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The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bihar, Patna v. Messrs Vijoy Kumar Budhia, Ranchi Opp. Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
The reference arises under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee, Shri Vijoy Kumar Budhia (an individual shareholder in Ganpati Properties (P) Ltd., Ranchi), received 83/510th share of a company's property on voluntary liquidation. The voluntary liquidator valued the company's property at Rs. 1,53,000/-, making the assessee's share Rs. 24,900/-. The Income-tax Officer (I.T.O.) rejected the liquidator's valuation as inadequate and determined the company's market value at Rs. 4,50,000/-, fixing the assessee's share at Rs. 73,235/-. The I.T.O. computed a capital gain of Rs. 48,335/- by deducting the liquidator's value (taken as the value on 1.1.54) from the market value assessed, and included that amount in the assessee's total income.
The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who accepted the assessee's contention that the I.T.O. lacked competence under Section 52 to enhance the liquidator's valuation and deleted the Rs. 48,335/- addition. The Department appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal, relying on a Gujarat High Court bench decision (C.I.T. Gujarat v. R.M. Amin, 82 I.T.R. 194), held that distribution on liquidation did not amount to a transfer within Section 45 read with Section 2(47) and therefore affirmed the deletion. The Additional Commissioner of Income-tax filed a reference under Section 256(1), posing questions as to whether the Tribunal was right to disallow the I.T.O.'s inclusion of Rs. 48,335/- as capital gains and whether the Tribunal correctly applied the Gujarat decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the amount received by the shareholder on liquidation (the assessee's share) was a "transfer of capital asset" within the meaning of Section 2(47) and thus chargeable under Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
- Whether, assuming the first issue resolves in a particular way, the sum of Rs. 48,335/- was rightly included as capital gains in the assessee's total income — specifically, whether the I.T.O. could determine market value and whether the computation under Sections 46(2), 48 and 49 was correct.
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The assessee contended that receipt of the company's property on distribution by the voluntary liquidator did not constitute a transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of Section 45 read with Section 2(47), and therefore no capital gains tax arose on that receipt.
- The assessee further asserted that, if any capital gains principle applied, the market value as on 1.1.1954 (taken as Rs. 1,53,000/- for the entire property and Rs. 24,900/- for his share) should be taken as the cost of acquisition under available statutory options.
Department's Arguments
- The Department argued before the Tribunal that even if Section 52 was not applicable (as accepted), the I.T.O. should have his determination of market value upheld under Section 46(2) of the Act, and therefore the deletion of Rs. 48,335/- by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not justified.
- The Additional Commissioner framed questions challenging whether the Tribunal correctly applied the Gujarat High Court principle (C.I.T. Gujarat v. R.M. Amin) to the facts, implicitly questioning whether liability could be fixed under Section 46(2) and whether the I.T.O. had power to determine market value under Section 46(2).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat II v. R.M. Amin (82 I.T.R. 194) | Held that distribution of assets on liquidation did not amount to a transfer under Section 45 (corresponding to Section 12B of the earlier Act). | The Tribunal relied on this Gujarat decision to hold that the distribution to the shareholder did not attract capital gains under Section 45; the High Court used this precedent to answer the first question in the assessee's favour (i.e., no transfer under Section 2(47)/Section 45). |
| Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (42 I.T.R. 589) | Principle that if a question of law is raised before the Tribunal but it fails to deal with it, it is deemed to have been dealt with and therefore arises out of its order. | Invoked to observe that the Department should have pointedly raised the Section 46(2) issue before the Tribunal; the Court treated the omitted question as arising from the Tribunal's order for purposes of the reference. |
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Associated Industrial Development Co. (P) Ltd. (73 I.T.R. 50) | Calcutta High Court took the same view as Gujarat — distribution on liquidation is not a transfer attracting capital gains under the corresponding earlier statutory provision. | Referenced alongside the Gujarat decision to support the conclusion that distribution does not amount to a transfer under Section 45/earlier Section 12B; the Supreme Court later approved this view (see next row). |
| Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. (89 I.T.R. 45) | Supreme Court approved the views of the Gujarat and Calcutta High Courts that distribution of assets on liquidation does not amount to a sale/exchange/relinquishment/transfer so as to attract the relevant capital gains provision. | Used to affirm that distribution of assets in liquidation is not a transfer under Section 45 (corresponding earlier provision), supporting the Court's conclusion on the first issue. |
| Unspecified Supreme Court authority cited as 37 I.T.R. 11 (referenced in text) | Concerned with the limits of a High Court's power to call for supplementary statements and to ask new questions not arising out of the Tribunal's order (used to argue procedural limits). | The Court distinguished the present case from the facts underlying 37 I.T.R. 11, holding that here the questions referred were referable to the Tribunal's order and therefore within the Court's powers to decide. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court carried out a two-part analysis: (A) whether receipt on liquidation amounted to a "transfer" under Section 45 read with Section 2(47), and (B) whether the I.T.O.'s inclusion of Rs. 48,335/- as capital gains was sustainable under Section 46(2) read with Sections 48 and 49.
