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Ramdip Sharma And Others v. Baldeo Singh .

Patna High Court
Mar 2, 1977
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs brought a suit to recover Rs. 1,550, claimed to be the unpaid portion of the consideration under a sale deed dated 6-12-1962 (Ext. 2.a) executed by their father, Deonarain Singh, in favour of Baldeo Singh (the defendant). Ext. 2.a showed a consideration of Rs. 2,000, of which Rs. 450 was admitted to have been paid. The defendant's defence was that Ext. 2.a was not a sale deed but a deed of exchange. On the same date the defendant had also executed another registered sale deed (Ext. 2) in favour of Deonarain Singh, for Rs. 1,500, in respect of overlapping plots. The defendant maintained that Rs. 1,500 was not paid in cash but was adjusted between the two deeds.

The trial court and the lower appellate court reached concurrent factual findings: (i) both Exts. 2 and 2.a were deeds of exchange rather than sale deeds; (ii) the parties agreed not to act upon the sale deeds; and (iii) Rs. 1,500 covered by Ext. 2 was not paid in cash to the defendant but was adjusted towards Ext. 2.a. The plaintiffs pursued a second appeal before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether oral evidence is admissible to prove that documents which appear on their face to be sale deeds were in fact deeds of exchange, in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the appellants argued that oral evidence regarding the terms of the sale deeds is inadmissible under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act.
  • The appellants relied on the Privy Council decision in Balkishan Das v. Legge ((1900) 27 Ind App 58 (PC)) to support the proposition that oral evidence of intention is inadmissible to construe deeds or to prove parties' intentions.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant's case was that Exts. 2 and 2.a were deeds of exchange and that Rs. 1,500 (the balance) was adjusted between the two documents rather than paid in cash.
  • Learned counsel for the respondent relied on Tyagaraja Mudaliar v. Vedathanni (63 Ind App 126 : AIR 1936 PC 70) where the Privy Council permitted oral evidence to prove that a document was not the final contract it purported to be; counsel submitted that this authority applied to the present facts.
  • The defendant called oral witnesses to establish that the parties agreed not to act upon Exts. 2 and 2.a as sale deeds but to treat them as exchange deeds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balkishan Das v. Legge, (1900) 27 Ind App 58 (PC) Held that oral evidence of intention is inadmissible for the purpose of construing deeds or proving the intention of the parties. The Court observed that this decision (Balkishan Das) does not apply to the facts of the present case.
Tyagaraja Mudaliar v. Vedathanni, 63 Ind App 126 : AIR 1936 PC 70 Permitted oral evidence to show that a document was not intended to be the final contract (i.e., to prove the document was not the effective instrument it purported to be). The Court found this decision applicable to the present case and relied upon it to hold that oral evidence was admissible to show that the executed sale deeds were in fact not intended to operate as sale deeds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting its general reluctance to interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by the trial and appellate courts. Given both lower courts had concurrently held that Exts. 2 and 2.a were deeds of exchange and had accepted the defence witnesses while rejecting the plaintiffs' witnesses, the Court declined to disturb those factual conclusions.

The central legal analysis focused on the interplay between Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act and the admissibility of oral evidence:

  • The Court explained that Section 91 excludes oral evidence in respect of the terms of a document when the terms of a contract have been reduced to writing; the prohibition is confined to the terms of the document, not to the document's nature.
  • Section 92 prohibits oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from the terms of a written contract. However, proviso (1) to Section 92 allows proof that a document is invalid on grounds such as fraud, mistake of fact, or failure of consideration; proviso (2) permits oral evidence as to matters on which the document is silent and which are not inconsistent with its terms.
  • The Court held that neither Section 91 nor Section 92 bars parties from adducing oral evidence about the nature of a document or about an oral agreement not to act upon the written instrument. In particular, the defendant's plea that Exts. 2 and 2.a were exchanged as part of an oral understanding (i.e., deeds of exchange rather than sales) fell within the scope of provisos (1) and (2) to Section 92: the documents were alleged to be invalid on the ground of mistake of fact and the documents were silent on the question of exchange.
  • Applying these principles to the record, the Court accepted the oral testimonies presented on behalf of the defendant and agreed with the lower courts that the parties had agreed not to act upon Exts. 2 and 2.a as sale deeds but to treat them as deeds of exchange. On that basis, the Court concluded that Rs. 1,500 under Ext. 2 was adjusted and not paid in cash, leaving only Rs. 50 due to the plaintiffs.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Direct consequences:

  • The Court affirmed the concurrent factual findings of the courts below that Exts. 2 and 2.a were deeds of exchange and that Rs. 1,500 was adjusted between the deeds rather than paid in cash.
  • The plaintiffs are entitled to recover the sum of Rs. 50, which the Court held admittedly remained due to them.
  • The parties were directed to bear their own costs in this Court.

