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Srimati Radha Kumari... v. The Governing Body O...
Court Opinion Summary — H.L. Agrawal and S.K. Choudhuri, JJ.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners sought a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to appoint the petitioner as a lecturer in the Sanskrit Department of Mahanth Mahadevanand Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Arrah (an aided private college) by quashing the appointment of respondent no. 2 made pursuant to a Resolution of the Governing Body of the college.
Relevant facts recited in the opinion:
- The petitioner had been temporarily appointed as a lecturer by the Governing Body by letter dated 19-9-1972 (Annexure 1).
- The Governing Body issued an advertisement to fill the post permanently. Both the petitioner and respondent no. 2 were interviewed by the University Service Commission, which recommended the petitioner's name along with that of respondent no. 2 to respondent no. 1 for the post (both for the Gautam Budha Mahila College, Gaya and for the college in question).
- Despite the recommendation, the Governing Body passed a resolution appointing respondent no. 2 and terminating the petitioner's services with effect from 11-3-1975. The termination was communicated by Memo No. 375(3) dated 10-9-1975 (Annexure 3), the order under challenge.
- The college is a private college affiliated to Magadh University; the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court seeking the writ against the Governing Body.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against the Governing Body of a private affiliated college (respondent no. 1) that is not a statutory body.
- Whether the rule in Vidya Ram Misra v. The Managing Committee (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1450) — that a lecturer whose services are terminated by a non-statutory managing committee has remedy by suit for breach of contract and not by writ under Article 226 — applies to the facts of this case.
- Whether any statutory rule, delegated legislation, scheme, order or bye-law was breached by the Governing Body such that Article 226 relief would become available despite the private, non‑statutory character of the Governing Body.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent no. 2 (Contestant) — Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal
- Raised a preliminary objection to maintainability: no writ would lie against respondent no. 1 because it is not a statutory body falling under Article 12 of the Constitution.
- Relied on the Supreme Court authority in Vidya Ram Misra v. The Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1450) to contend that where a managing committee (not a statutory body) terminates the services of a lecturer under a contractual relationship, the remedy is a suit for damages and not a writ under Article 226.
Petitioner — Mr. Kailash Roy
- Attempted to distinguish Vidya Ram Misra by relying on a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Harijander Singh v. Selection Committee, Kakatiya Medical College, Warangal (A.I.R. 1975 Andhra Pradesh 35), where Vidya Ram was considered and distinguished.
- Relied on the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench's view that Sirsi Municipality v. C.K.F. Tellis (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 855) marked a significant change in administrative law and had restored Article 226 protection to a wider class of employees, a proposition which, according to petitioner, undermined Vidya Ram.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vidya Ram Misra v. The Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College and another (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1450) | Holds that services of a lecturer terminated by a managing committee which is not a statutory body give rise to contractual remedies (suit for damages) and not to relief under Article 226. | The court held that Vidya Ram has full application to the present facts and relied upon it to conclude that a writ would not lie against the Governing Body in this case. |
| Harijander Singh v. Selection Committee, Kakatiya Medical College, Warangal (A.I.R. 1975 Andhra Pradesh 35) — Full Bench | Distinguished Vidya Ram and suggested that Sirsi Municipality v. C.K.F. Tellis had considerably shaken earlier Supreme Court decisions, thereby widening access to Article 226 for many employees. | The petitioner relied on this decision to distinguish Vidya Ram; the court, however, respectfully disagreed with the Full Bench's view and rejected its inference that earlier Supreme Court authority had been disapproved. |
| P.R. Jodh v. A.L. Pandey (1965) 2 S.C.R. 713 | Held that the "College Code" (Ordinance 20) had the force of law under the University Act and conferred legal rights on teachers of affiliated colleges. | The court noted that P.R. Jodh was considered by the Supreme Court in Vidya Ram and was distinguished on the facts; thus it was not treated as supporting the petitioner's position in the present case. |
| Sirsi Municipality v. C.K.F. Tellis (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 855) | Addressed dismissal by a local authority in breach of a statutory rule; held that dismissal in violation of a statutory rule could be invalid. | The court examined Sirsi Municipality and concluded that it did not disapprove the earlier decisions (Tyagi, Indian Air Lines) in the manner suggested by the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench; Sirsi was read in its context and found not to disturb Vidya Ram's applicability here. |
| Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corpn. Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244) | Held that breach of a regulation by a corporation was a breach of terms and conditions (master‑and‑servant relationship) giving rise to damages but not a breach of statutory obligation attractable by writ. | The court summarized Tyagi's ratio and applied it to demonstrate that where no statutory obligation is violated, the relationship remains contractual and Article 226 is not available. |
| Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828) | Established that dismissals by statutory bodies in breach of provisions of statutes/orders/schemes are invalid; contrasted with cases where termination arises from contractual relations without statutory compulsion. | The court noted the case as part of the jurisprudential background and observed that Sirsi Municipality's discussion did not amount to disapproval of Indian Air Lines for purposes relied upon by the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench. |
| State of Assam v. Ajit Kumar (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1176) | Referenced by the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench as part of the earlier authorities said to be shaken; the opinion treats it as one of the antecedent Supreme Court decisions. | The court indicated disagreement with the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench's conclusion that this authority (along with others) had been disapproved; it did not accept that earlier cases were invalidated by Sirsi Municipality. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in identifiable steps, based strictly on the materials and authorities cited in the opinion:
- The court started by identifying the central preliminary objection: whether a writ under Article 226 is maintainable against the Governing Body of a private affiliated college which is not a statutory body.
- It examined the Supreme Court decision in Vidya Ram Misra (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1450), which holds that where a non‑statutory managing committee terminates a lecturer engaged under a contractual relationship, the lecturer's remedy is contractual (suit for damages) and not a writ under Article 226. The court stated that Vidya Ram is fully applicable to the facts of the present case.
- The petitioner attempted to distinguish Vidya Ram by invoking a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Harijander Singh), which had suggested that Sirsi Municipality v. C.K.F. Tellis had altered the legal landscape and materially undermined earlier Supreme Court precedents. The court examined this contention carefully.
- The court analyzed Sirsi Municipality (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 855) in detail. It observed that Sirsi concerned a local statutory authority dismissing an employee in breach of a statutory rule (Rule 143): the dismissal was set aside because the rule had statutory backing and the dismissal violated that rule. The present court found nothing in Sirsi that amounted to a wholesale disapproval of the earlier Supreme Court decisions (Tyagi and Indian Air Lines) cited in Vidya Ram.
- The court reviewed Tyagi (U.P. State Warehousing) and Indian Air Lines to note their ratios: Tyagi held that breach of a regulation by a corporation constituted breach of contractual terms (remedy damages) where there was no statutory obligation; Indian Air Lines recognized that dismissals by statutory/local authorities in breach of statutory provisions are invalid but did not convert all contractual dismissals into matters for Article 226. These analyses underpinned the court's view that Sirsi did not negate the relevance of Tyagi and Indian Air Lines for the present context.
- The court observed that the petitioner had not pointed out any infraction of a statutory provision having the force of law by the Governing Body in the termination order. Absent such statutory infringement, and absent an element of public employment or an office/status with statutory protection, the relationship remained essentially contractual.
- On that basis, applying the principle in Vidya Ram and the supporting analysis of prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that no writ under Article 226 could be issued against the Governing Body of this private affiliated college on the facts before it.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ application is DISMISSED. The court held the petition to be misconceived and not maintainable and, accordingly, dismissed the application. The court made no order as to costs. The formal concluding line in the opinion was:
Application dismissed.
Implications (as set out in the opinion):
- The court applied Vidya Ram Misra to these facts and concluded that where a non‑statutory Governing Body of a private affiliated college terminates the services of a lecturer and no statutory provision or delegated legislation conferring enforceable rights is shown to have been violated, Article 226 relief is not available in such circumstances.
- The decision has the direct consequence that the petitioner's writ petition is dismissed and the High Court will not grant mandamus to quash the Governing Body's appointment of respondent no. 2 on the facts presented.
- The court specifically noted disagreement with the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench's reading that Sirsi Municipality disapproved earlier Supreme Court authorities; the present court did not treat Sirsi as undermining Vidya Ram or the earlier cases in the manner suggested by that Full Bench.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities to the facts before it; its effect is the disposition of the present writ petition (dismissal) with no order as to costs.
