The State Of Bihar v. Kamakhya Narain Singh Opposite Party.

1. This proceeding for contempt of Court has been started against the opposite party on a petition filed by the State of Bihar in August, 1962. The relevant facts of the case may be shortly stated. The opposite party challenged the validity of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, and the Patna High Court declared it to be ultra vires of the Constitution as being violative of Article 14,. The State Government took an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Constitution was amended during the pendency of that appeal. The amendment conferred immunity upon the Land Reforms Act from attack on the ground that it violated any of the Articles in Part III of the Constitution. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the State Government, and held that, but for some minor provisions contained in sections 4(b) and 23(f) of the Act, it was valid and constitutional.

2. The opposite partyis the ex-proprietor of Ramgarh and Serampur Estates. The State Government issued notification No. 3-L.R./ZAN., dated the 31st October, 1951, in respect of the opposite party's estates with the consequence that the estates vested in the State of Bihar. This notification was published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary on the 3rd November, 1951.

3. The opposite party instituted Title Suit No. 24 of 1953 against the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh, for a declaration that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was unconstitutional, and that the notification issued under it was invalid, and for permanent injunction restraining the State Government from interfering with his possession over the estates. An Additional Subordinate Judge tried the suit, and by his judgment dated the 18th July, 1956, refused to grant the declaration and the injunction prayed for but gave a finding that the estates had vested in the State of Bihar on 26-1-1955 and not on the 3rd November, 1951. The State of Bihar preferred First Appeal No. 557 of 1956 in this Court against the finding about the date of vesting. The opposite party filed First Appeal No. 641 of 1956 against the refusal to grant him the declaration and the injunction as prayed for by him.

4. The two appeals remained pending in this Court for about four years. It depends, to a large extent, upon the appellant to get an appeal ready for hearing at an early date. While First Appeal No. 557 of 1956 became read for hearing in September, 1960, First Appeal No. 641 was not ready for hearing. With the consent of the parties, a Division Bench passed an order on the 15th September, 1960, that First Appeal No. 557 be placed for hearing on the 28th November, 1960, subject to part heard, and that, if possible, First Appeal No. 641 of 1956 be also placed for hearing at the same time. On the 17th November, however, the parties moved the Court again, and the hearing of First Appeal No. 557 was adjourned with consent to the 14th December, 1960. It was also mentioned in the order that First Appeal No. 641 be also placed for hearing along with First Appeal No. 357, if that appeal could be made ready by that date.

5. On the 6th December, Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad, a junior advocate, mentioned on a slip of paper on behalf of the opposite party that. First Appeal No. 557 be adjourned for a week. It was not brought to the notice of the Bench that the case had been specially fixed for hearing, nor that the Government Advocate had refused to consent to the adjournment. The Bench granted the adjournment, as prayed for. On the 13th December, 1960, the Government Advocate mentioned to the Court that Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad had taken the adjournment without disclosing that he had refused to give his consent, and that the case was specially fixed. When Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad was sent for and when he appeared, he admitted his mistake, and tendered apology. The Court then ordered that the hearing of the case would proceed from the 14th December, as previously fixed. Mr. P.R Das, who was the senior counsel of the opposite party, stated on the 14th December that he was fully prepared to argue the appeal, but he was unable to do so because his client had asked him not to appear in the case, at any rate, on that day. The hearing of the case, therefore, started in the absence of any one on behalf of the opposite party (the respondent in the appeal). At 2 P.M on the 14th December itself, another Advocate, Mr. B.C Ghose, attempted to secure adjournment of the hearing of the appeal; but the prayer was refused.

6. Mr. P.R Das appeared on the 15th December, 1960, and informed the Court that his client had instructed him to argue the case on his behalf. He then began to attend the hearing of the appeal. On the 16th December, the opposite party filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, praying for an order directing the Patna High Court not to hear or dispose of First Appeals Nos. 557 and 641 of 1956. It was numbered as Writ Petition No. 10 of 1961. A copy of this petition is annexure A to the petition filed by the State of Bihar for starting this contempt of Court proceeding. We will refer to it as annexure A.

7. At 2 P.M on the 20th December, 1960, Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad submitted an application before the Court to the effect that the opposite party had filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, and that the hearing of First Appeal No. 557 be stayed because he expected to obtain a stay order from the Supreme Court on the 2nd January, 1961. The Government Advocate submitted that he was prepared to argue First Appeal No. 641 also, and Mr. P.R Das stated that he was prepared to argue First Appeal No. 557 independently of First Appeal No. 641, of 1956. The prayer for ??? it was, therefore, refused. Mr. P.R Das argued on behalf of the respondent, and concluded is ??? on the 21st December, 1960.

8. Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad filed another application at 2 P.M on the 21st December 1960. He attached to that application a copy of annexure A, and prayed for postponing delivery of the judgment until the 15th January, 1961. The Government Advocate submitted to the court that the copy of annexure A might not be read until after the delivery of Judgment but the prayer might be accepted. The court accepted the submission and postponed delivery of the Judgment until the 5th January 1961. The Judgment was actually delivered on the 16th January, whereby the appeal of the State of Bihar was allowed, and it was held that the estates of the opposite party had vested in the State of Bihar on the 3rd November, 1951.

