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Deo Kumar Rai v. State Of Bihar

Patna High Court
Mar 17, 1977
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Madan Mohan Prasad, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 3 April 1976 the police recorded a sanha following a statement by Bashisath Muni Rai alleging that the petitioners came and started cutting the mori (water channel) and assaulted him. An FIR was registered and an investigation was opened. The police initially submitted a final form (final report) treating the matter as one of mistake of fact. A protest petition was filed. Subsequently a sub-Inspector supervised the matter, re-examined witnesses, concluded that a prima facie case existed, and submitted a chargesheet. The Magistrate, on receipt of the chargesheet, took cognizance of offences under sections 307, 326 and 323 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and summoned the accused; cognizance was taken on 23 September 1976. The petitioners moved under section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the Magistrate's order of cognizance and summoning.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate had applied his judicial mind when taking cognizance and summoning the accused (i.e., whether the absence of stated reasons rendered the order the product of a mechanical act).
  2. Whether the police had jurisdiction to conduct further investigation and submit a chargesheet after having earlier submitted a "final report" under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Magistrate did not apply his mind to the facts before taking cognizance, making the cognizance order a non-judicial or mechanical act and thus liable to be quashed.
  • The police lacked jurisdiction to conduct further investigation or to submit a chargesheet after having already submitted a "final report" (final form), so subsequent proceedings based on that chargesheet were invalid.

The opinion does not contain a detailed separate statement of the State's or prosecution's arguments; the court's responses to the petitioners' points appear in its reasoning.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghu Nath Sharma v. The State, A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 268 Under the earlier law, a superior police officer could direct submission of a chargesheet even after a 'final report' had been submitted; a Magistrate could take cognizance on the basis of such subsequent chargesheet; there was no bar to further investigation after a final report. The court treated this decision as supporting the proposition that police may investigate further and submit a chargesheet after a final report; it was relied upon by a learned single judge in a later case and forms part of the line of authority showing no bar under the old code.
Ramakant Singh v. The State of Bihar, Cr. Misc No. 183 of 1970 and Cr. Rev. No. 191 of 1970 (unreported, disposed 16.3.1971) Held there was no provision in the old code that barred police from submitting a chargesheet after submission of a final form, even in absence of fresh materials; superior police officer may reopen investigation and direct chargesheet. The court cited this unreported decision to show consistent judicial treatment under the old code that further investigation and subsequent chargesheeting were permissible; it was used to demonstrate precedent in the State's High Court for that proposition.
State of Bihar v. Sher Bahadur, Cr. Rev. 70, 673 and 575 of 1967 (unreported, disposed 2.2.1969) Similar view under the old code that further investigation and subsequent chargesheeting after a final report were permissible. Referred to as another decision of the court reaching a similar conclusion under the old code, reinforcing the line of authority permitting further investigation.
Rama Shankar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 525 A decision relied upon in the older decisions (including Raghu Nath Sharma) supporting the permissibility of further investigation and subsequent chargesheeting under the earlier law. The court noted that this decision was relied upon by earlier judges as part of the jurisprudence under the old code that did not bar further investigation after a final report.
H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 196 Formation of opinion on the materials already collected and taking steps for filing of a chargesheet are also steps towards the investigation of a case. The court invoked this Supreme Court authority to support the proposition that acts such as forming an opinion and filing a chargesheet constitute investigative steps; this helped justify that later steps by police after a final report can be part of continued investigation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the two arguments raised by petitioners sequentially.

  1. On the contention that the Magistrate did not apply his mind: the court acknowledged the Magistrate's cognizance order did not set out reasons, but observed that no authority requires a cognizance order to contain reasons in so many words. The court explained the legal meaning of "taking of cognizance" under section 190 CrPC as an application of mind by the Magistrate to the bundle of facts with a view to proceed under the relevant chapters (Chapters XIV and XV). It distinguished the act of ordering inquiry or investigation under sections 155/156 (which is not the same as taking cognizance under section 190). The court held that the absence of recorded reasons alone does not prove mechanical action; instead the court must determine from the surrounding facts and circumstances whether the Magistrate applied judicial mind. In the present case, the Magistrate had the earlier final report, the protest petition and the subsequent chargesheet on record, had summoned the accused and fixed the matter for committal inquiry; these facts indicated that cognizance involved application of mind. Thus the first contention was rejected.
  2. On the contention that the police lacked jurisdiction to investigate further after submitting a final report: the court relied on the express provision of sub-section (8) of section 173 CrPC (1973) which permits further investigation and obtaining further evidence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, and requires forwarding a further report if further evidence is obtained. The court observed that although the old Code lacked an explicit provision, earlier decisions under the old Code had held that police could further investigate after submitting a final form; those decisions were consistent with the express provision in the 1973 Code. The court examined the chargesheet in the present case and concluded it showed the matter had been supervised by a superior police officer who re-examined witnesses and elicited further evidence (noting specifically that earlier statements had referred to assault by lathi while later statements alleged assault by garansa). The court rejected the petitioners' complaint that the prosecution had "developed" the case, noting that the reliability of witnesses is not to be assessed at this stage and that the police were entitled to accept or reject statements and form an opinion. Because the police obtained further evidence and submitted a chargesheet following further investigation, the second contention failed.