A. On whether distribution constitutes a "transfer" under Section 45 / Section 2(47)
- The Court surveyed existing case law (Gujarat and Calcutta High Courts) and the Supreme Court's approval (Madurai Mills) and concluded that distribution of assets of a company in liquidation does not amount to a transaction of sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer so as to attract Section 45 (corresponding earlier provision).
- On that basis the Court answered the first question in the negative: the amount received by the assessee as shareholder on liquidation was not a transfer of capital asset within Section 2(47), and therefore not chargeable under Section 45.
B. On liability under Section 46(2) and correctness of the inclusion of Rs. 48,335/-
- The Court noted that Section 46(1) expressly excludes company distribution on liquidation from being regarded as a transfer by the company for Section 45, but Section 46(2) expressly charges the shareholder to tax under the head "Capital gains" in respect of money received or the market value of assets on the date of distribution (subject to certain deductions).
- The Court reasoned that the I.T.O. was enjoined with the duty and was within power to determine the market value of the assets received by the shareholder on the date of distribution for the purposes of computing full value under Section 46(2) and thereafter Sections 48 and 49 for computation of capital gains.
- The Court explained the interplay of Sections 46(2), 48, 49 and 55: Section 49(1)(iii)(c) provides that cost of acquisition for assets received on distribution is to be treated as the cost to the previous owner (subject to adjustments), while Section 55 gives the assessee an option to take the fair market value as on 1.1.1954 as cost in specified circumstances and Section 55(2)(iii) treats market value on the date of distribution as cost of acquisition when assessed under Section 46.
- Applying these provisions to the facts: the I.T.O.'s determination fixed the full value on date of distribution at Rs. 73,235/- (assessee's share); deducting the cost on 1.1.54 (Rs. 24,900/-) under Section 48 produced the capital gain of Rs. 48,335/-, which matched the I.T.O.'s computation.
- The Court observed that neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor the Tribunal examined whether the specific market value fixed by the I.T.O. (for the entire company property) was too high; the Court stated that this factual assessment was not the subject of the present legal reference.
- Procedurally, the Court analysed the framing of questions by the Department and the Tribunal; although some questions were not phrased to explicitly invoke Section 46(2), the Court treated the Tribunal's second question broadly and reframed the legal question to directly address whether Rs. 48,335/- was rightly included as capital gain under Section 46 read with Sections 48 and 49.
- The Court rejected the assessee's argument that the definition of "income" in Section 2(24) (which mentions capital gains chargeable under Section 45) excludes capital gains chargeable under Section 46(2), explaining that the definition is inclusive and that the statutory context requires reading Section 46(2) capital gains within the definition of "income".
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court reached two principal conclusions:
- It held that, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the amount received by the assessee as a shareholder on liquidation was not a transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of Section 2(47) and therefore not chargeable under Section 45 of the Act (answer to the first question: in favour of the assessee on that point).
- It further held that the sum of Rs. 48,335/- was rightly included by the Income-tax Officer as capital gain in the total income of the assessee and that such inclusion is sustainable under Section 46(2) read with Sections 48 and 49 of the Act (answer to the reframed second question: in favour of the Revenue).
Implications / Direct Consequences:
- The tax consequence for the assessee is that the capital gain of Rs. 48,335/- computed by the I.T.O. stands as correctly included in his taxable income under Section 46(2) read with Sections 48 and 49, and therefore the assessee remains liable for tax on that amount.
- The Court ordered that the assessee pay the costs of the reference; hearing fee assessed at Rs. 100/-.
