- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
R.K Biswas v. The Union Of India And Others Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion by Choudhary, J. (with concurrence by G.N. Prasad, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (the plaintiff in the suit) alleged that he was appointed to a permanent post as a Special Grade Travelling Ticket Examiner (T.T.E.) at Dhanbad on 3 January 1964. On 7 May 1964 he received a transfer order to Sealdah Division (the forwarding memo stated the transfer was "with effect from the afternoon of 7th May, 1964"). The petitioner was on sick leave from 8 May to 25 May 1964 and had scheduled rest days on 16 and 23 May. His name was removed from the Dhanbad muster-roll on 28 May 1964.
On 15 May 1964 the petitioner filed Title Suit No. 328 of 1964 in the First Court of the Munsif at Dhanbad seeking a declaration that the transfer order was illegal and a permanent injunction restraining the railway authorities from giving effect to the transfer. On the same day he applied for a temporary injunction; the learned Munsif passed an ad interim injunction on 15 May 1964 restraining the defendants from giving effect to the transfer order.
After removal from the muster-roll, on 24 June 1964 the petitioner applied for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to restore his name to the Duly Roster at Dhanbad and to allow him to perform his duties there. The learned Munsif disposed of that application by an order dated 5 January 1966 granting a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to allow the petitioner to resume duties at Dhanbad.
The defendants appealed from the Munsif's order to the District Judge, Dhanbad; the appeal was heard by the Subordinate Judge, First Court, Dhanbad, which allowed the appeal and rejected the petitioner's application for a mandatory injunction. The petitioner filed the present civil revision application against that appellate order. Choudhary, J. authored the opinion, and G.N. Prasad, J. agreed. The petition was dismissed with costs (hearing fee Rs. 100).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal lay against the Munsif's order granting a mandatory injunction — i.e., whether the injunction was an order passed under the inherent jurisdiction (mentioned in different parts of the opinion as Section 151 and S. 161 of the Code) or under Order 39, Rule 2, of the Code, with the consequence that an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(r) would be competent.
- Whether a Court can grant a mandatory injunction under Order 39, Rule 2, of the Code (i.e., whether temporary injunctions under that provision can take a mandatory form).
- On the facts: when did the transfer order become effective — on 7 May 1964 (date of communication) or only on 28 May 1964 (date of removal from the muster-roll)? This factual determination affected whether the injunction of 15 May 1964 restrained an act that the defendants could still perform.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Petitioner (Mr. Ghose)
- Contended that no appeal lay to the District Judge against the Munsif's order because the mandatory injunction was passed under the Munsif's inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code (the opinion records this submission).
- Argued that the transfer order became effective only on 28 May 1964 when the petitioner's name was removed from the muster-roll, and therefore the defendants gave effect to the transfer after service of the ad interim injunction of 15 May 1964 — a violation justifying the mandatory injunction.
- Pressed that the appellate Court's conclusion that the transfer was effective on 7 May 1964 was incorrect and that the High Court in revision should upset that factual finding.
Respondents / Defendants (Mr. Bose)
- Maintained that the application for mandatory injunction was properly entertained as one under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2, of the Code.
- Submitted that, because the order was under Order 39, Rule 2, an appeal lay under Order 43, Rule 1(r), and thus the appeal to the Court below was competent.
