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Rambilas Rai (Singh) v. Ramji Rai (Singh) Opposite Party.
Judgment Summary — Kanhaiya Singh, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises from a sale held in execution in Execution Case No. 1423/463 of 1955 before the 1st Additional Munsif Arrah. By consent of the parties, on 14-4-1956 the executing court ordered that certain costs (Rs. 32-12-0) be paid by 1-5-1956 and the balance be paid in eight quarterly instalments, the first instalment falling due on 15-6-1956; the consent order further provided that on default of any instalment the decree-holder would be entitled to realise the entire amount due at once by execution.
The judgment-debtor paid the initial costs but did not pay the first instalment on 15-6-1956. On that date he presented a defective chalan (deposit form) which was returned; a corrected chalan was filed and the amount was deposited on 20-6-1956. The chalan evidencing the deposit was not filed in court despite several adjournments. Meanwhile, because the first instalment had not been paid by 15-6-1956, the court proceeded with execution, the property was sold on 17-7-1956 and the sale was confirmed on 20-8-1956.
The judgment-debtor filed Miscellaneous Case No. 332 of 1956 to set aside the sale; the learned Munsif dismissed that application on 18-1-1957, holding that the court could not extend time where a decree payable by instalments had been made by consent and that the sale was valid. The judgment-debtor appealed to the District Judge (Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 1957), which was dismissed by order dated 13-3-1957 as not maintainable and meritless. The judgment-debtor then filed Miscellaneous Appeal No. 140 of 1957 and, as a precaution, Civil Revision No. 286 of 1957 in this Court. The present judgment disposes of both the civil revision and the miscellaneous appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sale conducted in execution should be set aside.
- Whether time was of the essence of the consent order (i.e., whether non-payment on the due date defeated any later deposit), such that a delayed deposit could not validate or invalidate the sale.
- Whether the deposit made on 20-6-1956 (after a defective chalan on 15-6-1956 that was returned) should be treated as a valid deposit pursuant to the consent order.
Arguments of the Parties
Judgment-Debtor's Arguments (Appellant)
- Time was not of the essence of the consent order; consequently a deposit made on 20-6-1956 should be treated as a valid deposit and the subsequent sale would be null and void.
- Even if time was of the essence, in the circumstances of this case the deposit made on 20-6-1956 ought to be deemed a valid deposit in accordance with the court's order (i.e., equitable relief should be granted or the deposit accepted retroactively).
Respondent / Court Below (as reflected in the record)
- The executing court and decree-holder relied on the consent order that fixed instalment dates; because the first instalment was not paid on the due date the court was entitled to proceed with execution and the subsequent sale was valid.
- The lower court(s) held that, having consented to instalment dates, the court was not competent to enlarge those dates; the default therefore rendered the entire remaining decree immediately recoverable and justified sale in execution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mt. Nand Rani v. Durga Dass, AIR 1924 Pat 387 | Example where a forfeiture clause was present; held that a consent decree does not oust the court's jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture; time held not to be of the essence in that case. | Court distinguished this precedent as inapplicable because that case involved forfeiture and was decided on different principles; not relevant where time was of the essence under the present consent order. |
| Kandarpa v. Banwari, AIR 1921 Cal 356 | Similar to Mt. Nand Rani: relief against forfeiture where compromise/consent decree existed. | Distinguished on ground that the present case involves a consent order where time was of the essence and no forfeiture principle arises to allow equitable relief. |
| Mangal Singh v. Sundersan Pd., 1960 Pat LR 38 | Sale set aside where judgment-debtor deposited money before the time fixed by court order but sale occurred earlier due to court officer mistake; equitable relief applied (nunc pro tunc). | Distinguished: that case turned on court/official mistake and the debtor was not at fault; in contrast, here delay was due to debtor's default and negligence, so nunc pro tunc did not apply. |
| Sheo Prasad Lal v. Tapeshwar Mahto, ILR 13 Pat 1 (AIR 1933 Pat 563) | Provision that failure to pay instalments made whole amount recoverable was not in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture that would attract equitable relief. | Applied by the court: the consent order in the present case contains a similar provision, and therefore cannot be regarded as entitling the judgment-debtor to equitable relief against forfeiture. |
| Kisan Gopal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1937 Pat 542 | Sets out circumstances in which a court can relieve against forfeiture; equity intervenes for accident, fraud, surprise or ignorance but will refuse relief where forfeiture is wilful or results from gross negligence. | Quoted and applied to hold that the judgment-debtor's deliberate/default conduct did not attract equitable relief; the debtor's conduct was not the type equity would relieve. |
| Harakh Singh v. Saheb Singh, 6 Cal LJ 176 (cited within Kisan Gopal extract) | Illustrates principle that equity refuses to aid a defaulter if forfeiture is wilful or results from gross negligence. | Used within the reasoning (via Kisan Gopal) to support denial of equitable relief to the judgment-debtor whose default was not excusable. |
| Ramsarup Prasad v. Shiva Dutta Prasad, 1959 BLJR 700 (AIR 1960 Pat 560) | Observations on the danger of waiting until the last moment to take steps to comply with court orders. | Referred to by the court to reinforce the point that the judgment-debtor's delay (waiting until the last moment) was blameworthy and contributed to refusal to extend time. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by applying the terms of the consent order and established facts step-by-step:
- Fact of default: The first instalment fell due on 15-6-1956 and was not paid on that date. Although an application (chalan) to deposit was presented on 15-6-1956, it was defective and returned; a corrected chalan was filed and money was deposited only on 20-6-1956. The court treats actual deposit as the operative event, and so there was a clear default on 15-6-1956.
