Untwalia, J.:— Acharya Prabhakar Mishra, the sole petitioner in this writ application, has obtained a rule from this Court against the Chancellor, Shri Kameshwar Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, respondent No. 1 and Shri S.C Misra, respondent No. 2, to show cause why the order dated the 20th March, 1972 passed by the Chancellor suspending the petitioner from the office of the Vice-Chancellor of the said Sanskrit University, a copy of which is Annexure ‘2’ to the writ application, as also the order of the same date appointing respondent No. 2 as Acting Vice-Chancellor in place of the petitioner, a copy of which is Annexure 3 to the writ application, be not called up and quashed in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Cause has been shown on behalf of respondent No. 1 by Mr. Balabhadra Prasad Singh, learned Advocate-General Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha appeared in support of the rule. Very many facts have been stated in the petition, which have been controverted in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1. An affidavit in reply has been filed by the petitioner. Since no argument was advanced on either side with reference to the detailed facts of the case, I shall refrain from stating them except the skeleton ones. The whole of the argument was confined to the question as to the power of the Chancellor to order suspension of the Vice-Chancellor with reference to the relevant statute, namely the Kameshwara Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit Vishvavidlalaya Act, 1962 (Bihar Act 21 of 1965) hereinafter called the Act.

2. The then Chancellor of the Sanskrit University, Shri Nityanand Kanungo, in exercise of his power under Sec. 10(2) of the Act, appointed the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor for a period of three years from the date he assumed charge or his office. A copy of this order dated the 22nd December, 1970 is Annexure 1 to the writ application. Annexure B to the counter-affidavit is a copy of the notification dated the 19th March, 1972 issued by the Governor of Bihar who is the Chancellor of the University, in exercise of his power conferred by Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 appointing a Commission of Enquiry to enquire into and report in regard to the various allegations of corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and mal-practices levelled against the petitioner in connection with his office as Vice-Chancellor of the Sanskrit University. Numerous items of such allegations have been enumerated in the notification. It is not necessary to reproduce them. On the 20th of March, 1972 respondent No. 1 issued the following notification (Annexure 2)—

“Whereas serious allegations of corrupt practices, irregularities inefficiency and negligence in discharge of official duty, have been received against Acharya Prabhakar Mishra, at present Vice-Chancellor, Kameshwara Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya:

And whereas a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Commissions or Inquiry Act, 1952 (LX of 1952) has been appointed to enquire into the allegations;

And whereas it is considered necessary in view of the serious nature of the allegation that pending the inquiry he should be placed under suspension;

Now, therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Kameshwara Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya Act 1962 (Bihar Act XXI of 1965) read with Section 19 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917 (Bihar and Orissa Act I of 1917) I, D.K Barooah. Chancellor of the said Vishwavidyalaya, hereby order that Acharya Prabhakar Mishra be sus-ended with effect from the date of pub-cation of this notification pending inquiry by the Commission.”

3. On the same date another notification (Annexure 3) was issued by the Chancellor in exercise of his powers under Section 10(10) of the Act appointing respondent No. 2 to carry on the office of the Vice-Chancellor of the Sanskrit University until further orders vice the petitioner placed under suspension.

4. The whole of the argument strenuously put forward by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Chancellor had no power under Section 10(2) of the Act read with Section 19 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act; 1917 to dismiss the petitioner or to suspend him, as under the Act the appointment was for a fixed, certain period of three years. The said period, under no circumstances, Counsel submitted, could be curtailed by termination of the appointment or dismissal of the petitioner and hence he could not be put under suspension either. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha, however, fairly conceded and, in my opinion, rightly that if there was power in the Chancellor to dismiss the Vice-Chancellor under the Act, he had also the power to suspend him. Learned Advocate-General on the other hand, combated the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Bool Chand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University, AIR 1968 SC 292, Learned Counsel for the petitioner not only distinguished the said decision but endeavoured to press this into service for his benefit also.

5. Under Section 7 of the Act the. Chancellor is the highest officer of the University. Under Section 8 the Governor of Bihar shall be the Chancellor. It further provides that he shall by virtue of the office, be the head of the University and the President of the Senate, Section 10(2) provides—

“The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Chancellor and hold office for a term of three years from the date he assumes charge of his office and the said term of three years shall include any further period which may elapse between the expiration of the said three years and the date on which his successor assumes charge of his office.”

