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Ram Bahal Singh Alias Bahal Singh & Others v. Chhote Narain Singh & Others
Judgment Summary — Application under Articles 226 and 227 (B.D. Singh, J. & Birendra Prasad Sinha, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners (Ram Bahal Singh alias Bahal Singh and five others) challenged multiple revenue orders and a resolution (Annexures 2–5) by filing an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
Key factual and procedural events, as set out in the opinion, are:
- Radhe Shekhar Singh (respondent no. 10) executed a sale deed dated 11-9-65 transferring 5.53 acres (27 plots, including house on plot no. 916) to respondents 8 and 9; registration under Section 61 of the Registration Act was completed on 19-3-66 (consideration Rs. 24,000).
- The petitioners acquired (by registered sale deeds dated 14-10-65) a house on plot no. 916 and 11½ annas interest in remaining properties (considerations Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,719 respectively) and entered into possession; a partition on 23-10-65 gave petitioner no.1 an exclusive 1¼ annas interest in various plots per the Circle Inspector's report (Annexure 1).
- On 28-10-65 respondents 4–7 and Ramnandan Singh filed an application under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 ("the Act") before the Sub-divisional Officer (respondent no. 12), impleading the petitioners and respondents 8 & 9. The Sub-divisional Officer took cognizance on 28-10-65, sought reports (Anchal Adhikari and Circle Inspector), and by order dated 14-3-66 (Annexure 2) allowed the application and ordered possession for the applicants.
- The petitioners and respondents 8 & 9 appealed to the Additional Collector (respondent no. 13). During the appeal, on 4-4-67 respondents 8 & 9 sought withdrawal of their appeal and alleged the sale deeds in favour of the petitioners (dated 14-10-65) were sham; respondents 8 & 9 later executed a sale deed dated 5-10-67 in favour of respondents 1–7. The Additional Collector dismissed the petitioners' appeal by order dated 16-8-67 (Annexure 3).
- The petitioners filed a revision to the Commissioner, Patna Division (respondent no. 14), which was rejected on 3-2-72 (Annexure 4). An application under Section 32 of the Act to the Member, Board of Revenue (respondent no. 15) was dismissed by resolution dated 18-8-72 (Annexure 5).
- The petitioners challenged these impugned orders (Annexures 2–5) in the present writ proceeding. The petitioners principally contended the Sub-divisional Officer acted without jurisdiction because cognizance was taken before registration of the earlier sale deed was complete.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Sub-divisional Officer (respondent no. 12) had jurisdiction to take cognizance of an application under Section 16(3) of the Act on 28-10-65 when the registration of the sale deed (executed on 11-9-65) was completed only on 19-3-66.
- Whether subsequent orders and the Board of Revenue resolution (Annexures 2–5) which arose from the Sub-divisional Officer's order are vitiated for want of jurisdiction.
- Whether the petitioners are "persons aggrieved" or "prejudicially affected" so as to maintain writ proceedings under Article 226 against the impugned revenue orders.
- Whether disputed factual questions described as "sham" or "benami" transactions are beyond the competence of the revenue authorities under the Act and are exclusively matters for civil courts, or whether the Act and its appellate scheme (Sections 17(2) and 43) empower revenue authorities to decide such issues.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The Sub-divisional Officer took cognizance on 28-10-65 though registration of the sale deed in question was completed only on 19-3-66; consequently the proceedings and final order (Annexure 2) were without jurisdiction and void. The petitioners relied on the decision in Kauleshwar Singh v. Parmanand (1972 P.L.J.R 321) for the proposition that a pre-emptor's right to apply arises only after registration is completed.
- The petitioners asserted they were raiyats and holders of adjoining lands for at least 16 of the 27 plots and had acquired certain shares by registered deeds; thus their proprietary interests were affected by the impugned orders.
- Because the primary jurisdictional point succeeded, the petitioners did not press the merits (i.e., the factual dispute over genuineness of sale deeds) in detail before the Court.
Respondents 1–7 (those claiming the right of pre-emption) — Arguments in support of impugned orders
- Respondents 1–7 contended they had a right to pre-empt the lands purchased by respondents 8 & 9 from respondent 10; they denied petitioners' claims and alleged the sale deeds in favour of the petitioners (dated 14-10-65) were sham and fictitious.
