- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Tapeshwar Missir v. Santokh Singh And Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Misra, C.J. et al.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit under Order 21, Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) in which the plaintiff-appellant, Tapeshwar Missir, sought a declaration of entitlement to possession of a house (municipal holding no. 3 of Ward no. 4 and Khas Mahal holding no. 517, Mohalla Thakurbari Road, Daltonganj) and a declaration that Santokh Singh (defendant no. 1) had no right to resist delivery of possession.
Khas Mahal holding no. 517 was originally recorded in the name of Shital Prasad. Mt. Jitan Kuer (defendant no. 2) claimed title under a sale deed from Shital Prasad. Shital Prasad died and Jitan Kuer initiated a probate proceeding (Probate No. 31 of 1951); Dinesh Prasad resisted, leading to Title Suit No. 5 of 1952. Probate was granted to Jitan Kuer on 1 May 1956.
The plaintiff had lent money to Jitan Kuer and others, leading to Money Suit No. 256 of 1952. The trial court decreed the suit; on appeal the decree was modified to run only against Jitan Kuer and Dinesh Prasad. While the money suit was pending, the plaintiff obtained an order of attachment before judgment issued on 2 July 1952 (an ad interim attachment in form no. 5, Appendix F, was used). The plaintiff contends this order was subsequently made absolute. The decree was executed via an application dated 4 January 1954, resulting in Execution Case No. 2 of 1954, and the property was sold at auction; the plaintiff purchased it on 1 February 1955 for Rs. 500.
When the plaintiff sought delivery of possession after the auction sale, defendant no. 1, Santokh Singh, filed an application on 15 May 1956 under Section 47 and Order 21, Rule 90 CPC, claiming he had purchased the house by a registered sale deed dated 16 January 1953 from Jitan Kuer (Misc. Case No. 103 of 1956). That application was dismissed on contest on 25 September 1956; the auction sale was later confirmed and the sale certificate sealed on 9 April 1957.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a further application under Section 74 CPC read with Order 21, Rule 97 CPC for delivery of possession and imprisonment of defendant no. 1 (Misc. Case No. 64 of 1957). Defendant no. 1 obtained civil revision to the High Court against the order allowing delivery; the High Court reversed the trial court's order and rejected the plaintiff's prayer for delivery of possession, observing that the plaintiff could institute a civil suit to assert his right.
At trial before the Munsif, the Munsif found the sale deed to defendant no. 1 to be sham and collusive and decreed delivery of possession to the plaintiff. Defendant no. 2 supported the plaintiff's case, alleging fraud and that the sale deed had been executed under misleading circumstances. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed the Munsif, holding the sale deed in favour of defendant no. 1 to be genuine (consideration of Rs. 3,000 stated) and noting the notice of attachment before judgment had not been shown to have been served on defendant no. 1; therefore, the subsequent auction sale in execution could not affect defendant no. 1's title.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an attachment before judgment issued under Order 38, Rule 5 (form no. 5, Appendix F) is effective to bind immovable property unless the notice/order contains the prohibition required by Order 21, Rule 54 (and in particular the prohibition against transferring or charging the property and the prohibition against third parties taking benefit of such transfer). 
- Whether, on the facts of this case, the auction sale in execution of the plaintiff's decree could defeat the title claimed by defendant no. 1 where the notice of attachment before judgment was in form no. 5 and did not contain the specific prohibition provided in Order 21, Rule 54 (form no. 24, Appendix E).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff — Tapeshwar Missir)
- The sale deed in favour of Santokh Singh was a farzi (sham) and collusive transaction created to shield the house from sale in execution of Money Suit No. 256 of 1952.
- No delivery of possession was made to Santokh Singh after the alleged transfer; Santokh had been in possession earlier as a tenant.
- A miscellaneous proceeding under Order 21, Rule 90 and Section 47 was started and an order was passed against Santokh; because Santokh did not appeal or revise that order, he could not resist the plaintiff's claim for delivery of possession.
Respondent (Defendant No. 1 — Santokh Singh and supporting arguments)
- Defendant no. 1 asserted he purchased the house from Jitan Kuer by a registered sale deed dated 16 January 1953 (consideration stated as Rs. 3,000), and claimed a valid title thereby.
