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Arjun Das v. The State Of Bihar .

Patna High Court
Dec 19, 1986
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.; S. Shamsul Hasan, J., concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This group opinion concerns twenty-eight criminal writ jurisdiction petitions arising out of prolonged criminal prosecutions in the State of Bihar. The petitioners invoked the constitutional right to a speedy public trial under Article 21, alleging gross and inordinate delays—in some matters approaching two decades—during investigation, framing of charge, committal and trial stages.

A representative case, Cr. W.J.C. No. 191 of 1986, is described in detail. There the FIR (Kotwali (Patna) P.S. Case No. 111) dated 20 July 1968 arose from alleged snatching/theft. The timeline in that matter (as recited) includes: first information in 1968; charge-sheet submitted on 30 April 1974 (after roughly six years); cognizance taken on 29 November 1975; committal to Sessions Court on 3 July 1978; charge framed only on 17 January 1986; one co-accused died; the prosecution had not examined any witness in the Sessions Court despite the long delay. The petitioner asserted continuous presence and cooperation except for one brief absence in 1976.

The opinion further summarizes the procedural posture of the other petitions in a table (reproduced in the opinion) showing dates of FIRs/first information, dates of charge-sheets where available, and stages of trial (many showing no witnesses examined, charges not framed, police papers not supplied, substantial intervals between stages).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether prolonged and inordinate delay in investigation and trial (and associated proceedings) violates the constitutional right to a speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
  2. If such delay is established, what remedy follows — whether the accused are entitled to unconditional release and quashing of proceedings.
  3. Whether exceptions apply where delay is shown to have been occasioned by the conduct of the accused.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners claimed infringement of their Article 21 right to a speedy trial because of protracted delays (in many cases amounting to seven years or more, and in some near two decades).
  • In the representative case (No. 191 of 1986) the petitioner asserted continuous presence and cooperation in the proceedings, denying any responsibility for the delay (save for a marginal absence in 1976).
  • Learned counsel for the petitioners sought disposal of all matters by a common judgment, as the legal issue and facts (delay) were essentially identical across the petitions.