- Legal effect of the consent order: The consent order expressly provided that on default of any instalment the decree-holder could realise the entire amount due at once in that execution. The court reasoned that this consequence demonstrates that time was of the essence of the contract (the consent order). Given this express consequence, the debtor did not have the option to pay after the due date in order to avoid the immediate executability of the decree.
- On the first contention (time not of essence): The court rejected the argument that time was not of the essence. It found the cases relied upon by the judgment-debtor inapplicable because those involved forfeiture or other circumstances (or court error) and not a consent order which made the whole decree recoverable on default.
- On equitable relief and precedents: The court distinguished decisions where relief was granted (forfeiture cases or where the court's officials caused the sale through mistake) and relied on authorities (e.g., Sheo Prasad Lal; Kisan Gopal) to show that the present provision was not a penalty/forfeiture attracting equitable relief and that equity will not relieve a wilful defaulter or one guilty of gross negligence.
- On the second contention (deposit on 20-6 to be treated as valid): The court found the delay was attributable to the judgment-debtor. The defective chalan was returned on 15-6, yet the debtor did not file a corrected chalan and deposit the money until 20-6. The court emphasized that the debtor could have sought acceptance in cash or otherwise approached the court promptly; the debtor's delay of several days demonstrated blameworthy conduct. Because the debtor was responsible for the delay, nunc pro tunc relief was not appropriate.
- Conclusion of analysis: Given the default on the due date, the explicit term in the consent order making the entire decree immediately recoverable upon default, the debtor's culpable delay, and the principles of equity as explained in cited authorities, the court held that the sale was not liable to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Both the Civil Revision and the Miscellaneous Appeal are dismissed.
Implications:
- The sale held in execution (sale on 17-7-1956 confirmed on 20-8-1956) stands and is not set aside by this Court.
- The judgment-debtor is not entitled to equitable relief in the circumstances: the consent order made time of the essence and the debtor's default and delay were attributable to his conduct rather than to court mistake or other excusable cause.
- The Court made no order as to the costs of this Court.
- The opinion confines itself to the direct effect between the parties in this case; it does not purport to create a new principle of law beyond applying and distinguishing established authorities on relief against forfeiture, the effect of consent instalment orders, and the circumstances in which nunc pro tunc or equitable relief may be granted.
Disposition recorded in the judgment: "Appeal dismissed." (Ramaswami, C.J. concurred.)
Kanhaiya Singh, J.:— The civil revision and the Miscellaneous Appeal, relating to the same matter, have been heard together and will be disposed of by one judgment. They have been filed against the order refusing to set aside a sale held in execution case no. 1423/463 of 1955 in the court of the 1st Additional Munsif Arrah, in the following circumstances. Prior to the impugned sale, by consent of the parties, the executing court by its order dated 14-4-1956 allowed eight instalments for payment of the decree, the first instalment falling due on 15-6-1956. The order reads as follows:—
“By consent of Parties it is ordered that Rs. 32-12-0 the cost under the decree, be paid by 1-5-56 and the balance be paid in eight quarterly instalments the first seven of which shall be of Rs. 25/- each and the last shall be for the balance together with interest at 6 p.c p.a and the cost of the execution beginning from 15-6-56. On default of any of the instalments the D.H shall be entitled to realise the entire amount due on such date at once by this execution. Sale is adjourned to 1-5-56 at 8 A.M”
The cost of Rs. 32-12-0 was duly paid by the judgment-debtor. The very first instalment was not paid by him in accordance with the order of the court which resulted in sale of the properties. On 15-6-1956 i.e the date on which the first instalment fell due, the judgment debtor filed a chalan for Permission to deposit the instalment money. The chalan, however, was defective and was, therefore, returned. He again filed a chalan on 19-6-1956, after removing the defects and prayed for acceptance of the instalment money. This was followed by an application on the following day, i.e on 20-6-1956 praying to issue chalan.
