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Md. Anis Khan v. T.L.V Aiyar And Another

Patna High Court
Aug 13, 1969
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Order No. 69 dated 16th December, 1963, passed by Sri T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar, which related to the constitution of a Commission of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952.

On 1st October, 1967, the State Government issued a notification appointing a Commission to inquire into allegations made against six named persons (their names and periods of office are quoted in the notification) that they had, by abusing their official positions, obtained pecuniary and other benefits for themselves and others and indulged in corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and other malpractices. The notification set out specific matters for inquiry in clauses (a) to (d) of paragraph 4, clause (d) being concerned with whether, besides the six named persons, any other persons holding official positions had made illegal gains or indulged in corruption, favouritism or abuse of power during specified periods.

The original notification was later amended by omitting paragraph 4(d) (notification dated 31st October, 1967), and that amendment was subsequently cancelled by a notification dated 14th September, 1968; the parties proceeded on the footing that the original paragraph 4(d) was thereby restored. A notice in the Bihar Gazette dated 26th September, 1998 invited representations regarding matters mentioned in paragraph 4(d); seventeen members of the public filed fifty-one representations on affidavits.

The Commission Member, Sri Venkatarama Aiyar, considered the preliminary question of the scope of paragraph 4(d) and expressed the view (in an opinion dated 16th December, 1968) that clause (d) applied only where one or more of the six named persons were involved in the acts alleged; it did not permit a general inquiry into the conduct of all persons holding public office during the stated periods. Following that conclusion, affidavits filed under paragraph 4(d) were considered on 8th January, 1969: most affidavits (including twenty filed by the petitioner) were rejected; affidavits Nos. 1, 3 and 5 had orders reserved.

The petitioner challenged the Commission's order in this Court. The State raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition failed for non-joinder of necessary parties — namely, the persons whose interests would be affected if the Commission's order were set aside — and the Court heard argument on both the preliminary point and the merits (interpretation of clause (d)).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the proper interpretation and scope of clause (d) of paragraph 4 of the notification constituting the Commission of Inquiry (i.e., whether clause (d) authorises the Commission to inquire into corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and other malpractices by all persons holding official positions during the specified periods, or whether it is restricted to persons linked to the six named individuals)?
  2. Whether the writ petition challenging the Commission's order could proceed without impleading as parties the persons who would be affected by a court order reversing the Commission's decision (i.e., whether those persons are necessary parties to the writ proceeding).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner (Sri Basudeva Prasad)

  • Urged a "widest interpretation" of clause (d) of paragraph 4: the Commission must inquire and report about all persons holding official positions during the periods mentioned in the notification with respect to illegal gains, corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and other malpractices.
  • Contended that it was not necessary to implead the individual persons named in the affidavits before seeking relief in this Court because at the stage when the Commission was considering the affidavits it was not necessary to hear those persons; if required, the petitioner could be permitted to implead them later.

Respondent / State (Sri K.D. Chatterji)

  • Argued that clause (d) must be construed in the context of the notification as applying only where the charge, besides satisfying the clause's conditions, also involves one or more of the six persons named in paragraph 1 of the notification; absent such a link, the charge falls outside clause (d).
  • Raised a preliminary objection that the writ application was defective for want of necessary parties: if the petitioner sought a wider interpretation that would require the Commission to inquire into allegations against many other persons, those persons (who would be affected if the Commission's order were reversed) ought to have been impleaded in the writ petition to give them an opportunity to support the Commission's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two connected strands: first, on the procedural point of necessary parties; second, on the substantive interpretation of clause (d) of paragraph 4 in the light of Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952.

On the preliminary objection (necessary parties):

  • The Court accepted the State's contention that after the Commission's impugned order conclusively refused to conduct inquiries against a number of persons, those persons who would be affected by a reversal of that order ought to have been impleaded in the writ petition so they could support the impugned order.
  • The fact that the Commission, at the stage of considering affidavits, may not have required formal hearing of the persons named does not absolve the petitioner from impleading them once the Commission has made a conclusive decision refusing inquiry; the Court emphasised that it is difficult to pass a contrary order without the affected parties being before the Court.
  • The petitioner's counsel repeatedly indicated a desire to implead such persons if necessary, but never furnished names and addresses nor filed an application to implead; in those circumstances the Court found it impossible to grant effective relief by impleading persons on the present record.
  • Conclusion on the procedural point: the preliminary objection is valid and bars the petition from succeeding on that ground.