- At the appellate stage respondents 8 & 9 had, according to respondents 1–7, withdrawn their appeal and disclaimed title, and had described the transfer to petitioners as a "sham" affair — hence respondents 1–7 argued the concern primarily affected respondents 8 & 9 and not the petitioners.
- Respondents 1–7 filed a counter affidavit denying allegations made by the petitioners and insisting on their right to pre-empt; they relied on the subsequent sale deed from respondents 8 & 9 to respondents 1–7 (dated 5-10-67).
Respondents 8–9 (as recorded in the file)
- Respondents 8 & 9 alleged in their petition of 4-4-67 that the sale deeds dated 14-10-65 in favour of the petitioners were sham, that no consideration had passed, and that those documents were created to defeat the pre-emption rights of respondents 1–7.
- Respondents 8 & 9 later executed a sale deed dated 5-10-67 in favour of respondents 1–7 (a copy is in the record as Annexure 'A' to a counter affidavit), and they sought to withdraw their own appeal.
- No appearance or counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of respondents 8 & 9 in the writ proceeding (the opinion records their absence).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kauleshwar Singh v. Parmanand (1972 P.L.J.R 321) | Held that a person claiming pre-emption acquires the right to apply only when registration of the transfer is complete; a tribunal must act within statutory conditions conferring jurisdiction; proceedings commenced before registration are without jurisdiction. | Court relied on this decision to hold the Sub-divisional Officer's taking of cognizance on 28-10-65 (well before registration on 19-3-66) was contrary to law and therefore void, thereby vitiating subsequent orders arising from it. |
| Gadda Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 828) | Affirmed the wide scope of Article 226 and principles on locus standi: a petitioner who is prejudicially affected may maintain writ even if not claiming a fundamental right or proprietary interest in conventional terms. | Cited to support the view that petitioners were "persons aggrieved" and thus had locus to challenge the impugned revenue orders under Article 226. |
| Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1044) | Explained Article 226's wide remedial scope and that applicants need not be limited to those claiming fundamental rights; ordinarily the applicant should have a personal or individual right but the rule is flexible. | Quoted (via Gadda Venkateswara Rao) to reinforce that the petitioners, being prejudicially affected, could maintain the writ petition. |
| Attorney-General of the Gambia v. N'Jie (1961-2 All E.R. 504) | Observed that the expressions "person aggrieved" / "prejudicially affected" are of wide import and include those with genuine grievance caused by an order that prejudicially affects their interests. | Relied upon to support the conclusion that the petitioners were persons aggrieved by Annexure 2 and hence entitled to seek relief under Article 226. |
| Maurice v. London Country Council (1964-1 All E.R. 779) | Quoted with approval the Privy Council's observations on the wide meaning of "person aggrieved". | Used cumulatively with the other authorities to support petitioners' locus to challenge the impugned order. |
| K.C. Pazhanimala v. State of Kerala (A.I.R. 1969 Kerala 154) | Applied the meaning of "person aggrieved" / "prejudicially affected" and held that appellants were aggrieved and could maintain writs under Article 226. | Cited to reinforce the principle that the petitioners were prejudicially affected and their writ was maintainable. |
| Narendra Kumar Ghose alias Pheli Ghose v. Sheodani Ram (1971 B.L.J.R. 528) | Interpreted Sections 16, 17 and 43 of the Act: where an application under Section 16(3) is allowed, it binds the real owner unless benami is raised and decided otherwise; Section 43 bars civil court jurisdiction over matters falling within the Act; revenue authorities can and should decide questions of benami/sham raised under Section 17(2). | Court relied on this decision to hold that questions as to whether transactions were benami or sham are within the ambit of the Act and should have been dealt with by the revenue authorities; the Additional Collector erred in declining to decide or remit that issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence focused on jurisdiction and maintainability:
- Jurisdictional defect at the threshold: The Court held that the Sub-divisional Officer (respondent no. 12) had taken cognizance of the Section 16(3) application on 28-10-65, whereas the registration of the sale deed executed on 11-9-65 was completed only on 19-3-66. Relying on Kauleshwar Singh v. Parmanand, the Court concluded that a pre-emptor's right to file under Section 16(3) arises only after registration is complete; therefore the Sub-divisional Officer acted without jurisdiction and the proceedings founded on that cognizance were void.
