S.K Choudhuri, J.:— Petitioner 1, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Dalmianagar and petitioner 2, an executive president and share-holder of petitioner 1 have filed this writ for quashing the order, dated 3 February, 1975, and also the order, dated 6 February, 1975, being the two orders out of the many orders contained in annexure 11 to this writ application passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna, Bihar, respondent 1.

2. Shortly stated the case of the petitioners is that in terms of the decision of the Bihar (Central) Labour Advisory Board of the Government of Bihar, Department of Labour and Employment by its resolution, dated 23 January, 1952, held a plebiscite on 8 April, 1956, to determine the representative character of the two rival unions, namely, Rohtas Industries Majdoor Sangh (respondent 3) and Dalmianagar Majdoor Sewa Sangh (respondent 5) in which it was decided to recognize respondent 3 as the representative union for the purpose of bargaining collectively on behalf of the workmen employed by the petitioner-company in terms of the aforesaid resolution, that is, in respect of the matters Laving general applicability to workmen of the petitioner-company. The petitioners have also stated that another union, namely, Rohtas Industries Staff Union (respondent 4) is also a recognized union.

3. By notification, dated 7 July, 1969, the State Government referred the dispute between the management of the petitioner-company (excluding sugar and cement factories) and their workmen represented by respondents 3 and 4 for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna (respondent 1). The terms of reference were as follows:

“Whether the wage-structure of the workmen should be revised? If so, what should be the revised wage-structure and since when?”

A true copy of the reference is made annexure 1 to the writ application. This reference was registered as Reference Case No. 60 of 1969, before the Tribunal (respondent 1). Thereafter the Tribunal issued notice to the petitioner-company and respondents 3 and 4, directing them to submit the names of their representatives in Form E of rule 14 of the Industrial Disputes (Bihar) Rules, 1961. A statement of demand was sent by the Government to the petitioner-company on 26 July, 1969, a copy of which is made annexure 2 to the writ application which according to the petitioner had formed the basis of another earlier Reference Case No. 18 of 1966, before the same Tribunal, namely, respondent 1, in which the award was made according to the settlement arrived at between the parties on different dates. A copy of the letter, dated 13 August, 1966, with the enclosure containing the charter of demand is made annexure 3 to the writ application. Thereafter it appears that three other unions representing different workmen belonging to the respective unions, namely, respondent 5, Dalmianagar Majdoor Sewa Sangh, respondent 6, Dalmianagar Majdoor Union and respondent 7, Rohtas Karmchari Sangh, were added as parties to the reference pending before the Tribunal. The petitioner-company thereafter filed a written statement on 19 February, 1970, in which, inter alia, it raised a preliminary legal objection to the maintainability of the reference case.

4. The petitioner has stated in the writ petition that in the meantime the Government of Bihar by its resolution, dated 28 January, 1970, constituted a tripartite committee to advise the State Government for revision of the wage structure of workmen in all the units of the engineering industries in Bihar which were registered under Factories Act as factories. The said committee unanimously arrived at a settlement on 14 March, 1970 (annexure 4) in which all the engineering units in Bihar employing 251 workman and above were given the benefits by increasing their wagers. It was also said in the said settlement that if there was any reference pending before any Tribunal or Conciliation Officer in respect of wage revision the parties may approach such Tribunal or Conciliation Officer to dispose of the matter in terms of the aforesaid settlement. It has been, averred in the writ petition that the engineering section of the petitioner-company had more than 251 employees. The petitioner company has further pleaded that in pursuance of the aforesaid tripartite settlement there were certain conciliation settlements arrived at on 9 June and 10 August, 1970, between the petitioner company and the recognized unions, namely, respondents 3 and 4. The petitioners have stated that the petitioner-company gave effect to the aforesaid settlement and a joint petition was filed before the Tribunal, respondent 1. The said settlement, according to the petitioner was to remain in force for a period of five years with effect from 14 March, 1970, expiring on 13 March, 1975. The petitioners have further stated that in spite of the joint petition being filed before the Tribunal, respondent 1, it did not pass any award in accordance with the said settlement. In spite of the said fact the petitioner company implemented the aforesaid settlement and gave effect to it and also made payments to the workmen and staff of the engineering unit. Thereafter it appears that a strike notice was given by one of the recognized union, namely, respondent 3 demanding certain increase in the dearness allowance and in pursuance of which the workmen went on strike from 28 March, 1973. Accordingly, the petitioner stated that to maintain harmonious industrial relation with these workmen it entered in to a conciliation settlement with the recognized union, respondent 3 by giving certain increase in the wage of the workmen other than the workmen employed in the cement and engineering unit. Thereafter it appears that several other settlements were also entered into between the petitioner-company and one or the other union, either recognized or unrecognized, under which certain benefits have been granted to the workman. A list of such settlement is given in Para. 26 of the writ petition which is as follows:

Sl. No. Date Particulars of the settlement. Workmen concerned in wage increase. Date of filing before Industrial Tribunal 1. 14-3-1970 State level tripartite Engineering settlement. Engineering unit workmen. 12-6-1970. 2. 9-6-1970 Adopting State level Engineering settlement. Labour Category of Engineering unit. 12-6-1970.

3. 10-8-1970 Adopting State level Engineering settlement. Staff factories of engineering unit. 12-8-1970 4. 15-4-1973 Conciliation settlement regarding wage structure. Labour category of workmen other than those of cement factory. 16-4-1973 5. 8-8-1973 Regarding wage-structure. Staff category of workmen other than those of cement factory. 9-8-1973 6. 24-8-1973 Regarding wage-structure of engineering workmen. Labour category of workmen of engineering unit. 27-8-1973 7. 24-8-1973 Regarding wage-structure. Labour category of workmen other than those of engineering unit and cement factory. 27-8-1973 8. 3-11-1973 Regarding wage structure. Staff category of engineering unit. 5-11-1973

5. Two of the unions, namely, respondents 5 and 6 filed an objection to the aforesaid settlement before the Tribunal (respondent 1) and a reply to the said objection was filed by the petitioner-company wherein, inter alia it was submitted that in its opinion the union like respondents 5, 6 and 7 were incompetent to raise the disputes which could be done only by the recognized union under the unanimous recommendation of the Bihar (Central) Labour Advisory Board's resolution, dated 21 March, 1968, a copy of which is made annexure 10 to the writ application. It may he stated here that annexures 5 to 9 are copies of joint petitions filed by the petitioner-company and the respective union with whom the petitioner-company made settlements praying therein to pass an award in accordance with the said settlements. It is stated in Para. 31 that one Kesho Prasad Singh purporting and pretending to act for respondent 4 filed a petition of objection to the compromize petitions jointly filed as stated above.

6. It appears from annexure 11 which is a copy of the order sheet of the Tribunal in the reference case in question that the Tribunal on 30 July, 1973, passed an order for hearing the matter on merits. It stated in the said order that the terms of settlement would be an element for consideration in determining the entire wages-structure and directed the workmen to give evidence in support of their demands for revision of the wage-structure. On a perusal of the order of different dates, it appears that the petitioner-company in spite of the aforesaid order, dated, 30 July, 1973, filed applications on different dates for passing order in terms of the settlements but those applications were rejected by the Tribunal (respondent 1) on the ground that it had already passed an order on 30 July, 1973, in that regard. 3 February, 1975, is an order passed by the Tribunal (respondent 1) rejecting the prayer of the petitioner-company to pass an award in terms of the settlement, namely, annexures 4 to 9 to the writ application on the petition filed by the petitioner-company. A copy of the said petition is made annexure 13 to the writ application Similar order was passed by the Tribunal on 6 February, 1975, on a petition filed by the petitioner company on 4 February, 1975. A copy of the petition, dated 4 February is made annexure 14 to the writ application. In the aforesaid circumstances the petitioner has filed the present writ application for the prayer as aforesaid.

7. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent 7, Rohtas Karamcharj Sangh. In the said counter-affidavit the allegations made in the writ application regarding the binding nature of the settlement arrived at from time to time by the company with one union or the other have been denied and the settlements have been alleged to be collusive and not in the interest of the workmen. It has also been alleged that the resolution of the Labour Advisory Board was merely of recommendatory nature and not enforceable in law and that the management unilaterally changed the grades and rates of the dearness allowance from time to time to which workmen have no alternative but to accept under protest and respondent 7 also filed a petition before respondent 1 objecting to the terms of those settlements. A copy of the objection filed before the Tribunal (respondent 1) is made annexure A to the aforesaid counter-affidavit.