Having rejected both contentions, the court found no ground to quash the Magistrate's order or the proceedings arising from it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application under section 482 CrPC to quash the Magistrate's order of cognizance and summons is dismissed. In the words of the court, "there does not appear to be any good ground for quashing either the order by which cognizance has been taken or the proceeding arising out of it. This application is accordingly dismissed."

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Magistrate's order taking cognizance and summoning the accused remains in force and the proceedings before the Magistrate continue (including the committal inquiry/further steps listed in the order).
  • On legal principle: The court affirmed that (a) absence of explicitly recorded reasons in a cognizance order does not automatically mean the Magistrate acted mechanically—cognizance may be inferred from the circumstances and materials on record; and (b) under section 173(8) CrPC the police may conduct further investigation and submit a further report/chargesheet after an earlier final report, and such further investigation may justify a subsequent chargesheet (including where additional or modified witness statements are obtained).
  • Broader precedent: The opinion relies on existing statutory text and prior decisions to reach its conclusion. The court did not state that it was establishing a new legal principle; the decision applies existing law to the facts and dismisses the quashing application.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Madan Mohan Prasad, J.:— This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (herein after referred to as ‘the Code’) for quashing an order by which the Magistrate has taken cognizance of offences under section 307, 326 and 323 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and summoned the accused persons.

2. It appears that a sanha was recorded by the police on the 3rd April, 1976. On the statement of one Bashisath Muni Rai alleging that the petitioners came and started cutting the Mori (water channel) and on Protest assaulted him differently. On this basis, the first information report was drawn up, a case instituted and investigation taken up. After completing investigation, the police submitted final form (loosely called, final report) treating the case to be one of mistake of fact. A protest Petition was filed. It appears, however that thereafter the case was supervised by the sub-Inspector of police and he re-examined the witnesses and on the basis of their statements, he found a prima facie case to have been made out against the accused and, accordingly, the police submitted chargesheet. On receipt thereof, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences, as stated above. Hence, this application.

3. Counsel for the petitioners has raised two points before me. Firstly, he has contented that the Magistrate does not appear to have applied his mind at all to the facts of the case before taking cognizance which is a judicial act and the order is had on that account; secondly, it has been urged that he had no jurisdiction to take cognizance because the police had no jurisdiction in law to hold further investigation and submit a chargesheet after having submitted a “final report” earlier. Both the points are devoid of any substance and must be rejected.

4. With regard to the first point, it is true that the order by which the Magistate has taken cognizance and summoned the accused persons does not give out reasons in support of it, but no authority has, however, been cited to show that the order by which the magistrate records taking of cognizance must contain the reasons. In the present case cognizance was taken on the 23rd September, 1976. All the materials, namely, the earlier final form submitted by police (final report), the protest petition and chargesheet submitted (subsequently) were on the records. The Magistrate has taken notice of the fact of submission of the chargesheet and taken cognizance on that basis. It means that the Magistrate was satisfied that he should act by proceeding under the code against the accused persons. It is obvious from the order that on the basis he has summoned the accused persons also and fixed the case for the purpose of determining whether the accused should be committed to the court of session. The mere absence of reason in an order of cognizance, in my view, cannot lead to the conclusion that a Magistrate acts mechanically without applying his mind. It must be born in mind that taking of cognizance under section 190 of the code means application of the mind by the Magistrate to bundle of facts stated before him with a view to take action under the relevant chapters of the code, namely, Chapters XIV and XV (under new code). It may be mentioned in this connection that when a Magistrate applies his mind to the facts of a case with a view to ordering enquiry or investigation by the police under section 155 or 156 of the code, it does not amount to taking of cognizance under section 190 of the code. The point which should be kept in view is that it is the act of application of the mind with certain purpose which is said to be taking of cognizance. The fact of cognizance having been taken need not be recorded in black and white. It may appear from the facts and circumstances of a case, even though it may not be stayed by the Magistrate that he has taken cognizance. In this view of the matter, when the Magistrate is not bound to record in so many words that he has taken cognizance, in my view, it cannot be said that he must record the reasons which led him to take cognizance. The fact as to whether or not cognizance has been taken, has to be gathered from the circumstances of a case and, in this respect, the court has to determine as to whether it appears that the Magistrate has applied his judicial mind or not. The test cannot, therefore, be as to whether he has recorded the reasons for taking cognizance or not. As stated earlier, there is nothing in the present case to show that the Magistrate passed the order without applying his mind. This argument must therefore, be rejected.

