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Gobardhan Mahton v. Hariram Mahto And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-respondent, Hari Ram Mahto, instituted a suit seeking a declaration that a sale deed dated 11 November 1947 (Exhibit C), executed by Mosmt. Jagesri (widow of the last male holder, Mahadeo Mahto) and Mosmt. Pankalia (their daughter and the plaintiff's mother), was without consideration or legal necessity and therefore not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed a reversionary right as the grandson of Mahadeo Mahto.
The Trial Court decreed the suit. Defendant No. 1 (the vendee under Exhibit C) appealed to this Court in First Appeal No. 73 of 1950; that appeal was dismissed by a learned Single Judge (judgment delivered 12 August 1958). A Letters Patent Appeal was thereafter filed. During the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal, Mosmt. Jagesri died on 30 July 1960; on 25 August 1960 the Registrar recorded her death and noted that her daughter Mosmt. Pankalia was already on record as an heir. The Court’s consideration turned substantially on the legal consequences of that death and the effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff (a grandson claiming as a reversioner) can maintain a suit for declaration that Exhibit C (the sale deed) was not binding, in view of changes in succession law effected by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
- Whether Mosmt. Pankalia (daughter and co-executant of Exhibit C), after the death of Mosmt. Jagesri and by operation of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, should be treated as the proper party to challenge the alienation.
- Whether Mosmt. Pankalia, having joined in executing Exhibit C as a co-executant (with only spes successionis at the time), is estopped from challenging the recitals of legal necessity in the sale deed.
- Whether Mosmt. Pankalia may be transposed from the category of defendant to that of plaintiff in the present suit to pursue any challenge to Exhibit C, and if so, whether such transposition would be permissible without introducing a new cause of action.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The opinion notes that learned counsel for the appellant raised a number of questions and cited authorities in support of his contentions, but the opinion does not set out the appellant's arguments in detail.
Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments
- Mr. Srivastava for the plaintiff contended that Hari Ram Mahto's suit was representative in nature, instituted on behalf of all reversioners (including his mother, Mosmt. Pankalia). On that basis, he sought transposition of Mosmt. Pankalia from the category of defendant to that of plaintiff as a formal step.
- Mr. Srivastava also urged that if transposition were not allowed, the Court should expressly leave open the points so that Mosmt. Pankalia could institute another suit later and that the present decree should not operate to her prejudice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 581 (Full Bench) | Authority that the reversioner or heir of the last male holder is competent to challenge an alienation by the widow where the alienation is not justified by legal necessity. | Used to show that Mosmt. Pankalia, as heir after her mother's death, could be competent to challenge the validity of the alienation. |
| Gummaiapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veerawa, AIR 1959 S.C. 577 | Supreme Court authority supporting the proposition that the heir/reversioner may challenge alienations not justified by legal necessity. | Relied on alongside Harakh Singh to support the proposition that an heir can challenge the alienation. |
| Sharm Singh v. Hakim Gurcharan Singh, AIR 1950 EP 1 | Where a person who has not actually succeeded to the property joins in executing a sale deed with the person in possession, a presumption arises that the recitals in the deed are true; principle of estoppel. | Applied to hold that Mosmt. Pankalia, having co-executed Exhibit C, is prima facie bound by the recitals and thus would be estopped from impugning the sale unless she adduces rebutting evidence (e.g., fraud). |
| Sahu Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, (1955) 2 SCR 22; AIR 1955 SC 481 | Support for the principle that the co-executant's joining in execution gives rise to a presumption in favour of the recitals (estoppel; onus to rebut). | Relied upon as part of a line of authorities establishing the presumption/estoppel principle applied to co-executants with spes successionis. |
| Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145 (reported at 1952 suh 478 at p. 488) | Another Supreme Court authority cited in the same context of estoppel/presumption arising from co-execution of sale deeds. | Used to reinforce the legal position that a co-executant who joins in a deed is prima facie bound by its recitals absent rebutting evidence. |
| Kalishankar Das v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1954 SC 505 | Authority cited in relation to the effect of recitals and the presumption arising from co-execution of deeds. | Cited as continuing authority supporting the court's inference that the co-executant is bound unless she adduces contrary proof. |
| Paremeshwaribal v. Raghavendra, AIR 1919 Bom 141 | Earlier authority cited among cases regarding presumption/estoppel arising from execution of instruments by persons interested in future succession. | Included in the array of precedents establishing the principle that a co-executant with a spes successionis who joins in execution gives rise to a presumption in favour of the recitals. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by first noting the changed factual and legal landscape resulting from the death of Mosmt. Jagesri during the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal and the statutory change effected by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The Court observed that had Mosmt. Jagesri died before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the daughter (Mosmt. Pankalia) would have been only a limited heir and the grandson (the plaintiff) could still have maintained a reversionary suit. After the Hindu Succession Act, however, the daughter becomes an absolute heir and any property inherited by a Hindu female is held as an absolute interest; Section 15 of the Act terminated the status of reversioners under Hindu law. On that basis the Court concluded that the plaintiff, as a grandson claiming as a reversioner, could not maintain the suit now that his mother (Pankalia) occupies the position of full heir.