8. Another counter-affidavit has been filed by respondent 3, Rohtas Industries Majdoor Sangh, a recognized union according to the petitioner. In that counter-affidavit also respondent 3 has supported the reference as valid and that the said reference could not be disposed of in pursuance of the settlements arrived at from time to time which have no binding effect upon all the workmen of the petitioner-company. It further stated that there has been a long delay in filing the present writ application because the impugned orders are merely repetition of the order which was passed by the Tribunal (respondent 1) as far back as on 30 July, 1973, and, therefore, the petitioner-company ought to have moved this Court as early as possible from that date. It further stated that between the years 1960 and 1969, the petitioner-company evaded the issue of wage-structure on one pretext or the other though the prices of all commodities rose abnormally and the revision of wage structure in pursuance of the terms of agreement was held up by the petitioner-company. All the attempts to make settlement having failed the matter was finally referred for adjudication by the notification dated, 7 July, 1969. It denied other allegations made in the writ petition.

9. A supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner-company on 9 December, 1975. In that supplementary affidavit it has been alleged that another conciliation settlement with the workmen represented by respondent 4 was arrived at on 26 November, 1975, a copy of which is made annexure 17 to the said supplementary affidavit. It is further averred in the said supplementary affidavit that the settlement has been made on 27 November, 1975, before the Tribunal, respondent 1, and a joint petition has also been filed on that date praying therein to pass an award in terms of the settlement. A further supplementary affidavit is filed on 14 January, 1976, on behalf of the petitioner company stating therein that on 3 January, 1974, the Government of Bihar by its resolution of that date constituted a State level Tripartite Negotiating Committee in Engineering Industry to review and revise the wage-structure and such units of the engineering industry which were registered as factories under the Factories Act and in pursuance of the decision of the said committee a conciliation settlement was arrived at between the representatives of the employer and workmen of the engineering industry at the State level. It is further stated in the said affidavit that the petitioner-company filed a petition before the Tribunal, respondent 1, on 29 July, 1975, annexing thereof a memorandum of settlement arrived at in course of the aforesaid conciliation proceeding held on 9 July, 1975, in the matter of industrial dispute between the employers of the engineering industry of Bihar and their workmen with a prayer to pass an award in terms of the said settlement in respect of the workmen employed in the engineering unit of the petitioner-company. The petitioner-company has further stated that ultimately on 7 January, 1976, a final settlement fixing wages of different categories of workmen employed in the engineering industries in Bihar was arrived at. A true copy of the said settlement is made annexure 18 to this further supplementary affidavit. It is further stated in the said affidavit that on 14 January, 1976, a copy of the annexure 18 has been filed before the Tribunal (respondent 1) praying to pass award in terms of the settlement, dated 7 January, 1976, and the settlement, dated 9 July, 1975.

10. Sri Govind Das, learned counsel for the petitioner raised only one point in support of the writ case, namely, that the conciliation settlement having been arrived at between the petitioner and one or the other of the unions representing the workmen, the Tribunal-respondent 1 ought to have given effect to these conciliation settlements and passed an award in accordance with such settlements as laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act. He further contended that those conciliation settlements having binding effect upon the workmen concerned represented by different unions who are respondents 3 to 7, the objection made by the union-respondents could not be entertained in law and as such the impugned orders, dated 3 February and 6 February, 1975, by which the Tribunal after referring to its previous order, dated 30 July, 1973, decided to proceed with the case on merits, are illegal and liable to be quashed. Sri B.C Ghose, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent 3 on the other hand supported the impugned orders and contended that the Tribunal was right in taking the decision that in the interest of all the unions and the management it would be desirable to hear the parties and decide the matter finally, of course the terms of settlement would be an element for consideration in determining the entire wage-structure. He further contended that the alleged settlements with one or other of the unions not having been arrived at during the pendency of the conciliation proceeding, they have no binding effect upon all the workmen of the concerned establishment.