2. The Court ordered the chalan to issue and directed the judgment-debtor to file a copy of the chalan showing the deposit of the instalment money. The money was in fact deposited on 20-6-1956, but the chalan evidencing the deposit was not filed in court in spite of several adjournments. The next instalment fell due on 14-9-1956. On this date the judgment-debtor filed a petition along with a chalan praying for permission to deposit the next instalment money. The issue of Chalan was refused as the sale had already taken place in the meantime. The case of the judgment debtor is that he had no knowledge of the sale until 14-9-1956, as he contracted jaundice and went to Chiraitar for treatment.
3. It appears that as the first instalment was not paid on 15-6-1956, the court ordered the execution to proceed and in due course the property was sold on 17-7-1956 and the sale was confirmed on 20-8-1956. The judgment-debtor thereupon filed miscellaneous case no. 332 of 1956 for setting aside the sale. The learned Munsif held that the decree was made payable in instalments with the consent of the parties, and, therefore, the court was incompetent to enlarge the time for payment of different instalments and since there was a default on the part of the judgment-debtor in payment of the first instalment he was not entitled to an extension of time and that the sale held was good and legal. On these findings, he dismissed the application on 18-1-1957. Against that order the judgment-debtor filed an appeal before the District Judge of Arrah, which was numbered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 40 of 1957. By his order dated 13-3-1957 the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was not maintainable and was also meritless. Against that order of the District Judge, the judgment debtor has preferred in this court Miscellaneous Appeal No. 140 of 1957. As a precaution he has also filed Civil Revision No. 286 of 1957 against the order of the learned Munsif dated 1-1-1957 refusing to set aside the sale.
4. The sole question in this case is whether the sale was liable to be set aside. It is manifest that the first instalment was not paid on 15-6-1956. The amount was actually deposited on 20-6-1956. There was, therefore, clear default on the part of the judgment debtor which made the entire decree remaining unpaid immediately recoverable. An application for issue of chalan to deposit the money was no doubt made on 15-6-1956. The application, however, was defective and was, therefore, returned. Mere presentation of an application for permission to deposit is not tantamount to actual deposit pursuant to the consent order. The default, therefore, had taken place.
5. Learned counsel on behalf of the judgment-debtor raised two contentions, first, that the time was not of the essence of the contract or, more precisely, of the order of the Court, with the result that the deposit, though made on 20-6-1956, was a valid deposit, and the sale held subsequently was a nullity; and second, that in the circumstances of this case, the deposit, though made on 20-6-1956, should be deemed to be a valid deposit, in accordance with the order of the Court. The first argument is not sustainable on the terms of the order of the court.
6. It will appear that in the event of default in payment of any of the instalments the decree holder was entitled to realise the entire amount due at once in the said execution proceeding. The fact that the consequence of the default in payment of the instalments was that the entire decree remaining unpaid became executable at once shows that the time was clearly of the essence of the contract. In face of the order it is idle to contend that the judgment debtor had the option to pay on the due date or on later dates.
7. Learned counsel for the judgment debtor referred to the decision in Mt. Nand Rani v. Durga Dass, AIR 1924 Pat 387, Kandarpa v. Banwari, AIR 1921 Cal 356 (2) and Mangal Singh v. Sundersan Pd., 1960 Pat LR 38. None of these cases has any relevancy in the present case. In the first two cases, there was a forfeiture clause, and it was held therein that the circumstances that a consent decree has been passed on the basis of a compromise does not oust the jurisdiction of the court to grant relief against forfeiture. Indeed, the rule is clear that in every case the court must determine upon the facts of the case whether relief against forfeiture is to be given or not. It was further held in the first case that the time was not of the essence of the contract.