The Court then considered whether Mosmt. Pankalia, as heir, could challenge the alienation. It acknowledged authorities (Full Bench and Supreme Court decisions) indicating that an heir or reversioner is competent to challenge an alienation by a widow if not justified by legal necessity. However, the Court then examined the fact that Pankalia was a co-executant of Exhibit C and applied a line of decisions (including Sharm Singh and various Supreme Court authorities) and the principle expressed in Mulla's Hindu Law: where a next reversioner joins in the execution of an alienation, a presumption arises that the recitals of legal necessity are true and the co-executant will be prima facie bound by those recitals unless rebutting evidence is led.
Acting on that ratio decidendi, the Court concluded that Mosmt. Pankalia is bound by Exhibit C's recitals and that the sale deed must therefore be treated as executed for legal necessity absent rebuttal. Consequently, since Pankalia now stands as an absolute heir under the Hindu Succession Act and the plaintiff (grandson) no longer has reversionary status, the property would remain as conveyed under Exhibit C in favour of the vendee (defendant-appellant).
The Court addressed the plaintiff's request to transpose Mosmt. Pankalia from defendant to plaintiff. It refused that request on the ground that transposition would introduce a new cause of action because Pankalia is a co-executant bound by the recital; only a plea of fraud would remain open to her. The Court declined to make any definitive observations on what rights Pankalia might have if she initiated fresh litigation, noting that the present judgment might either stand in her way or not, depending on the subsequent pleaded cause of action and evidence.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeal allowed; the suit of the plaintiff (Hari Ram Mahto) is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge are set aside.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiff's suit seeking a declaration that Exhibit C was not binding fails; title under Exhibit C remains in accordance with that sale deed in favour of the vendee (defendant-appellant), and the appeal is allowed. The parties are to bear their own costs throughout.
- On transposition and subsequent litigation: The Court refused to transpose Mosmt. Pankalia to the position of plaintiff because such transposition would introduce a new cause of action. The Court left open whether Pankalia, if advised, can successfully pursue another suit (noting that only a plea of fraud would clearly remain available to her in the present context), and refrained from making any conclusive observations that would bind future proceedings.
- Precedential scope: The opinion resolves the case on the facts and applicable authorities but does not purport to lay down any new broad principle beyond applying existing precedents concerning estoppel/presumption from co-execution and the effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The judgment does not state that a new precedent is being created; it decides the present litigation on the basis of the authorities and statutory change considered.
Disposition: Appeal allowed; plaintiff's suit dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.