Respondent State's Arguments

  • For most petitions, no counter-affidavit was filed and the State did not controvert the facts; the State's counsel was described as "half-hearted" in defence given the uncontroverted delays.
  • In specific cases (Cr. W.J.C. Nos. 209 and 247 of 1986) the State filed detailed counter-affidavits asserting that the delay in those matters was substantially attributable to the petitioners themselves (obstructions, stays obtained, repeated adjournments, requests for voluminous documents and long inspections, transfer petitions and other tactical steps taken by the accused).
  • In Cr. W.J.C. No. 209 the State also explained that the nature of the alleged offences (large scale lottery defalcations involving roughly Rs. 3 crores) required extensive investigation, contributing to the time taken.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir (1985 Cr. Law Journal 514 : 1984 BBCJ 749) Recognised the basic human right to speedy trial as part of Article 21; set out multiple ratios on speedy trial including entitlement to unconditional release where constitutional guarantee is violated; persuasive value of American Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The court treated Ramdaras Ahir as foundational precedent and set out its key ratios (i–vii) as the starting point for analysis of these petitions.
State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh (AIR 1986 Patna 38 : 1985 PLJR 946) Full Bench reaffirmation of Ramdaras Ahir: speedy trial under Article 21; violation entitles accused to unconditional release; American precedents persuasive; inordinate delays of 10 years or more prejudicial in reversal of acquittal in capital cases. The court relied on Maksudan Singh to support the proposition that violation of Article 21 entitles unconditional release and quashing of charges; used it to reinforce the remedy in these cases.
Madheshwardhari Singh v. The State of Bihar (1986 P.L.J.R 767) Extended the right to speedy trial to all offences (not confined to capital offences), included police investigation within the scope of the right, and held that a callous/prolonged delay of seven years or more (not caused by accused) in investigation and trial for non-capital offences violates Article 21. The court identified Madheshwardhari Singh as the specific ratio directly applicable here — particularly the seven-year benchmark for non-capital offences — and applied it to find violations in most petitions.
Sheela Barse v. Union of India ((1986) 3 SCC 596 : AIR 1986 SC 1773) Laid down precise time-frames for investigation and trial in cases involving children (investigation within 3 months; trial within a further 6 months) and directed quashing where these norms are breached; established the principle that time-frames and quashing for delay can be mandated. The court invoked Sheela Barse to show the Supreme Court had sanctioned specific time-limits and mandatory quashing remedies; used it to rebut the State's argument that time-frames could not be spelt out.
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [(1979) 3 SCR 168] Established that the right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21. The opinion relied on Hussainara Khatoon as an earlier authority anchoring the notion that speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21.
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar [(1986) 4 SCC 481] Reiterated that the right to speedy trial is a dimension of Article 21 and cited multiple authorities affirming the remedy of quashing when reasonable time is exceeded; noted foreign authorities where appropriate. The court noted Raghubir Singh as a recent reiteration of the settled constitutional position and relied on it as supporting authority for quashing proceedings for inordinate delay.
Kadra Pahadiya (I) v. State of Bihar ((1981) 3 SCC 671) and Kadra Pahadiya (II) v. State of Bihar ((1983) 2 SCC 104) Part of the line of decisions confirming that speedy trial is a constitutional dimension of Article 21. Used as part of the jurisprudential backdrop referenced in Raghubir Singh and relied upon in the court's assessment of Article 21 jurisprudence.
State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah [(1981) 3 SCC 610] Authority cited among the Supreme Court decisions affirming the right to speedy trial under Article 21. Included among precedents forming the settled rule that delay may warrant quashing of prosecution.
Strunk v. United States; Barker v. Wingo (US Supreme Court cases); Boll v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Jamaica) [(1985) 2 All ER 585] Foreign precedents showing that infringement of the right to a fair trial within reasonable time has led courts in other jurisdictions to quash convictions or stop proceedings. The court cited these foreign authorities as persuasive support for the remedial proposition that prolonged delay can justify quashing of prosecutions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in a structured sequence based strictly on the facts recited and binding/persuasive authority:

  1. Factual determination: The court examined representative factual matrices and a tabulation of the other matters showing extensive delays in investigation and trial stages (many matters exceeding seven years and several approaching or exceeding a decade). In the representative case (No. 191/86) the timeline showed almost 19 years from FIR to framing of charge and no prosecution witnesses produced at the Sessions stage. The State did not file a counter-affidavit in most matters and did not controvert the facts.
  2. Law applicable: The court reviewed a consecutive line of local and higher court authorities (Ramdaras Ahir; Maksudan Singh; Madheshwardhari Singh) and Supreme Court authorities (Sheela Barse; Hussainara Khatoon; Raghubir Singh, and others). These authorities collectively establish that:
    • the right to speedy trial is a fundamental dimension of Article 21;
    • the right encompasses investigation and trial stages;
    • where the State's default produces callous and inordinate delay beyond the temporal benchmarks (the Full Bench indicated seven years for non-capital offences), the constitutional guarantee is violated; and
    • if Article 21 is violated in this manner, the accused may be entitled to unconditional release and quashing of the prosecution.
  3. Application to the present cases: The court applied the seven-year benchmark (as elaborated in Madheshwardhari Singh) to the facts. It found that virtually all petitioners (except the two identified) had endured delays far beyond seven years; in many cases the delay was far longer (e.g., nearly 19 years in the representative matter) and the record did not show the accused had caused the delay. Under the cited precedents, such delay amounted to a violation of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial.
  4. Remedial conclusion: Relying on Maksudan Singh and the precedents cited, the court concluded that the appropriate remedy where the delay is callous, inordinate and not attributable to the accused is unconditional release and quashing of the investigation and trial.
  5. Exceptions for petitioner-caused delay: For Cr. W.J.C. Nos. 209 and 247, the court carefully examined the State's counter-affidavits and the trial record which showed that the accused themselves had materially contributed to, or occasioned, the delay (stays sought, transfer petitions, repeated adjournments, prolonged inspection of documents, absence on dates, obstruction noted by the trial court, etc.). On that factual basis the court concluded these petitioners were disentitled to the remedy and dismissed those petitions.
  6. Judicial concurrence: The opinion records S. Shamsul Hasan, J.'s agreement with the Chief Justice's conclusions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed all the criminal writ jurisdiction petitions in the batch except Cr. W.J.C. Nos. 209 and 247 of 1986. For the allowed petitions the court quashed the investigation and the trial against the petitioners on the ground that the constitutional right to a speedy public trial under Article 21 had been violated. For Cr. W.J.C. Nos. 209 and 247 of 1986 the court dismissed the petitions on the ground that the petitioners themselves materially contributed to the delay and were therefore disentitled to the remedy of quashing.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Petitioners in the allowed matters are granted the remedy contemplated by the precedents relied upon — the prosecution in those matters is quashed (the opinion states the investigation and the trial are quashed). The two identified petitioners (Nos. 209 and 247) are denied relief and their petitions are dismissed because the record shows the delays were occasioned by their conduct.
  • Precedential context: The court's decision rests upon established precedents (Ramdaras Ahir; Maksudan Singh; Madheshwardhari Singh; Sheela Barse; Hussainara Khatoon; Raghubir Singh and other authorities cited). The opinion applies those authorities to the facts before it; it does not purport to announce a new legal principle distinct from the line of authority relied upon.

