S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— Should the “information which has come into his possession”, as envisaged by section 18(1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, for purposes of reassessment, necessarily spring from a source external to the original record? This is the significant question which has necessitated this reference to the Full Bench. Equally at issue is the correctness of the view of the Division Bench in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1400 of 1973 (Satya Narainji Mills v. The State of Bihar) decided on August 13, 1976.

2. Since we propose to answer the afore said pristinely legal questions only, it seems unnecessary to delve deeply into the facts. It suffices to mention that the petitioner firm Messrs Bhimraj Madan Lal is a registered dealer under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) and is inter alia engaged in the manufacture of various kinds of pulses. For this purpose, it purchases whole grains like Arhar, Khesari, Masoor etc., from producers as well as registered dealers for sale of its products within the State as also outside the State through its agents as well as in the course of inter State trade and commerce. The petitioner firm's assessments for the years 1968–1969, 1969–1970 and 1970–1971 were duly completed under the Act on January 21, 1970; July 16, 1970 and December 7, 1972, respectively. However, on or about February 14, 1973, the petitioner firm was served with notices under sec. 18(1) of the Act with respect to all the aforesaid three assessment years calling upon it to appear in the office of the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes with its books of accounts etc., for a fresh hearing. On its application, the firm was separately furnished with the grounds for starting the re-assessment proceedings-vide Annexure ‘3’ wherein it was stated that the petitioner firm had been allowed certain deductions in the original assessment orders which were not legal or permissible under section 7(2)(b) of the Act and the proviso thereto. Aggrieved by the initiation of the reassessment proceedings aforesaid, the petitioner firm preferred three different writ applications challenging the same for the relevant years which were all admitted to hearing. When these cases originally came up for hearing before a Division Beach, it was strenuously contended on behalf of the petitioner that in order to initiate the proceedings for re-assessment under section 18(1) of the Act, the ‘information’ in possession of the prescribed authority must necessarily be external from the records of the original assessment. It was further contended that the mere discovery by the prescribed authority of something on the record that was already before him at the time when the earlier assessment orders were passed, cannot possibly warrant a re-opening of the matter. Particular reliance was placed on the observations in Satya Naralnji Mills case (supra). However, on behalf of the respondent Revenue, firm reliance was placed on Anandji Haridas & Co. (P) Ltd. v. S.P Kastura (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 565) to controvert the stand of the writ petitioner. The Division Bench noticing some cleavage of judicial opinion on the point, referred the matter for consideration by a larger Bench and that is bow the same is before us now.

3. As before the Division Bench, Bo before us, learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Bharuka contended, that section 18(1) of the Act visualises only such ‘information’ which is extraneous or external to the original assessment proceedings and the same cannot possibly stem from the existing record itself. Primary reliance was placed on The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Gujarat v. A. Raman & C. and Co. (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 49) as also on the earlier observations in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. The Commissioner of Income tax, Bihar and Orissa (A.I.R 1959 Supreme Court 257) and the subsequent case of Indian & Eastern Newspapers Society, New Delhi v. The Commissioner of Income tax, New Delhi ((1979) 4 SCC 248 : AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1960).

4. On the other hand, Mr. R.B Mahto on behalf of the Revenue firmly reiterated his stand that the ‘information’ envisaged under section 18 of the Act could well spring from the original record itself and pointedly relied on the observation of the Constitution Bench in Anandji Haridas & Co. (P) Limited's case (supra). It calls for notice that Mr. Chatterji appearing for the intervenor—Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd.—very fairly did not take the extreme stand pressed on behalf of the writ petitioner that the ‘information’ envisaged under section 18(1) of the Act must necessarily spring from a source external to the original record. With illimitable candour, he conceded that in view of the binding precedent it was possible that in a particular case such ‘information’ might well emanate from the original record itself. Equally it was not denied that such ‘information’ may both be on a point of law as also on a point of fact. What was, however, forcefully contended was that a mere change of opinion or having second thoughts by the prescribed authority on the same set of facts and materials already available on the original record does not constitute ‘information within the meaning of the Statute to confer jurisdiction for reopening a completed assessment.