9. In the meantime, the State of Bihar had filed a counter affidavit in the Supreme Court in the case of Writ Petition No. 10 of 1961. The opposite party filed a reply to that counter affidavit on the 5th February, 1961. A copy of that reply is annexure B to the petition of the State of Bihar, and we will hereafter refer to it as annexure B. Writ Petition No. 10 was put down for hearing before the Supreme Court on the 8th February, 1961. On the prayer of the Opposite party's Advocate, the Court allowed the petition to be withdraw and dismissed it.

10. Particular reference has been made in the petition of the State of Bihar to the allegations and statements made by the opposite party in paragraphs 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18 and 20 of annexure A and paragraphs 13(q), 16, 17(a), 17(b), 21, 24, 27 and 30 of annexure B as amounting to serious contempt of court.

11. We have read both the annexures; but we propose to confine ourselves to the paragraphs which we have just mentioned. The relevant paragraphs of annexure A may be summarised as follows:

12. That there is political rivalry between the Congress and the Janata Party, that the opposite party is the President of the Janata Party, that the Ministers of the Government of Bihar are congressmen, that there is enmity between him and the Ministers, including the Chief Minister, and that he may not receive justice from the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Patna High Court as they are,

“often in close social contact with several important Ministers of the State who treat the petitioner as enemy”.

(The word ‘petitioner refers to the opposite party). Further, the opposite party may not receive justice in the Court of Chief Justice Ramaswami as he is a close friend of the Chief Minister.

2. That the High Court of Patna is “a limb of the State of Bihar”, and, as such, it cannot be allowed to be a judge in its own cause.

3. That the opposite party has been

“afraid for several years that the executive of Bihar will interfere with the course of justice to injure the petitioner (i.e, the opposite party)”.

13. In the judgment, dated the 13th January, 1959, of a Bench presided over by Chief Justice Ramaswami and Kanhaiya Singh, J. in Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 605 to 609 of 1958, in which the opposite party was a party, Kanhaiya Singh, J. observed.:

“These cases have a checkered career and afford a flagrant example how the otherwise salutary provisions of law, designed to promote justice, may be misused by the litigants, if they so will, to obstruct the course of justice and to prevent the speedy termination of the litigations.

It is most unfortunate that the connected title suits instituted as for back as 1948 have not yet been disposed of.”

14. This kind of observation

“can proceed only from a judiciary influenced by the Minister-in-charge through social contact and familiar prejudicial talks”.

15. In these circumstances, he (the opposite party) is afraid that he may not receive impartial consideration from the Patna High Court.

4. That the opposite party is unable to place confidence in the judgment of the Patna High Court.

16. It is manifest that, in making the allegations which I have summarised above, the opposite party committed serious contempt of the Patna High Court, and especially the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, of a nature which is called scandalising the Court or the Judge. In effect, he stated that he could not expect fair and impartial justice from the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Patna Court because they were influenced, and liable to be influenced, by the Chief Minister and other Ministers of the Government of Bihar. He is the President of a political party and a member of the State Legislature. It is really strange to find a man of this position giving expression to the opinion that the High Court is a limb of the State Government. This exhibits a complete ignorance of the position of the Judiciary in a democracy. The Judiciary stands independent and has to do justice not only between subject and subject but also between a subject and the State. A, Judge has to do his duty without fear or favour, and he can certainly make an observation in his judgment if he considers it proper and if it fairly arises upon the record of the case.

17. The petition (annexure A) was filed, as I have said, in the Supreme Court on thej 16th December, 1960. The reply to the counter affidavit (annexure B) was filed in the same Court on the 5th February, 1961. The opposite party affirmed in that annexure almost all that he had said in annexure A. He made two further statements. Firstly, he said that Mr. Sharma, Editor of the “Searchlight”, had told him on several occasions that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court was not favourably disposed towards him personally and entertained a very unfavourable opinion. It may be observed that the opposite party did not make any such statement in annexure A. He obviously made it in annexure B because the truth or otherwise of his statement could not be ascertained from Mr. Sharma, who had died in the meantime.

18. Secondly, the Judgment in First Appeal No. 557 of 1956 was delivered by Kanhaiya Singh, J., the Chief Justice agreeing. After quoting some observations made by Kanhaiya Singh, J. in the judgment, the opposite party said in annexure B that the Hon'ble Judge did not properly appreciate the

“actual matters in issue, and misunderstood the context, scope and nature of the whole case”,

and that the observations reveal that

“the Hon'ble Judge was under a prefabricated impression about the petitioner (i.e, the Opposite party) from extraneous considerations and regarded the petitioner not as a suitor for justice but as a Political leader.”