On the substantive interpretation of clause (d):

  • The Court analysed clause (d) in the context of clauses (a)–(c) and Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, which contemplates "an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance".
  • Clauses (a) and (b) were interpreted as specifically concerned with assets and pecuniary resources of the six named persons (and their families/relations/persons in whom they were interested) at specified times; clause (c) deals with charges of corruption and similar malpractices, but only in relation to the six named persons.
  • The Court accepted the learned Member's construction that clause (d) was intended to "rope in" persons associated with the charges specified in clause (c) — that is, to enable inquiry into other persons who were connected with offences or malpractices involving the six named individuals — rather than to authorise a general, roving inquiry into all office‑holders during the specified periods.
  • The Court reasoned that construing clause (d) to permit inquiries into the conduct of all persons holding official positions during the periods would amount to an inquiry into persons "unknown as yet" regarding "incidents uncertain as yet," and thus would not constitute a "definite matter of public importance" as required by Section 3(1); such a construction would sanction an undefined, sprawling inquiry beyond the scope legitimately within the Commission's terms.
  • Therefore, the reasonable interpretation was that the Commission was directed to inquire and report on matters in clauses (a), (b) and (c) as regards the six named persons, and, in that context, to incidentally identify other persons holding official positions who were involved with or associated with those matters — but not to treat such other persons as being on the same footing as the six named persons and to conduct full, standalone inquiries against them under clause (d).
  • The Court also noted a practical point: the impugned orders (including the later order dated 8th January, 1969) did not indicate the nature of the inquiry to be conducted regarding affidavits Nos. 1, 3 and 5; if the inquiry into those affidavits were only incidental to the main inquiry against the six named persons, no objection would lie; if, however, a full and regular inquiry were contemplated against those persons on the same footing as the six named individuals, such an inquiry would not be envisaged by clause (d).

Holding and Implications

Holding: PETITION DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the writ application failed and was dismissed; the Court ordered that there would be no order for costs.
  • The Court declined to give the wide interpretation of clause (d) pressed by the petitioner; instead it confined clause (d) to permitting inquiry into persons associated with the six named individuals insofar as the main inquiry required, and not to authorise a general inquiry into all office‑holders during the specified periods.
  • The opinion does not discuss broader legal consequences or present the decision as setting a new, general precedent beyond the interpretation applied to the notification and clause (d) in this case. The immediate consequence is the dismissal of the petition and the confirmation of the narrower construction of clause (d) for the purposes of the Commission's mandate.

Judge(s) concurring: U.N. Sinha, J. delivered the opinion; Untwalia, J. and S.N.P. Singh, J. agreed.

Show all summary ...

U.N Sinha, J.:— The application has been filed by the petitioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that a direction, order or writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari may issue quashing order No. 69, dated the 16th December, 1963, passed by Sri T.L Vcnkatarama Aiyar, constituting a Commission of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Iritjuiry Act, 1952 (Act 60 of 1952) by the State Government. The impugned order arose under the following circumstances: On the 1st October, 1967, the State Government had issued a notification appointing a commission of Inquiry for inquiring into various matters and reporting about them. The first four paragraphs of the notification are relevant and they are quoted below.

1. Whereas allegations have been made that each of the following persons namely:

1. Shri Krishna Ballabha Sahay, who held the office of Minister during the periods from the 16th April, 1946 to the 5th May, 1957, and the 29th June, 1962 to the 2nd October, 11963 (afternoon) and the office of Chief Minister during the period from 2nd October, 1963 (afternoon) to the 5th March, 1967 (afternoon).

2. Shri Mahesh Prasad Sinha, who held the office of Minister during the periods from the 29th April, 1952 to the 5th May, 1957 and the 18th March, 1962 to the 5th March, 1967 (forenoon).