Concurrence: S. Shamsul Hasan, J. expressly agreed with the Chief Justice's judgment.

Show all summary ...

S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— The curse of delays in the administration of criminal justice—sometimes for more than a decade or two—which had straddled the State of Bihar, is epitomised by this set of twentyeight (sic) criminal writ jurisdiction cases. Indeed, facts in some of the cases read not like those of a current prosecution but as a chronicle of old history. All the petitioners herein invoke the constitutional right of speedy public trial under Article 21 and allege the most glaring infraction thereof. The legal issue is identical and the relevant facts focussed on gross delays bear the closest similarity. Learned counsel not only agreed but prayed that all these case be disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The representative matrix of facts may be taken from Cr. W.J.C No. 191 of 1986 and the briefest synopsis of others would suffice because gross and fatal delay herein is writ large on the face of impugned proceedings, some of which have come close to two decades. In Cr. W.J.C No. 191 of 1986 the genesis of the crime goes back to nearly 19 years. On the basis of the statement of one Neyamat Hussain, dated the 20th of July, 1968, Kotwali (Patna) P.S Case No. 111, dated 20.7.68, was instituted against the petitioner and others under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code. It is unnecessary to recount the facts therein, but the broad allegation was that the petitioner along with another had snatched the wrist watch of the first informant whilst, the alleged co-accused had taken Rs. 40/- from the cash box. It would seem that the investigation for this simple occurrence took well nigh 6 years and it was not till the 30th of April, 1974 that the charge sheet against the petitioner and two others was submitted. This came up for consideration by the learned Magistrate nearly a year and 7 months thereafter on the 29th November, 1975, on which date cognizance was taken. Three more years had to pass before the petitioner was committed to the Court of Session by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the 3rd of July, 1978. Yet again it was not till eight years later that on the 17th of January, 1986, the charge came to be framed against the petitioner and his co-accused. In this long travail of nearly 19 years, one of the co-accused Anand Kumar Lal died and a petition was filed oo the 21st of March, 1986 intimating the said fact. The Court called a report from the concerned Police Station regarding the death of the accused. It is averred that since then the case is pending before the learned Assistant Sessions Judge No. III at Patna and the prosecution has not chosen to put a single witness in the box so far despite the passage of nearly two decades. It has been categorically averred on behalf of the petitioner that barring a marginal absence way back in 1976 the petitioner has continuously remained present and co-operated in the trial and the horrendous delay of 19 years has not in the least been contributed by any default on his part. Aggrieved by the protracted prosecution against him for well nigh 19 years and to which as yet no end was in sight, the present writ petition has been filed.