5. Inevitably whilst examining the aforesaid rival contentions and the legal issues raised before the Full Bench one would have ordinarily adverted to the specific language of section 18 as also to the Scheme of the Act and the principles of construction etc. However, it seems unnecessary to dilate or those aspects because it is common ground that the question raised before us are not res tntegra. Indeed there appears to be a plethora of precedent on the point (though sone what discordant) and that too of the final Court itself. Therefore, so far as principle concerned, it suffices to mention that the word ‘information’ be not been defined in the Statute and must, therefore, be attributed its ordinary dictionary meaning coloured by the hue of the context in which it is laid. In its common connotation this word ‘information’ means to import knowledge. The statute or the context does not in any way seem to limit the source from which such knowledge has to be culled. Consequently, on a plain construction, ‘information’ envisaged under section 18(1) may welt stem both from the existing record as also from sources external thereto. How the record is precluded from imparting knowledge of the matter pertinent to reassessment is not easy to see on principle. Therefore, to confine the word ‘information’ in section 18 of the Act to an external or extraneous source only would in a way amount to inserting words in the statute to the effect that such ‘information’ must necessarily be alien to the original record. It is settled canon of construction that normally words, which are not there, are not to be easily read or inserted into a statute unless by necessary implication. However, herein no such compelling circumstances could be pointed out to justify a strained construction or insertion of the words “external or extraneous to the record” in the plain phraseology of the statute.

6. Now to appreciate the applicability and the binding nature of precedent on the issue, what first deserves notice is the close similarity of the provisions of section 18(1) of the Act with section 147(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and its predecessor provision of section 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. To appreciate this similarity, if not identity, it is apt to juxtapose the relevant parts of section 18(1) and those of section 147 against such other:

The Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959

“18(1) If upon information which has come into his possession, the prescribed authority is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that any turnover of a registered dealer in respect of any period has, for any reason, escaped assessment or any turnover of any such dealer or a dealer assessed under sub-section (5) of section to has been under-assessed or assessed at a rate lower than that which was correctly applicable or any deductions therefrom have been wrongly made, the prescribed authority may, subject to such rules as may be made by the State Government under this Act, and

(a) xxxxxx

(b) xxxxxx

serve on the dealer a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under subjection (2) of section 16 and proceed to assess or reassess, the amount of tax due from the dealer in respect of such turnover; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as maybe, apply accordingly as if the notice under this sub-section was a notice under sub-section (2) of section 16:

xxxxxx

The Income Tax Act, 1961.

147. If

(a) xxxxxx

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Income Tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provision of sections. 148 to 155, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).

7. There is no gainsaying the fact that the language of the two statutes is not strictly in pari materia. However, it is undoubtedly similar on the material point of the ‘information’ coming into the possession of the authority which would warrant a re assessment. In fairness to Mr. Mahto, the learned Additional Advocate General, it must be noticed that in the first flush of his argument, he had attempted to take the stand that even on the specific issue the language of section 18(1) of the Act was much wider, and considerations other than those applicable under section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would be attracted. However, when faced with direct and binding precedent, he with illimitable fairness withdrew his stand and conceded that for the purposes of the construction of the phrase ‘upon information which has come into his possession’ the distinction in language betwixt the Act and that in the Income Tax Act, 1961 was one without a difference. However, I am not inclined to base myself on this concession alone because independently I am of the view that the concept and connotation of the word ‘information’ in the two statutes appear to be identical. This apart, the final Court in Anandji Haridas & Co. (P) Limited's case (supra) has itself broadly taken the view that the concept of ‘information’ under section 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and the subsequent section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was virtually identical with that of section 11 A of the C.P and Berar Sales Tax Act which patently bears close identity to the present Act as well. One must, therefore, proceed on the admitted stand of the counsel for all the parties that the considerations and precedents governing the question of ‘information’, under section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would be equally attracted in the construction of section 18(1) of the Act.

8. Once that is so, it is manifest that the core of the issue herein is the correct application of the precedents of the final Court governing the point. However, before entering the thicket of the controversy of the mass of case law, it seems apt to first notice what is virtually well settled in this context. Both upon the language of section 18(1) and on the precedent on the analogous statutes, it seems to follow that the relevant information referred to must come into the possession of the prescribed authority subsequent to the making of the original assessment. Manifestly any information which was consciously in the knowledge of the authority when the original assessment was made is not in the ken of the statute and is not to be made a ground for reopening an assessment afresh. Secondly, it seems to have been well settled ever since Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh's case (supra) that the word ‘information’ includes within its sweep both information as to facts and as to law. Therein Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court had concluded as follows:

“…We would accordingly hold that the word ‘information’ in S. 34(1) includes information as to the true and correct State of the law and so would cover information as to relevant judicial decisions. If that be the position, the argument that the Income Tax Officer was not justified in treating the Privy Council decision in question as information within S. 34(1)(b) cannot be accepted.”