- Impliedly contended (and the appellate Court found) that the transfer order took effect on 7 May 1964, prior to the injunction of 15 May 1964, so that the injunction could not legally prevent giving effect to the transfer.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rasul Karim v. Pirbhai Amirbhai (1914) ILR 38 Bom 381 : AIR 1914 Bom 42 | Recorded a view (Beaman, J.) doubting power of Indian Courts to issue mandatory injunctions under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2; Shah, J. disagreed; the general question was not finally decided in that opinion. | The Court noted the conflicting views in that case and treated it as one of the authorities illustrating that the question had not been definitively settled; it did not rely on Rasul Karim as an unequivocal bar to mandatory relief under Order 39, Rule 2. |
| Champsey Bhimji & Co. v. Jamna Flour Mills Co. Ltd. (1914) 16 Bom LR 566 : AIR 1914 Bom 195 | Held that Order 39, Rule 2 could be applied to grant mandatory interlocutory relief (a mandatory injunction) — the Court in that case maintained a mandatory injunction on an interlocutory application. | The opinion treated this decision as supporting the proposition that Order 39, Rule 2 permits mandatory interlocutory injunctions; the Court relied on the reasoning of Davar, Acting C.J., and Heaton, J.'s concurrence as persuasive. |
| M. Randaswami Chelty v. P. Subramania Chetty (1918) ILR 41 Mad 208 : AIR 1918 Mad 588 | Held that Indian Courts can issue temporary injunctions in mandatory form under Order XXXIX, Rule 2; observed that Section 53 of the Specific Relief Act does not exclude mandatory temporary injunctions. | The Court relied on this Madras High Court decision as authoritative support for the proposition that a mandatory temporary injunction may properly be granted under Order 39, Rule 2, and for the corollary that an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(r) would lie. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a two-stage inquiry: (1) the legal character of the mandatory injunction order (whether it was under Order 39, Rule 2, or under the Court's inherent powers), because that determined the competency of the appeal; and (2) the factual question of when the transfer order became effective.
On the first stage, the Court examined Order 39, Rule 2, which allows a plaintiff in a suit restraining a defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury to apply for a temporary injunction "at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment." Applying that provision to the present suit (which sought to restrain the defendants from effecting the transfer), the Court concluded that the case fell within the scope of Order 39, Rule 2. The Court surveyed earlier authorities: Rasul Karim (showing conflicting judicial views), Champsey Bhimji (which upheld the power to grant mandatory interlocutory injunctions under O.39 R.2), and M. Randaswami Chelty (which held that temporary injunctions in mandatory form are permissible under O.39 R.2). Weighing these decisions and the language of the rule, the Court held that a mandatory injunction directing the defendants not to give effect to the transfer and to allow the plaintiff to work at Dhanbad could properly be passed under Order 39, Rule 2, and therefore an appeal lay under Order 43, Rule 1(r).
On the second stage, the Court addressed the factual dispute about the effective date of the transfer. The appellate Court had found that the transfer became effective on 7 May 1964 because the transfer order was passed and handed to the petitioner "hand to hand" on that date and the forwarding memo explicitly stated the petitioner "is spared on transfer to Sealdah division with effect from the afternoon of 7th May, 1964." The High Court in revision stated that the question of when the transfer became effective was essentially a question of fact and that a revisional court could not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent or final factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. Even if the High Court examined the materials, it concluded that the record justified the appellate court's conclusion: the petitioner received the order on 7 May; he was spared for transfer with effect from the afternoon of that date; pay particulars were forwarded to Sealdah showing administrative steps were taken immediately after the transfer was communicated; and the subsequent removal from the muster-roll on 28 May was a clerical/administrative act and did not mean the transfer had not already taken effect.
The Court also considered and rejected the petitioner's argument that his sick leave and the fact that he was on rest days meant he continued in service at Dhanbad until 28 May. The opinion reasons that he had no duty to perform on the rest days, and when he was directed to join Sealdah on 27 May, the question of performing duty at Dhanbad did not arise. On these factual and documentary bases the Court held the transfer had become effective on 7 May 1964, prior to the injunction of 15 May 1964; consequently, the temporary injunction could not legally restrain the defendants in respect of the petitioner's case.
Holding and Implications
APPLICATION DISMISSED.
Direct effect on the parties: The civil revision application filed by the petitioner was dismissed with costs; the hearing fee assessed was Rs. 100. The appellate Court's order allowing the defendants' appeal and rejecting the mandatory injunction was upheld by the revisional court.
Broader implications: The opinion analyses and applies earlier authorities on whether mandatory temporary injunctions may be granted under Order 39, Rule 2, and concludes that such relief can be granted under that provision. The decision resolves the issues in the present case by affirming (a) that an order in mandatory form can be regarded as one under Order 39, Rule 2 (so that an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(r) is competent), and (b) on the facts, the transfer took effect on 7 May 1964 and therefore the injunction of 15 May 1964 had no legal effect in respect of the petitioner's situation. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond the reasoning applied to these points.
Judgment authored by Choudhary, J.; G.N. Prasad, J. concurred. Final operative line in the opinion: "Application dismissed."