- The decision applies and affirms the established rule that distribution on liquidation is not a "transfer" by the company under Section 45 but that shareholders may be taxable under Section 46(2), and that the I.T.O. has the power to determine market value for the purposes of computation under Section 46(2) and related provisions. The Court applied pre-existing precedents rather than purporting to lay a novel principle of law.
Disposition in the original text: "Application allowed." (Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. concurred.)
Untwalia, C.J:— This reference under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (hereinafter called the Act) made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, demonstrates how some cases including the present one, which have come to my knowledge, are not properly handled at the hands of the departmental authorities or representatives or when the case goes before the Tribunal. As I proceed to state the facts of the case and the points involved in this reference, there will be sufficient warrant for the remark which I have just made in the beginning.
2. The assessee Shri Vijoy Kumar Budhia of Ranchi has been assessed under Section 143(3) of the Act as an individual. He was a share-holder in a private limited company known as Ganpati Properties (P) Ltd., Ranchi. The company went into voluntary liquidation. The voluntary liquidator valued the company's property situated at Patna at Rs. 1,53,000/-. The assessee received 83/510th share in the said property of the company. The value of his share, therefore, came to Rs. 24,900/-. The Income-tax Officer found that the value of the property assessed by the liquidator was highly inadequate. He accordingly assessed the market value of the property of the company at Rs. 4,50,000/-. Thus, the value of the share of the assessee in the property of the company distributed to, and received by, him was determined at Rs. 73,235/-. The assessee's stand that he was not chargeable for income from any capital gain on account of his receipt of the company's property was not accepted by the Income-tax Officer. He took the value of the company's property at Rs. 1,53,000/- as prevailing on 1.1.54 Deducting the said value from the market value of Rs. 4,50,000/-, the capital gain in the hands of the assessee was determined at Rs. 48,335/-, i.e, 83/510th share in the sum of Rs. 2,97,000/-. A copy of the order of the Income-tax Officer is Annexure A to the statement of the case and forms part of it.
3. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. He also rejected the stand of the assessee that in a matter like this there was no capital gain in the hands of the assessee, namely, the share-holder. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the contention put forward on behalf of the assessee in appeal that the Income-tax Officer was not competent to enhance the value of the property as determined by the liquidator. He, therefore, deleted the addition of Rs. 48,335/- from the total income of the assessee as determined by the Income-tax Officer. A copy of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is Annexure B and it also forms part of the statement of the case.
4. The Department preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. It was contended by the Department that the provisions of Section 52 of the Act were not applicable as was the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but then he should have upheld the market value of the property determined by the Income-tax Officer under Section 46(2) of the Act; hence, deletion of the sum of Rs. 48,335/- from the total income of the assessee was not justified. The assessee argued before the Tribunal that there was no transfer of capital assets within the meaning of Section 45 of the Act read with Section 2(47), when the assessee received his share of the property on distribution by the voluntary liquidator of the company; hence, he was not liable to pay any tax on the allegedly capital gains.
5. The Tribunal relying upon a Bench decision of the Gujrat High Court in (1) Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujrat II v. R.M Amin (82 I.T.R 194) held that there was no transfer of any capital asset within the meaning of Section 45 of the Act read with Section 2(47); hence, the Income-tax Officer was wrong in including the sum of Rs. 48,335/- on the basis of the fair market value of the share of the asses see, in the property distributed as being chargeable to income-tax on capital gain. A copy of the order of the Tribunal is Annexure C to the statement of the case and forms part of it.
6. The Additional Commissioner of Income-tax filed an application under Section 256(1) of the Act asking the Tribunal to state a case and refer the following two questions of law for opinion of this Court—
“(1) ‘Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the tribunal was justified in holding that the I.T.O was wrong in including the sum of Rs. 48,335/- to the assessee's income being the fair market value of the share of the assessee on the distribution of the net assets of Ganpati Properties (P) Ltd. by the liquidator as capital gains arising during the year within the meaning of Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
(2) ‘Whether on the facts and the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal has applied correctly to the facts of this case the principle of law laid down by the Gujrat High Court in the case of C.I.T Gujrat v. R.M Amin reported in (1971) 82 ITR 194?”
7. The Tribunal in paragraph 6 of the statement of the case has stated that questions of law referred by the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax do not arise but the questions of law which emerge out of the finding of the Tribunal are—
(1) “Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the amount received by the assessee as a share holder on liquidation of the company was a transfer of capital asset within the meaning of Section 2(47) of the I.T Act, 1961?’
