S. Ali Ahmad, J.:— This appeal by the decree-holder opposite party arises out of an order passed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure dismissing the execution case as barred by limitation.

2. To appreciate the points involved in the case, it will be necessary to mention a few dates. The Judgment in Money Suit No. 17/3 of 1953/57 was delivered on 24th August, 1957. The decree, which was for recovery of Rs. 21,154/13/4 besides costs, was sealed and signed on the 16th November, 1957. Execution petition was presented on 10th October, 1969 for execution of the aforesaid decree. This application was registered as Execution Case No. 13 of 1969 before the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur. The judgment-debtors-respondents appeared and filed objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure contending, inter alia, that the decree could not be executed as it had become barred by lapse of time. The Court below on a consideration of the materials placed before it came to the conclusion that Article 136 of the limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was applicable and the fact that the junior advocate of the decree-holder-appellant was under the wrong impression that time began to run not from 248.1957 but from 17.11.1957 was immaterial and that the prayer in the circumstances for condoning the delay, could not be allowed. Since the execution was levied beyond the period of 12 years, the court below held that the execution was barred by limitation as provided under Article 136 of the Act. It accordingly dismissed the execution case. Hence this appeal by the decree-holder-appellant.

3. Mr. T.K Prasad in support of the appeal first contended that the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has now been made much wider than what it was under the Limitation Act, 1908. He contended, therefore, that the delay, if any, in filing the execution petition should be condoned as it was caused on account of wrong advice given by the junior advocate. It is true that the scope of Section 5 of the Act is now wider but this section itself excludes admittance of any application under any of the provisions of order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure after the period prescribed by the Act. It is clear, therefore, that the time prescribed by the Act cannot be extended under any circumstance under this section. This argument, therefore, must fail.

4. Admittedly the Article applicable for recovery of the decretal amount is Article 136 of the Act. This Article corresponds to Article 182 of the Old Limitation Act. It will be useful to quote these Articles. Article 136 of the Act and Article 182 of the old limitation Act, run as follow:—

ACT OF 1963, ART. 136 “136. For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Twelve years. When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place- Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of the decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. ACT OF 1908. ART. 182 ‘182. For the execution of a decree or order of any civil court not provided for by Article 183 or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Three years; or where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered, six years. 1. The date of the decree or order, or 2. (Where there has been an appeal); the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, or 3. (Where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review, or 4. (Where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment, or 5. (Where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order, or 6. in respect of any amount, recovered by execution of the decree or order, which the decree-holder has been directed to refund by a decree passed in a suit for such refund the date of such last mentioned decree or, in the case of an appeal therefrom, the date of the final decree of the appellate court or of the withdrawal of the appeal, or 7. (Where the application is to enforce any payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date) such date.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant first contended that under the new Article limitation begins to run from the day the decree becomes enforceable whereas under Article 182 of the Old Limitation Act, 1908, time ran from the date of the decree. He further contended that the decree became enforceable after the decree was sealed and signed. If this argument is accepted, then the execution has been levied within 12 years and, therefore, is not barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the change “from the date of the decree” to when the decree becomes enforceable, does not alter the position in so far as the present decree is concerned. He contended that by virtue of Rule 7 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure, the date of the decree is the date of the judgment and the decree became enforceable immediately after the judgment was pronounced. He, therefore, contended that the execution case has been rightly held to be barred by limitation. Learned counsels in support of their arguments have cited cases decided by this Court as also by the Calcutta High Court. Before I deal with those cases, it will be fruitful to see as to why Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was replaced by the new Article 136 of the Act.

6. Chitaley and Rao in their Limitation Act, 1963, Vol. II at page 1870 under the heads “objects and reasons” have quoted it as follows:

“Existing Article 182 has been a fruitful source of litigation and therefore the proposed Art. 135, (now Art. 136) in lieu thereof, provides that the maximum period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of any civil court shall be 12 years from the date when the decree or order became enforceable (which is usually the date of the decree or order) or, where the decree of subsequent order directs any payment of money or delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, from the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree or order. There is no reason why a decree should be kept alive for more than 12 years, Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, provides that a decree ceases to be enforceable after 12 years. In England also the time fixed for enforcing a judgment is 12 years. Where, however the judgment debtor has by fraud or force prevented the execution of a decree within the prescribed period, suitable provisions for extending the period are being made in Clause 16 (now S. 17) of the Bill on the lines of S. 48(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Existing Article 183, which makes special provision for decrees and orders of Courts established by Royal Charter, is no longer necessary.

It is also provided that the period of 12 years will not apply to decrees granting perpetual injunctions.”

7. The decision in the case of (1) Biswapali Dey v. Kennsington Stores (A.I.R 1972 Calcutta 172) is the only case cited at the Bar which has noticed the expression ‘when the decree or order became enforceable’. According to the learned Judge, who decided the case the word ‘enforceable’ has been used in the context of such decrees or orders whose operation has been kept in abeyance by the language used in the said decrees or orders themselves. Usually decrees or orders become enforceable immediately after they are made. But cases are not unknown when they become enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified event. It appears to me the expression ‘enforceable’ has been used to cover such decrees or orders also which are not enforceable at the time they are made but become enforceable. Subsequently the expression ‘enforceable’ obviously embraces such decrees and orders which enforceable, immediately after they are made and the period of 12 years in such cases begins to run from the day the decrees or orders are made. This brings us to the next question as to what is the date of the decree.