8. In the present case no question of forfeiture is involved and, as held above the time was of the essence of the contract. As laid down by a Bench of this court in Sheo Prasad Lal v. Tapeshwar Mahto*, ILR 13 Pat 1 : (AIR 1933 Pat 563), the provision in a compromise decree that in the event of failure to pay the instalments, the whole amount of the original decree would be recoverable was not in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture giving the right to equitable relief. A similar provision occurs in the consent order in question, and therefore, this consent order cannot be regarded as one involving penalty or forfeiture so as to entitle the judgment debtor to equitable relief. These cases were therefore decided on different principles of law which do not arise in the present case. In that case of Mangal Singh, 1960 Pat LR 38, on the date fixed for the sale, the judgment debtor filed a chalan for depositing the money to avoid sale, and the court ordered the cashier of the court to receive the amount and credit the same if tendered before 3 P.M that day. The judgment debtor deposited the money before 3 P.M as ordered by the court. In spite of that order, the sale took place before 11-30 a.m In these circumstances, the sale was set aside.
9. It is manifest that the sale took place due to mistake on the part of the officers of the court, and the judgment debtor was not to blame. Therefore, the maxim nunc pro tunc applied and the sale was nightly set aside. The position in the instant case was Entirely different. The sale was brought about by deliberate default on the part of the judgment debtor to make deposits on due dates. These cases, therefore, are not in point and do not help him at all. I may refer in this connection to a Bench decision of this court in Kisan Gopal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1937 Pat 542, which lays down the circumstances in which a court can relieve against forfeiture. I would Reproduce below the observations of the court:—
“As regards the power of the court to relieve against forfeiture, it is to be remembered that equity only interferes to do complete justice between the parties: No doubt, if forfeiture is occasioned by Occident, fraud, surprise, or ignorance, a court of equity will interpose and relieve against forfeiture so caused; but it is equally clear that a court of Equity will refuse to aid a defaulter if the forfeiture is wilful or is the result of gross negligence; as Mookerjee, J. observed in Harakh Singh v. Saheb Singh 6 Cal LJ 176. Nor does this appear to be a case of forfeiture of the kind that equity would have relieved against even if the judgment debtors had made a serious attempt to pay according to the compromise into which they have entered and the attempt had failed for no fault of theirs. Where the creditor agrees to accept part of the debt in full satisfaction if paid within a stated time, equity will not relieve against the provision as to time”.
It is, therefore clear beyond doubt that, in the circumstances of this case, the judgment debtor is not entitled to any relief. The first contention, therefore, is entirely without foundation and must be rejected.
10. As regards the second contention, the deposit made on 20-6-1956, be regarded as a valid deposit, because the judgment debtor and not the court was responsible for this delay. The judgment debtor appeared before the court on the last day for the payment of the first instalment i.e on 15-6-1956. Even then, the chalan that was filed was not properly filled up and was therefore, defective. The chalan was returned to the judgment debtor. Still, he did not care to file a duly filled in chalan then and there. Fie took five days to file a fresh and corrected chalan and to deposit the money. If for any reason what-soever, the chalan was defective and returned, the judgment debtor must have known that the money could not be deposited on 15-6-1956 by following the ordinary procedure.
11. The proper course for him to adopt was to approach the court with a prayer for acceptance of the money in cash, which is generally done. The danger of waiting until the very last moment for taking necessary steps has been pointed out by this court repeatedly. Still, the parties persist in their habit of putting things off to the last moment. If they so behave, they have only themselves to blame, if any order adverse to them is passed by the court. Reference may be made in this connection to the Observations of this court in Ramsarup Prasad… v. Shiva Dutta Prasad…., 1959 BLJR 700 : (AIR 1960 Pat 560). The fact remains that the judgment debtor defaulted, without valid leason, in making the deposit, and, therefore, the court was right in refusing to extend the time for payment.
12. As was held in the case aforesaid, where a party is entirely responsible for the delay in making the deposit the maxim nunc pro tunc has no application. Where the court has fixed, by consent of the parties, specific date for payment of the money and the time is of the essence of the contract and no deposit is made within the time fixed by the contract of the parties, then the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of the deposit. The second contention is equally without substance.
13. In the result, both the civil revision and the Miscellaneous Appeal are dismissed.
14. In the circumstances of the case I would make no order as to costs of this court.
15. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.
ID/D.R.R
16. Appeal dismissed.
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