- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Kamlesh Roy v. Rudra Narain Rai And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner sought quashing of a resolution of no-confidence dated 7 October 1979 (filed as Annexure 4) by which he was removed from the office of Pramukh of the Patepur Panchayat Samiti.
Key factual and procedural points, stated in the opinion, are:
- The petitioner was elected Pramukh on 10 March 1979 and initially took oath on 11 March 1979; that oath was later found to be defective and he took a further oath on 11 June 1979 in the form required by Section 71 of the Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961 (“the Act”).
- The petitioner alleged that respondent No. 1 (Rudra Narain Rai, District Development Officer and samdhi of respondent No. 4) pressured respondent No. 2 (Paras Nath Choudhary, Prakhand Vikas Padadhikari) to arrange a no-confidence vote against the petitioner. The petitioner also alleged that respondent No. 2 was hostile because the petitioner served on an anti-corruption committee investigating allegations against respondent No. 2 and some Mukhiyas.
- A no-confidence motion was sponsored by respondent No. 4 (Krishna Nandan Prasad Singh) on 27 September 1979 and placed before the petitioner on 28 September 1979. Because of a series of holidays (28 September to 4 October 1979 were executive holidays, 5 and 6 October were special holidays, and 7 October 1979 was a Sunday), the petitioner directed the matter to be taken up on 8 October 1979.
- On 4 October 1979 respondent No. 2 issued a notice fixing 7 October 1979 (a Sunday/holiday) for a Samiti meeting signed by 18 members (Annexure 3). The petitioner alleges he was not informed and that six members (named in the petition) were not served with notice. The meeting on 7 October 1979 proceeded and the no-confidence motion was passed.
- The petitioner also alleged that ten members (including respondent No. 4) had not taken oath and that respondent No. 3 (Up-Pramukh) administered oaths to some members on 7 October 1979 itself, which the petitioner characterized as illegal because that meeting was convened under Rule 5(2) for consideration of a no-confidence motion and not for administering oaths.
- Counter-affidavits were filed by respondents 1 to 3 and respondent 4; the petitioner filed replies. The matter proceeded as a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution; the court considered a preliminary objection about availability of alternative remedy under Section 68 of the Act.
- The opinion is delivered by K.B.N. Singh, C.J., with M.P. Singh, J. concurring; the application was allowed and the impugned resolution (Annexure 4) was quashed, with no order as to costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the first oath taken by the petitioner on 11 March 1979 complied with Section 71 of the Act or was defective such that the petitioner only lawfully assumed office upon taking the second oath on 11 June 1979.
- Whether, given the effective date of the petitioner's lawful assumption of office, a notice of no-confidence dated 27 September 1979 and the subsequent notice of 4 October 1979 were barred as premature under Section 32(4) of the Act (which prohibits notice of motion within six months of assumption of office by a Pramukh).
- Whether Rule 3 of the Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1963 — which forbids meetings on holidays — was violated by holding the Samiti meeting on 7 October 1979 (a Sunday/holiday), and whether that vitiates the no-confidence resolution.
- Whether the existence of an alternate statutory remedy (under Section 68 empowering the State Government to annul a Panchayat Samiti resolution) renders the writ petition under Article 226 not maintainable.
- Whether the statutory prescription of the form of oath in Section 71 is mandatory (non‑directory) or directory, in light of precedents relied upon by respondents.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Ram Bihari Singh)
- The first oath taken on 11 March 1979 was defective; the petitioner properly took oath on 11 June 1979 as required by Section 71, and therefore his lawful assumption of office dates from 11 June 1979.
- Because the lawful assumption of office occurred on 11 June 1979, Section 32(4) barred any notice of a no-confidence motion within six months of that date; hence notices of 27 September 1979 and 4 October 1979 were premature and invalid.
- Rule 3 forbids holding meetings on holidays; the meeting of 7 October 1979 was held on a holiday (Sunday) and therefore was impermissible under the Rules.
- The notice of the meeting was not served on several members of the Samiti.
Respondent No. 4's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh)
- A preliminary objection: because the State Government has power under Section 68 of the Act to annul a Panchayat Samiti resolution, the petitioner had an alternative remedy and the writ petition is not maintainable.