3. On behalf of the respondent State no counter-affidavit has been filed and the facts are not controverted. Indeed, learned Counsel for the State in view of the uncontroverted facts inevitably was somewhat half-hearted in defence of a delay so glaring as herein.

4. The facts in the other cases equally bespeak for themselves, but now it is unnecessary and not possible to pointlessly delve into the same. These may at best be noticed in a tabulated form as under:—

Cr. W.J.C No. Date of Date F.I.R Date of filing of charge-sheet Stage of trial or proceeding. 180/86 25.4.77 29.10.79 Only five witnesses examined so far. 182/86 30.8.73 — Pending after cognizance, charge framed but no witness examined so far. 186/86 20.3.76 22.8.79 No witness examined as yet. 187/86 20.3.76 22.8.79 No witness examined as yet. 188/86 20.3.76 22.8.79 No witness examined as yet. 191/86 20.7.68 30.4.74 Case committed and charge framed. One accused died. Pending for death report of that accused. 209/86 2.6.76 6.8.81 Order passed for framing of charge, but no charge framed as yet. 210/86 29.7.75 3.6.77 Pending after cognizance. Out of 11 not a single witness examined as yet. 212/86 2.6.76 18.1.80 Pending after cognizance. Not a single witness examined as yet. 222/86 13.3.76 23.7.82 Pending after cognizunce. Charge not farmed. 225/86 9.8.77 31.12.79 One witness examined, after five years from the date of framing of charge. 226/86 3.8.79 148.81 Pending after cogizance. 227/86 24.4.76 26.10.76 Only four witnesses examined. No sanction obtained. 229/86 20.11.73 14.2.74 Police papers not yet supplied. 231/86 7.9.77 9.5.79 Charge framed but riot a single witness examined as yet. 232/86 10.7.76 20.12.76 Charge framed and pending thereafter. 233/86 19.7.79 30.8.81 Pending after cognizance; no police papers furnished. 243/86 13.9.79 30.1.80 Only two out of ten witnesses examined. 245/86 20.12.76 8.11.78 Out of 21 only 11 witnesses examined. 246/86 13.1.77 1.10.83 Pending after cognizance. 247/86 15.1.78 — Four P. Ws. examined. Now defence witness to be examined. 249/86 27.10.77 20.12.83 No evidence recorded as yet. 253/86 25.7.77 2.6.78 Only two witnesses examined. 257/86 9.11.78 — Copies of police papers not supplied as yet, after cognizance on 15.9.80 259/86 12.10.75 10.3.76 Not a single witness examined after commitment made in 1976. 261/86 20.4.78 — Pending after cognizance. 262/86 7.1.78 — Only one witness examined. 263/86 31.5.79 22.11.79 Case was closed after framing of charge. 144/86 24.7.74 2.2.77 Pending after cognizance; charge not framed as yet.
189/86 23.7.76 15.12.77 Pending after congizance; no witness examined as yet. 190/86 7.8.73 9.4.75 Prosecution evidence completed. 211/86 29.11.75 26.6.76 Charge not framed as yet. 213/86 23.4.68 25.1.71 Pending after framing of charge on 1.9.86 215/86 11.4.71 25.9.79 Cognizance not taken; case diary not submitted as yet. 216/86 22.4.71 24.7.79 Do 217/86 22.4.71 24.5.79 Cognizance not taken as yet. 220/86 27.8.78 2.6.80 Pending after examination of 15 witnesses. 223/86 11.4.71 24.5.79 Pending after cognizance; Case diary and police papers not filed.

5. It is manifest from the above that the facts and the quantum of delay are too glaring to call for any further elaboration. With the aforesaid resume thereof one may now straight go to the law applicable thereto. Within this jurisdiction this seems to be now well settled by a trilogy of cases beginning with the Division Bench judgment in The State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir (1985 Cr. Law Journal 514 : 1984 BBCJ 749). Therein after a somewhat exhaustive discussion of principle and precedent, the following relevant ratios were arrived at:—

(i) That now by precedential mandate the basic human right to speedy trial has been expressly written as if with pen and ink and into the constitutional right relating to the right of life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of our Constitution.