(2) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, Rs. 48,335/- was rightly included as capital gains in the total income of the assessee?”
8. In between the two questions, the Tribunal has stated—
“If the answer to the above question in the affirmative then:—….”.
9. It would thus be seen that while referring the two questions of law for opinion of this Court, the Tribunal felt persuaded to think that, perhaps, it would be necessary to express opinion on question no. 2 only if answer to question no. 1 was in the affirmative-otherwise not. I shall now proceed to state some more matters with reference to the orders of the departmental authorises as also of the Tribunal. But before I do so, I may state the position of law which is in vogue after coming into force of the Act and after enactment of Section 46(2). I shall discuss the law on the point later in my judgment, but here I may state that the assets received by a share-holder from the company in liquidation on, distribution of the assets are chargeable to income-tax as tax on capital gain under Section 46(2) of the Act and not under Section 45. The method of computation of the quantum of capital gain is indicated in Sections 46(2), 48 and 49. I shall deal with them later in my judgment. In this background, I proceed first to refer to the order of the Income-tax Officer. It would be found from his order that the assessee had not shown any income from capital gains but on 20.6.68 a letter was filed stating that, as the properties were received on liquidation of the limited company, the transfer did not amount to actual sale and, therefore, there was no capital gain in the hands of the assessee. By his another letter dated 19.3.69, the assessee had further stated that, even if it was decided that any principle of taxation on capital gain was attracted, the cost of assets, namely, Rs. 1,53,000/- may be taken to be the market value of the property as on 1.1.54 and that the market value was the same on the date of distribution, i.e, 1.10.63 The Income-tax Officer gave certain materials in this order for coming to the conclusion that the market value of the property distributed on 1.10.63 could not be less than Rs. 4,50,000/-. Thinking that the under valuation was for avoidance of proper tax under Section 45, he proceeded to determine the fair market value in exercise of his power under Section 52 and did so with the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax as required by the said provision of law. In that view of the matter, he added the extra value of the capital assets received by the assessee, to the tune of Rs. 48,335/-, to the total income of the assessee.
10. When the assessee went up in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It would appear from his order that he brushed aside the argument made on behalf of the assessee that capital gains in his hands could not be taxed under Section 45 of the Act, by stating that the clear provisions contained in Section 46 of the Act would be applicable and the point did not need any elaboration. But then, he held that the Income-tax Officer had no power under Section 52 of the Act to enhance and determine the fair market value of the property in this case as one of the conditions for exercise of that power was surely not fulfilled, namely, avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee under Section 45. Taking the two values at par, therefore, he came to the conclusion that there was no capital gain in the hands of the asessee and hence the inclusion of the amount in his assessment was erroneous.
11. The Department went up in appeal before the Tribunal. While recapitulating in paragraph 3 of its order as to what was done by the appellate Assistant Commissioner it referred to his view with reference to Section 46. In paragraph 4 of its, order, the Tribunal said—
“At the time of the arguments, the Departmental Representative urged before us that since the provisions of sec. 52 of the Act were not applicable, the A.A.C should have upheld the market value determined by the I.T.O under sec. 46(2) of the Act and, as such, the order of the A.A.C was not proper and deserves to be set aside.”
12. (Paragraph 4 as printed in the paper book is incorrect, we have quoted in from one of the certified copies produced before us on behalf of the assessee.)
13. It would thus be seen that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had opined that the liability of the assessee in this case can be fixed under Section 46(2) of the Act. It was not thought necessary for the Department to challenge this finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The argument, therefore, confined before the Tribunal was that the Income-tax Officer had the power to determine the market value under Section 46(2) of the Act although he had no such under Section 52. The argument put forward on behalf of the assessee as noted in paragraph 5 of the order is as follows:—
“On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the assessee that there was no transfer of capital asset within the meaning of sec. 45 read with sec. 2(47) when the assessee received Rs. 24,900/- on final distribution of the net assets of Ganpati Properties (P) Ltd. Ranchi.”
14. Whether the assessee combated the argument of the Department with reference to Section 46(2) of the Act or not is not clear. The Tribunal proceeded to discuss the argument put forward on behalf of the assessee and did not touch at all in its appellate order the argument put forward on behalf of the Department. It accepted the argument of the assessee, relied upon the Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in (1) 82 I.T.R 194 and decided that—
“….the I.T.O was wrong in including Rs. 48,335/- being the fair market value of the share of the assessee on the distribution of the net assets of Ganpati Properties (P) Ltd. by the liquidator as capital gains arising during the year.”