- The oath taken on 11 March 1979 was in substance sufficient compliance with Section 71; the statutory prescription is directory, not mandatory, and the earlier oath should be treated as valid (relying on two Supreme Court decisions).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (AIR 1958 SC 687) | Held that the requirement of Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act (deposit of security) was directory rather than mandatory; substantial compliance sufficed. | The court reviewed this precedent but found it inapposite: the omission in the present case (failure to state the capacity in which the oath was taken) went to the root of the oath itself and could not be treated as a mere directory/technical omission. Thus Kamaraja Nadar did not assist respondent No. 4's contention that Section 71's form requirement was directory. |
| Ch. Subbarao v. Election Tribunal, Hyderabad (AIR 1964 SC 1027) | Held that substantial compliance with Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act (copies and attestation) was sufficient; omission of certain words was not fatal. | The court considered this decision but held it unhelpful to respondent No. 4: Section 71's requirement to state the capacity in which the oath is taken is vital before assumption of office and therefore mandatory, unlike the defect in Ch. Subbarao which involved a non‑vital wording omission. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining the key statutory provisions and the facts alleged in the petition and affidavits. The principal strands of the court's analysis are as follows:
- Maintainability (alternative remedy): The court rejected the submission that the existence of the State Government's power under Section 68 to annul a Panchayat Samiti resolution precluded recourse to the High Court under Article 226. The court held that the discretionary power of the State Government does not defeat a petitioner’s right to approach the High Court alleging wrongful removal in defiance of the Act and Rules.
- Construction and application of Section 71 (oath): The court compared the form of oath prescribed by Section 71 with the form actually used on 11 March 1979. The prescribed form expressly requires stating the capacity in which the person is taking oath (e.g., member of the Panchayat Samiti or a Zilla Parishad standing committee). The form used on 11 March omitted any statement of capacity and contained other differing language. The court concluded that this omission went to the root of the requisite oath: the 11 March 1979 instrument was not an oath in law because it did not conform to Section 71.
- Legal effect of the second oath (11 June 1979): The court held that the valid oath was the one administered on 11 June 1979 in the prescribed form; the petitioner lawfully assumed the office of Pramukh from that date. The court rejected the contention that the later valid oath should relate back to 11 March 1979. It emphasized that the statutory oath is a condition precedent to taking a seat or acting as a member; mere de facto functioning does not validate a defective oath.
- Application of Section 32(4): Section 32(4) bars notice of a motion under that section (no-confidence) within six months of assumption of office by a Pramukh. Because the petitioner’s lawful assumption date was 11 June 1979, the notices of 27 September 1979 and 4 October 1979 (and the resulting resolution of 7 October 1979) were within six months and therefore premature and legally ineffective. The court held those notices and the resolution to be hit by Section 32(4) and illegal.
- Rule 3 (meetings on holidays): The court noted that Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules requires that Samiti/Parishad shall meet on days not being holidays and that meetings on holidays are forbidden. The meeting of 7 October 1979 was a Sunday/holiday and therefore, on that ground too, the meeting was contrary to Rule 3. The court observed that the Rules are statutory rules made under Section 75 and have the force of law. Although the court remarked on this violation, its principal ground for quashing the resolution was the mandatory six‑month bar under Section 32(4) combined with the invalidity of the first oath.
- Precedent reliance: The court considered the two Supreme Court decisions relied upon by respondent No. 4 but distinguished them on the facts and statutory context. It observed that the defects in those cases were of a non‑vital or technical nature where substantial compliance could be found; by contrast, failure to state the capacity in Section 71 is vital and mandatory.
- Other procedural objections: The court noted allegations such as non-service of notice on certain members and the administration of oaths by the Up‑Pramukh on 7 October 1979, but indicated that it was not necessary to resolve all such questions to decide the case given the conclusions on the oath and Section 32(4).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application was allowed and the impugned resolution dated 7 October 1979 (Annexure 4) was quashed. There was no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The court's direct operative effect in this opinion is to invalidate the specific no-confidence notices (27 September 1979 and 4 October 1979) and the resulting resolution of 7 October 1979 on the grounds that (a) the petitioner’s lawful assumption of office only occurred on 11 June 1979 (the valid oath) and (b) Section 32(4) barred any notice of no-confidence within six months of such assumption.
- The court also observed that holding the Samiti meeting on 7 October 1979 was contrary to Rule 3 (prohibition on meetings on holidays), which reinforced the invalidity of that meeting; however the ruling focused principally on the mandatory six‑month protection and the defective first oath.