(ii) That the constitutional right of speedy trial envisages an equally expeditious conclusion of a substantive appeal and not merely a technical completion of the proceeding in the original court alone.

(iii) That a grave, inordinate delay in reversing an acquittal on a capital charge, though not idential, is yet in a way akin to similar delay in the execution of a capital sentence.

(iv) That a horrendous delay, extending beyond a decade in a criminal trial (including a substantive appeal) on a capital charge, involving the reversal of a double presumption of innocence, would violate the constitutional guarantee of a fair, just and reasonable procedure, and, equally infract the fundamental right to a speedy trial vested in the accused under Article 21.

(v) That American decisions on the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution with regard to accused's right to speedy and public trial would now have a direct bearing under Article 21 of our Constitution.

(vi) That once a constitutional guarantee to speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure has been violated, then the accused is entitled to unconditional release and the charges against him would fall to the ground.

(vii) That a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of 10 years or more, which, in no way arises from the accused's default (or is otherwise not occasioned due to any extra-ordinary and exceptional reasons), in the context of the reversal of a clean acquittal on a capital charge, would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Art. 21.

6. On behalf of the State the reasoning and ratio in Ramdaras Ahir's case (supra) were thereafter challenged but re-affirmed by the Full Bench in the State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh (A.I.R 1986 Patna 38 : 1985 PLJR 946) with the following conclusions:

“To finally conclude, it is held—

(i) That the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy and public trial in all criminal prosecution now flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution by virtue of precedential mandate is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution:

(ii) that once the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 have been violated then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would fall to the ground:

(iii) that the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution would be equally attracted and applicable as persuasive on this facet of Art. 21 of our Constitution as well:

(iv) that inordinately prolonged and callous delays of 10 years or more entirely because of the prosecution's default in the context of the reversal of a clean acquittal on a capital charge would be per se prejudicial to the accused:

(v) that the ratio and the reasoning of Ramdaras Ahir's case is hereby affirmed.”

7. However, the decision that clinches the issue is that of the subsequent Full Bench in Madheshwardhari Singh v. The State of Bihar (1986 P.L.J.R 767) and it would suffice to notice the final summing up of the undermentioned propositions therein:

(i) That both on principle and precedent the fundamental right to a speedy public trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offences generically, irrespeptive of their nature. It is not confined or constricted to either serious or capital offences only.

(ii) That the right to a speedy public trial is applicable not only to actual proceedings in court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation in a criminal prosecution as well.

(iii) That a speedy investigation and trial are equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(iv) That the ratio in Ramdaras Ahir's and Maksadan Singh's cases are mutatis mutandis applicable equally to all offences and irrespective of the fact whether the proceedings are a trial or an appeal against acquittal.”

8. However, the specific ratio which is directly attracted to the present set of cases is to be noticed with a little more-elaboration in the following observations and conclusions of the Full Bench aforesaid:

“Ere I come to a close, I cannot held expressing some surprise at the somewhat vehement stand taken on behalf of the respondent State against the very right of a speedy public trial. It has been repeatedly asserted and, in our view rightly, that a prompt trial is in the interest of the prosecution itself. Inordinate delays only tend to fade memories and bring in a host of factors which militate against the successful culmination of a criminal prosecution. One would, therefore, have imagined that the respondent State would, in its own interest, be solicitous of speed in criminal prosecutions launched by it. Equally it seems to me that a prompt trial is in the interest of the accused and a fair defence as well. Though not unoften an attempt is even made on behalf of the accused persons to gain time and protract the proceedings, it is axiomatic that an accused may also be hampered in his defence by too long a passage of time. Equally a speedy trial avoids the stigma of a long pending accusation and the obloquy of a criminal charge against the citizen if he happens to be innocent. However, as has been authoritatively stated, even leaving out the interest of the prosecution or the defence, there is a societal interest in ensuring a speedly public trial. Indeed, public wealth cannot be allowed to be whittled down for considerations of any private advantage.

To conclude on this aspect, the answer to question no. 5 is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. It is further held that a callous and in ordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extra-ordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21.”