1. Defendant No. 1 is the appellant. The plaintiff respondent Hari Ram Mahto brought the suit giving rise to this appeal for a declaration that the sale deed dated the 11th of November, 1947 (Ext. C) by Mosmt. Jagesri, widow of the last male holder, was without consideration or legal necessity and hence not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed reversionary right to institute the suit for the above declaration, being the grandson of Mahadeo Mahto, husband of Mosmt. Jagesri. It may be stated that the sale deed in question was executed both by Mosmt. Jagesri and her daughter Mosmt. Pankalia, mother of the plaintiff and daughter of Mahadeo Mahto. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and defendant No. 1, the vendee under Ext. C, preferred an appeal to this Court against the decision of the Trial Court. The appeal, being First Appeal No. 73 of 1950, was dismissed by a learned single Judge whereupon the present appeal under Letters Patent has been filed. The judgment of the teamed Single Judge dismissing the appeal was delivered on the 12th August, 1958.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised a number of questions before us and cited authorities in support of each one of his contentions. In our opinion, however, it is not necessary to refer to them all in view of the fact that this appeal can be disposed of conclusively by taking into consideration the death of Mosmt. Jagesri. She died on the 30th July, 1960, during the pendency of this Letters Patent Appeal in this Court. On the 25th August, 1960, the Registrar passed an order that Jagesri (respondent No. 1) was dead and her heir respondent No. 3, Mosmt. Pankalia, her daughter, was already on the record. This has given rise to a situation which is altogether new in course of this litigation.
3. I have already mentioned that Ext. C, the sale deed, in favour of the appellant was executed both by Mosmt. Jagesri, the widow of Mahadeo Mahto, and Mosmt. Pankalia, his daughter. After the death of Mosmt. Jagesri, Mosmt. Pankalia would succeed as the heir of Mahadeo Mahto. If, however, this event had taken place prior to the passing of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), the suit of the plaintiff as the grandson of Mahadeo Mahto would still be maintainable inasmuch as the daughter would be only a limited heir under the Hindu law. After the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, however, the daughter would succeed as an absolute heir and any property to be inherited by a Hindu female would be held to be an absolute interest. In that view of the matter, the suit by the plaintiff would not be maintainable inasmuch as if the plaintiff could succeed, he would do so after the death of the mother as an heir and not as a reversioner; Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act having already terminated the status of reversioners as such under the Hindu law.
4. Mosmt. Pankalia, therefore, could be entitled to challenge the alienation made by her mother Mosmt. Jagesri in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 581 (FB) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Gummaiapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veerawa, AIR 1959 S.C 577. Mosmt. Jagesri having parted with her interest in the property, which was in her possession, would not be entitled to take advantage of Section 14 and in terms of the same decisions the reversioner or the heir of the last male holder would be competent to challenge the validity of the alienation, if it be not justified by legal necessity. In that case, Mosmt. Pankalia no doubt would be a person competent to bring the suit but not the plaintiff. Mr. Srivastava for the plaintiff respondent has urged that it should be held that the suit by Hari Ram Mahto as the daughter's son of Mahadeo Mahto was a suit of a representative character on behalf of all the reversioners including his mother Mosmt. Pankalia, and in that view, Mosmt. Pankalia might be transposed to the category of the plaintiff. She is already on record here and only a formal order of transposition of herself from the category of the defendant to that of the plaintiff would be necessary and nothing more. We are, however, unable to accede to this prayer because when deciding whether in the circumstances of this case Hari Ram Mahto can be taken to have instituted the representative suit on behalf of the reversioners or not, which is a doubtful proposition, it has to be borne in mind that even assuming that it is so, to permit Mosmt. Pankalia to be transposed to the category of the plaintiff would introduce a new cause of action altogether. It is so because Mosmt. Pankalia is a co-executant of the sale deed (Ext. C) along with her mother Mosmt. Jagesri. She being a co-executant, although at the time of the execution of the sale deed her interest in the vended property was in the nature of spes successions and nothing more, still she would be prima facie bound by the recital.