Broader implications: The opinion explains and applies the distinction between the "terms" of a written document (protected from extrinsic oral variation by Sections 91 and 92) and the "nature" of the document or oral agreements not to act upon it (which may be proved under provisos to Section 92). The Court did not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond this application to the facts; it relied on existing Privy Council authorities and applied them to the record.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiffs preferred this second appeal before this Court

2. The plaintiffs instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 1550/-, the unpaid portion of the consideration money covered by the sale deed dated 6-12-1962 (Ext. 2.a), which was executed by their father Deonarain Singh in favour of Baldeo Singh (the defendant). The consideration money mentioned in Ext. 2.a was Rupees 2,000/-, out of which Rs. 450/- was paid by Baldeo Singh (Vendee) to Deonarain Singh (Vendor). The defence of defendant Baldeo Singh was that Ext. 2.a was a deed of exchange, and not a deed of sale. On 6-12-1962, the defendant executed another registered sale deed (Ext. 2) in favour of Deonarain Singh (father of the plaintiffs) in respect of 13 decimals of plot no. 364, 1 decimal of plot no. 363 and 21 ½ decimals of plot no. 435 for Rs. 1500/-. The consideration money of Ext. 2 was not paid to Baldeo Singh. Hence another registered sale deed (Ext. 2.a) was executed on 6-12-1962 by Deonarain Singh (father of the plaintiffs) in favour of Baldeo Singh for a consideration of Rs. 2000/- in respect of 13 decimals. It is admitted by both the parties that the defendant paid Rs. 450/- out of Rs. 2,000/-. The case of the defendant further was that the balance of the consideration money covered by Ext. 2.a, that is Rupees 1500/-, was adjusted towards the consideration money covered by Ext. 2.

3. On these facts, both the courts below concurrently held as follows:

(i) Both the sale deeds dated 6-12-1962 (Exts. 2 and 2.a) were deeds of exchange;

(ii) It was agreed between the parties not to act upon the sale deeds; and,

(iii) Defendant Baldeo Singh did not receive the consideration amount, that is Rs. 1500/-, covered by Ext. 2 and the said amount was adjusted towards the consideration money of the sale deed covered by Ext. 2.a.

4. In the ordinary course, this Court is precluded from interfering with the concurrent findings of facts. Hence, in view of the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below, I shall not interfere with the same.

5. The short point for consideration in this appeal is:— Whether oral evidence is admissible on the point of exchange in view of the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act? When the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document, S. 91 excludes oral evidence of the terras of such contract. Section 92 excludes oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from the terms of a written contract.

6. In the present case, the case of the defendant was that it was agreed between the parties that the documents (Exts. 2 and 2.a) will not be treated as sale deeds, but as exchange deeds. Under proviso (1) to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, the documents (Exts. 2 and 2.a) can be invalidated on the ground that these were not sale deeds, but were deeds of exchange. In my opinion, this is a question of fact. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that these two documents (Exts. 2 and 2.a) are deeds of exchange. On the basis of the oral testimonies of the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant, I hold that the parties agreed not to act upon Exts. 2 and 2.a as sale deeds but they agreed to treat as deeds of exchange. Section 92 of the Evidence Act excludes oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting varying, adding to, or subtracting from, terms of any written contract, but it does not exclude parties to lead evidence about the nature of the documents. The oral testimonies of the witnesses in respect of the nature of the document is admissible under provisos (1) and (2) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act.

7. In para 21 of its judgment, the trial Court held as follows:

“These two issues have been taken up together and in view of the discussions made above, it is clear that the documents were exchange deeds and that Rs. 1500/- was adjusted and it was not paid in cash as alleged by the plaintiffs to Baldeo Singh. As regards the sale deed which Baldeo Singh had executed to Deonarayan Singh Rs. 1500/- was adjusted in the sale deed of Baldeo Singh and out of balance amount Rs. 450/- has been received by the Plaintiffs' father Deonarain Singh, as admitted by them. So the only money that remained due against the defendant is Rs. 50/-………”.

8. In para 15 of its judgment, the lower appellate Court upheld the above finding of the trial Court. The trial Court and the appellate Court discussed the evidence of both parties. Both the Courts below rejected the evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses and accepted the defence version. In these circumstances. I accept the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below and hold that Exts. 2 and 2.a were deeds of exchance. I also hold that the consideration amount, that is, Rs. 1500/-, covered by the sale deed Ext. 2 was not paid to defendant Baldeo Singh and the same was adjusted towards the consideration amount covered by the sale deed Ext. 2.a. A sum of Rs. 50/- admittedly remained due to the plaintiffs which they are entitled to recover. Hence I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs. 50/-.