11. In support of the contention Sri Govind Das, learned counsel for the petitioners referred several sections of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be called as the Act). It may be stated here that all the unions, except the union-respondent 6 made settlements with the petitioner-management deriving certain advantages as mentioned in these settlements. Strong reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners upon Sub secs. (1) and (3) of S. 18 of the Act, the relevant portion of which read as follows:

“18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.— (8) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.

(3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under Sub-sec. (3)(A) of S. 10A or an award of a labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on—

(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;

(c) where a party referred to in Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) is an employer, his heirs successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which dispute relates; and

(d) where a party referred to ia Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.”

He also referred to the definition of settlement as defined in S. 2(p) of the Act which may be quoted here:

“2. Definitions— In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant, in the subject or context,

(p) ‘settlement’ means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer authorized in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the Conciliation Officer;”

Relying upon these two sections, Sri Das contended that the settlement, having beet arrived at in course of the conciliation proceeding under the Act, shall be binding on all the parties. Thus the question that turns to be decided in this case is as to whether the settlement list which has been given in Para. 26 of the writ application and the subsequent documents mentioned in the supplementary affidavits can be called a conciliation settlement within the meaning of S. 18 of the Act. It may be stated here that all the settlements that have been referred to above and settlements referred in the supplementary affidavits have been arrived at during the pendency of the reference case before the Tribunal-respondent 1. In order to appreciate the argument of Sri Das it is necessary to see the scheme of the Act. Section 3 of the Act contemplates the establishment of a “works committee” consisting of the representatives of the employer and workmen engaged in the establishment whose duty is to promote measures for securing and preserving the amity and good relations between the employer and the workmen. If this works committee fails to bring any amicable settlement then the Conciliation Officer or the Board of Conciliation, as the case may be intervenes to settle the disputes between the employer and the workmen. The working of the machinery is contemplated by the sections beginning from Ss. 3 to 5, 12 and 13. If the conciliation machinery fails to bring about any settlement between the employer and the workmen then compulsory adjudication of the industrial disputes by the Labour Courts and Tribunals have been provided in the Act. When the question of compulsory adjudication of the industrial disputes arises then under S. 10 the appropriate Government has been given a wide discretion to refer the matter to the Board, Labour Court or Tribunal as the case may be. It is only after the reference is made under S. 10(1) of the Act that the proceeding commences and it is concluded by making of an award by the Tribunal which becomes enforceable under S. 17A. Thus from the aforesaid frame-work of the Act it is clear that when the dispute has been referred to the Tribunal the stage for conciliation settlement has already passed and any settlement which would be made between the parties would be a settlement over which the Tribunal only would have a jurisdiction to dispose of the same.

12. Not a single decision has been cited by Sri Das which has taken the view that if a settlement is arrived at during the pendency of reference before the Tribunal between the management and some of the unions who are parties before the Tribunal leaving others, then such a settlement will bind all the workmen of the industrial concern. He, however, relied strongly upon S. 18 in support of his contention noted above. I have already quoted above S. 18 of the Act. Reading S. 18 of the Act which I have already quoted above, it is clear that a provision has been made with regard to the settlements which are arrived at in course of the conciliation proceeding and also the settlements which are arrived at otherwise than in course of the conciliation proceeding. In the first type of cases the effect of such settlement has been indicated in Cls. (a) to (d) of S. 18(3) of the Act. In the latter type of cases, however, the said S. 18(1) says that such settlement shall be binding on the parties to the agreement It is manifest, therefore, that S. 18(3) has extended operation beyond the parties to the settlement, whereas the settlement under S. 18(1) binds only the parties to the settlement. We are not concerned here in the present case about the applicability of S. 18(3) and, therefore, the decisions which have been cited on the interpretation of S. 18(3) have no application at all. While enumerating the facts of the case in detail above, I have already indicated that all the settlements, without any exception were arrived at with one or the other of the union who are party-respondents before the Tribunal (respondent 1) during the pendency of the dispute before the Tribunal and it may also be noted that the union, respondent 6, was not a party in any of the settlements. The facts further show that when the conciliation proceeding was pending, that is, before the industrial disputes could be referred by the State Government under S. 10 of the Act, no settlement was arrived at between the employer and any of the unions far less a recognized union. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, S. 18(1) of the Act applies and such a settlement, if arrived at bona fide, will be binding only on the parties to such settlement. Of course the Tribunal (respondent 1) before whom all the settlements have been filed awaiting orders of that Tribunal, has complete jurisdiction over the matter to decide as to whether those settlements were arrived at bona fide and as to how far such settlements would bind the workmen concerned. The Tribunal, I have already indicated has passed orders to the effect that it would take into consideration the settlement while passing final award by it. Keeping the aforesaid matters in mind, I now proceed to discuss the decisions cited at the Bar by learned counsel for the petitioner.