Choudhary, J.:— This civil revision application by the plaintiff is directed against an order passed in appeal by the Subordinate Judge, First Court, Dhanbad, vacating an or her of injunction passed by the Munsif, First Court there.
2. The petitioner alleges to have been appointed to the permanent post of a Special Grade Travelling Ticket Examiner (hereinafter referred to as “T.T.E” for the sake of brevity) at Dhanbad on the 3rd January, 1964. On the 7th May, 1964, he was directed to attend the office of the Commercial Superintendent, Dhanbad; and when he went there he received on that very date at about 5 p.m an order of his transfer to Sealdah Division From fie 8th May, 1964 till the 25th May, 1964, he was on sick leave on the 26th May, 1964 and the 27th May, 1964, as appears from the pro gramme for Squad No. 4, of which the petitioner was said to be in charge, he was on rest due on the 16th May and the 23rd May, 1964, respectively His name however continued to appear on those two dates in the muster-roll on the 27th May, 1964, the petitioner met the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Dhanbad who verbally directed him to join Sealdah Division. His name was removed from the muster-roll at Dhanbad on the 28th May, 1964. It, however, appears that, on the 15th May, 1964, the petitioner filed a title suit, being Title Suit No. 328 of 1964, in the First Court of the Munsif at Dhanbad for a declaration that the transfer order was illegal and contrary to rules, and a prayer was made for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants railway authorities from giving effect to the transfer order. On the same day, he made an application for issue of an order directing the defendants not to give effect to the transfer order pending the disposal of the title suit. The learned Munsif, on the same day, passed an order of ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from giving effect to the above transfer order. After the name of the petitioner was removed from the muster-roll on the 28th May, 1964, the petitioner filed another application on the 24th June, 1964 for issue of a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to put the name of the petitioner in the Duly Roster at Dhanbad and to allow him to perform his duty as a Special Grade T.T.E at Dhanbad, in view of the order of ad interim injunction passed on the 16th May, 1964.
3. This application was disposed of by the learned Munsif by his order dated the 5th January, 1966, whereunder he passed an order of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to allow the petitioner to resume his duties as a Special Grade T.T.E at Dhanbad. Against the above order, the defendants preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Dhanbad, which was heard by the Subordinate Judge, First Court, there. The appellate Court allowed the appeal and rejected the petition of the petitioner for issue of a mandatory injunction. Being thus aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present revision application.
4. The first point raised by Mr. Ghose, appearing for the petitioner, is that no appeal lay against the order of the Munsif to the District Judge, and, therefore, the order of rejection of the application for mandatory injunction passed by the Appellate Court is illegal and void it has been submitted that the order of mandatory injunction was passed by the learned Munsif under his inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) On the other hand, Mr. Bose, appearing for the opposite parties, has urged that the application for mandatory injunction was made and entertained as being an application under the provisions of Order 39. R. 2, of the Code: and against an order passed on such application, an appeal lay under the provisions of Order 43. Rule 1(r), of the Code. In order to find out therefore, the competency of the appeal in the Court below, it his to be seen whether the order of mandatory in junction was passed under Order 39. Rule 2, or under the inherent powers of the Court under S. 161 of the Code.
5. There is no dispute that a Court can pass an order of mandatory injunction under S. 151 of the Code: but at the same time it appears to me that such an order could also be passed under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2, of the Code Order 39. Rule 2(1). states that in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation in claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. Applying the above provision to the facts of the present case, it is manifest that the plaintiff-petitioner brought the suit for restraining the defendants from committing an injury to the plaintiff by transferring him from Dhanbad to Sealdah Division, and a prayer for injunction was made to direct the defendants not to give effect to the transfer order so that the injury complained of might not be committed.
6. It is, therefore, a case under the privisions of Order 39, Rule 2, of the Code. An order of mandatory injunction directing the defendants not to give effect to the transfer order and to allow the plaintiff to work as a Special Grade T.T.E at Dhanbad could, in my opinion, very well be passed under the above provision of the Code. The decision of the question, however, is not free from difficulty, and there appears to be no direct authoritative decision of any Court on this point, though there are decisions which throw some light on the subject.