- Counsel for the respondent (Mr. Kailash Roy) contended that the decisions in the two first appeals (First Appeal Nos. 140 of 1956 and 119 of 1957) were correct in holding that strict/formal observance of form no. 24 (Appendix E) is not necessary for an attachment before judgment, because form no. 24 refers to a judgment-debtor's failure to satisfy a decree while Order 38, Rule 5 addresses attachment before judgment.
Defendant No. 2 (Mt. Jitan Kuer)
- In her written statement she supported the plaintiff's contention that the sale deed to defendant no. 1 was obtained by persuasion and fraud, executed without being read out to her, and rushed through; she asserted the deed would not put defendant no. 1 in a better position than the judgment-debtor because the property had been attached before judgment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sadhu Prasad Sah v. Satnarain Sah, AIR 1939 Pat 81 | Holds that an attachment before judgment of immovable property is not valid unless the form and prohibition required under Order 21, Rule 54 (form no. 24) are observed. | The Court regarded this decision as correct and applied its principle to hold that attachments before judgment must include the prohibition in Rule 54 to be effective. |
| Harihar Pandey v. Vindhyachal Rai, AIR 1949 Pat 170 | Same view as Sadhu Prasad: emphasis on necessity of the prohibition required by Order 21, Rule 54 when attaching immovable property. | The Court accepted this decision as correct and followed it in preferring it over contrary Division Bench views. |
| First Appeals Nos. 140 of 1956 (Sm. Savitri Devi v. Bank of Bihar Ltd.) and 119 of 1957 (Bank of Bihar v. Sheo Kumari Devi), Dated 5-2-1962 (Pat) | These Division Bench decisions held that strict/formal observance of form no. 24 (Appendix E) is not necessary for attachment before judgment; suggested that form no. 5 (Appendix F) could suffice. | The Court found these Division Bench views incorrect on the point in issue and disagreed with them, holding that the prohibition in Rule 54 must not be ignored. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court focussed on the statutory scheme governing attachment before judgment and attachment in execution. The key statutory provisions analysed were:
- Order 38, Rule 5 CPC — governs issuance of attachment before judgment (form no. 5, Appendix F is the usual form used for the warrant/notice).
- Order 38, Rule 7 CPC — expressly provides: "Save as otherwise expressly provided, the attachment shall be made in the manner provided for the attachment of the property in execution of a decree." The Court treated this as the textual bridge requiring the manner of attachment before judgment to follow the manner applicable in execution.
- Order 21, Rule 54 CPC — prescribes the manner of attachment for immovable property in execution and contains two key clauses:
- Clause (1) requires the order to prohibit the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property and prohibits all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge.
- Clause (2) prescribes proclamation and affixation procedures (public notice by beat of drum or customary mode, affixing copy on the property and courthouse and, if land, to the Collector's office).
The Court framed the central interpretative question as whether the manner of attachment required by Order 38, Rule 7 must include the prohibition specified in Clause (1) of Rule 54 when immovable property is attached before judgment, or whether only the procedural publicity steps in Clause (2) of Rule 54 suffice.
The Court rejected the narrower interpretation urged by Mr. Kailash Roy (that only the proclamation and affixation steps of Clause (2) need be observed) and adopted a broader reading. The Court's reasons were:
- Order 38, Rule 7 requires that the manner of attachment before judgment be the same as in execution; Rule 54 (which governs attachment of immovable property in execution) contains an express prohibition in Clause (1) and that requirement is therefore part of the "manner" to be followed.
- Form no. 24 of Appendix E (used in execution) incorporates the prohibition language of Rule 54(1). The form in Appendix F (form no. 5) does not contain that prohibition and thus may be inadequate to produce the legal consequences that Rule 54 intends (i.e., to restrain transfer/charging and prohibit third parties from taking benefit).
- The legislative policy behind Rule 54's prohibition is to give notice both to the judgment-debtor/defendant and to purchasers or persons who might claim under any subsequent transfer that after attachment transfers and charges will be invalid — this is not merely formal but substantive and protective of the attaching plaintiff's rights.