3. Sri Satyendra Narain Sinha, who held the office of Minister during the period from the 18th February, 1961 to the 5th March, 1967 (forenoon).

4. Shri Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav, who held the office of Minister during the period from the 2nd October, 1961 (afternoon) to the 5th March, 1967 (forenoon).

5. Shri Raghavendra Narain Singh, who held the office of Minister of State during the period from the 2nd October, 1963 (afternoon) to the 5th March, 1967 (forenoon) and

6. Shri Ambika Sharan Singh, who held the office of Deputy Minister during the period from the 6th May, 1957 to the 2nd October, 1963 (afternoon) and Minister of State during the period from the 2nd October, 1963 (afternoon) to the 5th March, 1967 (forenoon)

by abusing and exploiting the official position or positions held by him as a aforesaid, obtained pecuniary and other benefits for himself, either in his own name or benami, and for his family, relatives and other persons in whom he was interested, and allowed them to obtain, or connived at their obtaining, pecuniary and other benefits and thereby he, his family, relatives and other persons in whom he was interested acquired vast properties and made illegal gains:

2. And whereas allegations have also been mode that each of the persons ab-ovendmed, during the tenure or tenures of their respective office or offices as aforesaid, otherwise indulged in corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and other malpractices;

3. And whereas the Governor of Bihar is of opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into the definite matters of public importance herein stated;

4. Now, therefore, the Governor of Bihar, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (LX of 1952), is hereby pleased to appoint a commission of Inquiry to enquire into and report on the following matters, namely,

(a) What was the extent of the assets and pecuniary resources owned and possessed by each of the persons abovenamed, his family, relatives and other persons in whom he was interested (i) at the beginning and (ii) at the end of the tenure of office of each of the offices held by him as foresaid;

(b) Whether, besides the persons above-named, during the tenure of office or offices held by him, obtained any assets, pecuniary resources or advantages or other benefits by abusing and exploiting his official position or positions and whether during the said period or periods is family, relatives and other persons in whom he was interested obtain-. ed, with his knowledge, consent or connivance, any assets, pecuniary resources, advantages or other benefits:

(c) Whether, and if so to what extent, each of the persons abovenamed otherwise indulged in corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and other, malpractices

(d) Whether, besides the persons above-named, any other person or persons or persons holding official position, either as a member of the Council of Ministers or otherwise, during any of the aforesaid periods, made illegal gains or indulged in corruption/favouritism, abuse of power or other malpractices in like manner as aforesaid.”

2. The original notification was amended by omitting paragraph 4(d), by a notification dated the 31st October, 1967. Thereafter, by another notification dated the 14th September, 1968 the second notification was cancelled. The parties have proceeded on the footing, that, original paragraph 4(d) was thereby restored. Thereafter, a notice, was published in the Bihar Gazette on the 26th September, 1998, Stating that the Government of Bihar, members of the public and organisations might make their representations as to the matters mentioned in paragraph 4(d). Certain time limit was given, which was subsequently extended. Pursuant to this notice, seventeen members of the public filed fifty one representations on affidavits. The matter was noted for argument on? preliminary question as to the scope of paragraph 4(d) and that is the subject-matter of the order impugned in this case. Two contentions were advanced before Sri Venkatarama Aiyar on the interpretation of paragraph 4(d). The contention put forward on behalf of some of the deponents of the affidavit was that the Commission was to inquire into and report as to all matters of corruption, favouritism, abuse of power etc. of all persons holding official position in the State during the periods mentioned in paragraph 1 of the notification, as against this, the contention raised on behalf of the State was that, to quote the words of the learned Member, in the context of the Notification, Cl. (d) must be construed as applicable only if the charges, besides satisfying the conditions laid down therein, also involve one or more of the six persons mentioned therein and that unless there is such a linking the charge would fall outside the purview of the clause. On the question as to which of the contentions was to be adopted, Sri. Venkatarama Aiyar has given his opinion as follows:—

“Clauses (a) and (b) are no doubt concerned with not merely the six persons ‘named but also their relations, friends, and persons in whom they are interested. But those clauses are limited to assets and pecuniary anti other benefits and the enquiry is as to the assets as on specified dates and acquisition of assets during the period when they held office. It is only Cl. (c) that deals generally with charges of corruption and the like, and that takes in only the six persons named. The purpose of Cl. (d) is to rope in with ‘respect to charges in (c), all persons who were associated with the six persons named. It should also be noted that while (a) and (b) take in relations friends and persons in whom the six persons are interested there may be other persons besides the above who might also be involved in those charges and they will be covered by Cl. (d).

