Anand Prasad Sinha, J.:— The petitioner has challenged his detention consequent to the order No. 2049.C dated 27.10.1983 passed by the District Magistrate, Begusarai, under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). A copy of the said order is Annexure-1 to this application.

2. The grounds for detention were served upon the petitioner in jail on 30.10.1983 as contained in Order No. 2062.C under the signature of the District Magistrate, Begusarai. The said order is Annexure-2 to this writ application. The petitioner had been directed to file representation, if any, addressed to the Deputy Secretary, Home (Special), Government of Bihar. The State Government had approved the detention order of the petitioner by order No. 5149.C dated 5.11.1983 and that order had been served upon the petitioner on 6.11.1983 A copy of this order of the State Government is Annexure-3 to the writ application. The State Government by letter No. 2314 dated 12.11.1983 had sent a detailed report to the Central Government with regard to the detention of the petitioner and that had been done as contemplated under sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act. In pursuance of section 10 of the Act, a reference was also made to the Advisory Board about the case of the petitioner on 14.11.1983 It appears from the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that the Advisory Board has also approved the detention order of the petitioner.

3. The grounds mentioned are that the petitioner had been indulging into illegal activities in industrial area of Barauni industrial complex and thus had given rise to the problem of maintenance of public order. On account of his activities the people of the area lived in an intense feeling of fear and threat. Earlier the petitioner had also been put under detention under the provisions of the Act and had been released on 23.7.1983, but immediately after his release, he had indulged into misconducts by threatening and terrorising the contractors and engineers working in the Barauni Industrial area forcibly demanding job and threats and atomosphere of fear thus created had adversely affected the normal conditions and public order required for working of the industries. The Chief Administrative Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Limited had sent a communication to the concerned authorities that the petitioner had threatened Shri Pankaj Kumar the structural contractor of Nauratan Das and company near the gate of the factory and his threat had continued since a fortnight. Pankaj Kumar had been so much terrorised that he was unable to go to the work site. This letter had been sent on 12.10.1983 On 25.10.1983 at 7.45 A.M Shri Amarendra Kumar, who happened to be the store keeper of Shri Pankaj Kumar, while he was going to his work site was confronted by the petitioner and the petitioner took him forcibly towards his village and also he was assaulted at a lonely place. The petitioner has given threat to Shri Amarendra Kumar that if at least 5 of the men of the petitioner are not given job, both Shri Amarendra Kumar and Pankaj Kumar will be shot dead. A police case had also been instituted. A copy of the said first information report had been annexed with the grounds.

4. The petitioner was arrested but was released on bail on 26.10.1983 and that being so, it appears that in spite of his order of detention under the Act, there could not be any improvement whatsoever in his illegal activities.

5. Various correspondences from the Superintendent of Police, Begusarai, to the District Magistrate, from Chief Personnel and Administrative Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Limited to the District Magistrate, from Resident Construction Manager, Engineers India Limited and from Nauratan Das & Company Private Limited, all indicating that the petitioner by his conduct had completely disturbed the normal working and condition of the people at large involved in the working of the different industries and also the community based upon the industrial complex had faced an acute problem out of fear and threat created by the illegal activities of the petitioner.

6. The detention order has been resisted on the ground that there has been no compliance of certain legal obligations and also the order of detention is bad in law as the grounds mentioned are confined simply to the problem of law and order and not public order.

7. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that as contemplated under sub-section (5) of section 3 of the Act it was the legal obligation on the part of the detaining authority to make a report to the Central Government within seven days.

8. I do not find any force in this contention. Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:—

“When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order.

9. In the instant case, as stated above, the State Government had approved the detention order by order dated 5.11.1983 Further in the supplementary counter affidavit, the State Government has made a definite statement that in pursuance of Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act the report had been sent to the Central Government on 12.11.1983 This fact has not been resisted at all.