- Effect of a void foundational order: Because the Sub-divisional Officer's order (Annexure 2) was void for want of jurisdiction, the Court treated the subsequent appellate, revisional and Board of Revenue resolution (Annexures 3–5) which flowed from that order as vitiated as well. The Court invoked its supervisory power under Article 227 to quash orders contrary to law.
- Maintainability / locus standi: The Court examined whether the petitioners were "persons aggrieved" and could maintain an Article 226 petition. Applying authorities (Calcutta Gas, Gadda Venkateswara Rao, Attorney-General v. N'Jie, K.C. Pazhanimala), the Court held that the petitioners were prejudicially affected by Annexure 2 (which ordered that the applicants be put in possession of the disputed lands) and therefore had locus to challenge the impugned orders.
- Scope of revenue authority on 'sham' or 'benami' issues: The Additional Collector had held that the claim by the petitioners became a question of title beyond the purview of the Land Ceiling Act because respondents 8 & 9 had described the transfers to petitioners as "sham". The Court disagreed: relying on Narendra Kumar Ghose, it concluded that the statutory scheme (Sections 17(2) and 43) permits revenue authorities to decide disputed questions of fact — including benami or related challenges — and that the Additional Collector erred by refusing to decide or remit that issue to the Sub-divisional Officer for determination.
- No investigation of disputed facts in writ forum: The Court recognized that questions of the genuineness of the sale deeds and related disputed facts were matters for the competent authority under the Act; it did not attempt to resolve factual controversies in the writ proceeding. Nevertheless, the jurisdictional defect alone was sufficient to dispose of the case.
- Outcome driven by jurisdictional holding: Because the primary contention that the foundational order was void for want of jurisdiction succeeded, the Court did not need to decide the merits of the petitioners' alternative contentions concerning factual entitlement.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court allowed the application and quashed the impugned orders and the resolution contained in Annexures 2 to 5.
Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The order of the Sub-divisional Officer dated 14-3-66 (Annexure 2) was void for want of jurisdiction because cognizance was taken prior to completion of registration of the underlying sale deed; consequently the subsequent orders (Annexures 3 and 4) and the Board of Revenue resolution (Annexure 5) that arose from Annexure 2 were also quashed.
- The Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to quash the impugned orders which were contrary to law.
- There was no order as to costs.
- The opinion did not purport to set a new legal precedent; it applied and followed existing authorities to resolve the questions of jurisdiction and maintainability presented in this case.
Disposition: Application allowed; Annexures 2–5 quashed; no order as to costs.
B.D Singh, J.:— This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India Ram Bahal Singh alias Bahal Singh and five others is directed against an order dated 14-3-66 (Annexure 2) passed by the Sub-divisional Officer, Jahanabad (respondent no. 12), order dated 16-8-67 (Annexure 3) passed by the Additional Collecter (respondent no. 13), order dated 3-2-72 (Annexure 4) passed by the Commissioner, Patna Division (respondent no, 14) and the resolution dated 18-8-72 (Annexure 5) of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue (respondent no. 15). In the application the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the orders and resolution as contained in these Annexures.
