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Deolakban Thathera v. State Of Bihar Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Anant Singh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The matter arose on an application presenting the question whether, when an accused has been exempted from personal attendance and permitted to be represented by a pleader up to the stage of his examination under Section 342 (or Section 242) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr PC), the non-examination of the accused himself in person (the pleader being examined instead) constitutes an illegality that vitiates the trial or is only an irregularity curable under Section 537 of the Code.
Procedurally, the question had been referred to a Division Bench by a single Judge of the High Court because of conflicting decisions in different High Courts. The Division Bench also issued a rule for enhancement of sentence in the underlying criminal conviction; counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Rahman) challenged both the procedural point and the conviction/sentence on merits under the scope of Section 439(6) of the Cr PC.
On the facts of the specific case considered: the petitioner was tried and was represented at trial by his pleader with the permission of the Court; the Magistrate did not require the accused's personal attendance for his examination under Section 342 and the pleader was examined in his place. Articles alleged to be stolen were recovered from the petitioner's possession two days after a theft; there was no suggestion of enmity between the complainant and the petitioner and no specific assertion that the recovered articles belonged to the petitioner. The trial court convicted the petitioner for dishonest possession of the articles. The Division Bench reviewed the conviction and sentence: the conviction was affirmed on the evidence; however, the Court reduced the fine from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 200 (in default one month's rigorous imprisonment). The petition was dismissed and the rule for enhancement was discharged.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, where an accused has been exempted from personal attendance and allowed to be represented by a pleader (under Section 205 or Section 540-A of the Cr PC), the examination of the accused by examining his pleader in the accused's place (under Section 242 or Section 342) constitutes an illegality that vitiates the trial or merely an irregularity curable under Section 537 of the Cr PC.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments
- Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahman, relied on the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dudhnath Shaw v. The State (AIR 1958 Cal 431) to contend that the accused cannot be permitted to be examined through his pleader under Section 342 of the Cr PC.
- Mr. Rahman also challenged the conviction on merits and sought relief under the rule for enhancement — invoking the review under Section 439(6) of the Cr PC to argue against the conviction and sentence imposed.
Respondent's (State's) Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dudhnath Shaw v. The State, AIR 1958 Cal 431 | Authority relied upon by the petitioner to assert that an accused cannot be examined through his pleader under Section 342 of the Cr PC. | The Court noted this authority was relied upon by the petitioner but observed that a contrary view in this case had been overruled by a later Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Sm. Prova Debi). The Division Bench did not accept Dudhnath Shaw as operative authority for the present question. |
| Sm. Prova Debi v. Mrs. Fernandes, AIR 1962 Cal 203 | Full Bench decision overruling Dudhnath Shaw and affirming that when an accused is represented by a pleader with the Court's permission, it is not necessary to call the accused personally for examination under Section 342. | The Court relied on this majority Full Bench decision as supporting the proposition that an accused may be examined through his pleader when he has been permitted to be represented — a position the Court accepted. |
| Sm. Champa Devi v. Babulal Goenka, AIR 1950 Cal 161 | Earlier Calcutta High Court authority holding that where the accused is represented by a pleader with the Court's permission, it is not necessary to call the accused personally for examination under Section 342. | The Division Bench treated this earlier decision as consistent with and followed by the Full Bench in Sm. Prova Debi. It formed part of the chain of authority supporting examination through the pleader. |
| Ram Singh v. State, AIR 1959 All 623 | Single Judge view of the Allahabad High Court supporting the proposition that a pleader may be examined in place of the accused when the accused is represented by leave of the Court. | The opinion records that a similar view was taken by a Single Judge in this case; it supported the Court's acceptance of the permissibility of pleader-examination. |
| Narain Lall Bansi Lall v. State, 1963 BLJR 88 | Held that a pleader representing an accused under an order passed under Section 205 or Section 540-A can be examined under Section 242 or Section 342 instead of the accused. | The Court explicitly cited and agreed with this holding; it is used to support the conclusion that examination through the pleader is permissible and not an irregularity or illegality. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a statutory and precedent-driven manner:
-
Statutory framework: The Court examined Sections 205 and 540-A of the Cr PC (as amended in 1955) which permit, in specified circumstances, the accused to be exempted from personal attendance and to be represented by a pleader.