- The opinion states no broader precedent beyond the decision in this case; the court distinguished earlier Supreme Court decisions relied upon by respondent No. 4 and treated the Section 71 requirement as mandatory in the facts of this case. The court did not purport to lay down an extended new principle beyond the application to the present facts.
Bench: K.B.N. Singh, C.J. (delivering the opinion). M.P. Singh, J. concurred. Application allowed.
K.B.N Singh, C.J:— In this writ petition the petitioner prays for quashing a resolution of no-confidence dated 7th Oct., 1979, removing the petitioner from the office of Pramukh of Patepur Panchayat Samiti, a copy of which has been filed as Annex. 4.
2. The petitioner's case is that on 10-3-79 he was elected Pramukh of Patepur Panchayat Samiti, hereinafter referred to as “Samiti”, by defeating respondent No. 4, Krishna Nandan Prasad Singh, and took oath of office on 11-3-79 but later it was found that the oath of office administered to the petitioner was not in accordance with Section 71 of Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961 (Hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), and, therefore, the petitioner had again taken oath on 11-6-79, as required under Sec. 71. The petitioner has averred that respondent No. 1, Rudra Narain Rai, District Development Officer, Hajipur who happens to be the samdhi of respondent No. 4, did not take the defeat of his samdhi sportingly and soon after the election of the petitioner started pressurising respondent No. 2, Paras Nath Choudhary, Prakhand Vikas Padadhikari, Patepur, to see that a vote of no-confidence was passed against the petitioner so that he may be removed from the office of Pramukh. The petitioner has also alleged that respondent No. 2 was not favourably disposed towards the petitioner inasmuch as at the instance of the petitioner an anti-corruption committee has been formed by the District Magistrate, Vaishali, of which the petitioner is a member, and the said committee is enquiring into several allegations of corruption against respondent No. 2 and some Mukhiyas.
3. The petitioner has further alleged that on 27-9-79 respondent No. 4 in league with respondents 1 and 2 sponsored a no-confidence motion which was placed before the petitioner on 28-9-79 (Annexure 1). As there were executive holidays from 28th September to 4th Oct., 1979, and 5th and 6th Oct., 1979 were declared as special holidays and 7th Oct., 1979, being a Sunday, the petitioner directed the no-confidence motion to be placed for orders on 8th Oct., 1979 (Annex. 2) as no meeting could be held on a holiday. But surprisingly enough on 4-10-79 respondent No. 2 issued a notice fixing 7-10-79 as the date of the said meeting of the Samiti to discuss the no-confidence motion signed by 18 persons of the Samiti (Annexure 3). The petitioner was not given any information about the said meeting and the said meeting should not have been held on 7th Oct., 1979, which was a Sunday and a holiday according to Rule 3 of the Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1963, hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”. The petitioner has also alleged that the notice of the said meeting was not served on six members of the Samiti besides the petitioner, namely, Paltan Ram, M.L.A, Sushil Prasad Yadav, Tej Narain Singh, Ganga Choudhary, Srimati Jyoti Devi and Basist Rai. In spite of the aforesaid lacuna the meeting was held on 7-10-79 in which the motion of no-confidence was passed. The petitioner has averred that ten members of the Samiti, mentioned in para 13 of the petition, had not taken oath of office including respondent No. 4. The petitioner has come to know that respondent No. 3, Up-Pramukh, administered oath to some members of the samiti on 7th Oct., 1979, itself, which the petitioner characterised as illegal inasmuch as the meeting was held under R. 5(2) of the Rules for considering the no-confidence motion and not for administering oaths of office. On account of violation of the aforesaid mandatory provisions of the Act and the Rules, the petitioner has prayed for declaring the impugned resolution as invalid. Counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 as well as on behalf of respondent No. 4 to which the petitioner has filed replies. They will be referred to in so far as they are relevant.
4. At the outset a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4, that the petitioner having an alternative remedy to move the State Government for cancelling or suspending the impugned resolution, this writ petition is not maintainable. It is true that the State Government may annul any resolution passed by the Panchayat Samiti in the circumstances mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Act but the existence of such a discretionary right with the State Government cannot defeat the petitioner's right to move this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, as it now exists, on the allegation that he had been wrongfully removed from the office of Pramukh, which he is entitled to hold, in defiance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules.