10. The contention of Mr. Prasad that the report ought to have reached the Central Government within seven days cannot be accepted because the obligation imposed upon the State Government under section 3(5) of the Act is that the State Government shall send a report and it is not that the report should reach within a period of seven days. There is absolutely no ambiguity or any question of interpretation of the provision stated aboved and, therefore, the contention raised, as stated above, is not tenable.

11. Mr. Prasad has also submitted that when the order has been approved on 5.11.1983 assuming that the report has been sent on 12.11.1983, it will not be within seven days, but it shall be on the 7th day. It has been argued that the provisions of the Act has to be construed strictly. In support of this reliance has been placed in the case of Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar ((1982) 3 SCC 10 : A.I.R 1983 Supreme Court 320). In this case the order of detention has been struck down on account of the fact that there had been inordinate delay in considering the representation. The representation was made on October 20, 1981 and it was rejected on November 16, 1981, the very date on which the report of the Advisory Board was also received. Thus, there was a delay of about 28 days in considering the representation. There was no satisfactory explanation on the part of the respondents (State Government) as to how the representation was dealt with. The representation had been received in the office of the State of Bihar on October 20, 1981. A copy of the representation was sent to the District Magistrate on October 20, 1981. The District Magistrate returned the representation with his comments on October 31, 1981 and it was received in the Department of Home (Special) on November 4, 1981. On November 5, 1981 it was examined by the Deputy Secretary Home (Special). On November 6, 1981 it was received by the Special Secretary, Home (Special) Department, who endorsed it to the Chief Minister on November 10, 1981.

12. Therefore, the disposal of the representation was construed to be after inordinate delay. I am afraid, the facts of the reported case are not similar to the facts of the case in hand. As stated above, it would appear that on the 7th day the report has been made to the Central Government. Neither there is any violation of the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 3 of the Act nor there is any fact leading to the fact that the same has been done after an inordinate delay.

13. The provisions of section 3(5) of the Act cannot be read as subject to law of limitation and the same principle can neither exercise any control nor affect the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act and that will be affected and controlled only when there is an element of inordinate delay.

14. The next contention raised is that the matter has been put up before the Advisory Board after inordinate delay since a letter has been sent being letter No. 2050 dated 21.12.1983 to the petitioner by the State Government that the detention of the petitioner has been approved by the Advisory Board.

15. I do not find any substance in this contention even. No affidavit has been filed in support of this fact. Morever, the aforesaid communication is only confined to the fact that the Advisory Board has confirmed the detention order and there is no indication whatsoever in the submission of the learned counsel that as to when the matter has been considered by the Advisory Board.

16. In this connection, it deserves to be mentioned that as contemplated under section 10 of the Act a period of three weeks have been laid down for referring the matter to the Advisory Board from the date of detention. It has been already indicated above that the matter had been referred to the Advisory Board on 14.11.1983 That being so, the detention cannot be challenged on this ground even at all.

17. The last contention raised is that the allegations attributed against the petitioner, which have been made the basis of the order is simply confined to a question of problem of law and order and not the public order. In support of this it has been stated that the petitioner has been indulged into a bilateral act confined to one individual and so and accordingly that cannot be said to be giving rise to an occasion of public order for the application of the provisions of the Act.

18. In support of this contention the cases of Sushanta Goswami ((1969) 1 SCC 273 : A.I.R 1969 Supreme Court, 1004) and Arun Ghosh v. State Of West Bengal ((1970) 1 SCC 98 : A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 1228) have been relied upon.

19. In the decisions distinction has been made between the law and order and public order. The underlying principle decided is that when such disturbance has been created which has affected the community as a whole, that has given rise to a problem of public order and when any conduct of a person is simply confined to an act giving rise to an offence not of wider and broad application in that case a question of law and order is involved. Under the circumstances, it is now not necessary to go into details and specially when I find no force in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner as on the basis of the allegations and facts enumerated, I have no hesitation in saying that a question of public-order had definitely been arisen warranting an action under the provisions of the Act.