15. It, therefore, maintained the final order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner although for different reasons.
16. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in (2) Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (42 I.T.R 589) at page 611,
“When a question of law is raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal fails to deal with it, it must be deemed to have been dealt with by it, and is, therefore, one arising out of its order.
On behalf of the Department, therefore, a question of law ought to have been pointedly raised as to whether the liability of the assessee in this case for tax on capital gain could be determined under Section 46(2) of the Act and so the Income-tax Officer had power to determine the market value under the said provision of law. When in appeal it was conceded that Section 52 was not attracted, by necessary implication it must be deemed to have been conceded—and, I may add—conceded if rightly, that the assessee could be held liable in this case under Section 45 of the Act. Yet it is strange to find that the first question of law asked to be referred on behalf of the Department was with reference to Section 45 and no question of law was framed in specific terms referring to Section 46 at all. The second question framed was whether the principle of law enunciated by the Gujarat High Court had been correctly applied to the facts of this case. If the facts of this case were referable to Section 45, undoubtedly the principles have been correctly applied. But the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax sought for a reference on the second question clearly on the footing that the principles had not been correctly applied because this was not a case which was governed by Section 45 rather it was a case where the liability of the assessee could be fixed under Section 46(2). It is, however, not intelligible to me as to why a specific question in certain term with reference to Section 46(2) of the Act was not sought to be referred to this Court by the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax. Be that as it may while making reference of the two questions of law, the Tribunal framed the first question more or less incorporating therein the, spirit of the first question sought to be referred by the Department. The second question referred by the Tribunal is undoubtedly comprehensive enough to cover the question of law which does arise in this case and which will consist of two parts, namely, whether the Income-tax Officer had power to impose tax on the assessee in this case under Section 46(2) of the Act; if so, whether he could determine the, market value of the assets distributed in exercise of that power. But, while referring the second question, the Tribunal again ignored that the case would be squarely covered by Section 46(2) of the Act and the second question was necessary to be answered not only when the answer to the first question was in the affirmative but, more so, when the answer was in the negative. I shall therefore, ignore the rider put by the Tribunal in between the two questions and shall treat both the questions as having been referred to this Court for its opinion.
17. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had taken an identical view as the one taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of (3) Commissioner of Income-tax v. Associated Industrial Development Co. (P) Ltd. (73 I.T.R 50). The view expressed in the two cases was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of (4) Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. (89 I.T.R 45) and at page 51, after referring with approval to the two decisions of the two High Courts, it was stated by Khanna, J., delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court—
“We are, therefore, of the view that distribution of the assets of the companies in liquidation does not amount to a transaction of sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer so as to attract Section 12B of the Act.”
18. For the purposes of the point at issue, Section 12B of the Income-tax Act, 1922 corresponds to Section 45 of the Act. The decision in the Gujarat case, in term, was given with reference to Section 45. It is therefore, clear that the first question referred to this Court has got to be answerd in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. I accordingly hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the amount received by the assessee as a share-holder on liquidation of the company was not a transfer of capital asset within the meaning of Section 2(47) of the Act and hence he was not chargeable to income-tax on capital gain under Section 45 of the Act.
19. I now proceed to discuss the second question by pointing out the relevant provisions of the Act. I ought to have stated that the assessment year in question was 1964-1965. Section 45 of the Act, as originally enacted, became Sub-section (1) of Section 45 by Act 5 of 1964 which came into force with effect from 1.4.64 By the same Act, Sub-sections (2) to (4) were added to Section 45. The said Sub-sections, however, were deleted with effect from 1.4.66 by Section 13 of the Finance Act, 1966. For my purpose, I shall quote only Sub-section (1) of Section 45 which was in force at the relevant time. The said Sub-section reads—
“and profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall, save as otherwise provided in Section 53 and 54, be chargeable to income-tax under the head ‘Capital gains’ and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place.”
20. The mode of assessment of capital gains on distribution of, assets of companies in liquidation has been provided in Section 46 of the Act, which reads:—
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 45, where the assets of a company are distributed to its shareholders on its liquidation, such distribution shall not be regarded as a transfer by the company for the purposes of Section 45.