13. Sri Das has referred to the case of State of Bihar v. D.N Ganguli [A.I.R 1958 S.C 1018], in support of his contention that the settlements arrived at in the present case are binding upon all the workmen concerned, but that case, in my opinion, has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the question involved for decision was as to where an industrial dispute has been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication by the appropriate Government under S. 10(1)(d) of the Act, can the said Government supersede the said reference pending adjudication before the Tribunal constituted for that purpose. In that case the dispute relating to thirty-one workmen, was referred to the Tribunal to decide as to whether the dismissal of those workmen was justified, which was numbered as Reference Case No. 10 of 1954. Again another dispute relating to twenty-nine workmen of the same employer was referred to the Tribunal which was numbered as Reference Case No. 1 of 1955. While those proceedings, which were consolidated by the Tribunal, were pending before it and it made some progress, the Government issued another notification, dated 17 September, 1955, by which it purported to supersede the two earlier notifications to combine the said two disputes into one dispute. The depute thus referred to was as to whether the dismissal of sixty workmen was justified or unjustified and to what relief if any, those workmen were entitled to? The Supreme Court, after referring to the various provisions of the Act, decided that it was not permissible for the Government to supersede the reference by another notification. Sri Das relied upon only one sentence from this reported decision appearing at page 1023, namely:

“…. there can, therefore, be no doubt that if an industrial dispute before a Tribunal is amicably settled, the Tribunal would immediately agree to make an award in terms of the settlement between the parties…”

But this sentence, in my opinion, cannot be read aloof from what his been said with reference to the facts of that case. Thus, in my opinion, this case does not help the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner

14. The next case relied upon was Sirsilk, Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [A.I.R 1964 S.C 160]. In this case after the award was given by the Tribunal and sent for publication to Government in accordance with the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, a settlement was arrived between the parties and accordingly a letter was written to Government signed jointly by the parties intimating about the settlement and requesting the Government not to publish the award. On the Government having expressed its inability to withhold the publication, the matter came up before the High Court, who upheld the order of the Government holding that S. 17 of the Act was mandatory and it was not open to the Government to withhold the publication of the award sent to it by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court while accepting the contention that S. 17 was mandatory held that such settlement comes under S. 18(1) and is binding between the parties. It noticed a conflict between Sub-sees (1) and (3) of S. 18 and held that in such a situation in order to reconcile the said two sub-sections of S. 18, the State Government would withhold publication of the award as binding settlement has already come into force. Thus this decision also has no application to the present case.

15. The next case referred to was A.I.R 1960 S.C 1012. That was a case where the question involved about the construction and the effect of the provision of S. 22(1)(d) of the Act. In that case on the allegation that strike was commenced during the currency of settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding, a criminal complaint was filed against eleven persons. It was held in that case that strike was commenced when the conciliation proceeding was pending and as such the Supreme Court in appeal by special leave set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and convicted the eleven workmen concerned who were involved in the strike. It held as follows:

“In our opinion, the pendency of the conciliation proceeding between the appellant and the employees' union attracts the provision of S. 22(1)(d) to the strike in question and makes the said strike illegal under S. 24(1)(i) of the Act. If the strike is illegal it follows that respondents have taken past in subversive activity as defined in S. 2(9)(e) of the West Bengal Security Act and as such they committed the offence punishable under S. 11 of the Act.”

I fail to appreciate how this case has application to the facts of the present case.