9. Thirdly, the authority concerned upon such ‘information’ must be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the turnover of the assessee has eluded the tax net for any of the reasons spelt out in section 18 of the Act.

10. The stage is now set for an examination of the binding precedent which concededly covers the issue. As has already been noticed, there exists a plethora of case law of various High Courts on the point to which individual reference seems unnecessary in view of the decisions of the final Court itself. For our purposes it is not necessary to delve beyond the case of Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, (1961) 42 I.T.R 547, which has the express stamp of approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Therein the identical contention that information under section 4(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, must necessarily spring from sources external or extraneous to the original assessment record was strenuously pressed before the Bench. Rejecting the same in unequivocal terms, it was observed:

“…It is difficult to accept the position that while what is seen by another in the record is ‘information’ what is seen by the Income Tax Officer himself is not information to him. In the latter case he just informs himself. It will be information in his possession within the meaning of section 34. In such cases of obvious mistakes apparent on the face of the record of assessment, that record itself can be a source of information, if that information leads to a discovery or belief that there has been an escape of assessment or under assessment.

xxxxxx

“…We see no justification to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that to constitute information within the meaning of section 34, it must be wholly extraneous to the record of the original assessment. We hold that the mistake apparent on the face of the order of assessment itself constitutes information: whether someone else gave that information to the Income Tax Officer or whether he informed himself is immaterial. We are further of opinion that, in the circumstances of this case, the availability of the powers vested in the Income-tax Officer by section 35 did not bar recourse to the jurisdiction vested in him by section 34. The initiation of proceedings under section 34 was, in our opinion, valid.”

11. The aforesaid view was then expressly followed by a Division Bench of the Kerela High Court in United Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerela, (64 I.T.R 218) for arriving at the conclusion that such ‘information’ could stem from the record itself in the following terms:

“To inform “means” to impart knowledge and a detail available to the Income-tax Officer in the papers filed before him does not by its mere availability become an item of information. It is transmuted into an item of information in his possession only if, and only when its existence is realised and its implications are recognised.”

12. Now it is the aforesaid enunciation of the law which stands unhesitatingly affirmed and sanctified by the Constitution Bench in Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd.'s case (supra). Reference to paragraph 11 of the report makes it plain that the identical question posed here was specifically raised before their Lordships and it was in terms observed that the contention that similar information contemplated by section 11A of the C.P and Berar Sales Tax Act should invariably be from an outside source and not something that could be gathered from the record was wholly untenable. Their Lordships not only referred to Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd.'s case (supra) but quoted the aforesaid observations with unmistakable approval. A reference was also made to the subsequent similar view in United Mercantile Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) and thereafter it was concluded as under with reference to the original record;

“(13) In our judgment, the knowledge of the fact that the appellants had not submitted their quarterly returns as well as the treasury challahs, constituted an information to the assessing authority turnovers with which we are concerned in this case had escaped assessment.”

13. It deserves highlighting that the aforesaid ratio has been rendered by a Constitution Bench of five Judges and there has not been a hint of dissent therefrom in subsequent decisions. Equally it calls for notice that Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd's case (supra) was rendered subsequently to A. Raman and Co.'s case (supra) (on which particular reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner and to which detailed reference follows). Equally well it is to recall that V. Kamaswami, J. was common to the Bench of both the afore said cases and it must, therefore, be presumed that he was not intending to run counter to what had been very recently laid down earlier in A. Raman and Co.'s case (supra). In a vain attempt to distinguish Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd.'s case, Mr. Bharuka had contended that the primary issue therein was the constitutionality of section 11(4)(a) of the C.P and Berar Sales Tax Act on the ground of discrimination by the statute with regard to registered dealers and unregistered dealers. It was argued that section 11(4)(a) of the aforesaid Act was struck down therein. On this premise, Mr. Bharuka had contended that the observations of their Lordships with regard to reassessment and the source of information for doing so under section 11(a) were merely in the nature of obiter dicta and need not be followed. I am wholly unable to agree with this line of reasoning. A close perusal of the judgment would show that the question as to the nature of ‘information’ was an integral part of the issue as also of the argument raised before their Lordships. The question was expressly posed, considered and answered by them in categorical terms and it is, therefore, vain to argue that the said observations declaratory of the law under Article 141 should be by passed or ignored on the obiter dicta. In my view Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd.'s case (supra) squarely governs the issue.