(2) Where a shareholder on the liquidation of a company receives any money or other assets from the company, he shall be chargeable to ‘income-tax under the head ‘Capital gains’, in respect of the money so received or the market value of the other assets on the date of distribution, as reduced by the amount assessed as dividend within the meaning of Sub-Clause (c) of Clause (22) of Section 2 and the sum so arrived at shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration for the purposes of Section 48.”
21. Sub-section (1) makes it clear that, where the assets of a company are distributed to its shareholders on its liquidation, it is not a transfer by the company for the purposes of Section 45. The company is, therefore, not chargeable to income-tax on any capital gain in respect of such transaction. But Sub-section (2) imposes a liability on the shareholder and he becomes chargeable to income-tax under the head ‘Capital gains’ in respect of the money received or the market value of the other assets received by him on the date of distribution. For determining the full value for the purposes of Section 48, the amount assessed as divided within the meaning of Sub-Clause (c) of Clause (22) of Section 2 of the Act has got to be deducted from the said money or the market value, which in this case does not arise. Section 48 prescribes the mode of computation of the income chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’. The method of computation is to deduct from the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a Result of the transfer of the capital assets the amounts, namely, the cost of acquisition of the capital assets and the cost of any improvement thereof. In this case, therefore, the computation of income chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’ under Section 48 of the Act undoubtedly had to be done by the Income-tax Officer. It was inherent in the exercise of that power to determine the full value of the consideration, as provided in Section 46(2). The Income-tax Officer was, therefore, enjoined a duty to determine the market value of the assets received by the share-holder on liquidation of the company on the date of distribution. A contributory receiving assets from a company not necessarily receives the assets of the value determined by, the liquidator. Where such a value has been determined by the liquidator, it is the duty of the Income-tax Officer and within his power to determine the market value of the assets received by the shareholder and such a market value has to be determined as prevalent on the date of distribution. In this case the Income-tax Officer determined the market value of the assets received by the assessee from the company on liquidation on the date of distribution to be Rs. 73,235/- From this full value had to be deducted the cost of acquisition of the capital asset; there was no cost of improvement in this case. In a case like this, the cost of acquisition of the capital asset has to be determined under Section 49(1)(iii)(c), the relevant words of which would read as follows:—
“(1) Where the capital asset became the property of the assessee—
(i) …………
(ii) …………….
(iii)(a).. ….. ….
(b) ……………….
(c) on any distribution of assets on the liquidation of a company….
(d) ………………..
(e) ………………..
the cost of acquisition of the asset shall be deemed to be the cost for which the previous owner of the property acquired it, as increased by the cost of any improvement of the assets incurred by the previous owner or the assessee, as the case may be.
…………….”
22. Section 55 gives in option to the assessee to take the market value of the asset as on the 1st of January, 1954 to be the cost of acquisition of the capital asset. I shall read the terms of Section 55(2)(ii) and (iii)
“(2) For the purposes of Sections 48, and 49, ‘cost of acquisition’, in relation to a capital asset,—
(ii) Where the capital asset became the property of the assessee by any of the modes specified in Sub-section (i) of Section 49, and the capital asset became the property of the previous owner before the 1st day of January, 1954, means, the cost of the capital asset to the previous owner or the fair market value of the asset on the 1st day of January, 1954, at the option of the assessee;
(iii) Where the capital asset became the property of the assessee on the distribution of the capital assets of a company on its liquidation and the assessee has been assessed to income-tax under the head ‘Capital gains’ in respect of that asset under Section 46, means the fair market value of the asset on the date of distribution;……”
23. The difference between Clauses (ii) and (iii) is significant. The cost of acquisition in relation to a capital asset for the purposes of Section 49(1)(iii)(c) in this case should be the market value of the company's asset on the 1st day of January, 1954, as was the option of the assessee in this case. And after the assessee has been assessed to income-tax under the head ‘capital gains’ in respect of the asset which he received from the company under Section 46 vis-a-vis any further transaction which he may enter into, the fair market’ value of the asset on the day of distribution will be the cost of acquisition of the capital asset under Clause (iii). I shall make myself clear by making a supposition. Supposing today the assessee sells the assets received by him from the company for Rs. 1,00,000/-, then he will be assessed to income-tax on capital gain on a sum of Rs. 26,765/- only, which is the difference between the figure of 1,00,000 and 73,235/- the fair market value of the asset on the date of distribution. It would thus be seen that in this case for the purposes of Section 46(2) the full value of the asset on the date of distribution was Rs. 73,235/-. From this had to be deducted the value of that asset on 1.1.54 The assessee's share came to Rs. 24,900/-. Under Section 48, deducting the same from the full value, the income