- Where a form lacking the essential prohibition (form no. 5) is used, the Court concluded that the attachment cannot have the effect of restraining the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the immovable property and cannot bind third parties in the way Rule 54 contemplates.
- Consequently, the earlier decisions of this Court in Sadhu Prasad and Harihar Pandey (which require the prohibition) were held to be correct; the contrary view taken by the two Division Bench decisions in the cited first appeals was held to be incorrect on this point.
The Court also observed that, although it is the duty of the Court issuing the attachment to use the proper form (i.e., form no. 24 mutatis mutandis with substitution of "defendant" for "judgment-debtor"), the matter is not free from difficulty in practice; nevertheless the essential ingredient of Rule 54 must not be ignored.
Applying that legal conclusion to the facts before it (where the notice of attachment was in form no. 5 and did not contain the Rule 54 prohibition, and where the service of such notice on defendant no. 1 was not shown), the Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that the sale deed in favour of defendant no. 1 could not be invalidated by the subsequent auction sale purchased by the plaintiff. This formed part of the basis for upholding the judgment of the court of appeal below.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Holding (direct outcome):
- The judgment of the court of appeal (Subordinate Judge) below was upheld and the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed. The Court ordered that, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties must bear their own costs throughout.
Broader implications explicitly stated in the opinion:
- The Court held that the view taken in Sadhu Prasad Sah v. Satnarain Sah (AIR 1939 Pat 81) and Harihar Pandey v. Vindhyachal Rai (AIR 1949 Pat 170) is correct: an attachment before judgment that seeks to bind immovable property must be made in the manner prescribed by Order 21, Rule 54, and must include the specific prohibition against transfer or charge (and contra-indicating third-party benefits) to have the intended legal effect.
- The contrary approach taken by the Division Bench in the cited first appeals (Sm. Savitri Devi v. Bank of Bihar Ltd. and Bank of Bihar v. Sheo Kumari Devi) — that a punctilious/formal observance of form no. 24 is unnecessary — was held to be incorrect on the point examined by this Court.
The decision therefore clarifies that the substantive prohibition in Order 21, Rule 54(1) is an essential element of the manner of attachment for immovable property and cannot be ignored when attachment is effected before judgment under Order 38, Rule 5 read with Order 38, Rule 7.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.
Misra, C.J:— This appeal arises out of a suit under Order 21, Rule 103 of the CPC, in which the plaintiff-appellant sought a declaration that he was entitled to possession of the house bearing municipal holding no. 3 of Ward no. 4, and Khas Mahal holding no. 517, Mohalla Thakurbari Road in the town of Daltonganj. Khas Mahal holding no. 517 stood recorded originally in the name of Shital Prasad. His further prayer was that it should be declared that Santokh Singh (defendant no. 1) had no right to resist the delivery of possession in favour of the plaintiff. Mt. Jitan Kuer (defendant no. 2) claimed to have title to this house under a sale deed executed in her favour by her uncle Shital Prasad. Shital Prasad died and Mt. Jitan Kuer started a probate case (no. 31 of 1951) in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner Chotanagpur. The application for probate made by Jitan Kuer was resisted by Dinesh Prasad nephew of Shital Prasad. This gave rise to a title suit between them being Title Suit no. 5 of 1952. Probate was, however, granted to Jitan Kuer on the 1st of May, 1956.
2. Jitan Kuer and others borrowed some money from the plaintiff, Tapeshwar Missir, for which he had to institute Money Suit No. 256 of 1952 in the Court of the Munsif of Palamu. The suit was decreed by the trial court but in appeal the decree of the trial Court was modified inasmuch as the decree stood only against Mt. Jitan Kuer and Dinesh Prasad. While Money Suit No. 256 of 1952 was still pending, the plaintiff prayed for an order of attachment before judgment and the trial Court ordered it to be issued on the 2nd of July, 1952, and an ad interim order of attachment was issued thereafter. According to the plaintiff, this order of attachment was subsequently made absolute. The decree obtained by plaintiff Tapeshwar Missir was put into execution by an application dated the 4th of January 1954, which resulted in Execution Case No. 2 of 1954. In execution of the decree, the property in suit was sold at auction to satisfy the decree of the plaintiff and the plaintiff purchased it on the 1st of February, 1955, for a sum of Rs. 500/-.
