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Smt. Lalmuni Devi & Others v. Shiv Shankar Tiwary & Others

Patna High Court
Feb 27, 1980
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Opinion Summary — High Court (Hari Lal Agrawal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the decree-holders challenging an order of the executing court which sustained certain objections raised by the judgment-debtors (the respondents first party) to delivery of possession of a house pursuant to a compromise decree. The compromise decree, passed on 29.2.1968 in a suit originally instituted by Saryug Tiwary in 1964 (Calcutta High Court), allotted various properties between competing branches of a joint family and partnership concerns. Item No. 46 of the Schedule in the compromise decree described the property in dispute as “A pucca Brick built house at Village Manpura P.S Ravelganj, District Chapra (Saran).”

The decree was registered and transmitted to Chapra for execution. Execution Case No. 14 of 1978 was registered in the First Subordinate Judge at Chapra. The respondents first party (sons and wife of Saryug Tiwary), who had signed the compromise as benamidars and stated they had no interest in the properties, filed an objection petition in execution raising four objections: (1) the property description was vague and unidentifiable; (2) the property had not been the subject-matter of the suit; (3) the Calcutta High Court ordered execution only against Saryug Tiwary and not against his heirs (respondents first party); and (4) the compromise decree was merely declaratory and not executable for delivery of possession. The executing court allowed the objection petition, holding (i) the decree was vague and (ii) execution could not be directed against the respondents first party; the appellant decree-holders appealed to this court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the description of the house in Item No. 46 of the compromise decree was sufficiently definite (not vague) to permit identification and execution of delivery of possession.
  2. Whether the decree could be executed against the respondents first party given their status as benamidars and the direction of the Calcutta High Court relating to execution against Saryug Tiwary.
  3. Whether inclusion of a property not originally part of the suit renders the compromise decree (or that part of it) unexecutable — i.e., whether a compromise including extraneous immovable property is enforceable in execution.
  4. Whether a separate final decree was necessary before execution, or whether the compromise decree that made final allotments was itself executable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (for the decree-holders)

  • The respondents themselves, in paragraph 11 of their objection petition, described two houses on plot No. 1133 (one to the north, one to the south) and appended a sketch map, thereby enabling identification.
  • One of the two houses was pucca and the other kacha; Item No. 46 described a “pucca brick built house,” which was sufficient to single out the decree-holder's property.
  • The executing court could, if necessary, appoint a pleader-commissioner to inspect and determine physical features to remove any doubt as to identity; the appellants were ready to have such inspection and bear costs.
  • The Calcutta house allotted in the compromise was also briefly but sufficiently described elsewhere in the schedule (Serial No. 71) as “premises no. 6, Mot Lane, Calcutta-13,” showing the schedules used brief but operative descriptions.

Respondent's Arguments (for the judgment-debtors / objectors)

  • The property description in the decree was vague and unidentifiable, preventing meaningful execution for delivery of possession.
  • The house was not the subject-matter of the suit and therefore should not have been included in the decree for execution.
  • The Calcutta High Court directed execution only against Saryug Tiwary and not against his heirs; hence the executing court lacked jurisdiction to execute against the respondents first party.
  • The executing court had no jurisdiction to take additional evidence or make inquiries to identify the property (i.e., it could not go beyond the decree to take such steps).
  • The compromise decree was only declaratory in nature and did not permit delivery of possession under execution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Munshi Ram v. Banwari Lal, AIR 1962 S.C. 903 That a compromise including matters extraneous to the suit may still be enforceable in relation to the matters that relate to the suit. The court relied on this principle to support the proposition that inclusion of a property not strictly part of the original suit does not necessarily render the compromise or its operative parts unexecutable.
Ramjanam v. Bindeshwari, A.I.R. 1951 Patna 299 Test for whether a term of compromise relates to the subject-matter of the suit: answerable by reference to the frame of the suit, reliefs claimed and matters in issue on pleadings; if compromise relates to matters that fell to be decided, it may be treated as relating to the suit. Referred (with approval) as authority for treating compromise terms as relating to the suit when they are part of the integral consideration; court relied on this reasoning in assessing whether the allotment was within the compass of the suit-related compromise.
Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. Maharajadhiraj Dr. Sir Kameshwar Singh Bahadur, A.I.R. 1953 Patna 178 If parts of a compromise are so mixed that they cannot be separated (i.e., inseparable), the entire compromise is operative; if separable, the operative part is confined to matters relating to the suit (severability test). The court applied the severability test and concluded the allotments were integral to the compromise; therefore the compromise decree could be executed in respect of the property so allotted.
Raghubir v. Ajodhya, A.I.R. 1945 Patna 482 Where parties by compromise make final allotments, no separate final decree needs to be drawn up for execution — the compromise can stand as operative for execution. The court relied on this decision to hold that where a compromise makes final allotments, the compromise decree itself is executable and a separate final decree is not necessary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each contested point in turn and explained its legal reasoning as follows.