9. Learned Counsel for the appellants contends that oral evidence in respect of the terms of the sale deeds is inadmissible under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. In this connection he relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Balkishan Das v. Legge, (1900) 27 Ind App 58 (PC). In that case it was held that oral evidence of intention is inadmissible for the purpose either of construing the deeds or of proving the intention of the parties. In my opinion, this decision does not apply to the facts of the present case.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on another decision of the Privy Council in Tyagaraja Mudaliar v. Vedathanni, 63 Ind App 126 : (AIR 1936 PC 70). In that case the plaintiff challenged the validity of a maintenance deed on the ground that it was distinctly understood between the parties that the document was not to be the final contract for the plaintiff's maintenance. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the plaintiff was entitled to lead oral evidence to prove that it was not a maintenance deed. In my opinion, this decision applies to the facts of the present case.

11. In the present case, both the parties executed two sale deeds Exts. 2 and 2.a on the same date. The areas mentioned in the two deeds are identical except 21 ½ decimals covered by plot no. 435. By virtue of Ext. 2, Baldeo Singh (defendant) sold to Deonarain Singh 13 decimals of plot no. 364, 1 decimal of plot No. 363 and 21 ½ decimals of plot No. 435.

12. It is said that plot No. 435 was given to Deonarain Singh on the basis of Ext. 2 as he was already shown in its possession in the rent schedule Ext. G. In other words both the Courts below held that by virtue of Ext. 2.a, 13 decimals of land was given in exchange by Deonarain Singh to Baldeo Singh and by virtue of Ext. 2, 14 decimals of land was given by Baldeo Singh to Deonarain Singh, It has also been held by the Courts below that both parties were Gotias. Both the documents were also registered on 6-12-1962. It is on the basis of these facts that the Courts below concurrently held that the parties never intended to execute sale deeds nor to act upon the same and that the documents were deeds of exchange. I agree with the concurrent findings of the Courts below.

13. The law may be briefly stated thus:

When the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document, Section 91 excludes oral evidence in respect of the terms of the documents. The prohibition under S. 91 is that oral evidence shall be excluded in respect of the terms of a document. The parties are certainly entitled to lead oral evidence in respect of the nature of the document. Section 91 refers to the terms of the document, and not the nature of the document. The parties are entitled to lead oral evidence to the effect that they never intended to act upon such document. In other words, when a sale deed is executed, a party can lead oral evidence to the effect that he never intended to act upon the sale deed. If a party executes a maintenance deed, the party can certainly lead oral evidence to the effect that it was never intended to act upon the maintenance deed. The party is entitled to lead oral evidence to the effect that the intention of the party was not to execute documents or it should not be acted upon.

Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act excludes oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting, from the terms of a written contract. In my opinion, however, the party is entitled to lead oral evidence that there was no agreement at all. Under proviso (1) to S. 92, the party may prove that the document is invalid on the ground of fraud intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want of failure of consideration or mistake in fact or law. In the present case, the defendant led evidence that the sale deed Ext. 2.a is an invalid document on the ground of mistake of fact. In other words, the defendants, case is that it is in fact a deed of exchange, and not a sale deed. Hence the defendant can lead oral evidence to invalidate the sale deeds Exts. 2 and 2.a under proviso (1) to S. 92. The parties may also lead oral evidence under proviso (1) to S. 92 as to any matter on which the document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms. In the present case the defendant is entitled to adduce oral evidence to the effect that the parties never intended to act upon these sale deeds (Exts. 2 and 2.a) as it was agreed between the parties to treat these sale deeds as exchange deeds. The defendant can certainly lead oral evidence to this effect for the simple reason that these documents (Exts. 2 and 2.a) are silent on the point of “exchange” and there is no inconsistency with the terms mentioned in these sale deeds (Exts. 2 and 2.a). Hence, I hold that the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant is also admissible under proviso (2) to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.

In sum and substance, S. 91 excludes the oral evidence in respect of the terms of a written contract. Section 92 excludes oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from the terms of a written contract. In other words, Ss. 91 and 92 exclude oral evidence in respect of the terms of a written contract. They do not prohibit the parties to lead oral evidence in respect of the nature of contract as well as in respect of the oral agreement entered into between the parties.

14. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs in this court.

15. Appeal dismissed.