9. It appears to me that the view aforesaid now bears the stamp of approval by the Final Court itself. On behalf of the State it had been earlier argued in the aforesaid case that a time frame or norm suggested by precedent was impermissible and in the absence of statutory provisions it could not possibly be so spelt out. The last nail in the coffin of such an argument appears to be now struck on its been squarely by Sheela Barse v. The Union of India ((1986) 3 SCC 596 : AIR 1986 S.C 1773). Their Lordships in the said case, in the context of the trial of children for criminal offences laid down a time-frame, not in years only, but in months, and yet again not for trials alone, but even for investigations and for filing the complaints or charge-sheets in court, in the following terms:—

“We would also direct that where a complaint is filed or first information report is lodged against a child below the age of 16 years for an offence punishable with imprisonment of not more than 7 years, the investigation shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of filing of the complaint dr lodging of the first information report, and, if the investigation is not completed within this time, the case against the child must be treated as closed. If within three months, the charge-sheet is filed against the child in case of an offence punishable with imprisonment of not more than 7 year, the case must be tried and disposed of within a further period of 6 months at the outside and this period should be inclusive of the time taken up in commital proceedings, if any…..

We would direct every State Government to give effect to this principle or norm laid down by us in so far as any further cases are concerned, but so far as concerns pending cases relating to offences punishable with imprisonment of not more than 7 years, we would direct every State Government to complete the investigation within a period of 3 months from today if the investigation has not already resulted in filing of charge-sheet and if a charge-sheet has been filed, the trial shall be completed within a period of 6 months from today and if it is not, the prosecution shall be quashed.”

10. It is manifest from the above that not only has a precise time-frame been spelt out, but a mandatory direction to quash prosecutions violating the same has been laid: However, lest it be misunderstood that this was in any way confined to the case of children alone, it is well to quote the following observations from the said judgment, reiterating the earlier view with regard to the other criminal trials as well:

“We have already held in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary State of Bihar [(1979) 3 SCR 168] that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implict in Article 21 of the Constitution. If an accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the sessions court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unless of course, the trial is held up on account of some interim order passed by a superior court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy, trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right.

11. Perhaps, the recent reiteration of the rule in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar [(1986) 4 SCC 481] equally calls for notice, which is in the terms following.

“The constitutional position is now well settled that the right to a speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution; vide Hassainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar [(1979) 3 SCR 169], Kadra Pahadiya (I) v. State of Bihar ((1981) 3 SCC 671 : AIR 1981 SC 939), Kadra Pahadiya (II) v. State of Bihar ((1983) 2 SCC 104 : AIR 1982 SC 1167) and State Of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah [(1981) 3 SCC 610]. In foreign jurisdictions also, where the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time is a constitutionally protected right, the infringement of that right has been held in appropriate cases sufficient to quash a conviction or to stop further proceedings; Strunk v. United States (37 L Ed 2d 56) and Barkar v. Wingo (407 US 514) two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and Boll v. Director of Public Prosecutions, Jamaica [(1985) 2 All ER 585], a case from Jamaica decided by the Privy Council…”

12. Now once the legal position is settled as above, it is manifest that the cases of virtually all the petitioners (barring those to which separate reference follows at the end) come amply within the ambit of the ratios thereof. As has been noticed at the outset, the genesis of the crime lay nearly 19 years ago in 1968. In all these cases the mortal threat of a criminal prosecution has now hung over the head of the petitioners like the proverbial Democles' sword for years and decades. In every one of them it is far beyond the time frame of seven years and admittedly herein the charges levelled against them are in cases other than those of a capital nature. It is not in dispute either that the blame for the gross delays herein could not even remotely be laid at the door of the petitioners. In many of the cases it is common ground that as yet even the investigation has not been completed nor even a charge framed or a single witness examined. In Madheshwardhari Singh's case it was held that an inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more in investigation and trial for offences other than capital ones would violate the guarantee of speedy public trial under Article 21. Herein instead of seven in many cases nearly twice or thrice that period has elapsed and one can only guess how many more years would pass before the alleged trials come to a conclusion. With great regret, it has to be held unreservedly that the constitutional right to speedy public trial by fair, just and reasonable procedure, now recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution stands patently violated herein. As has been authoritatively laid down in Maksudan Singh's case (supra), the petitioners will be entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against them would fall to the ground. All these criminal writ jurisdiction cases, except Cr. W.J.C Nos. 209 and 247 of 1986 to which reference follows hereinafter, are allowed and the investigation and the trial against the petitioners are hereby quashed.

