incuriam without noticing S. 8 in particular and S. 4 and the numerous other provisions and statutory rules to which reference has been made now. Neither principle nor authority seems to have been referred to in the order and it appears that virtually ex concession is direction to pay interest was quashed and writ petition was allowed to that extent. With deepest respect, this judgment does not lay down the law correctly and is hereby overruled.

17. To conclude on this aspect, the answer to the very first question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, itself envisages grant of interest on delayed payments of gratuity to an employee and equally the rate and mode for the recovery thereof.

18. It remains now to consider somewhat briefly what I have already labelled as the technical stand that no interest on delayed payments of gratuity can be granted in the absence of an express claim therefor in the application of the employee before the Controller. What has been discussed above under the heading of the earlier question in a broad manner is applicable to this aspect as well because the twin issue does overlap. However, what would call for specific notice in this context is the provision of S. 7 providing both for the determination of the amount of gratuity and the payment thereof by a statutory mandate itself. The relevant parts thereof deserve notice in extenso:—

“7. Determination of the amount of gratuity.— (1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing, to act on his behalf shall send a written application, to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity.

(2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-sec. (1) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined.

(3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within such time as may he prescribed, to the person to whom the gratuity is payable.

(4)(a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim, of, or in relation to an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity.”

Herein, particular notice deserves to be taken of aforementioned sub-ss. (2), (3) and (4)(a). These leave no manner of doubt that the statute places the basic duty of determining the amount of gratuity and tendering the same to the employee squarely on the employer dehors any claim or application by him. A combined reading of these provisions will indicate that herein the employer is under a mandatory obligation to determine and pay the gratuity and it is not dependent or conditioned on any express claim or application by the employee for such gratuity and consequential interest. This seems to be manifest from sub-sec. (2) which in terms states whether an application has been made or not the employer is bound to determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the employee and equally to the Controlling Authority specifying the amount so determined. Yet again, sub-sec. (3) lays a duty on the employer to pay the amount of gratuity within the prescribed limit to the employee irrespective of any application or claim by him. The intention of the legislature is further made explicit by sub-sec. (4)(a) mandating that in the event of any dispute as to the amount or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer is placed under a liability to deposit the amount which he deems to be payable with the Controlling Authority. This duty is again irrespective of any claim or application by the employees. It is unnecessary to advert to the remaining provisions of S. 7 which pertain to the procedure for the Controlling Authority when deciding the applications made to it under Cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 7. Thus it seems more than manifest that wholly irrespective of the fact whether an application is made by the employee to the employer or to the Controlling Authority, the employer is duty bound under the mandate of the law to determine the amount of gratuity due, to arrange to pay the same to the employee and in the event of a dispute, to deposit the admitted amount with the Controlling Authority. Therefore, if the basic claim of gratuity accrues irrespective of any application or express claim on behalf of the employee, it is somewhat elementary that the consequential claim of interest for delayed payment would equally accrue without any express claim therefor. To reiterate at the risk of repetition, it is the Act itself which mandates the payment of gratuity and the consequential payment of interest in the event of its failure within the prescribed time. These statutory rights stem from the Statute and not from any application or claim therefor.

19. To sum up on this aspect, answer to the second question is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the right to interest on delayed payment of gratuity is statutory and the same can be granted in the absence of an express claim therefor in the application of the employee before the Controller.

20. All the three significant legal issues having been thus decided against the petitioner, there is patently no merit in this writ application solely challenging the statutory grant of interest for grossly delayed payments of gratuity to the respondent-employee. The writ application is consequently dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

S. Ali Ahmad, J.:— 21. I agree

M.P Verma, J.:— 22. I agree.

Petition dismissed.