2. In order to appreciate the point involved in this application it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. Radhe Shekhar Singh (respondent no. 10) sold 5. 53 acres of land, inclusive of a house, standing on plot no. 916 measuring an area of 0.4 decimal to respondent no. 8, (Dineshwar Singh) and respondent no. 9 (Muneshwar Singh) by a sale deed dated 11-9-65, registration whereof was completed under Section 61 of the Indian Registration Act on 19-3-66 for a consideration of Rs. 24000/-. The aforesaid land comprised of as many as 27 plots and, according to the petitioners they are raiyats and holders of adjoining land in respect of at least 16 plots as it would be evident from the sale deed itself. The name of petitioner no. 1 is mentioned in one or the other boundary of 16 plots out of 27 plots, which were the subject matter of the said sale deed. Petitioner no. 1 is father of other petitioners. All the petitioners, as stated by them, are members of a joint Hindu Mitakshra family. Subsequently, the petitioners by a registered sale deed dated 14-10-65 purchased a house appertaining to plot no. 916 from respondents 6 and 9 in the names of petitioners 2 to 6 for a consideration of Rs. 2000/- and amalgamated the said house with their own ancestral house over plot nos. 913, 917 and 918, which lie, according to the petitioners, partly adjacent, south of plot no. 916 and partly adjacent, east of plot no. 916. By another registered sale deed of the same date, the petitioners purchased 11½ annas interest out of the remaining properties covered by the sale deed dated 11-9-65 from respondents 8 and 9 in the name of petitioner no. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 1719/-. The petitioners thereafter entered into possession of the subject matter of the two sale deeds, which were executed in their favour. On 23-10-65 there was a partition between the petitioners on the one hand and respondents 8 and 9 on the other regarding 1¼ annas interest in the properties and the lands comprised in various plots, mentioned in Schedule I of the report of the Circle Inspector dated 30-11-65 (Annexure 1) fell into the exclusive share of petitioner no. 1, Bahai Singh.
3. On 28-10-65 respondents 4 to 7 and Ramnandan Singh (since deceased), father of respondents 1 to 3, filed an application under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, (here inafter referred to as ‘the Act’) before the Sub-divisional Officer, (respondent no. 12) and impleaded the petitioners as parties along with respondents 8 and 9 in exercise of right of promotion on account of the sale deed executed by respondent no. 10 in favour of respondents 8 and 9. Respondent no. 12 took cognizance on the same date, that is, 28.10.65, issued notice and called for a report from Anchal Adhikari, Jahanabad, who, in his turn, called for a report from the Circle Inspector and after receiving the report from him the Anchal Adhikari forwarded the report dated 30.11.65 (Annexure 1) to respondent no. 12, who after hearing the parties, allowed the application filed by respondents 4 to 7 and father of respondents 1 to 3, under Section 16(3) of the Act by his order dated 14.3.66 (Annexure 2).
4. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioners and respondents 8 and 9 filed an appeal before the Additional Collector (respondent no. 13). During the pendency of the appeal respondents 8 and 9 filed a petition dated 4.4.67 before respondent no. 13 seeking permission to withdraw the appeal. In the application respondents 8 and 9 alleged, inter alia, that the two sale deeds dated 14.10.65, executed in favour of the petitioners, were sham and fictitious documents and no consideration had passed. According to respondents 8 and 9, they had created those documents in order to deprive respondents 1 to 7 of their right to preempt, which had accrued to them according to the Act. Respondents 8 and 9 also took the entire money deposited by respondents 1 to 7 under the Act and as an abundant precaution respondents 1 to 7 requested respondents 8 and 9 to execute a sale deed in favour of respondents 1 to 7 regarding the entire land, which respondents 8 and 9 had got under the sale deed executed by respondent no. 10. Respondents 8 and 9, accordingly, executed the sale deed dated 5.10.67 in favour of respondents 1 to 7, a copy of which is marked as Annexure ‘A’ to the counter affidavit filed by these respondents. The petitioners then and there on the same date (4.4.67) filed an application before respondent no. 13 objecting to the withdrawal of the appeal and they, inter alia, controverted the allegations made by respondents 8 and 9 in their application and had stated therein that the consideration had passed and they were genuine and valid documents. The petitioners also alleged therein that respondents 1 to 7 had won over respondents 8 and 9 during the pendency of the appeal. A copy of the said application is marked Annexure ‘B’ to the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 to 7. Respondent no. 13, however, by his order dated 16.8.67 (Annexure 3) dismissed the said appeal filed by the petitioners.
5. Against the said order of dismissal of appeal the petitioners filed a revision, as contemplated under the Act, before the Commissioner, Patna Division (respondent no. 14), who also by his order dated 3.2.72 (Annexure 4) rejected the revision application. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioners filed an application under Section 32 of the Act before the Member, Board of Revenue, who also by his resolution dated 18.8.72 was pleased to dismiss the application (vide Annexure 5).