6. Sub-section (S) says—

“The Vice-Chancellor, after the expiration of the term of his office, may be re-appointed for only one more term specified in sub-section (2).”

7. Power to make arrangement when any temporary vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice-Chancellor has been provided in sub-section (10) which reads as follows—

“When any temporary vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice-Chancellor, by reason of leave, illness or any other cause, or the Vice-Chancellor, is in the opinion of the Chancellor, unable to perform his functions on account of the absence from the headquarters or for any other reasons, the Chancellor shall make such arrangement as he thinks fit for carrying on the office of the Vice-Chancellor.’

8. I shall now read Section 19 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917—

“Whereas, by a Bihar and Orissa Act or Bihar Act, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority, having power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power/

9. By now it is firmly established that the rule provided in Section 19 of the General Clauses Act, which is equivalent to Section 16 of the Central General Clauses Act, is a rule of construction and interpretation. The section by itself does not confer any power in an appointing authority. As stated above, it was conceded that the Chancellor having a power to make the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor shall also have power to suspend or dismiss him unless a different intention appears from the language of sub-sec. (2) or Section 10 of the Act. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Vice-Chancellor on being appointed by the Chancellor has got a right to hold office for a term of three years which period is to commence from the date he assumes charge of the office and is to terminate on the assumption of office by his successor. In between the period or before its expiry neither dismissal nor suspension can be ordered. In other words, the argument is that the incumbent of the office once appointed gets an indefeasible right to continue in the office for the full term of three years and under no circumstances this period can be curtailed by dismissal or can be temporarily suspended by putting the incumbent under suspension. To me it seems, the argument so put is directly opposed to the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Bool Chand's case. The distinction sought to be made on behalf of the petitioner is neither relevant nor germane to the point at issue.

10. On June 18, 1965 Dr. Bool Chand was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University by order of the then Chancellor of the University. On March 31, 1966 the successor Chancellor ordered him to be suspended from the office of the Vice-Chancellor and by another order issued a notice requiring him to show cause why his services as Vice-Chancellor of the Kurukshetra be not terminated. He submitted his representation, and shortly thereafter filed an application before the High Court of Punjab for a writ in the nature of mandamus quashing the order and the notice. On May 8, 1966 during the pendency of the writ application, the Chancellor passed an order in exercise of his power under sub-cl. (vi) of Clause 4 of Schedule I to the Kurukshetra University Act, 1956 read with Section 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, terminating with immediate effect the services of Dr. Bool Chand from the office of the Vice-Chancellor of Kurukshetra University. The writ petition was then amended by him and a writ of certiorari or an appropriate writ calling for the record and quashing the order dated May, 8, 1966 terminating his services was also claimed. The High Court rejected the petition and against the order of the High Court Bool Chand went up in appeal before the Supreme Court.

11. Section 14(1) of the Kurukshetra University Act, 1956 provided that on the commencement of the said Act the statutes of the University shall be those as set out in Schedule I. The relevant sub-clauses (vi) and (vii) of Clause 4 of Schedule I which have been quoted in the judgment of the Supreme Court are in material particulars the same as sub-sec. (2) of Section 10 of the Act, except that in sub-clause (vii) it is said that the Vice Chancellor shall hold office ordinarily for a period of three years while in sub-section (2) the word ‘ordinarily’ is not to be found. Section 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act is, word for word, the same as Section 19 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act. It would appear from paragraph 5 at page 295 of the Report that Counsel for the appellant urged that Section 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act had no application to the interpretation of the Kurukshetra University Act because Clause 4(vii) of the Statutes, which prescribes that the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor shall ordinarily be for a period of three years discloses a different intention. This argument was repelled by Shah, J., as he then was, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court thus—

“But Clause 4(vii) of the Statutes does not purport to confer upon a person appointed Vice-Chancellor an indefeasible right to continue in office for three years: the clause merely places a restriction upon the power of the Chancellor, when fixing the tenure of the office of Vice-Chancellor.”