On vagueness / identifiability of the property

The court observed that the respondents' own objection petition described two houses on plot No. 1133 (with a sketch map) and stated one was pucca and the other kacha. Given that Item No. 46 described “a pucca Brick built house,” the court found that this description was sufficient to identify the property allotted to the decree-holders. The court further held that the executing court is entitled to take steps to effect delivery of possession — including appointing a pleader-commissioner to inspect physical features — and that such measures are not the taking of "additional evidence" but rather steps to ascertain the identity of the property in terms of the decree.

On jurisdiction to take steps to identify property

The court rejected the objection that the executing court lacked jurisdiction to take steps (such as appointing a pleader-commissioner) to determine the identity of the property; these were characterised as permissible measures to effect execution rather than inadmissible receipt of new evidence.

On executability against respondents first party (benamidars)

The court noted that the respondents first party had represented in the decree petition that they were benamidars and had no right in the properties. Because they took that position in the decree court, they could not object to execution under Section 47 of the Code; any objection of that nature could properly have been raised only by Saryug Tiwary. The court nevertheless addressed other objections on merit, since Saryug Tiwary was impleaded in the miscellaneous case in the executing court and in the current proceedings.

On inclusion of property not originally part of the suit and registration requirement

The court analysed the law as to compromises that include matters beyond the original subject-matter of the suit. It explained that while Rule 3 of Order 23 (pre-amendment) ordinarily limited compromise to “the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit,” earlier decisions recognised that compromises may include extraneous matters yet remain enforceable for portions relating to the suit. The court referred to Section 17(2)(vi) and Section 17(1) of the Registration Act, emphasising that incorporation of immovable property extraneous to the suit required compliance with registration formalities to render the compromise enforceable. Applying the tests in the cited precedents (including the severability test from Jagdish Chandra Sinha), the court found the allotment of the ancestral house to be an integral part of the compromise and, because the decree was registered, concluded it was legally executable.

On necessity of a separate final decree

The court distinguished between a preliminary decree and a situation where parties by compromise have made clear final allotments. It held that when the compromise itself makes final and specific allotments (leaving only certain items joint), the compromise decree functions as a consolidated preliminary and final decree; therefore no separate final decree need be drawn up for execution. The court cited Raghubir v. Ajodhya in support.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal was allowed. The objections raised by the respondents first party were overruled and the executing court was directed to proceed with execution of the decree.

Key direct orders and practical consequences:

  • The High Court directed the executing court to appoint a pleader-commissioner (at the cost of the appellants) to inspect the two houses on plot No. 1133 and determine whether Item No. 46 of the Schedule (the “pucca brick built house”) can be ascertained without vagueness.
  • If the pleader-commissioner confirms identification consistent with the decree, the executing court is to proceed to deliver possession of the house to the decree-holders.
  • The parties were left to bear their own costs in the High Court; the appeal was allowed.