H.L Agrawal and S.K Choudhuri, JJ.:— This is an application for a writ in the nature of mandamus calling upon the respondent for appointing the petitioner as a lecturer in the Sanskrit Department of the Mahanth Mahadevanand Manila Maha-Vidyalaya Arrah, an aided college after quashing the appointment of respondent no. 2 in pursuance of a Resolution of the Governing Body of the said College.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the petitioner was appointed temporarily, a lecturer in the Department of Sanskrit by the Governing Body of the College by the letter dated 19-9-1972 (Annexure 1). The Governing Body, however, issued an advertisement inviting applications for filling up the said post on a permanent basis. The petitioner and the aforesaid respondent no. 2 both were interviewed by the University Service Commission and the name of the petitioner was recommended along with the name of respondent no. 2 to respondent no. 1 by the University Service Commission for the post of a lecturer in the Gautam Budha Mahila College, Gaya as well as for the College in question. But by its resolution already referred to, respondent no. 2 was appointed on terminating the services of the petitioner with effect from 11-3-1975. The order was communicated to the petitioner by Memo no. 375(3) dated 10-9-1975 (Annexure 3) by respondent no. 1 which is under challenge.
3. It is not disputed that Mahanth Mahadevanad Mahila Mahavidyalay, Arrah, is a private College affiliated to the Magadh University and the by the present application wants a writ of the nature stated above from this Court against the Governing Body of the College.
4. Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, appearing for contesting respondent no. 2 aforesaid raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this application and grant of the relief on the ground that no writ would lie against respondent no. 1, as it was not a statutory body covered under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention counsel cited and if we may so a direct authority of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Vidya Ram Misra v. The Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College and another (A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 1450). In that case the services of a lecturer appointed by the Managing Committee of Jai Narain College, Lucknow (formerly known as Kanyakubja Degree College), an associated College of the Lucknow University were terminated by the Managing Committee of the College. He filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) challenging the validity of the resolution of the Managing Committee in question. The learned Single Judge however, decided the matter in favour of the petitioner, but on appeal a Division Bench dismissed the writ application holding that the remedy of the appellant was to file a suit for damages in as much as, the relationship between the College and the lecturer was that of only a master and servant. When the matter went to the Supreme Court, the view of the Division Bench was affirmed and it was specially laid down that services of a lecturer appointed by reason of a contract having no legal force, between himself and the managing Committee, which is not a statutory body, were terminated by the latter, the lecturer cannot have any cause of action on breach of the law but only on breach of the contract and in his only remedy was by way of a suit for damages and not by way of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Having examined this decision we are of the view that it has got full application to the facts of the present case.
5. Mr. Kailash Roy appearing for the petitioner, however, endeavoured to distinguish this authority placing reliance upon a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Harijander Singh v. Selection Committee, Kakatiya Medical College, Warrangal (A.I.R 1975 Andhra Pradesh 35) in which the case of Vidya Ram (Supra) was considered and was distinguished in paragraph 75 of the report in these words.
“The authority both of A.I.R 1965 S.C 1176 (State of Assam v. Ajit Kumar) and A.I.R 1972 S.C 1450 (Vidya Ram v. S.J.N College) has now been considerably shaken. The two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, i.e A.I.R 1970 S.C 1244 (U.P State Warehousing Corpn. v. G.K Tyagi) and A.I.R 1971 S.C 1828 (Indian Air Lines Corpn. v. Sukhdeo Rai) on the basis of which A.I.R 1972 S.C 1450 was decided have now been distinguished, in a way dis-approved, in Sirsi Municipaliry v. C.K.F Tellis (A.I.R 1973 S.C 855).”
6. The learned Judges of the Full Bench subsequently have observed that the decision in A.I.R 1973 S.C 855 makes a notable break through and is an important land mark in the growth of the administrative law. It removes the effects of the above said two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and revises the position of law as it existed before the said two Supreme Court decisions. Now the employees not only of the State but also of statutory bodies, public and local authorities can avail of the protection which Article 226 provided if they point out any violation of a delegated legislation or scheme or order or bye-law or breach of natural justice. More precisely it has been expressed that “a large number of employees who were denied access to the High Court for redressal of their grievance have now been again brought under the protective umbrella of Article 226.”