6. Supporting the impugned orders and resolution respondents 1 to 7 have filed a counter affidavit on 4.9.74 inter alia denying the allegations made by the petitioners in the writ application, and contended that they had right to preempt and that the two sale deeds dated 14.10.65, executed by respondents 8 and 9, were fake and created in order to defeat the right of preemption of respondents 1 to 7, as stated by respondents 8 and 9 themselves.
7. None has appeared on behalf of respondents 8 and 9 nor any counter affidavit has been filed on their behalf.
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has assailed the impugned orders and the resolution chiefly on the ground that the application under Section 16(3) of the Act filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 7 was premature, since the application was filed by them on 28.10.65, whereas registration of the sale deed, executed by respondent no. 10 on 11.9.65 in favour of respondents 8 and 9 was completed on 19.3.66 under Section 61 of the Registration Act. On the basis of the application respondent no. 12 had taken cognizance of the application filed by those respondents on the same date, namely, 28.10.65 According to learned counsel for the petitioners he had acted without jurisdiction. Therefore, his entire order is vitiated due to want of jurisdiction. In order to find support to his contention he has relied on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (1) Kauleshwar Singh v. Parmanand (1972 P.L.J.R 321) where Untwalia, J. (now Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court) and Akbar Husain, J. were dealing with the provisions contained in Section 16(3) of the Act. In that case the respondents had transferred the land by means of a registered sale deed executed on 16.11.1967, and the registration was completed on 11.12.1967 The petitioner in that case claiming to be the co-sharer, and an adjoining raiyat filed an application under Section 16(3) of the Act. Their Lordships held that a person claiming to pre-empt got a right to file an application only when the registration of a document of transfer was complete. It was repeatedly held that a Tribunal or an authority acting under a special statute derived his power to so act within the four corners of that statute. If the provisions of the statute were violated and specially in regard to the condition which conferred jurisdiction and power on the Tribunal or Authority to exercise it then the order was without jurisdiction. If a proceeding was commenced by taking action on an application of registration of the sale deed, then cognizance of such a proceeding was without jurisdiction and void. That being so, the final order made in such a proceeding was also without jurisdiction. The point could be taken at any stage if it did not involve investigation of new and fresh facts. On the basis of the aforesaid decision of this Court learned counsel for the petitioners contended that since the order of the Sub-divisional Officer was without jurisdiction void, other orders and the resolution contained in Annexures 3 to 5 are vitiated and they were obviously without any jurisdiction.
9. The second point urged by learned counsel for the petitioners was with regard to the merit of the application. He submitted that the petitioners being raiyats of the adjoining lands in respect of at least 16 plots, as detailed under Annexure ‘1’ and since they had purchased the same by the two sale deeds dated 14.10.65 and they had partitioned the properties, the petitioners having purchased 1¼ annas share from respondents and amalgamated the same with their undisputed plots prior to the application filed by respondents 1 to 7 on 28.10.65, the right of pre-emption of respondents 1 to 7 was defeated.
10. It will be convenient to deal with the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners under point no. 2 first. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 7, contended that those respondents had not sought the right of pre-emption against the petitioners in their application dated 28.10.65 It is true that the petitioners were made parties to the application as opposite party nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, but in the prayer portion the right of pre-emption was claimed by respondents 1 to 7 only against respondents 8 and 9, who had subsequently withdrawn the money deposited by respondents 1 to 7, and not only accepted the right of preemption but also executed a sale deed of their entire properties in favour of respondents 1 to 7, referred to above. Mr. Thakur Prasad submitted that, if at all, the interest of only respondents 8 and 9 was affected by the impugned order (Annexure 2), therefore the application at the instance of the petitioners under Article 226 in this court is not maintainable. In my opinion, this submission of Mr. Prasad is not tenable. Reference may be made to the concluding portion of Annexure ‘2’, which reads as:
“……In view of the facts enumerated above, I am satisfied that the applicants are the Raiyats of the adjoining lands and it is, therefore, ordered that the applicants be put in possession of the disputed lands.”