13. However, in Hare Krishna Sahay v. The State of Bihar (Cr. W.J.C No. 209 of 1986) the first information report was lodged on the 2nd of June, 1976 under section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sections 161, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Cod. The State's stand herein is that about 22 cases relating to lottery defalcations involving a huge amount of approximately rupees three crores, were filed against this petitioner which ultimately forced the State to keep at a standstill the whole scheme of lotteries because the entire goodwill of the State agency for conducting the lottery scheme was put in doubt. Because of the nature of the crime it took a long time to investigate the same and it was not till the 6th of August, 1981 that the charge-sheet was submitted. The record thereafter exhibits unequivocally that the petitioner has himself signally contributed to the delay. A detailed counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State pinpointing the obstructions in the way of the trial designedly laid by the petitioner himself. It suffices to notice that the petitioner moved Criminal Misc. No. 110 of 1982 (R) in the Ranchi Bench of the High Court and secured a stay which halted the proceedings for more than a year till the 1st of April, 1983. Thereafter the petitioner again moved the High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 12281 of 1983 for quashing the cognizance itself which was apparently found without merit and dismissed. However, the proceedings in the trial court were meanwhile held up and on numerous dates thereafter the charge could not be framed due to the absence of the petitioner himself. Far from co-operating, the petitioner, it would appear, insist ted that the copies of the cash book and other voluminous documents be provided to him, and the court ultimately ordered that those be put in court for the inspection and satisfaction of the petitioner. However, he took advantage of this order in leisurely pretending to inspect the documents and took as many as 29 dates extending over two years for the purported inspection of the records from the 28th of April, 1984 to the 3rd of March, 1986. On the latter date he again absented himself and the framing of the charge could not be concluded. Plainly enough the petitioner herein has himself materially contributed to the delay in the trial. He, therefore, is disentitled to invoke the rule of the speedy public trial and his criminal writ petition is hereby dismissed. In Shave Dutta Prasad v. The State of Bihar (Cr. W.J.C No. 247 of 1986) the first information report was lodged on the 15th January, 1978 on a charge under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code involving an amount of more than Rs. 20,000/-. There was relative despatch in the investigation of the crime and the filing of the charge-sheet and cognizance was taken on the 21st of March, 1978 and later in the year 1979 charges were framed. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 2 which is clearly indicative of the fact that the delay and default herein have been indeed the petitioner's own creation. It has been categorically averred that throughout the accused himself obstructed the trial and took various adjournments for prolonging the same himself. This in fact has been noticed in the orders of the trial court itself which has observed as under.

“………The defence has been continuously taking time in this case on so many frivolous grounds and in that chain this is the fresh ground. Any way the accused is granted 17 days time for bringing stay order in this case from the Hon'ble Court………”

14. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had moved transfer petitions and otherwise sought stay on the ground that he was to move the High Court in the case. It is further common ground that all the prosecution witnesses have been examined since long and the petitioner has also been examined under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and only arguments were to be addressed in the case when the petitioner further prolonged the trial apparently with an eye to take advantage of the rule laid down in Madheshwardhari Singh's case (supra). It is somewhat plain that this petitioner also has contributed to the delay and at the later stage, perhaps, designedly so stall the judgment in the case and to bring it within the rule for delay beyond seven years. This petitioner's case clearly comes within the rule that if delay and default is occasioned by the conduct of the accused himself then be must be deemed to have waived his right to speedy public trial in the case. On an over-all conspectus of the case I find that this petitioner is disentitled to the benefit under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. His application as well is consequently dismissed.

S. Shamsul Hasan, J.:— I agree.