5. It was so held in the case of Sharm Singh v. Hakim Gurcharan Singh, AIR 1950 EP 1, that when a person who has not actually succeeded to the property joins in the execution of the sale deed along with a person who is in rightful possession of the property for the time being, even if that be as a limited owner, the effect of execution of the sale deed by the person entitled to succeed to the property after the death of the principal executant would give rise to a presumption that the recitals contained in the document are true, and if no rebutting evidence to the contrary be led, the mere fact of entering into the execution along with another person by the next reversioner will validate the transaction as a right and proper one. This decision obviously rests on the principle of estoppel in the sense that if the next reversioner executes a document which contains a recital that there is legal necessity for executing the deed of transfer and the next reversioner signs the document, it is obvious that the transferee agrees to enter into the transaction not merely on the representation of the vendor in possession, but also on the representation of the co-executant without which he might hesitate to enter into the transaction. In that view of the matter, the above proposition has been rightly laid down in this as well as. In Sahu Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, (1955) 2 SCR 22: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 481), Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore 1952 suh 478 at p. 488 : (AIR 1952 SC 145 at p. 148), Kalishankar Das v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1954 SC 505, Paremeshwaribal v. Raghavendra, AIR 1919 Bom 141. The following passage in Mulla's Hindu Law (10th Edition) is also relevant and may be quoted:
“183(1) When the alienation of the whole or part of the estate by a Hindu widow or other limited heir is to be supported on the ground of legal necessity, then if such necessity is not proved aliunde and the alienee does not prove inquiry on his part and honest belief in the necessity., the consent of such reversioner as may fairly be expected to be interested to dispute the transaction will be held to afford a presumptive proof which, if not rebutted by contrary proof, will validate the transaction as a right and proper one.
(2) x x x x x x x Where the next reversioner is a female, as, for instance, a daughter, her consent alone is not sufficient to validate an alienation, whether she takes a limited estate, or an absolute estate as in Bombay. In such a case the consent both sf the female reversioner and the immediate male reversioner is necessary to validate the alienation. But though her consent alone would not validate the transaction so as to bind the reversion, it would preclude her from impugning the validity of the alienation on the principle stated in Section 191.”
6. Thus, in the absence of rebutting evidence by the person entitled to challenge the validity of alienation, there would be necessary inference in law that the co-executant interested in the spes successionis would not be entitled to challenge the statement made in the sale deed. Acting upon the ratio decidendi of these decisions and the above statement of law, it follows that Mosmt. Pankalia, who is a co-executant under Exhibit C, is bound by the recital therein and that the sale deed would be taken to have been executed for legal necessity. If, therefore, Mosmt. Pankalia is bound by that recital and she is now a full owner under the Hindu Succession Act being an heir of Mahadeo Mahto, and the suit of Hari Ram Mahto, the grandson of Mahadeo Mahto, not being maintainable as he has ceased to have any right as a reversioner to bring the suit, the result would be that the property would lie where it should be in terms of Exhibit C, the sale deed, under which the title, had been acquired by the defendant appellant Gobardhan Mahto as a vendee.
7. In this view of the matter, the only plea open to Mosmt. Pankalia is one of fraud, if any. If the prayer for transposition is allowed, it will introduce a new cause of action altogether. It may well be that Mosmt. Pankalia is bound by the fact that she did not herself challenge the validity of the sale deed on the ground of fraud or non-passing of consideration. Mr. Srivastav contends that the points should be left open in clear terms if the prayer for transposition is not allowed so that Mosmt. Pankalia may be competent to institute another suit and the present decree may not operate to her prejudice in the subsequent litigation. We are unable to accede to this prayer, fill that we can say is that the prayer for transposition cannot be allowed and the suit of Hari Ram Mahto must be dismissed in so far as it is a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that the sale deed (Ext. C) was not binding upon him. We shall, however, refrain from making any observation as to what right, if any, is available to Mosmt. Pankalia, if she is advised to bring another suit. It may well be that the present judgment and decree would stand in her way and the suit might be dismissed on this very ground. It may as well be that on a proper consideration the present judgment may not stand in her way so far as the cause of action would be based on any other legitimate ground available to her. We are, therefore, Unable to accede to the prayer that we should make any clear observation as desired by Mr. Srivastav on behalf of the plaintiff respondent.
8. It is enough to say that in view of the considerations mentioned above, the suit of the plaintiff cannot now succeed. The appeal, therefore, is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the learned single Judge are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs throughout.
EG/H/D.V.C
9. Appeal allowed.
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