11. Therefore, by the said order the petitioners also are affected and are prejudiced. They can very well be said to be the aggrieved parsons. According to the petitioners, they had purchased one house, and 1¼ annas interest in 16 out of 27 plots. To that extent, their interest is affected. It is true that at the appellate stage respondents 8 and 9 had stated that the two sale deeds, under which the petitioners are alleged to have acquired title and interest, were sham transactions and no consideration had passed, which fact, however, was disputed by the petitioners at the earliest opportunity. The matter is a disputed question of fact which cannot be investigated here. Nonetheless, the petitioners became aggrieved persons because of the order quoted above. Reference may be made to (2) Gadda Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R 1966 Supreme Court 828) where their Lordships have quoted with approval the following extract from the earlier decision in (3) Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (A.I.R 1962 Supreme Court 1044 at page 1047), dealing with the question of locus standi, of the appellant in that case, to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court:
“Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III or for any other purpose.
“It is, threrefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the Court seeking a relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, but it is implicit in the exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. …The right that can be enforced under Art. 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be releaesed or modified.”
12. Thereafter, their Lordships further held:
“Has the appellant a right to file the petition out of which the present appeal has arisen? The appellant is the President of the Panchayat Samithi of Dhamajigudem. The villagers of Dhamajigudem formed a committee with the appellant as President for the purpose of collecting contributions from the villagers for setting up the Primary Health Centre. The said committee collected Rs. 10,000/- and deposited the same with the Block Development Officer. The appellant represented the village in all its dealings with the Block Development Committee and the Panchayat Samithi in the matter of location of the Primary Health Centre at Dhamajigudem. His conduct, the acquiescence on the part of the other members of the committee, and the treatment meted out to him by the authorities concerned support the inference that he was authorised to act on behalf of the committee. The appellant was, therefore, a represntative of the committee which was in law the trustees of the amounts collected by it from the villagers for a public purpose. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the appellant had the right to maintain the application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This court held in the decision cited supra that, ordinarily the petitioner who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should be one who has personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest, it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases as the expression ‘ordinarly’ indicates, a person who has been prejudiciatly affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable.”
13. In this connection it will be useful to extract a passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in Attornay-General of the Gambia v. N'Jie, 1961-2 All England Report 504 at page 511 as follows:—
“The words ‘person aggrieved’ are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busy-body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests”.
14. The Court of Appeal in (4) Maurice v. London Country Council, 1964-1 All England Report 779 at page 782 quoted with approval the observations of the Privy Council, quoted above. In (5) K.C Pazhanimala v. State of Kerala (A.I.R 1969 Kerala 154) (F.B) after surveying various decisions Including that of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council, referred to above, their Lordships observed in paragraph 6 at page 159 as follows—
“In our view the meaning given to the words ‘person aggrieved’ has to be applied to the expression ‘person prejudicially affected’. We have therefore no doubt to hold that the several appellants are persons who are aggrieved because of the enforcement of the impugned order. The objection of the maintainability of the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution has only to be overruled.”
15. Applying the above principle to the instant case, I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioners were aggrieved and were prejudicially affected by the order contained in Annexure ‘2’ and the subsequent orders and resolution contained in Annexures 3 to 5. It is obvious that if the petitioners were not aggrieved they would not have filed an appeal, revision and application before the Member Board of Revenue.
16. Mr. Thakur Prasad in this regard submitted that the observation of their Lordships in (1) 1972 P.L.J.R 321 is not applicable to the instant case, because it involved investigation of new and fresh facts. He drew our attention to the observation of their Lordships in that case in which it was held that the point could be taken at any stage, if it did not involve investigation of new and fresh facts. On the basis of the said observation he contended that in the present case the two sale deeds, as stated by respondents 8 and 9, were fake and, therefore, the petitioners did not derive any title therefrom, and as such whether those sale deeds were sham transactions or not, could have been decided only by a competent civil court. He drew our attention to the order passed by the Additional Collector (Annexure 3), the relevant portion of which is to the following effect:—
“Appellant First set, Dineshwar Singh and Muneshwar Singh (respondents 8 and 9) having withdrawn from the appeal on a disclaimar of title, over the land and on further describing the transfer in favour of appellants second set Ram Bahal Singh and others by them as ‘Sham’ affair, the claim preferred by the appellant second set becomes a question of title, which is beyond the purview of the Land Ceiling Act and such a question is not to be entertained by me.”