- Section 205 was interpreted as applicable at the commencement of proceedings when a Magistrate issues a summons: the Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance and permit representation by pleader, and thereafter the Magistrate may at any stage require personal attendance.
- Section 540-A, placed under “Miscellaneous”, was read broadly to permit the Judge or Magistrate, at any stage of an inquiry or trial, if satisfied for reasons to be recorded that personal attendance is not necessary in the interests of justice, to dispense with the accused’s attendance and proceed if the accused is represented by a pleader; the Court may later direct personal attendance if it deems necessary.
-
Interaction with Sections 242 and 342: The Court explained the nature and timing of examination provisions.
- Section 242 relates to examination at the commencement of proceedings in a summons case when the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate to plead to the substance of the accusation.
- Section 342 permits the Court, at any stage (but necessarily after the prosecution witnesses are examined), to put questions to the accused to enable him to explain circumstances appearing in the evidence.
- On the central question, the Court reasoned that once lawfully permitted to be absent and to be represented, the accused's representation by a pleader must be understood to include, for purposes of examination under Sections 242 and 342, the pleader acting in the accused’s stead. The word “the accused” in those sections was read in context with provisions dispensing with attendance; therefore the accused, having sought and obtained exemption, cannot later complain that his pleader was examined instead of him personally.
- Precedential analysis: The Court reviewed conflicting authorities. It acknowledged the petitioner’s reliance on Dudhnath Shaw, but observed that the Calcutta High Court Full Bench in Sm. Prova Debi had overruled that earlier Division Bench decision and followed Sm. Champa Devi’s view that personal attendance was not necessary where the accused was represented by a pleader by the Court’s permission. The Court also noted supporting views from Allahabad High Court authorities (Ram Singh and Narain Lall). On this basis the Division Bench adopted the view that examination through the pleader is permissible.
- Practical conclusion: The Court concluded that examination of the accused through his pleader (where exemption and representation have been permitted) is neither an irregularity nor an illegality and is permissible under Sections 205/540-A read with Sections 242/342. The discretion to require personal attendance remains with the Court; if the Court does not exercise that discretion to call the accused personally, the accused cannot later complain.
- On merits (as to conviction and sentence): The Court reviewed the evidence summarized in the opinion (recovery of articles from the petitioner two days after the theft, absence of allegations of enmity, lack of explanation that the recovered articles belonged to the petitioner) and held the conviction to be justified. Concerning sentence, the Court reconsidered its earlier inclination to enhance sentence but, taking into account that the recovered articles were of insignificant value, reduced the fine from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 200, in default one month's rigorous imprisonment.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court held that an accused who has been lawfully exempted from personal attendance and permitted to be represented by a pleader may be examined through his pleader under Section 242 or Section 342 of the Cr PC; such examination is neither an illegality nor an irregularity that vitiates the trial.
Direct consequences in the instant case:
- The conviction of the petitioner was affirmed on the facts and evidence as discussed by the Court.
- The sentence was modified: the fine was reduced from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 200, in default one month's rigorous imprisonment.
- The petition was dismissed and the rule for enhancement was discharged.
Broader implications:
The opinion applies and follows existing High Court authorities (including the Full Bench decision in Sm. Prova Debi and the earlier Sm. Champa Devi decision) to confirm that examination through a court-permitted pleader is lawful; the Court did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying and endorsing those authorities.
Anant Singh, J.:— The main question for decision in this application is whether after the accused on his asking has been exempted from personal attendance in Court and allowed to be represented by a lawyer up to the stage of his examination under Section 342 of the Cr PC or for the matter of that under Section 242 of the Cr PC and the pleader is examined under either of the above sections in place of the accused, the non-examination of the accused him-self in person will constitute an illegality so as to vitiate the trial or even an irregularity curable under Section 537 of the Code.