7. We have taken little pains to examine the two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court sought to be distinguished and the authority of which is said to have been considerably shaken as said by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and with due deference to the learned Judges of the said Court we venture to disagree with them and take a different view. We shall presently indicate our reasons for the disagreement but before that, we would like to deal with another case of the Supreme Court referred to in the Full Bench case presently. The Full Bench in paragraph 87 has again referred to the case of (3) P.R Jodh. v. A.L Pandey (1965) 2 S.C.R 713 where a writ against a private college was issued, in support of their view. This case was relied upon by Mr. Setalvad appearing for the appellant before the Supreme Court in Vidya Ram's case (Supra) which was considered and distinguished by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in some detail. In paragraph 13 of the report the contention raised on behalf of the learned counsel that the Court had substantially sanctioned the issue of a writ under Article 226 to quash an order terminating services of a teacher passed by a college similarly situated and, therefore, the fact that the College or the managing committee was not a statutory body was no hindrance to the High Court issuing the writ prayed for by the appellant was repelled on the ground that “this Court expressly stated in the judgment that no such contention was raised in the High Court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court.” Apart from that on the facts also the case of P.R Jodh is quite distinguishable. There a lecturer who was dismissed by the Governing Body of a College affiliated to the Saugor University challenged the dismissal on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice and sought protection of the provisions of the “College Code.” The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Ordinance 20, known as “College Code’ had the force of law and conferred legal rights on the teachers of affiliated colleges which was intra vires of the powers of the University contained in Section 12 read with Section 4(6) of the University Act and, therefore, it was incorrect to contend that the “College Code” merely regulates the relationship between the University and the affiliated colleges. The provisions of the Code relating to the security of tenure of teachers properly fell within the statutory power of affiliation granted to the University under the Act.
8. Now let us examine the case of (4) the Sirsi Municipality v. C.K.F Tellis (A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court, 855) in which the two decisions which were referred to in the case in A.I.R 1972 Supreme Court 1450, namely. (5) A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 1244 (Executive Committee of U.P State Warehousing Corpn., Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi and (6) A.I.R 1971 Supreme Court 1828 (Indian Air Lines Corpn. v. Sukhdeo Rai) were considered and said to have been disapproved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
9. The case of A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 855 was itself of a local authority, namely, Sirsi Municipality under the Bombay District Municipalities Act which had dismissed on of its employees without affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard which was under challenge. The question falling for our consideration, therefore, did not directly fall for any decision in this case. The two cases, namely, (1) A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 1244 and (2) A.I.R 1971 Supreme Court 1828 have no doubt been referred to in this case, but entirely in a different context and we do not find from the discussions in this case that the authority of the two earlier cases has in any way been shaken or to use the expression of the Andhra Pradesh High Court—“have now been distinguished, in a way disapproved…….”
10. The first case of the Supreme Court in Aji Kumar Sharma (supra), whose authority is said to be considerably shaken in the view of the Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R 1975 Andhra Pradesh 35) was a case where it was clearly held by the Supreme Court that no writ would lie against the Governing Body of an affiliated college and the employees of such a college could not seek enforcement or non-enforcement of any rule by a writ. The college in this case was a private college affiliated to the Gauhati University established under the Gauhati University Act and managed by a Governing Body according to the provisions of the Statute for the management of private colleges framed by the Gauhati University under Section 21(g) of the Act. The Supreme Court has clearly held in this casa that the Assam Aided Colleges Employees Rules (1960) regarding conduct and Discipline of Employees of Aided Educational Institutions had admittedly no statutory force and were framed in order to give revised grants to private college to enable them to give higher scales of pay etc. to their teachers in accordance with the recommendations of the University Grants Commission. It was very clearly pointed out that where such conditions of grants-in-aid are laid down by mere executive instructions, it is open to a private college to accept those conditions or not to accept them. It was not open to a teacher to insist that the Governing Body should not carry the instruction, and the rules for the purpose of grant-in-aid were merely executive instructions which conferred no right of any kind on teachers and they could not apply to the High Court for a mandamus against the State for enforcement or non enforcement of the rules, even if indirectly there might have been some effect on them because of the grant-in-aid being withheld by the State in whole or in part.