17. In my opinion, this contention of Mr. Prasad is also not acceptable. Reference may be made to (6) Narendra Kumar Ghose alias Pheli Ghose v. Sheodani Ram (1971 B.L.J.R 528) where Untwalia, J. (now Hon'ble Judge of Supreme Court) and S. Sarwar Ali, J., while dealing with Sections 16, 17 and 43 of the Act held that if an application under Section 16(3) of the Act was allowed under Clause (iii), it would be binding on the real owner, if the question of benami was not raised by the ostensible owner, or if raised, it was decided against him or the real owner. Such a decision being binding on the real owner, it appeared that if the question was raised, then it was a question which was, by or under the Act, required to be settled, decided and dealt with by the Board of Revenue, the appellate authority or the Collector within the meaning of Section 43 of the Act, which barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in regard to question, which fell to be decided by the Revenue authorities. The language of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 would also indicate that the real owner in occupation of the land was also liable to be objected by the Collector if action was taken under Section 17 of the Act. If this procedure was comprehensive enough, as undoubtedly it was, to go into disputed questions of fact as to who was the co-sharer and who was the adjacent raiyat, it was wide enough to take within its sweep the question of benami if it was raised before the Collector. On such evidence as might be or educed before him or as might be permitted by him to be produced, he was competent to decide that question. In that view of the matter in my opinion Section 43 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In fact, the question whether it was sham transaction or not ought to have been decided by the authority under the Act under Section 17(2). On that account also it is obvious that the order of the Additional Collector (Annexure 3) was bad because he failed to exercise his jurisdiction in deciding that issue himself or remanding the case back to the Sub-divisional Officer for that purpose.
18. Mr. Thakur Prasad, however, tried to persuade us to hold that the observation of their Lordships in the case of Narendra Kumar Ghose, just referred to above, is not applicable in the instant case, as their Lordships were considering matter relating to benami transaction whereas in the present case there is the question of ‘sham transaction’, in which no consideration had passed. In my opinion, that would not make any difference, and would not take out of the purview of Sections 17(2) and 43 of the Act. Mr. Prasad has not been able to substantiate his contention by any authoritative decision on the point.
19. The next question, which arises for consideration is as to whether the entire orders and the resolution contained in Annexures 2 to 5 have to be quashed or only that portion which affects the right and interest of the petitioners. As already mentioned the petitioners had purchased only a fractional share in 16 out of 27 plots of land and a house; whereas the right to pre-empt was granted to respondents 1 to 7 with respect to the entire lands, which respondents 8 and 9 had purchased from respondent no. 10. In my opinion, the entire impugned orders (Annexures 2 to 5) have to be quashed. As mentioned earlier, respondent no. 12 had taken cognizance and had assumed jurisdiction on 28.10.65 much before registration was completed on 19.3.66, which is contrary to the decision of this Court in (1) 1972 P.L.J.R 321, quoted above. The application by the petitioners is also under Article 227 of the Constitution. In our supervisory jurisdiction under that Article, if we come across any order, which is contrary to law, we have ample jurisdiction to quash the same suo motu. If the order passed by respondent no. 12 was void and without jurisdiction, the subsequent orders and the resolution, which arise out of the order of respondent no. 12 are also bad and without jurisdiction.
20. Lastly, Mr. Prasad submitted that in the instant case since respondents 1 to 7 have also acquired a sale deed from respondents 8 and 9, it has gone beyond the purview of the Act. According to him, respondents 1 to 7 have now acquired title not only because of the impugned orders but also because of the sale deed dated 5.10.67 If that is so, respondents 1 to 7 should have no grievance in case the impugned orders and the resolution (Annexures 2 to 5) are quashed.
21. Since the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners under point no. 1 succeeds, it is not necessary to deal with his contention under point no. 2.
22. After careful consideration I allow this application and quash the impugned orders, and the resolution contained in Annexures 2 to 5. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
23. Birendra Prasad Sinha, J.:—I agree.
Application allowed.
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