In the result I am of opinion that id Order to invoke Cl. (d) it is not merely necessary that the charge is made against a person who held a public office and the act charged took place during the periods specified, but that further it is necessary that one or move of the six parsons named in para 1 should be involved in that act.”

3. It appears from Annexure B of the counter affidavit filed by the State of Bihar, that, thereafter, the affidavits filed under paragraph 4(d) were taken up by Sri Venkatarsma Aiyar for consideration on the 8th January, 1969, in the light of the conclusion arrived at by him on the 16th December, 1968. The hearing of affidavit No. 28 was adjourned and all other affidavits, except affidavits Nos. 1, 3 and 5 were rejected, including all the twenty affidavits filed by the petitioner of this case. In the case of affidavits Nos. 1, 3 and 5 orders were reserved.

4. On behalf of the State of Bihar preliminary objection has been raised by Sri K.D Chatterii. The substance of his contention is that if the petitioner wishes this court to give a wider interpretation of clause (d) of paragraph 4, as was urged before Sri Venkatarama Aiyar then the writ application suffers from the absence of necessary parties. It is argued that according to the order impugned in this court, the commission has refused to inquire about the allegations made against number of persons mentioned by the petitioner of this court in his twenty affidavits, and these persons should have been impleaded in this court by the petitioner for asking this court to reverse the order of the commission and to direct it to inquire about the allegations made against them. In reply to this argument, Sri Basudeva Prasad has argued on behalf of the petitioner, that, it was not at all necessary for his client to implead those persons in this writ application. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, at the stage at which Sri Venkatarama Aiyar was considering the matter, it was not necessary to hear the various persons named by the petitioner in his affidavits and, therefore, it was also not necessary to implead them in this application. Sri Basudeva Prasad has urged, in continuation of his argument, that, the persons against whom his client has desired the commission to proceed are not necessary parties in this court, and if by any stretch of argument it is considered that they are proper parties, the petitioner may be permitted to implead them.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the contending parties on this matter, I am of the opinion, that, the preliminary obiection taken by Sri K.D Chatterii is valid. At the stage at which the commission was considering the various affidavits filed under clause (d) of Paragraph 4, it may not have been necessary to hear the parties affected, but after the impugned order was passed by the Commission, the persons who will be affected by the reversal of the order ought to have been impleaded in this Court, so that thev would have had an opportunity of supporting the order. In effect, Sri Venkatarama Aiyar has conclusively refused to conduct, an inquiry against a number of persons and before this court can pass a contrary order, the parties who had been benefited by the impugned order should have been impleaded in this court. It is difficult to appreciate the stand taken by Sri Basudeva Prasad when he argues that the concerned persons who are not before this Court. Yet, may be allowed to be impleaded at this stage. During the course of the argument on the preliminary point, it was put to Sri Basudeva Prasad, more than once, that if the preliminary objection taken by Sri K.D Chatterji succeeds, the writ petition may fail on that ground and Sri Basudeva Prasad went on repeating that in such circumstances his client may be permitted to implead the persons named in the petitioner's affidavits filed before the Commission. But, at no stage Sri Basudeva Prasad indicated the details of the names and the addresses of the persons whom he wanted to implead, and of course, no application has been filed making this prayer and giving the names and addresses of those persons. In these circumstances, it is not possible to pass an effective order for impleading any persons at the instance of the petitioner of this writ case.