3. The plaintiff after having purchased the house at auction sale proceeded to take delivery of possession through Court and in course of that proceeding an application was filed by defendant No. 1 Santokh Singh on the 15th of May 1956, both under Sec. 47 and Order 21, R. 90 of the CPC, for setting aside that auction sale, stating that he purchased the house from Mt. Jitan Kuar under registered sale deed dated the 16th of January, 1953. This gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 103 of 1956. It was, however, dismissed on contest on the 25th of September, 1956. The auction sale was confirmed thereafter and the sale certificate was prepared and sealed on the 9th of April 1957. It may be stated that the prayer for delivery of possession was made after the sale was confirmed in the circumstances set out above. Defendant No. 1 Santokh Singh once more resisted the delivery of possession. The plaintiff filed an application thereafter under section 74 of the CPC, read with Order 21, Rule 97 of the CPC, for granting delivery of possession putting defendant no. 1 in civil prison. This gave rise to Miscellaneous case no. 64 of 1957. Defendant No. 1 Santokh Singh, however, came in Civil revision to the High Court against the order allowing the plaintiff to come in possession of this house. The High Court, however, reversed the order of the trial Court and the prayer of the plaintiff, Tapeshwar Missir, for delivery of possession was rejected. The High Court observed that it was open to the plaintiff, Tapeshwar Missir, to institute a Civil suit to assert his right to obtain delivery of possession of the house.
4. The plaintiff's claim rested on the ground that the sale deed in favour of Santokh Singh (defendant No. 1) was a farzi and sham transaction and it was brought into existence for the purpose of shielding the house from sale in execution of the decree obtained in Money Suit No. 256 of 1952. No delivery of possession after the transfer of title was made in favour of Santokh Singh (defendant no. 1) inasmuch as he had been in continued possession of the house from before as a tenant. Moreover, a miscellaneous case having been started, which was under Order 21, Rule 90, and Section 47 of the CPC, in which order was passed against him and he not having gone up in revision or appeal against that order it was not open to him to resist the claim of the plaintiff for delivery of possession.
5. The learned Munsif passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff holding that the sale deed in favour of defendant no. 1 was a sham and collusive transaction. No consideration passed in favour of defendant no. 1 and as such the plaintiff was entitled to obtain delivery of possession dispossessing defendant no. 1, who acquired no title under the sale deed. It may be stated that defendant no. 2 (Mt. Jitan Kuer) in her written statement supported the case of the plaintiff. Her stand was that defendant no. 1 succeeded in persuading her to execute a sale deed in respect of the house on the assurance that her right, title and interest would not be affected by the transaction and that it would enable her to save the house from the clutches of her creditor, Tapeshwar Missir. Her further case was that the sale deed was executed by her without it being read out to her; that she was a pardanashin lady and that she could not take the advice of her friends and relations. Moreover, the whole transaction was rushed through with great hurry by defendant no. 1 who was proceeding in the matter fraudulently. The sale deed was in her possession for some time when defendant no. 1 managed to have it handed over to him on the plea that he required it to consult some lawyer. As to the case of the plaintiff that the property was attached before judgment during the pendency of Money Suit No. 256 of 1952, it was accepted and as such any sale deed in favour of defendant no. 1 by defendant no. 2 would not put him in a better position than the judgment-debtor herself.
6. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge has reversed the finding of the learned Munsif on almost all the substantial questions. He has come to the conclusion that the sale deed in favour of defendant no. 1 by defendant no. 2 was genuine and valid transaction and that Rs. 3,000/-, as the consideration mentioned in the sale deed, was paid by him. The alleged notice of attachment before judgment was not shown to have been served on defendant no. 1 and as such the genuine sale deed in favour of defendant no. 1 in respect of the house in 1953 could not be affected by the subsequent auction sale of it at the instance of the plaintiff when he purchased it in execution of his decree for a sum of Rs. 500/-.