2. The question though differently worded, was referred to a Division Bench by a single Judge of this Court for an authoritative decision in view of some conflict of decisions on the point in different High Courts, and this is how the matter came up before us. We have also issued a rule for the enhancement of the sentence, to which I shall refer hereafter. The question arising for decision, referred to above, must be answered in the negative for the reasons I give below. There are two Sections 205 and 540-A of the Cr PC as amended in 1955 which provide for exemption of the accused from personal appearance in Court and his representation by a pleader.
3. Section 205 occurs under Chapter XVII under the heading
“of the commencement of proceedings before Magistrate”
4. And it is as follows:—
“205. Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance of accused; (1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused, and permit him to appear by his pleader.
(2). But the Magistrate inquiring into of frying the case may, in his discretion, at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and, if necessary, enforce such attendance in manner herein before provided”.
5. Section 540-A occurs under the heading “Miscellaneous” in Chapter XLVI of the Code, and it is to the following effect;
“540-A. Provision for inquiries and trial being held in the absence of accused in certain cases: (1). At any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that the personal attendance of the accused before the Court is not necessary in the interests of justice, the Judge or Magistrate may, if the accused is represented by a pleader dispense with his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings direct the personal attendance of such accused.
(2). If the accused in any such case is not represented by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers his personal attendance necessary, he may if he think fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of such accused be taken up or tried separately.”
6. It will appear that the provisions of Section 205 would be attracted at the stage of the commencement of the proceedings before the Magistrate decides to issue a summons, and it is only at that stage that he is empowered to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit his appearance by his pleader. If the personal attendance of the accused has been dispensed with-by a Magistrate on the commencement of the proceeding, the accused might be allowed to be represented by a pleader till the conclusion of the case unless the Magistrate decides otherwise to require the personal presence of the accused at any stage of the proceeding. But in cases, where the personal attendance of the accused is not dispensed with at the initial stage of the commencement of the proceeding and a summons was issued, the Magistrate has no power in terms of Section 205 to dispense with his personal attendance after the trial has commenced after the appearance of the accused in person. The terms of Section 540-A will cover up such cases. In view of the provisions of Section 540-A it is manifestly clear that “at any stage” of an enquiry or trial the Judge or a Magistrate can dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and allow him to be represented by a pleader up to the final conclusion of the case including the examination of the accused either under Section 242 or Section 342 of the Cr PC, which is undoubtedly a part of the trial, unless of course, the Court at any stage of the enquiry or trial decides in his discretion to compel the personal attendance of the accused in Court. The discretion is with the Magistrate or Judge and if the Judge or the Magistrate holding the enquiry or trial does not call for the personal attendance of the accused even for his examination in person Tinder Section 242 or Section 342 of the Cr PC, he is surely acting within law as provided for in Section 540-A, quoted above.
7. The examination of the accused is provided for in Section 242 in the trial of summons case at the initial stage of the commencement of the proceeding when the accused) appears or is brought before the Magistrate and is required to plead to the substance of the accusation. Section 342 provides for the examination of the accused at any stage before the conclusion of the trial and necessarily after the conclusion of the evidence led by the prosecution. The relevant provisions of Section 342 are as follows:—
“342. Power to examine the accused; (1) For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court may, at any stage of any inquiry or trial, without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary, and shall, for the purpose aforesaid, question him generally on the case after the witnesses of the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence.