Implications beyond the parties: The decision resolves the dispute between the parties by directing execution subject to ascertainment of identity and reiterates established principles concerning (a) the enforceability of compromises that include immovable property extraneous to the original suit where registration requirements are complied with, (b) the executing court's power to take steps (including a pleader-commissioner's inspection) to give effect to a decree, and (c) the principle that where a compromise effects final allotments a separate final decree is not necessary. The opinion does not state that it establishes a novel precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities.

Show all summary ...

Hari Lal Agrawal, J.:— This is an appeal under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the decree holders and arises out of an order passed on an objection petition filed by the judgment-debtors-respondents first party, in the excution court, objecting to the delivery of possession of a house in pursuance of a compromise decree between the parties.

2. It appears from the facts stated in the compromise decree that the decree holder Bhagwat Prasad Tiwary, ancestor of the appellants, and Saryug Tiwary, respondent second party, besides being members of a joint family which possessed various landed properties at various places, were also carrying on certain business in partnership. It further appears that some dispute having arisen between the parties, Saryug Tiwary instituted a suit in the year 1964 on the original side of the Calcutta High Court for various declaration and dissolution of some business. In that suit a compromise decree was passed on 29.2.1968 In accordance with the said compromise, properties mentioned in Part II in Schedule A were allotted to Bhagwat Tiwary and those mentioned in Part I of the said Schedule to Saryug Tiwary. Some properties, however, were left joint. The two houses, one situated in the town of Calcutta and the other in the village home of the parties at Manpura in the district of Saran, were incorporated in the said compromise decree. Whereas the Calcutta house was allotted to the branch of Saryug Tiwary being described in Item No. 71, the ancestral house in village Manpura was allotted to the branch of Bhagwat Tiwary. It was described in Item No. 46 of the relevant, schedule as follows:—

“A pucca Brick built house at Village Manpura P.S Ravelganj, District Chapra (Saran).”

3. It is not disputed that this house property was not originally included in the suit but formed part of the compromise by consent of the parties. The decree, however, was registered. The respondents first party who are none else than the sons and wife of Saryug Tiwary, besides being parties to the suit were also parties to the compromise having signed the compromise on their own behalf, but it was stated that they were merely benamidars and had no interest in the properties. After the compromise decree was duly registered, the decree holders got it transmitted to Chapra for effecting delivery of possession of the aforesaid Item no. 46, namely, the ancestral house which lay within the territorial jurisdiction of the court below. The decree was accordingly transferred and Execution Case No. 14 of 1978 was registered in the court of the First Subordinate Judge at Chapra. The respondents first party in their objection petition raised the following objections: (1) The property as mentioned in the decree was vague and unidentifiable, (2) it was not the subject matter of the suit, (3) the Calcutta High Court had directed for execution of the decree only against Saryug Prasad Tiwary (defendant no. 1) and not against his heirs, and (4) the compromise decree was only declaratory in nature and no delivery of possession could be effected under such decree.

4. A rejoinder was filed on behalf of the appellants controverting the pleas of the objectors. The executing court, however, allowed the objection petition and recorded the following findings; (I) The decree was vague as the property in question was not indentifi able and (2) in view of the direction of the Calcutta High Court decree could not be executed against the respondents first party. The other objections that the property having not formed part of the suit, could not be included in the decree and the nature of the decree was merely declaratory and unexecutable were rejected. These points were, however, also strongly pressed by Mr. Lakshman Saran Sinha, appearing for respondent party before us.