chargeable Under the head ‘Capital gains’ will be Rs. 48,335/-, the amount determined by the Income-tax Officer. It is true no doubt that neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor the Tribunal went into the question as to whether the market value fixed by the Income-tax Officer of the assets received by the assessee from the company on liquidation on the date of distribution with reference to the total market value of such assets in the shape of the property of the company situated at Patna was proper or high. But we are not concerned with this matter in this reference. In my opinion, the question of law which does arise from the appellate order of the Tribunal has got to be refrained in order to bring about the real bone of contention between the parties, which will be in consonance with the second question of law referred by the Tribunal and not an addition to it. The reframed question will be—
24. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the sum of Rs. 48,335/- could be held to have been rightly included in the capital gain of the assessee under Section 46 read with Section 48 and 49 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
25. Mr. G.C Bharuka, learned counsel for the assessee, had to concede and conceded rightly, in my opinion, that the liability of the assessee in this case could be fixed under Sections 46(2) and 48 of the Act. But he strenuously submitted that no such question of law was either sought to be referred by the Commissioner of Income-tax nor has any been referred to this Court. He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 37 I.T.R 11. In my opinion, the argument is not sound and must fail. It will be seen from the decision aforesaid of the Supreme Court that by calling for a supplementary statement of the case the High Court purported to ask the Tribunal to decide new questions of fact on the basis of new materials which were not the basis of the Tribunal's appellate order. The question of law which was endeavoured to be roped in by the supplementary statement in the case did not arise out of the Tribunal's appellate order nor was it asked to be referred by the applicant in reference. To crown all, no such question had been referred by the Tribunal. In such a situation, it was held that the power of the High Court under Section (664) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was circumscribed by its power under Section 66(2). In the instant case, however, as I have said above, by necessary implication, question no. 2 sought to be referred by the Department was clearly referable to the liability of the assessee under Section 46(2) of the Act. The principle laid down by the Gujarat High Court was not challenged in the said question; only its application was challenged. Section 46(2), as would appear from the judgment of P.N Bhagwati, C.J, could not be applied in that case the company was not a company to which the said provisions of law could apply. Argument on behalf of the Department with reference to Section 45 was repelled. When the Addl. Commissioner said that the principle of the Gujarat High Court had not been correctly applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, surely he meant to convey that to the facts of this case was applicable to the provision of Section 46(2) of the Act. When the Tribunal referred the second question in that broad and general term, it did invite this Court to record its opinion whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the sum of Rs. 48,335/- was rightly included as capital gain in the total income of the assessee. If the first question referred by the Tribunal were to be answered in the affirmative, the answer to the second question would have followed as a matter of corollary and, perhaps, no specific answer was necessary. Expression of opinion on the second question was necessary chiefly, if not only, when the answer to the first question was in the negative.
26. I would in passing just deal with the argument attempted to have been made on behalf of the assessee that under Section 2(24) of the Act ‘income’ has been defined to include—
“(vi) any capital gains chargeable under Section 45”; and not capital gains chargeable under Section 46(2). I have no difficulty in rejecting this argument and for two reasons. Firstly, the definition of the term ‘income’ starts with the word ‘includes’; the list is not exhaustive. When ‘Section 46(2) read with Section 48 clearly fixes the liability for payment of income-tax on capital gains of the shareholder in a case covered by the said provision of law then it is difficult to wipe off the liability with reference to the inclusive definition of the term ‘income’ in Section 2(24) of the Act. The second reason is that, as in every statute, the definition section starts with the expression “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires”. The context in this case does require otherwise. I may also venture to add one more reason and that is this. Section 45 of the Act is the first section under the head ‘E. Capital gains’. In the definition, therefore, when capital gains are sought to be included, it must, by way of construction, mean that all capital gains which are sought to be charged to income-tax under the said heading are included.
27. For the reasons stated above, I would answer the reframed question in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue and hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Rs. 48,335/- was rightly included by the Income-tax Officer as capital gain in the total income of the assessee and the inclusion is well sustainable under Section 46(2) read with Sections 48 and 49 of the Act. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference; hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/- only.
28. Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. I agree.
Application allowed.
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