5. Mr. Ram Bihari Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has urged that the petitioner having taken oath on 11-6-79, required by S. 71, as the previous oath administered on 11-3-79 was defective, the no-confidence motion could not be moved against the petitioner as laid down in sub-section (4) of S. 32 of the Act. The fact that the petitioner had to take the second oath as the first oath was defective is admitted in para 4 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 to the effect that some technical errors were found in the form of oath and, therefore, it was administered in the meeting of the Samiti to regularise the previous oath. Section 71 of the Act lays down that every member of the Panchayat Samiti shall, before taking his seat, make and subscribe at a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti an oath or affirmation according to the following form, namely:—
“I, A.B having become a member of the Panchayat Samiti/Zilla Parishad standing committee of the Panchayat Samiti/Zilla Parishad swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will hear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India and that I will faithfully discharge the duty upon which I am about to enter.”
Sub-section (2) of S. 71 lays down:
“No such member shall take his seat at a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti or of the Zilla Parishad, as the case may be, or do any act as such member unless he has made and subscribed the oath or affirmation in accordance with the provision of this section.”
In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 4 the form in which the first oath was taken is mentioned in para 4 and it runs as follows:
“I, A.B do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India by law established, that I will do right to all the members of people in accordance with the provision of the Act and that I will faithfully and consciously discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.” Reading the two forms of oath it is apparent that the oath taken on 11-3-79 by the petitioner was not in pursuance of the oath prescribed in Section 71 of the Act, that is, as to the capacity in which he was taking oath, namely, whether as a member of the Panchayat Samiti or Zilla Parishad Standing Committee of the Panchayat Samiti or Zilla Parishad. The provision with regard to taking oath as laid down in S. 71 of the Act is clear and explicit that no member shall take his seat or do any act unless he subscribes oath in a particular form.
6. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4, has submitted that the oath taken on 11-3-79 was in substance an oath as prescribed under Sec. 71 of the Act. In my opinion, there is no substance in this submission. The oath taken on 11-3-79 does not mention the capacity in which the petitioner was taking oath and it did not conform to the provision of Sec. 71 and as such it was no oath in the eye of law. Mere functioning of the petitioner will not validate the invalidity in taking oath nor can it validate his having assumed the office of Pramukh. The oath, therefore, taken on 11-6-79 will be the proper oath after which the petitioner can be said to have assumed his seat as a member of the Panchayat Samiti and started acting as the de jure Pramukh of the Samiti. The oath is not an empty formality but it means to bind one subscribing to the oath as Pramukh of the Samiti. As provided under Section 71 before a member takes his seat he must subscribe oath in the form as mentioned in that section and it also forbids a member, who has not taken such oath, from taking his seat at a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti or to do any act as such member unless he has made and subscribed the oath or affirmation in accordance with the provision of this section. There is also no substance that the oath taken on 11-6-79 will relate back to 11-3-79. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner lawfully assumed the office of Pramukh of the Samiti on 11-6-79 after taking valid oath as a member of the Samiti. The fact that the petitioner was required to take oath as a member of the Samiti as required by S. 71 of the Act has been admitted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and has not been disputed before us by learned counsel for the respondent. Thus the oath taken on 11-6-79 will be effective from that date and will not relate back to 11-3-79. Mere de facto functioning will not be lawful assumption of office of Pramukh as required by law which was a condition precedent to such an assumption. The result will be that no notice of no-confidence motion could be made against the petitioner within six months of assumption of office as Pramukh under sub-section (4) of Section 32 of the Act which reads as follows:
“No notice of a motion under this section shall be made within six months of assumption of office by a Pramukh or Up Pramukh as the case may be.”
Consequently the notice of no-confidence motion dated 27-9-79 (Annexure 1) and the notice dated 4-10-79 (Annexure 3) would be premature and no-confidence motion could not be passed in pursuance thereof. Therefore, both the notices as also the resolution (Annexure 4) are hit by S. 32(4) of the Act and are illegal and must be quashed.