20. Before discussing the allegations attributed against the petitioner, it will be necessary briefly to consider and discuss the elements involving a law and order problem and that a problem of public order.

21. Law presupposes organized society. Accordingly law is an instrument whereby the organized purposes of society are achieved. The conduct of individual serves as levers. In the present century law plays considerable active and compelling part in social relations than it did a few centuries before. The concept of optional alternative of self redress has undergone a vital change. The injury done was primarily the affair of the party injured and of his relations and thus even serious crimes were mitigated by compensation. This concept stood rejected and any offence involving the social order and the society began to be understood as breach of the King's peace.

22. When kingship has been substituted by the institution of the State, it has become responsibility of the State to have peace at all places and at all times. Under this concept misconduct of a person affecting law gives rise to both a problem of law and order and public order. Thus, when any misconduct shakes the fibres of organized society and affects the community at large, it becomes a problem of high magnitude affecting far and wide and thus it becomes necessary for maintaining the social order in the society by exercising control as envisaged by any law for achieving the purposes of social order and thus avoiding any threat affecting a large number of people, who can safely be categorised as being an association or State or nation itself. The application of the provisions of the Act can safely be said to be for the purpose of securing the conditions of social, industrial, economical and the like life. Accordingly, whenever it becomes necessary in promoting purposes of security and stability, the instrument of law is taken.

23. Even if there be a case of individual act, that has to fall under the problems of public order. Thus, it becomes necessary that a person will not indulge into aggressions and will act in good faith and refrain from engaging himself in such activities, which may be responsible for causing injury and damage to the established system of peace, progress and functioning of such agencies responsible for the maintenance of normal condition necessary for the development and organised condition of life for all the citizens (public at large) and the solidarity and prosperity either of the State or of the country, and that is a question of ‘public Order’.

24. In the instant case, from the allegation it appears that the activities of the petitioner have completely paralysed the working of certain contractors engaged in an important affairs of oil refinery. Under the circumstances, the activities of the petitioner cannot be said to be either that of bilateral impact or individual consequences but it has affected the important organ of the society i.e an industry and if there is impediment in the smooth functioning of such industry like Oil, it would have wider repercussion far and wide affecting a larger social order, a greater population and very important element necessary for the progress of the mankind as a whole.

25. I am tempted to give a few illustrations in order to make a distinction between the law and order and public order more distinct. Suddenly students go on strike in furtherance of collective bargaining on the basis of certain demand put before the university authorities and there may be a case of violence or such conduct making out a substantial penal offence, but still the problem so arisen can safely be said to be a problem of law and order only. In case either one individual students or a body of students make out a campaign that they will not allow any particular language to be talked in the university and if continuous efforts are made to sabotage the working of the university so for teaching of that language is concerned that definitely will have wide repercussion in the manner that, that problem would not be confined to that particular university but it would spread far and wide affecting the whole community and population as there is a point put on controversy both for and against and such agitation raised is certainly to spread at other places and thus a problem of public order is said to have taken place.

26. The another illustration is that suppose one individual or a group of individuals atrandom has taken up an activity of committing high way robbery, that may be construed to be a problem of law and order but if that activity is extended far and wide inter-state as a perpetual occupation and profession and creating such an atmosphere by which the normal running of transport affecting a bulk of the population is affected, that is definitely a problem amounting to public order.

27. Thus, the problem of public order reflects inevitably a perpetual state of insecurity of life and property, causing disturbances in the social order giving rise to a problem of higher magnitude, than maintenance of minimum stability and order and the purpose of application of law would be thus to maintain public order, public safety, peace and order and general security.

28. Under the circumstances, unhesitatingly it can be said that the activities of the petitioner is confined to a public order and not law and order. In the result, I do not find any merit in this application which fails and is dismissed.

29. Ram Naresh Thakur, J.:— I agree.