8. The object of the examination of the accused under Section 342 is only to apprise the accused of the evidence and circumstances appearing against him, and it will be noticed that after the conclusion of the evidence the accused has got to be examined and afforded opportunity to explain the evidence and circumstances appearing against him. The accused, therefore, must have to be examined after the close of the evidence by the prosecution, but the question in whether the accused must necessarily be examined himself in person even in cases where he has been exempted from personal attendance and allowed to be represented by a pleader. It is true that the word “the accused” appears in both the Sections 242-arid 342, but once a provision has been made for dispensing with the presence of the accused and his representation through a pleaded instead as provided in Section 205 as also in Section 540-A it must be interpreted that the accused for the purpose of examination either under S. 242 or S. 342 would include his pleader representing him at his own request and on his own behalf. No accused can be heard to plead any illegality or irregularity later on after he has himself sought for his exemption from personal attend and representation by a pleader. In my opinion, therefore, there is no irregularity much less any illegality, if the accused is not examined personally but examined through his pleader who he been allowed to represent him. The discretion to compel the; personal attendance of the accused is with the Judge or Magistrate and it does not choose to exercise his discretion by enforcing the personal attendance of the accused at any stage including the stage of his examination under Section 242 or 342, the accused cannot be heard to make any grievance on this score. Mr. Rahman, appearing for the petitioner, has, however, relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dudhnath Shaw v. The State, AIR 1958 Cal 431 in support of his contention that the accused cannot be permitted to be examined through his pleader under Section 342 of the Cr PC. A contrary view supporting the contention of Mr. Rahman has no doubt been taken in the aforesaid case, but this decision was recently overruled by a majority decision of three out of the five Judges of the same High Court constituting a Full Bench in Sm. Prova Debi v. Mrs. Fernandes, AIR 1962 Cal 203. Their Lordships followed an earlier decision of their Court in Sm. Champa Devi v. Babulal Goenka, AIR 1950 Cal 161 wherein it was held that in a case in which the accused was represented by a pleader by the permission granted by the Court, it was not necessary to call upon the accused to be personally present for his examination under Section 342 of the Cr PC, this view was confirmed as mentioned before by the majority view in the aforesaid case, and a similar view has been taken by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Singh v. State, AIR 1959 All 623. After this case was referred to a Division Bench, the learned Single Judge, K. Sahai, J., who had referred the case, has himself since taken the same view in the case of Narain Lall Bansi Lall v. State, 1963 BLJR 88 and has held as follows:
“A Pleader, representing an accused either under an order passed under Section 205 or under an order passed under Sec. 540-A can be examined under Section 242 or 342 instead of the accused.”
9. With respects, I am of the same view.
10. In my considered opinion, the examination of the accused either under Section 242 or 342 of the Cr PC, through his pleader is neither an irregularity nor illegality, and it is permissible under the law, as mentioned before. In the instant case, the petitioner was represented at the trial by his pleader with the permission of the Court and the Magistrate did not ask for the personal attendance of the petitioner for his examination under Section 342; but, in his place, his pleader who had been authorised to represent him was examined. Thus, there has been no irregularity, much less, any illegality in his trial.
11. Mr. Rahman, appearing for the petitioner, has, however, repudiated the conviction of the petitioner on merits as well. Since a rule for enhancement was issued by us, he has taken us to the facts of the case as well, as provided for in Section 439(6) of the Cr PC. The facts are as follows: (His Lordship then stated the facts and discussed the evidence on paras 7 and 8 and proceeded:) There is no enmity suggested between him and the petitioner, and there is no reason why he would falsely claim these articles as belonging to him. There was no suggestion made on behalf of the petitioner that the articles in question that were recovered from the possession of the petitioner belonged to him. There can be no doubt that he had been keeping these articles dishonestly; and, since they were recovered from his possession only two days after the theft, will be presumed that he knew them to be stolen goods for which he had no explanation to offer. In my opinion, he was rightly convicted of the charge. As regards the sentence, we no doubt issued a rule for enhancement, being at that time of the view, when full facts had not been placed before us, that there should have been some substantive sentence of imprisonment though it is not mandatory under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, but having taken into consideration that the articles recovered from the possession of the petitioner were of insignificant value, I would not consider that any substantive sentence of imprisonment is called for. As a matter of fact, for the same reason even a fine of Rs. 1000 is much too excessive, and I would reduce it to Rs. 200/- (Rupees two hundred), in default to one month's rigorous imprisonment. With this modification, the petition is dismissed and the rule for enhancement is discharged.
G.N Prasad, J.:— I agree.
FG/S/D.V.C
12. Petition dismissed and rule for enhancement discharged.
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