5. With regard to the second point, it has been urged that the police had no jurisdiction to investigate the case further after having submitted a final report earlier. This submission is incorrect in law in view of the provision of sub-section (8) of section 173 of the Code which clearly enables the Police to investigate a case further and to obtain further evidence. It will be noticed that even though there was no corresponding provision to this effect in the old code of 1898, it was held in a number of decisions under the old code that the police had power to investigate a case further even after having submitted final form once. It was so held as there was no provision in the Code barring further investigation by police after submission of final form. It is not necessary to refer to them in view of the express provision in the Code of 1973.

6. Next it has been urged that if, at all, the police could investigate the case further, it could submit a chargesheet only on some fresh materials gathered and Dot in absence thereof. In this respect, it may be mentioned that none of the provisions of the Code contained under Chapter XII of the Code except section 173 is relevant to the point at issue. Section 173 lays down that investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay and that as soon as it is completed, the police has to make a report in the prescribed form. Therefore, final form has to be submitted on the completion of the investigation, under section (2) of section 173, sub-section (8) of section 173 however lays down that nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and then upon such investigation, if the officer incharge of the police station obtains further evidence oral or documentary, he has to forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence in the form prescribed. It will be relevant to refer to some decisions, though in respect of the law obtaining under the old Code, to find out how the point at issue was dealt with and decided them.

7. I may, in this connection, refer to the two decisions of learned single judge of this court. Firstly, it is an unreported decision of Wasiuddin, J. in case of Ramakant Singh v. The State of Bihar . Cr. Misc No. 183 of 1970 and Cr. Rev. No. 191 of 1970. disposed of on 16.3.1971 In this case final report was first submitted by the police, then the investigation was reopened by the order of the Superintendent of Police and even in absence of fresh materials charge sheet was submitted subsequently. The learned Judge held that there was no provision in the Lode which imposed any baron the discretion and power of the police to submit a chargesheet after submission of the final form (final report). The learned judge relied on the decision of S.N.P Singh, J. (as he then was) in the case of Raghu Nath Sharma v. The State . A.I.R 1963 Pat. 268., where also a final report had been submitted first, but under the orders of the Superintendent of Police, charge sheet had been submitted subsequently and the learned Judge had held that the superior police officer had the authority to direct submission of a charge sheet, even though the officer in charge of the Police Station had already submitted the ‘final report’ under section 173 of the Code and that a Magistrate was competent to take cognizance on the basis of subsequent charge sheet. It was also held that there was no bar to the investigation by the police after submission of a final report under section 173 and further that formation of the opinion on the materials already collected and taking steps for filing of a charge sheet were themselves steps towards the investigation of the case Wasiuddin, J. had also placed reliance on an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of State of Bihar v. Sher Bahadur . Cr. Rev. 70, 673 and 575 of 1967., disposed of on 2.2.1969 where also similar view was taken. Reliance was also placed by the learned Judge on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rama Shankar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh . A.I.R 1956 Alld. 525., S.N.P Singh, J. had also relied on this last mentioned decision in the case of Raghu Nath Sharma (supra). It will thus appear that under the old law, the view taken by this court was that the police could hold further investigation and submit a charge sheet even after having submitted earlier a final report even in the absence of fresh material. It was also held that higher police officer could direct charge sheet to be submitted on the basis of his opinion arrived at after such further investigation. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi . A.I.R 1955 S.C 196. formation of opinion on the materials already collected and taking steps for filing of a chargesheet are also steps towards the investigation of a case.

8. In the circumstances of this case, the argument of learned counsel cannot be accepted for the reason, as I have said earlier, that under sub-section (8) of section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the police could hold further investigation and submit a report Next the charge sheet submitted itself shows that a superior Police officer had after submission of the final form supervised the case, held further enquiry re-examined witnesses and then submitted the charge sheet. It appears further that fresh materials were also elicited. I may point out in this connection that it appears that in the earlier statements before the police, the witnesses had not spoken about any body assaulting the complainant with a garansa and it was said to be by lathi. In the subsequent further enquiry, they alleged the assault by garansa. In fact, learned counsel for the petitioners made a grievance of the fact that the case had been developed by the Prosecution. Whether these witnesses should be relied upon or not is not a point to be decided at this stage. The poke had the right to believe them or disbelieve them and form its opinion on the basis. Having accepted their further statements, it appears that the police submitted charge-sheet, obviously therefore, the charge-sheet was not submitted without fresh materials.

9. In view of the aforesaid there does not appear to be any good ground for quashing either the order by which cognizance has been taken or the proceeding arising out of it. This application is accordingly dismissed.