6. On the merit of the application, Sri Basudeva Prasad has reiterated the argument that had been advanced before the Commission of Inquiry, contending that the widest interpretation should be put upon clause (d) of paragraph 4, holding that the Commission must inquire and report about all persons holding official positions, during certain periods mentioned in the notification. Learned counsel for the State of Bihar has, on the other hand, supported the order of Sri Venkatarama Aiyar on the grounds mentioned by him. After considering this question, on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, I am of the opinion that this Court should refrain from giving the wide interpretation to clause (d) of paragraph 4 as is contended for by Sri Basudeva Prasad. The clause may be analysed in the light of Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. If it be held that under clause (d) of paragraph 4 the Commission has to inquire and report about all illegal gains, all corruptions and favouritisms indulged, in all abuses of power and all other malpractices taken recourse to by all persons holding official positions during certain periods mentioned in the notification, then it may be difficult to hold that such a direction can be supported by the provision of Section 3(1) of the Act.

7. Section 3(1) of the Act envisages “an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance” and the interpretation sought for by Sri Basudeva Prasad would involve an inquiry into the conduct of persons unknown as yet, regarding incidents uncertain as yet, the only definite provision under clause (d) of paragraph being certain ascertained periods. It is hardly possible to hold that such a roving inquiry would come within the expression “An inquiry into any definite matter of public importance”, mentioned in Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. It is difficult to hold that only because certain allegations had been made against six persons named in paragraph 1 of the notification the State Government was of the opinion that it was necessary to make an inquiry into all illegal gains, all corruptions, all favouritisms, all abuses of power, all other malpractices of all persons holding official positions in the whole of the State during certain periods. Therefore in my opinion, the reasonable interpretation of clause (d) of paragraph 4 should be that the Commission of Inquiry was directed to inquire and report about the matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 4, so far as the six persons named in paragraph 1 are concerned, and in that context, it was directed to find out incidentally, what other persons holding official positions were also involved. The interpretation contended for by Sri Basudeva Prasad would result in a situation, that in effect, the Commission of Inquiry will go on adding names of persons holding official positions during certain periods, in the list of persons named in paragraph 1 of the notification and then go on conducting full fledged inquiries against them. As the main purpose of setting up the Commission of Inquiry was to proceed against the six persons actually named in the notification, it is hardly possible to approve of the construction put upon clause (d) of paragraph 4 of the notification by Sri Basudeva Prasad.

8. In substance, therefore, the conclusion arrived at by Sri Venkatarama Aiyar should be upheld. But I would like to make some observation, as there is no indication in the impugned order or in the later order of the learned Member, dated the 8th January, 1969 (Annexure B of the counter affidavit) as to the nature of the inquiry which will be conducted with respect to the allegations made in affidavits 1, 3 and 5. If the nature of this inquiry is going to be merely incidental to the inquiry which is being conducted against the six persons named in paragraph of the notification, no objection can be taken to it. But, if a full and regular inquiry is being contemplated against the persons named in affidavits Nos. 1, 3 and 5, as if they are on the same footing as the six persons named in the notification, then, that kind of inquiry can hardly be held to be envisaged by clause (d).

9. It may be realised that under clause (d) of paragraph 4 all that the Commission of Inquiry has been asked to inquire and report is whether certain persons holding official positions had indulged in certain kinds of malpractices, mentioned in that clause, within certain periods, in the manner mentioned in the other clauses of paragraph 4. With reference to clause (d) it is noticeable that there is no such direction that the Commission of Inquiry should also report whether, and if so, to what extent each of these persons holding official positions had indulged in corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and other malpractices as is mentioned in clause (c) with respect to the six named persons. Therefore, the reasonable interpretation of clause (d) of paragraph 4 of the notification should also be that just as the Commission of Inquiry has to inquire and report about the family relatives and other persons mentioned in clause (b), in conducting the main inquiry against the six named persons, so also the Commission of Inquiry has to inquire and report about the persons holding official positions, keeping in view the fact that the main allegations had been made only against six named persons.

10. For the reason given above, I am of the opinion that the writ application must fail and it is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order for costs.

11. Untwalia, J.:— I agree.

12. S.N.P Singh, J.:— I agree.

13. Petition dismissed.