12. It would thus be noticed that the argument of the appellant before the Supreme Court was not repelled because of the use of the word ‘ordinarily’ in Clause 4(vii): it was repelled because the Statutes aid not purport to confer upon a person appointed Vice-Chancellor an indefeasible right to continue in office for three years. The providing for the period was interpreted to mean a restriction upon the power of the Chancellor when fixing the tenure of the office of the Vice-Chancellor. In other words, ordinarily the Chancellor under the Kurukshetra University Act could not fix the tenure of the office of the Vice-Chancellor while appointing one to that office for more or less than the period of three years. The said period could be renewed under Clause 4(vii) of the Statutes without there being any restriction in the number of renewals while under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act the Vice-Chancellor after the expiration of the term of his office can be re-appointed for only one more term specified in sub-section (2) under which sub-section the term of appointment has got to be invariably for three years. The Chancellor under the Kurukshetra University Act, under certain circumstances, could make a departure in that term while making the appointment whereas under sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act a departure from the term of three years is not permissible. It would be noticed from paragraph 9 of the Report at page 296 that the letter of appointment of Bool Chand had, in his case also, created a tenure of office for three years. Even, then in paragraph 8 his Lordship was pleased to say:—

“It is true, the office of the Vice-Chancellor of a University is one of great responsibility and carries with it considerable prestige and authority. But we are unable to hold that a person appointed a Vice-Chancellor is entitled to continue in office for the full period of his appointment even if it turns out that he is physically decrepit, mentally infirm, or grossly immoral. Absence of a provision setting up procedure for determining the employment of the Vice-Chancellor in the Act or the Statutes or Ordinances does not, in our judgment, lead to the inference that the tenure of office of Vice-Chancellor is not liable to be determined.”

13. The termination of service in Bool Chand's case was attacked on many other grounds which were all repelled by the Supreme Court and the appeal failed there. It is again to be pointed out that even in paragraph 8 of the judgment no stress was laid on, and no reference was at all made to, the use of the word ‘ordinarily’ in the Statutes.

14. The distinction sought to be made between the Supreme Court case and the instant one because of the absence of the word ‘ordinarily’ in sub-s. (2) of Section 10, to my mind, is of no consequence, as the ratio of the Supreme Court decision even with that difference in the wordings of the two provisions of law aptly and squarely applies to the point at issue in the instant case. It is difficult to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner that the reasons given by the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment can be given a go-by and made not applicable to the case of the petitioner merely because of the absence of the word ‘ordinarily’ in sub-section (2) of Section 10. The argument is ingenious but on scrutiny not sustainable. In Bool Chand's case after issuing show cause notice and on consideration of the representation of the Vice-Chancellor his appointment had been terminated by the Chancellor while in the present case an enquiry has been ordered against the petitioner under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952; during the pendency of the enquiry he has been put under suspension. Although, Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha pointed out certain other provisions from the Act as also from other Acts to show that in many cases the period of a particular office is fixed he was not able to cite any decision directly in his favour to show that when the period of an office is fixed and certain, in absence of the use of the word ‘ordinarily’ or ‘generally’ the power of dismissal or suspension is necessarily excluded. After bestowing my due and careful consideration to the case of the petitioner, as it deserved, I have come to the conclusion that the rule of construction engrafted in Section 19 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, does come into play in interpretation of Section 10(2) of the Act and it has got to be held that under certain justifiable circumstances the Chancellor has the power to dismiss a Vice-Chancellor. The Supreme Court has interpreted the word ‘dismiss’ in paragraph 6 of the judgment in Bool Chand's case not only to mean dismissal by way of punishment but also including termination of appointment. That being so, it must be further held that the Chancellor, respondent No. 1, had the power to suspend the petitioner. His order contained in Annexure 2 cannot be held to be illegal or invalid on that account. Consequently it follows that the Chancellor's order contained in Annexure 3 appointing respondent No. 2 as the acting Vice-Chancellor under Section 10(10) of the Act is also legal and justified.

15. For the reasons stated above, the writ application fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances I shall make no order as to cost.

K.B.N Singh, J.:— I agree.

16. Application dismissed.