7. Before, however, any other question relating to the correctness of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is taken up, it may be relevant to deal with the point on which there is some conflict of views in two decisions of this Court. The learned Single Judge referred the question for decision by the Division Bench and the Division Bench, in its turn, has referred the matter to a larger Bench which is being considered by us in this reference. The point referred to is as to which of the two views, the one expressed in Sadhu Prasad Sah v. Satnarain Sah, AIR 1939 Pat 81 and Harihar Pandey v. Vindhyachal Rai, AIR 1949 Pat 170, on the one side, and the view expressed in First Appeals Nos. 140 of 1956, Sm. Savitri Devi v. Bank of Bihar, Ltd. and 119 of 1957 Bank of Bihar v. Sheo Kumari Devi, D/- 5-2-1962 (Pat) on the other, is valid. The first set of cases referred to above have taken the view that there can be no attachment before judgment of any property if the notice of attachment is issued under Order 38, Rule 5 of the CPC in form no. 5 (Appendix F of the Code) because in order to be valid attachment of the immovable property, notice should be issued under O. 21, R. 54 in form no. 24 (Appendix E of the Code) and the latter cases are to the contrary. The fact is not denied that in the present case the notice of attachment was in form no. 5 (Appendix F) which runs thus:—
The Bailiff of the Court.
Whereas………has proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant in the above suit…………These are to command you to call upon the said defendant ………… on or before the……… day of …………19…………… either to furnish security for the sum of Rupees………to produce and place at the disposal of this Court when required…or the value thereof or such portion of the value as may be sufficient to satisfy any decree that may be passed against him, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security: and you are further ordered to attach the said………and keep the same under safe and secure custody until the further order of the Court; and you are further commanded to return this warrant on or before the……day of……19…… with an endorsement certifying the date on which and the manner in which it has been executed, or the reason why it has not been executed.
Given under my hand and the seal of the court, this………day of…… 19……”
8. This form does not contain any prohibition restraining the defendant from transferring or charging the property attached so as to prejudice the right of the plaintiff which may have to be enforced in execution of the decree obtained in the suit Order 38, Rule 7, however, runs thus:—
“Save as otherwise expressly provided, the attachment shall be made in the manner provided for the attachment of the property in execution of a decree”.
9. This rule, therefore, provides that in order to make attachment before judgment valid, attachment must be issued in the form in which it will be issued when attachment is necessitated in course of execution of a decree. It may be stated that Order 21, Rule 42, onwards, up to Rule 57, deals with attachment Rule 43 of this Order deals with the manner of attachment of movable property other than agricultural produce and its custody while the subsequent rules deal with the attachment of specific forms of movable property such as agricultural produce etc. and their custody. Rule 54 of Order 21, which is really material, lays down as follows:—
“54(1) Where the property is immovable, the attachment shall be made by an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge.
(2) The order shall be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent to such property by beat of drum or other customary mode, and a copy of the order shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and then upon a conspicuous part of the Court-house, and also, where the property is land paying revenue to the Government, in the office of the Collector of the district in which the land is situate.”
10. The moot point for consideration is whether it is necessary in all cases before immovable property can be bound with the attachment taken out in a case of attachment before judgment, that the order must prohibit the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. Form no. 24 of Appendix E also contains a similar prohibition which may be usefully quoted here:
Whereas you have failed to satisfy a decree passed against you on the……… day of……… 19………, in suit no…… of 19………in favour of……….for……. It is ordered that you, the said…………, be, and you are hereby prohibited and restrained until the further order of this Court, from transferring or charging the property specified in the schedule hereunto annexed by sale, gift or otherwise, and that all persons be, and that they are hereby prohibited from receiving the same by purchase, gift or otherwise.