11. Let us now examine the other two cases, namely, Tyagi's case (A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 1244) and Indian Air Lines Corporation's case (A.I.R 1971 Supreme Court 1828), which were referred to with approval in Vidya Ram's case (A.I.R 1972 Supreme Court 1450) to see if they have in any way been distinguished by way of disapproval in Sirsi Municipality's case (A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 855) as said by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
12. In order to appreciate the point, we shall briefly indicate the facts of the two cases and the relevant observations of the Supreme Court.
13. In Tyagi's case, the Warehousing Corporation had framed certain regulations, one of which dealt with the termination of the service of an employee other than by way of punishment. The complaint of Tyagi was that in the enquiry that was held by the Corporation, he was not given opportunity to adduce evidence in defence, nor the persons from whom the Enquiry Officer gathered information were tendered for cross-examination. The dismissal of Tyagi was challenged on this account as null and void. The Supreme Court held that an order made in breach of the regulation was not in breach of statutory obligation and that violation of regulation was “a breach of terms and conditions of relationship of master and servant and the master was liable for damages for wrongful dismissal.” There was an express observation that in that case there was no violation of any statutory obligation by the Corporation.
14. In the Indian Airlines Corporation's case the respondent having been found guilty in a domestic enquiry was dismissed, which was challenged by a suit, alleging that the enquiry had been conducted in breach of the procedure laid down by regulations made by the Corporation under Section 45 of the Act which rendered it void. The High Court had held in favour of the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court set aside the declaration with these observation:—
“The employment of the respondent not being one to an office or status and there being no obligation or restriction in the Act or the rules subject to which only the power to terminate the respondent's employment could be exercised, could the respondent contend that he was entitled to a declaration that the termination of his employment was null and void?”
15. The Supreme Court proceeded to consider a series of cases and then further observed:—
“These decisions establish that the dismissal of a servant by statutory including local authorities or bodies in breach of the provisions of the statutes or orders or schemes made under the statute which regulate the exercise of their power is invalid or ultra vires and the principle of pure master and servant contractual relationship has no application to such cases.”
16. In Sirsi Muncipality's case, the pre-eminent question was whether the dismissal of the respondent was in violation of the Rule 143 which was framed in exercise of power conferred on the Municipality by statute and could not be amended without the assent of the State Government, and the dismissal of respondent was found to be in violation of the said rule of being dismissed without a reasonable opportunity having been given or being heard in her defence. We are afraid, on reading the case of Sirsi Municipality, we do not find any such observation for the contention that the two earlier cases of the Supreme Court have been distinguished in any such way which amounted to their disapproval, as in that case the dismissal of the respondent was upheld on account of the violation of statutory rule by a public body. The Bench of the Supreme Court in this case was consisted of five Judges and although Beg, J. (who was also a member of the Bench) had concurred, with the judgment of Ray, J. (now Hon'ble the C.J) who delivered the main judgment for himself and on behalf of the other three learned Judges, in paragraph 42 has observed that he was “unable to reconcile the decision of this Court in the case (A.I.R) 1970 S.C 1244 with our view in the case before us.” If the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court have taken this observation of Beg., J. we do not think that they were right as in the main judgment, no such observation was made.
17. The Andhra Pradesh High Court was itself considering the case regarding the admission of a student in the First Year Integrated B.B.B.S Course in the Medical College. In paragraph 100 of the report, they have made an apparent distinction between the case of a pure “master and servant” from the case of a teacher in an affiliated college on the ground that “a pure master and servant” case may mean a case in which there is no element of public employment or service, no support by statute, nothing in the nature of an office or a status which is capable of protection”, a proposition which is now well established by a long line of judicial authorities of this Court and of the Supreme Court. This proposition was made clear by the Supreme Court in the Tyagi's case.
18. In the case before us, Mr. Kailash Roy could not point out infraction of any statutory provision having the force of law by the Governing Body, in the order terminating the services of the petitioner for which any writ could issue by this Court. Therefore, unless there was an element of public employment or service, having support of any statute, or an office or status capable of protection, no writ can be issued against respondent no. 1 simply because it happened to be an affiliated college to the Magadh University.
19. For these reasons, it must be held that this writ application is misconceived and not maintainable. We would, accordingly, dismiss the same, but in the circumstances of the case, shall make no order as to costs.
Application dismissed.
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