7. Learned counsel on behalf of respondent No. 4 has relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (AIR 1958 SC 687) and Ch. Subbarao v. Election Tribunal, Hyderabad (AIR 1964 SC 1027), in support of his submission that the oath taken on 11-3-79 should be deemed to be sufficient compliance with the provision of S. 71 of the Act and the provision in this regard is directory and not mandatory. In the first case the question for consideration was with regard to Sec. 117 of the Representation of the People Act relating to deposit of security for the cost of an election petition. The only lacuna in the deposit was that it was not stated to be in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the provision of S. 117 was directory and not mandatory. The essence of the provision contained in that section is that the petitioner should furnish security for the costs of the petition and should enclose along with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing that a deposit of one thousand rupees had been made by him either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India which was at the disposal of the Election Commission to be utilised by it in the manner authorised by law and was under its control and payable on a proper application being made in that behalf to the Election Commission or to any person duly authorised by it to receive the same, be he the Secretary to the Election Commission or anyone else. In the instant case there was no mention of the office in respect of which the oath was taken by the petitioner on 11-3-79. Such an omission goes to the root of the oath itself and it cannot be said to be a non-mandatory provision of Section 71 of the Act.
8. In the other case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1027 the question was of non-compliance with the requirements of Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act which lays down that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one more copy for the use of the Election Commission and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. The election petition that was filed was typewritten and the copies which accompanied the petition were carbon copies of the typescript. The copies bore two signatures in original of the election petitioner authenticating both the contents of the petition as well as the verification thereof. In the copies of the petitioner, however, did not insert the words “true copy” before or above his signature. The High Court rejected the election petition. The Supreme Court reversing the decision of the High Court held that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of S. 81(3) and mere omission of the words “true copy” was not fatal to the election petition. The above two decisions are of no assistance to learned counsel for respondent No. 4 inasmuch as Section 71 of the Act requires clearly to state the capacity in which the oath was being taken, which is vital before assumption of the office. The provision of S. 71, therefore, in this regard is mandatory and not directory.
9. Another argument advanced by learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner as to the invalidity of no-confidence motion dated 7-10-79 may be noted. Learned counsel has urged that Rule 3 of the Rules forbids holding of any meetings on a holiday. The said rule reads as follows:
“Every Samiti/Parishad shall meet at least once in every two months for the transaction of business upon such days not being holidays and such hours of the day as it may arrange and also at other times as often as a meeting is called by the Pramukh of the Samiti Adhyaksha of the Parishad.”
Rule 5(1) lays down that there should be clear ten days' notice for a meeting and in case of urgency a shorter notice can be given but at such a meeting items of routine business will not be discussed as per R. 5(2). Rule 7 lays down that the Pramukh shall call for a special meeting including the meeting for considering no-confidence motion within seven days of the receipt of the request in writing signed by not less than one-third of the total number of members of the Samiti specifying the resolution which it is proposed to move and if the Pramukh does not call the meeting the Block Development Officer or the Secretary shall call the meeting within three days thereafter. In the instant case when the first notice was given to the petitioner on 28-9-79 he ordered it to be placed on 8-10-79 as from 28th September to 7th Oct., 1979, there were holidays. In the meantime a special notice was given by respondent No. 2 on 4-10-79 fixing the meeting on 7-10-79 which was a holiday. It was hit by R. 3 as no such meeting could be held on a holiday. The rules have been framed under Sec. 75 of the Act for carrying out the purposes of the Act and it requires to be laid before each House of the Legislature for a total period of 15 days. The rules thus being statutory rules have the same force as the provisions of the Act. Rule 3 being a complete embargo on a meeting being held on a holiday, the meeting held on 7th Oct., 1979, was against the express provision of R. 3. It is somewhat surprising as to how a responsible officer like respondent No. 2, the Prakhand Vikash Padadhikari, who is expected to be aware of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, could overlook this provision of law and call a meeting on a holiday. The assertion of the petitioner in para 15 of the petition that no such meeting could be called has not been clearly controverted in para 14 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 as to how the meeting could be held on a Sunday. All that is stated is that the statement in para 15 is not correct in view of the provisions of the Conduct Rules. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has also urged that in order to forestall the order that might be passed by the petitioner on the 8th Oct., 1979, that the meeting was called on the 7th Oct., 1979, which was a Sunday, to help respondent No. 4, who is samdhi of respondent No. 1. It is needless to go into this question for deciding this case. It is also not necessary to go into the question raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no service of notice of no-confidence on many of the members.
10. In the result, this application is allowed and the resolution as contained in Annexure 4 is quashed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
M.P Singh, J.:— I fully agree.
Application allowed.
Alert