16. The next case for discussion is Eastern Manganese and Mineral, Ltd., Sibsagar v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Dhanbad [1968 L. & I.C 1430]. It is a Bench decision of this Court. Sri Das relied again upon a sentence of this decision where it has been stated that the Tribunal was bound to make an award in terms of the settlement. But the paragraph in which that sentence appears is a complete answer to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The said paragraph runs as follows:

“Sri Ranen Roy, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that there was no industrial dispute after the matter was settled between the employer-petitioners and the union, opposite party 1, at whose instance the industrial dispute was raised and reference to the Tribunal under S. 10A of the Act was made by the Central Government. An agreement (annexure B) duly signed by the manager of the management and the secretary of the Abrakh Mazdoor Union together with an endorsement by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Hazaribagh, was filed before the Tribunal on 26 February, 1966. Sri Ranen Roy submitted that after the Tribunal was apprised of the settlement of industrial dispute between the employers and the Abrakh Mazdoor Union the Tribunal was bound to make an award in terms of the settlement. There is a good deal of force in this contention.”

Thus this decision is also distinguishable.

17. The next case for discussion is Tiruchi Srirangam Transport Company (Private) Ltd v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras [A.I.R 1963 Mad. 79] It is a decision of a single Judge of that Court. In this case two unions representing different sets of workmen of the same establishment raised disputes separately of identical nature. When the matter was pending before the Conciliation Officer, a settlement was arrived at between the employer and one of the unions without reference to other union who was not even a party to the settlement. After discussing the relevant provision of the Act it has been held in that case that such settlement would not automatically bring an end of the conciliation proceeding with regard to the other union and it would not be binding on all the workmen of the establishment. In such a situation settlement would have to be arrived at with the entire body of workmen who were parties to the dispute either by themselves or through their unions before the same officer, so as to make the settlement within the ambit of S. 18(3) of the Act. This decision thus does not in any way help the petitioners; rather it goes against them.

18. The next case relied upon is Buckingham and Carnatic Company v. Commissioner of Labour and Chief Conciliation Officer [A.I.R 1964 Mad. 538]. From this decision reliance was placed on Para. 27, where S. 18(3) of the Act has been dealt with. Reference was also made to S. 32 of the Act which indicated a distinction between Sub-sec. (1) of S. 18 of the Act and Sub-sec. (3) of the said section. In that paragraph it has been stated that S. 18 makes a distinction between a case of settlement without aid of a recognized official agency and the one arrived at with the help of it. It has been indicated in that paragraph that the settlement under S. 18(1) will bind only the parties thereof. I do not find anything in this decision to support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

19. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent 6, however, referred to the case of monthly-rated Workmen of Pierce Leslie and Company, Ltd. v. Labour Commissioner and Chief Conciliation Officer, Kerala [A.I.R 1967 Ker. 245], in support of the proposition that if a settlement is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceeding with one union representing some of their workmen it would not bind the other union who represented other workmen. He contended, therefore, that learned counsel for the petitioner was not correct in contending that the aforesaid settlement arrived at between some of the parties to the reference case will bind all the workmen of the employer. It is not necessary for me to go into this question because in the present case no settlement was arrived at during the conciliation proceeding.

20. It was indicated by Sri B.C Ghose, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 3 and 4 that the petitioner has come to this Court very late and that is also another ground for dismissing the writ application. He drew our attention to the order, dated 30 July, 1973, and pointed out that by that order the Tribunal decided to proceed with the case on its merits when the terms of settlement would also be taken into consideration by it. He contended that the impugned orders, dated 3 and 6 February, 1975, are merely repetition of the previous order and, therefore, the petitioner must be held to have approached this Court much late. No reasonable explanation has been given by the petitioner as to why they did not move this Court when the order, dated 30 July, 1973, was passed. It appears that the submission made by Sri Ghose is correct.

21. However, I have decided the case on merits also on the basis of the argument advanced by both sides and for the reasons recorded by me above I do not find any reason to interfere with any of the impugned orders.

22. In the conclusion I hold that the argument of Sri Das has no substance and cannot be accepted and that put forward by Sri Ghose is well founded.

23. In the result, the application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250.

24. H.L Agrawal, J.:— I also agree that this application must be dismissed.