7. In the case of Rasul Karim…Applicant; v. Pirbhai Amirbhai…., (1914) ILR 38 Bom 381 : (AIR 1914 Bom 42), Beaman, J. expressed his opinion doubting the power of the Indian Courts to issue mandatory injunction under the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, of the Code. Shah, J. however, did not agree with his view, bul did not decided the general question argued, whether the Courts had power, under Order 39, Rule 2, to make an order restraining a defendant from committing the injury complained of Subsequently, in another Bench decision of that Court, in Champsey Bhimji & Co.…Defendants v. Jamna Flour Mills Co. Ltd.…Plaintiffs, (1914) 16 Bom LR 566 (AIR 1914 Bom 195), the view taken was in favour of the application of Order 39. Rule 2, of the Code to a case like the present one in that case, the plaintiffs leased certain premises to the defendants for a term of years the latter covenanting that they would make, keep and maintain at their own expense two roads leading to the premises.
8. In May, 1914, the defendants, having blocked up one of the roads, the plaintiffs commenced an action to restrain the defendants from keeping any debris on the road and from raising the level thereof to a height greater than before. On the plaintiffs' application, the Court granted a mandatory injunction until the hearing of the suit restraining the defendants from doing any if the acts threatened. The defendants appealed on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant the mandatory injunction. It was held in that case that the Court was justified in granting the mandatory injunction, and the appeal was dismissed. Davar, Acting, C.J, while dealing with the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a mandatory injunction, observed that Having regard to the very clear wording of O. XXXIX, R. 2, and to the fact that this Court has always exercised the power ref remedying an injury or wrong by a mandatory injunction on an interlocutory application, I have no doubt whatever that this Court has power to make a mandatory order on an interlocutory application”. Heaton, J., in his concurring judgment, however, added that “whatever view may be taken of the general question of mandatory injunction under O. XXXIX, R. 2. I think this injunction must be maintained.”.
9. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner in the instant case that Heaton, J. did not express his opinion about the applicability of Order 39, Rule 2, and Davar, Acting C.J also did not depend for his decision entirely on Order 39, Rule 2, bul also on the practice of the Court in exercising the power of remedying an injury or wrong by a mandatory injunction. The case had gone before their Lordships in an appeal, and it was not suggested that the appeal was incompetent as the impugned order of mandatory injunction could not be passed under O. 39, R. 2. If the view of their Lordships had been that such an order could not be passed under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2, of the Code, but only under S. 151, the appeal itself would have been held to be not maintainable. Their Lordships, however, do not appear to have taken the view that the appeal was not maintainable on the ground that the impugned order was not passed under the provisions of O. 39, R. 2, of the Code.
10. Subsequently, a similar question arose to be decided by a Bench of the Madras High Court in M. Randaswami Chelty v. P. Siubramania Chetty, (1918) ILR 41 Mad 208 : (AIR 1918 Mad 588). II was held in that case that Courts in India can, under Order XXXIX Rule 2, of the Code issue temporary injunction in a mandatory form in that case their ??? ships pointed out that they were not prepared to adopt the opinion expressed by Beaman, J. in (1914) ILR 38 Bom 381 : (AIR 1914 Bom 42), referred to above; and observed that the description of temporary injunctions in Section 53 of the Specific Relief Act does not exclude injunctions of a mandatory nature Their Lordships further observed that Shah, J. did not agree with the opinion of his learned brother in Rasul Karim's case, (1914) ILR 38 Bom 381 (AIR 1914 Bom 42) and two other Judges of the Bombay High Court took a different view from Beaman, J. in (1914) 10 Bom LR 566 : (AIR 1914 Bom 195). already referred to Takinsr these decisions into consideration, along with the language of Order 39 Rule 2, of the Code, I have no doubt that a mandatory injunction of the nature as was passed in the case in hand could be passed under the provisions of O. 39, R. 2 An appeal, therefore, lay to the Court below under O. 43. R. 1(r) of the Code.
11. Mr. Ghose has then contended that, even if the appeal in the Court below was maintainable, its order vacating the injunction order passed by the court of first instance was not legally justified, inasmuch as the Court below wrongly held the transfer order to have become effective prior to the order of temporary injunction that was passed on the 15th May, 1964. His contention is that, though the order of transfer was made on the 7th May, 1964, it was actually given effect to on the 28th May, 1964 by removing the name of the petitioner from the muster-roll; and this having been done after the service of the temporary in junction order passed on the 15th May, 1964, the defendants violated the injunction order, and, as such, the Court of first instance was perfectly justified in issuing the mandatory injunction.