5. I will first consider the argument regarding the vagueness of the decree. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, invited our attention to the statements macle in the objection petition filed by the respondents first party. In paragraph 11 of the objection petition it is stated that in village Manpura, the ancestral village home of the parties, over plot no. 1133 two houses were situate, one being towards the north and the other towards the south, but their area was identified. They also delienated the two houses aforesaid in a sketch map appended to their objection petition. Mr. Kailash Roy contended that one of the aforesaid houses was pucca and the other was kacha and in this view of the matter, when Item No. 46 described the property that what was allotted to the decree holder was “a puoca brick built house”, the property became obviously indentifiable and absence of other particulars with reference to its plot number and boundary etc. did not matter as the description in paragraph 19 of the compromise petition and in Serial No. 46 of the Schedule referring the house as pucca brick built house, was sufficient for identifying the same. Learned counsel indicated his willingness and readiness for appointment of a pleader commissioner if it was thought so necessary by the executing court to find out the physical features of both the houses so as to examine-as to whether the above description namely, “pucca brick built house” was by itself sufficient to exclude the other house unmistakably. He also contended that the description of the house allotted to Saryug Tiwary in Serial No. 71 of his Schedule was also described in brief as “premises no. 6, Mot Lane, Calcutta-13.”

6. Mr. Lakshman Saran Sinha, appearing for the objectors, on the other hand, contended that the executing court had no jurisdiction to take additional evidence to find out the properties in suit. I do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Sinha in as much as the executing court is certainly entitiled in law to take such steps to effect delivery of possession in terms of the decree under execution. “Such steps” would not amount to taking any additional evidence in the matter but would amount simply to ascertain and fix up the identity of the property in terms of the decree itself.

7. Now I proceed to consider the other objection, namely, that the decree was unexecutable against the respondents first party in view of the directions of the Calcutta High Court an objection which has been upheld by the executing court. In my view, this objection of the objectors also is devoid of any snbstance. The executing court has referred to the compromise petition where a statement had been made that respondents first party had no right in the properties in question. In the execution application in the column “against whom to be executed” no doubt the decree holders described respondents first party also as the parties concerned. It has already been said that they were also parties to the compromise decree. Saryug Tiwary was also named in this column of the execution application. The respondents first party having already taken a position in the decree court that they were benamidars or for that matter had no right to the properties in question, on their own stand, they had hardly any right to file an objection to the delivery of possession of the house in question under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Objection, if any, could be filed only by Saryug Tiwary. At one time I had thought that in view of the fact that Saryug Tiwary had kept back, I should not proceed to consider the other objections on’ merits, but having found that Saryug Tiwary was also impleaded as an opposite party to the miscellaneous case which was registered by the executing court on the objection petition, and he being also a party in this Court in order to cut short the litigation, in my view it would be desirable to dispose of the other questions also which have been pressed on behalf of the respondents first party by Mr. Lakshrnan Sharan Sinha for our consideration, as already indicated above.

8. I would first take up the objection that the house in question was not the subject matter of the suit and, therefore, the decree was not executable. It cannot be disputed as a proposition of law that a compromise can be effected in a suit “in respect of the whole or in part of the subject matter of the suit” only as envisaged in Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code as it stood prior to its amendment in the year 1976. However, where a compromise included matters extraneous to the suit it was not altogether unlawful and the decree was still executable with respect to the matters that related to the suit [See (I) Munshi Ram v. Banwari Lal: AIR 1962 Supreme Court 903]. In order to make the compromise enforceable the requirement of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act was to be complied with. According to this provision, the decrees or orders expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property otherwise than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding have to be registered if such decrees or orders come within the purview of Section 17(1) of the Registration Act. In the case of (2) Ramjanam v. Bindeshwari* (A.I.R 1951 Patna 299) which was referred with approval in the case of (3) Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. Maharajadhiraj Dr. Sir Kameshwar Singh Bahadur (A.I.R 1953 Patna 178), it was held as follows:

“The question whether a particular term of a compromise relates to the subject-matter of the suit has to be answered on the frame of the suit, the reliefs claimed and the matter which arose for decision in the case on the pleadings of the parties. The term is comprehensive enough and if the compromise relates to all those matter which fell to be decided in the case, it could not be said that any part of the compromise was beyond the subject-matter of the suit. There is a large body of authority to show that, where a compromise relating to matters outside the scope of the suit is a part of the consideration for the agreement as to matters in suit, the entire compromise as an integral whole must be recorded and decreed as relating to the suit whether they otherwise relate to the suit or not.”