14. As stands already noticed, there has been no divergence from Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd.'s case (supra) subsequently Indeed the said decision ??? has been followed by the High Court's and later Benches of the Supreme Court itself. In Kalyanji Mavji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, II, (AIR 1976 Supreme Court ???) the specific question was the scope, extent and ambit of section 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 (which, as already noticed, is of identical import) and on a conspectus of authorities, distinct tests and principles were spelt out by the Bench and proposition (4) thereof was as follows:

“(4) Where the information may be obtained even from the record of the original assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record or the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law.”

15. Perhaps it is apt at this very stage to mention that undoubtedly later a larger Bench in Indian and Eastern-Newspapers, Society's case (supra) disagreed with the, altogether different proposition (2) laid down in Kalyanji Mavji and Co.'s case (supra) and overuled the same to the limited extent. It is common ground that propositions (1), (3) and (4) resting as they were on earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, were not even remotely diverged from. Consequently proposition (4) in Kalyanji Mavji and Co's case which follows or in any case in consonance with the observations in Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd.'s case still holds the field and leaves no manner of doubt that ‘the information’ may equally stem from the record of the original assessment as also from any other source.

16. In fairness to Mr. Bharuka, the learned counsel for the petitioner, we must notice his pointed reliance on A. Raman and Co.'s case (supra) for butressing his stand that the information must stem from a source external to the record. Undoubtedly in paragraph 5 of the report their Lordships did observe as under:

“…The expression ‘information’ in the context in which it occurs must, in our judgment, mean instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars, or as to a matter bearing on the assessment.”

17. Now there is no gainsaying the fact that the aforesaid observations, if considered in isolation, would lend patent support to the stand of the petitioner and undoubtedly have been the source of a wide ranging legal controversy. One cannot bury one's head in the sand and refuse to face that appears to me as an inherent conflict in the very same judgment. Indeed, Mr. R.B Mahto, Additional Advocate General, was equally vehement in relying on this case and in particular the more detailed enunciation therein which followed in paragraph 7 thereof in undermentioned terms:

“…Jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer to reassess income arises if he has in consequence on information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. That information must, it is true have come into possession of the Income-tax Officer after the previous assessment, but even if the information be such that it could have been obtained during the previous assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record, or the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry of research into facts or law but was not in fact obtained, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer is not effected.”

18. It is manifest from the above that their Lordships herein have themselves sanctified re-assessment based on information which could have been obtained from the previous assessment record or the facts disclosed thereby. In face of these categorical observations it seems difficult to argue that A. Raman and Co.'s case (supra) in any way lays down that such information must be external to the original record. It is well settled since the celebrated observation of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern (1901 Appeal Cases 495), that a case is an authority for what it actually decides and it cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically therefrom. Equally it has been observed in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, or a phrase and attempt to build thereon.

19. Even as a matter of last resort if the observations in paragraph 5 in A. Raman & Co's case are to be taken as the ratio of the judgment then it will be in headlong conflict with the subsequent large?-Bench in Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd's case (supra). It is well settled that in the face of such a conflict the High Courts are bound by the larger Bench and consequently the categorical enunciation of the law in Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd's case (supra) cannot be eroded on this score by a passing observation in an earlier case.

20. One must now advert to the Division Bench judgment in Satya Narainji Mill's case (supra) which indeed has necessitated this reference. A close perusal of the same would indicate that counsel were some what remiss in not adequately agitating the issue either on larger principle or by citing all the relevant precedents on the point which stand noticed above. Consequently the Division Bench primarily followed the isolated observation in paragraph 5 of the report in A. Raman and Go's case (supra). Apparently the more detailed and meaningful observations subsequent thereto which were in the nature of summing up and the real ratio of the decision in paragraph 7 of the said report seem to have gone unnoticed. It is also manifest that the direct authority on the point in Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd.'s case (supra), which is a later judgment of the Constitution Bench, was not cited nor the earlier decision in Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd's case (supra), which was affirmed therein, was brought to the notice of the Division Bench. With the greatest respect, the observations in Satya Narainji Mill's case (supra) to the tenor that information’ under section 18 of the Act must inflexibly stem from a source external to the original record do not lay down the law correctly and with deference the judgment has to be overruled on this specific point.