12. The contention is based on an argument that the order of transfer became effective on the 28th May, 1964, and not on the 7th May, 1964, as held by the Appellate Court. The question as to when the order of transfer became effective is a question of fact, and this Court, sitting in revision, cannot interfere with the finding arrived at on that point by the final Court of fact. It is not, therefore, possible to interfere with the finding of the Appellate Court that the transfer order became effective on the 7th May, 1964.
13. Assuming, however, that such a finding could be examined by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, the materials available on the record of the case, in my opinion, fully justify the conclusion to which the Appellate Court has arrived. The transfer order was passed on the 7th May, 1964 and it was received he the petitioner hand to hand on the same day. There is a note of the transfer order, as has been pointed out by Mr. Ghose, that. This will not confer any claim on Shri Biswas for absorption in this Grade in preference ??? other eligible staff”. A good deal of criticism has been made on this note suggestion that by the transfer order the petitioner was going to be reduced in rank. I, however, do not find any substance in this contention, because he was transferred in the same grade in which he was posted at Dhanbad and the effect of the above note was not to place him higher than the other employees of the same grade already posted in Sealdah Division. One thing, however, is of great importance in this transfer order. Item No. 8 of the forwarding memo recites (“Cory to Shri R.K Biswas, Offg Spl. Gr. TTF/Dhanbad (present in office) for information and compliance. He is spared on transfer to Sealdah division with effect from the afternoon of 7th May, 1964”)
14. Thus, his transfer was made effective in the afternoon of the 7th May, 1964 itself had the copy of the order was handed over to him on the same date in the office. He was also spared on the same date in the afternoon. The order of transfer so made, therefore, became effective from the afternoon of the date on which it was passed and communicated to the petitioner. Mr. Biswas, however, in my view, wanted somehow or other to do away with the effective character of this order by at once going on sick leave from the 8th May, 1964 till the 26th May, 1964. On the 26th and the 27th May, 1964, he was on rest, according to the programme (Ex. 2). On the 27th May, 1964 he went to the Head Ticket Collector, when he was asked to see the Divisional Commercial Superintendent. Dhanbad, and when the petitioner went to the Superintendent, he was asked to join Sealdah Division at once and his name was removed from the muster-roll on the 28th May, 1964. On these facts Mr. Ghose has urged that the transfer order did not actually become effective on the 7-5-1964, but only on the 28-5-1964 when the name of the petitioner was removed from the muster-roll of Dhanbad it has been submitted that, after his sick leave was over he joined his duty on the 26-5-1964 and performed the same till the next day, that is till the 27th May, 1964, and, therefore, the transfer order could not be said to have been made effective earlier than the 28th May, 1964. But, as already stated, he had no duty to per form on the 26th and the 27th May, as those were his rest days, and on the 27th May, 1961 when he saw the Divisional Commercial Superintendent at Dhanbad, as directed by the Head Ticket Collector, he was asked to join Sealdah Division at once. The question of his joining and performing his duty did not arise at all. The removal of his name from the in muster-roll on the 28th May, 1964 was only a clerical job on the administrative side. The petitioner, therefore, could not be said to have continued in service at Dhanbad till the 28th May, 1964.
15. It may be mentioned here that, soon after the transfer order was passed and communicated to the petitioner, his pay slip for the period up to the 7th May, 1964 was sent to Sealdah Division to be paid to him. This clearly Indicates that effect to the transfer order-was given on the 7th May, 1964 Itself.
16. That being the position, the defendants had to do nothing to give effect to the transfer order subsequent to the 7th May, 1964, and the injunction order passed on the 15th May, 1964 restraining the defendants from giving effect to the transfer order had no legal effect so far as the case of the petitioner is concerned.
17. The result, therefore, is that there is no merit in this application, which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100 (Rupees One hundred only).
18. G.N Prasad, J.:— I agree.
BJ/VRB/D.V.C
19. Application dismissed.
Alert