9. Considering the question Sarjdo Prasad, J., who delivered the judgment for the Bench in Jagdish Chandia Sinha's case (supra), with reference to a large number of authorities said that the test in such a case was whether the matters in the compromise were so mixed up that it was impossible to separate the part which excusively related to the suit and another part which did not relate to the same. If it was found that the two parts were severable, then the operative part of the decree would have to be confined to the matters which relate to the suit on the terms of Rule 3 itself. If, on the other hand, they could not be severed from each other they stood or failed together; in that case the whole compromise would constitute the operative part of the decree and would be liable to be dealt with in execution. The recording of the compromise would be legal and the question as to what extent the executing court would have jurisdiction to deal with the terms of the compromise decree, would fall for consideration in that court.

10. Reading the compromise decree in question as a whole it is not possible to hold that allotment of the ancestral house to the decree holder and the Calcutta house to the judgment debtor was not the consideration or the agreement between the parties to the suit. The compromise, therefore, having been found by the decree court to be lawful and incorporated in the decree of the court, after its due registration, the decree against the property becomes executable and the executing court could not refuse to execute the decree in such a case. There is sufficient support for this view from the case of Jagdish Chandra Sinha (Supra). Although there seems to be a conflict of decisions amongst the various High Courts on this point, the amendment of 1976 makes the position all the more clear and comprehensive. In Rule 3 for the expression “in respect of whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit” it has been provided “so far as it relates to the parties to the suit whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit.” Under the present rule, therefore, as amended, the court can clearly pass a decree in terms of the agreement even though it includes matters not forming the subject matter of the suit provided that such extraneous matters related to the parties to the suit. Although clauses of Section 97 of the 1976 Amendment Act do not make the amendment applicable to any suit or proceeding pending at the time of commencement of the amending provision, on the other reasonings already stated a little earlier, I have no doubt in my mind that the inclusion of the property in question formed integral part of the compromise between the parties and, therefore, the compromise decree on being registered became fully executable in law. Although the case of Jagdish Chandra Sinha (supra) is a corollary, as it was held in that case that the properties forming part of the compromise were not outside the scope of the suit, the principle is supported that if the properties are so then the compromise in order to be lawful, has got to be registered. The requirement of a registration is obviously called for to make the compromise legal and enforceable. The parties to this case, as already said earlier, have taken this precaution and, therefore, it cannot be contended that the decree is unexecutable on account of incorporating any property outside the suit.

11. Now remains for consideration a very small question as to whether it was necessary for the decree holders to apply for a final decree or whether the compromise decree which finally allotted specific properties to the parties was executable by itself. It was not disputed before us that in a suit more than one final decrees can be prepared. Haying examined the terms of the agreement, I find that allotment has been made to the parties in a clear manner, of the various assets except only those which were agreed to be left as joint. In such a situation it is clear that no final decree need be drawn up. The preliminary decree as such simply declares the interest of the parties and until a final decree is drawn up, it is not possible to fix up the interest of the parties concerned in any specific property. It is, therefore clear, that until that stage comes the preliminary decree cannot be executed. The position stands entirely different where, the parties make final allotments by a compromise. In such a situation nothing remains pending to be dealt with in the final decree. The compromise decree takes the position of consolidated preliminary and final decree. In such a case the view that final decree is nob required to be drawn up finds support from the decision in (4) Raghubir v. Ajodhya* (A.I.R 1945 Patna 482).

12. I would accordingly allow this appeal, overrule the objections raised on behalf of the respondents first party and direct the executing court to proceed with the execution of the decree in question, subject to the observations made above, namely, that it would appoint a pleader commissioner at the cost of the appellants to find out the physical feature of the two houses standing on plot no. 1133 so as to examine as to whether the decree can be worked out and Item no. 46 of the Schedule allotted to the decree holders can be ascertained without any vagueness and if that be so, then the court below will proceed to deliver possession over the said house in question. In the circumstances, however, I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs.

13. Chaudhary Sai Saran Sinha, J. I agree.

Appeal allowed.