8. The decree comes into existence as soon as the judgment is pronounced and not on the day when it is sealed and signed in accordance with Section 33 and Order XX, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Pro-cedure. Rule 7 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the decree shall bear the date the day on which the judgment was pronounced. It is on account of this legal friction contained in Rule 7 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure that the date of the decree relates back to the day on which the judgment was pronounced. I am supported in my view by a decision of this Court in the case of (2) Rajeshwari Rai v. Shankar Rai (1962 B.L.J.R 434).

9. Next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the decree could be executed without the signing and sealing of the decree in a formal way. The answer to this question is given under Rule 11 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 where the decree is for payment of money, on an oral prayer made by the decree-holder, the court may order immediate execution of the decree by the arrest of the judgment debtor prior to the preparation of a warrant if he is within the precincts of the court. This sub-rule leads to the inference that action can be taken prior to the preparation of the decree under Order XX, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Again Sub-rule (2) of the rule provides that every application for execution of a decree shall be in writing signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case and shall contain in a tabular form specified particulars. It is not necessary under this sub-rule to file certified copy of the decree. The court may, without the cerified copy of the decree, proceed with execution. It is only under Sub-rule (3) that the court may require the applicant to produce a certified copy of the decree. Unless an order is made under Sub-rule (3) calling upon the applicant to produce certified copy of the decree, the execution has to proceed on the basis of an application under Sub-rule (2). In A.I.R 1972 Calcutta 172 (Supra) and in the case of (3) Lal Baijnath Prasad v. Nursingdas Guzrati (A.I.R 1958 Calcutta 1), it has been held that the time taken in preparation of the decree cannot be excluded for the purpose of limitation. I am in full agreement with the law laid down in these two cases and as a general preposition of law, it has to be held that the time taken in preparation of the formal decree cannot be excluded for the purpose of Article 136 of the Act. This proposition, however, is subject to the condition that the decree for realisation of money or any part thereof has been ascertained in the judgment. In case whole or any part thereof has been mentioned in the judgment then whole of the decree or part of the decree, as the case may be, becomes enforceable immediately on the pronouncement of the judgment (which is the date of the decree). But where the amount decreed or any part thereof has to be ascertained subsequent to the pronouncement of the judgment then the whole or part of the decree which has to be ascertained subsequently remains in abeyance till the amount is ascertained. A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of (4) Ramnath Das v. Saha Chowdhury & Co. Ltd. (A.I.R 1974 Calcutta 246) where it was held that the decree so far as it related to the payment of cost was not enforceable until the amount of cost was ascertained upon taxation and directions contained therein to the taking officer were complied with. Now, therefore, the judgment and the decree which the appellant decree-holder wanted to execute will have to be examined.

10. The suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 21,154-13-4 was decreed besides interest with costs. The amount of Rs. 21,154-13-4 was ascertained in the judgment itself and, therefore, became enforceable immediately on pronouncement of the judgment. It was not at all necessary for the decree-holder to wait for preparat; on of a formal decree. The rate of interest and how it was to be determined was also clearly indicated in the judgment. Therefore, the amount of interest could also be ascertained by decree holder without any assistance from the office of the court passing the judgment and became enforceable at once. The judgment was pronounced on 24th August, 1957, which is the date of the decree and the execution case was filed on 10th October, 1969, i.e beyond 12 years. Therefore, the execution in so far as it relates to recovery of part of Rs. 21.154-13-4 and interest thereon is barred by limitation. As I have said above, the judgment was pronounced on 24th August, 1957, with the proportionate costs against the respondent-judgment-debtors on the lines Indicated in the judgment. The amount of costs, however, was not ascertained in the judgment. This had to be done by the office on the lines indicated by the decree. Since the appellant-decree-holder could not ascertain as to what shall be the exact amount of costs it was not possible for him to enforce the decree in so far as it related to costs. Rs. 2190.62 paise, the amount of costs awarded to him was ascertained for the first time on 16th November, 1957, when the decree was sealed and signed. It was on this day that the decree in so far as it related to costs became enforceable and it could be executed within 12 years from that day. Since the execution petition was filed on 10th October, 1969, the claim for the amount of costs could not be said to be barred under Article 136 of the Act.

11. In the result, the execution case is held to be barred by limitation in respect of the decree for recovery of Rs. 21,154/13/4 or any part thereof. It is, however, within the period of limitation in respect of Rs. 2190.62 paise (amount of costs). The order under appeal is accordingly modified. The execution proceeding will now proceed for recovery of costs only. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs throughout.

12. Shambhu Prasad Singh, J.:— I agree.

Appeal allowed in respect of cost only.