21. Having held as above that ‘information under section 18(1) of the Act may well stem from the original assessment record itself, the question would still remain as to what truly constitutes such an ‘information’. 1 do not propose to launch on an exhaustive dissertation as to what may well fall within the ambit of such ‘information’ from the record and what would be necessarily outside the same. It, however, seems apt and indeed necessary to notice that it follows from the binding precedents that a mere change of opinion or having second thoughts about it by the prescribed authority on the same get of facts and materials on the record does not constitute ‘information’ for the purposes of the Act. This indeed seems to be so well settled by all the judgments on the point that it would be wholly unnecessary to consider the question on principle. In this context it is not apt to recall that even in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh's case (supra) the contention was raised on behalf of the Revenue that it would be open to the Income Tax Officer to act under section 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 even if he merely changed his mind without any information from an external source and came to the conclusion that in a particular case had erroneously allowed an assessee's income to escape assessment. This contention, however, was left open because it did not pointedly arise in that case. However, subsequent decisions of the final Court have categorically rejected any such proposition. In Bankipur Club Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa, (1971) 82 I.T.R 831, their Lordships particularly took the view that in the original assessment the Income Tax Officer having the view that amount received by the Club from its members as guest charges was not taxable income, he could not on the same materials later take the view that it was taxable and reopen the assessment on the score of having come into possession of information under section 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act 1922. In a way this was nothing more than a mere change of opinion by the Income Tax Officer on identical materials with regard to the taxability or otherwise of the guest charges. Later in Income-tax officer, Income-tax cum-Health Tax Circle II, Hyderabad v. Nawab Mir Birkat Ali Khan Bahadur, Hyderabad ((1975) 4 SCC 370 : AIR 1975 Supreme Court 703) their Lordships had concluded as under:

“…Having second thoughts on the same material does not warrant the initiation of a proceeding under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.”

22. What then seems to clinch the matter are the observations of the later Bench in Indian & Eastern Newspapers Society's case (supra) in paragraph 14 of the report wherein it was concluded as follows:

“…in our opinion, an error discovered on a reconsideration of the same material (and no more) does not give him that power. That was the view taken by this Court in Kamal Singh v. Commr. of Income-tax (supra), Commr. or Income-tax v. Raman and Co. (supra) and Bankipur Club Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1971) 82 ITR 831 (SC), and we do not believe that the law has since taken a different course. Any observation in Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. Commr. of Income tax (supra) suggesting the contrary do not, we say with respect, lay down the correct law”.

23. Inevitably the various High Courts have followed the aforesaid “authoritative enunciation to hold that a mere change of opinion on the same facts and materials does not constitute ‘information’ within the meaning of the statute. See Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City Ii v. H. Holck Larsen (85 I.T.R 467) and Sassoon Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City I (137 ITR 427).

24. In fairness to Mr. R.B Mahto, the learned Additional Advocate General, we must notice his ingenious contention that Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society's (supra) has overruled proposition (2) in Kalyanji Mavji & Co.' case (supra) only with regard to a mistake committed and not with regard to an oversight or inadvertence. It deem it unnecessary here to go into the niceties of this finical distinction which obviously does not call for adjudication in this case. To finally conclude—

(i) The answer to the question posed at the very outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that ‘information’ envisaged by section 18(1) of the Act for purposes or reassessment need not necessarily spring from a source external or extraneous to the original record.

(ii) That having second thoughts or a mere change of opinion by the prescribed authority on the same set of facts and materials on the “record would not constitute ‘information’ under section 18(1) of the Act for the purposes of reassessment.

(iii) That with deference Satya Narainji Mills v. The State of Bihar, (C.W.J.G No. 1400 of 1973 decided on August 13, 1976) does not lay down the law correctly and is hereby overruled.

25. The meaningful legal issues-having been settled as above, this set of Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases will now go back to the Division Bench for a decision on merits in accordance therewith.