11. Given under new hand and the seal of the Court, this……day of…… 19 ……”
12. The Division Bench, as referred to above, have taken view that it is ??? that the form prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure under Order 21, Rule 54, being form no. 24 of Appendix E, must be observed before the property can be taken to bear the liability arising from service of notice of attachment before judgment Order 38, Rule 7, is in clear terms and, therefore, the view of the Division Bench referred to above must be taken to be prima facie correct Mr. Kailash Roy has, however, contended that the view of the Division Bench in the aforesaid two first appeals (First Appeal nos. 140 of 1956 and 119 of 1957 (Pat)) lays down the law correctly, because their Lordships have expressed the opinion that a punctilious observance of form no. 24 of Appendix E is not necessary since that form refers to the fact that the judgment-debtor has failed to satisfy the decree, whereas under Order 38, Rule 5, attachment is issued before judgment. Hence, form no. 24 of Appendix E cannot be the proper form for making the property liable. The distinction sought to be made by the Division Bench in the above two first appeals cannot be taken to be valid distinction inasmuch as Order 38, Rule 7, in terms provides that the manner of attachment must be the same as in regard to the attachment of property in course of execution of a decree which will attract the operation of Rule 54 of O. 21 in case of immovable property. Mr. Kailash Roy has contended that the manner of attachment would be only with reference to Clause (2) of Rule 54 of O. 21, which provides that the order shall be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent?o such property by beat of drum or other customary mode, and a copy of the order shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and then upon a conspicuous part of the Court-house, and also, where the property is land paying revenue to the Government in the office of the Collector of the district in which the land is situate.
13. In my opinion, however, it is difficult to accede to this contention. The manner of attachment is not only provided in Clause 2 of Rule 54 but it is also provided in Clause 1 of this rule which makes it obligatory for the Court to pass an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. Where this is not done, it must be held that the manner of attachment is not the one prescribed in Rule 54 of O. 21, which is relevant in determining whether an attachment before a judgment is valid or not. As a matter of fact, the from prescribed under Order 30, ??? 5, is a supplemental form end it may be applicable to a casa which is not dearly covered by Rule 43 or Rule 54 of Order 21. If were a case of conflict only between form no. 5 of Appendix F issued under O. 38, Rule 5 of the CPC, and form no. 24 of Appendix E issued; under Order 21, Rule 54 of the CPC, the point was arguable that specific provision under Order 38, Rule 5, might be taken to prevail over form no. 24 of Appendix E. As it is, however, there is positive provision in, Rule 54 itself, the language of which has been incorporated in form no. 24 of Appendix E, making it clear that the order must specifically prohibit the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property and likewise the form to be applicable in issuing notice under Order 38, Rule 5, should be so that the defendant must be specifically prohibited from transferring or charging the property in any manner, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. The alteration in form no. 24 of Appendix E should be mutatis mutandis with slight variation and not that the essential ingredient of R. 54 is to be completely ignored. The policy of the Legislature is obvious in enacting this ingredient in Rule 54 of Order 21, so that notice may be given both to the judgment-debtor or the defendant, for the matter of that as also to the purchassr or any person taking any benefit under the transaction, that after the attachment both transferring and charging and taking any benefit from such transfer or charge will be invalid in law. It is not only a formal procedure and cannot be Ignored.
14. In my opinion, therefore, the decision of this Court in the case of Sadhu Prasad, AIR 1939 Pat 81 and Harihar Pandey, AIR 1949 Pat 170 is correct and the decision of the Division Bench in the two unreported first appeals referred to above, in so far as this point is concerned, must be held to be incorrect it is true, no doubt that in issuing notice of attachment before judgment in form no. 5 of Appendix F under O. 38, Rule 5, a party is not to blame and it is the duty of the Court itself to be circumspect that form no. 24 of Appendix E is used putting the word “defendant” for the word “judgment-debtor” so that the suing plaintiffs may not suffer on account of any lacuna on the part of the court although the matter is not free from difficulty.
15. But unless the proper form under Order XXI, Rule 54 of the CPC, is used and the defendant or judgment-debtor is restrained from transferring or otherwise charging the property, the attachment made cannot have the effect of restraining him from doing so.
16. In the result therefore, the judgment of the court of appeal below must be upheld as correct and the appeal dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, however, the parties must bear their own costs throughout.
17. Choudhary, J.:— I agree.
18. U.N Sinha, J.:— I agree.
S.N.V/D.V.C
19. Appeal dismissed.
Alert