19. Thus, it is quite clear that the statements made by the opposite party in annexure A were not tray statements made once by chance but were deliberate statements which were repeated with some additions about one and a half months later.

20. When the opposite party showed cause on the 8th May, 1963, in response to the notice served upon him under the orders of this court to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt, he took the plea in his petition that, as he had withdrawn the allegations and statements amounting to contempt of court with the leave of the Supreme Court, they could not be made the subject-matter of this contempt of court proceeding. This;s incorrect because he merely withdrew his petition, and made no reference to the allegations contained in it. Thereafter, he said:

“Without prejudice to all his contentions and submissions aforesaid, this deponent expresses his unqualified and unconditional regret for the statements and allegations made in the said petition and the affidavit charged as amounting to contempt of this Hon'ble Court.”

21. This is clearly not an expression of genuine contrition, and hence the apology is no apology at all in M.Y Shareef v. Hon'ble Judges of the Nagpur High Court, AIR 1955 SC 19 at p. 23 Mahajan, C.J has observed:

“The proposition is well settled and self-evident that here cannot be both justification and an apology. The two things are incompatible. Again an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness.”

22. However, this case was taken up for hearing on the 8th August, 1963. Mr. Balbhadra Pd. Singh, who then appeared on behalf of the opposite party, informed us that the opposite party would file another petition, tendering unqualified and unreserved apology. Such a petition was filed on the 9th August. In this petition, the opposite party has said that, although he had engaged senior Advocates of the Supreme Court, he had, unfortunately, received no guidance at the proper time, and that he

“offers as a mark of real contriteness and of manly consciousness of the grave wrong, his unreserved and unqualified apology”

23. Referring to his show cause petition, he has said that it may be

“read in the light that the statements made in the several paragraphs therein have been made only with the view to dilute the gravity of the offence and with a view to explain the circumstances under which in the absence of any proper legal guidance, in a state of mental distress, he had made the application”.

24. It has been admitted in the petition filed on the 9th August, 1963, that there are statements amounting to contempt of this Court in annexure A. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh has not contended before us that the statements, which we have re-ferred to above, both in annexures A and B do not amount to contempt of Court. In fact, that is quite evident. Hence, the only question which requires consideration is whether the apology tendered by the opposite party on the last day should be treated as having purged him completely of the contempt. In this connection, I may quote the observation of Vivian Bose, J. in Sub-Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand, AIR 1940 Nag 407:

“There appears to be an impression abroad that an apology consists of magic formula of words which has but to be uttered as an incantation at the last possible moment when all else has failed and it is evident that retribution is inevitable, to stave off punishment. It appears to be felt that a man should be free to continue unfounded attacks upon another's honour and character and integrity with the utmost license till the last possible moment and then when he is unable to stave off the consequence of his infamous conduct any longer, all he need do is to wave this magic formula referred to as an apology in a Judge's face in order to emerge triumphantly from the fray. Nothing can be further from the truth.

An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of their offences…. It is intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong-doer's power. Only then is it of any avail in a court of justice………. Mere lip service to a formula without any contrition of heart will not do.”

25. Coming as the statements do from a political leader, who probably has some following, we think that serious notice must be taken of them because they are liable to shake the confidence of ordinary litigants in the impartial and independent justice of this court. As Beaumont, C.J has observed in In re A firm of Solicitors, AIR 1942 Bom 331 contempt of Court proceedings of the nature known as scandalising the Court

“are not taken in order to relieve a particular judge's feelings; they are taken because it is essential in the public interest that the confidence which should be reposed in judges be not shaken by their being subjected to abuse”.

26. We do not think that litigants should get the impression that, however much they attack the impartiality, independence and integrity of the Chief Justice and Judges of this Court, they would be let off without punishment, if they tender apology at the end. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that some punishment must be awarded to the opposite party.

27. We have now to decide what punishment would meet the ends of justice in this case. In view of the position which the opposite party occupies, he is certainly expected to know the effect which his words are likely to have. He twice made allegations and statements which have a serious tendency to shake the confidence of the litigant public in the Chief Justice and Judges of this Court. His action cannot but be held to be deliberate. We feel, therefore, that the apology tendered by him on the 9th August is likely to be a

“mere lip service to a formula without any contrition of heart”.

28. Ordinarily, we would have thought that a term of simple imprisonment in jail, along with fine, was absolutely necessary, ??? view of the grave wrong which the opposite party has done. We have, however, decided to deal leniently with him in the hope that, having found it necessary to tender unqualified apology in order to escape the full measure of punishment and thereby having learnt his lesson, he would behave better, and would be more careful in future in choosing his language while referring to Judges and the judiciary.

29. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, we find him guilty of contempt of Court, and we sentence him for that offence to undergo simple imprisonment until the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, to be paid within two weeks from today, or, in default, to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months. It is entirely due to the opposite party that this proceeding has had to be taken. He must, therefore, pay to the State the costs of this proceeding which we assess at Rs. 500/-.

JG/RMG/D.V.C

30. Order accordingly.