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Express Auto Service (Private) Ltd. Dumka v. State Of Bihar And Others
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is Express Auto Service (Private) Ltd., Dumka. A vacancy for a permanent bus service on the Dumka–Sahebgunj route was advertised by the East Bihar Regional Transport Authority (RTA) by a Gazette notification dated 18 December 1956. The petitioner and others, including respondent No. 3, applied for the permit. On 6 April 1957 the RTA granted the permit to respondent No. 3.
The petitioner appealed under section 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appellate authority, by order dated 6 May 1958, set aside the RTA's order of 6 April 1957 and granted the permit to the petitioner. On 24 May 1958 respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 64A before the Transport Minister. By order dated 5 October 1958 the Transport Minister set aside the appellate authority's order and restored the RTA's original order granting the permit to respondent No. 3.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in this Court challenging the Transport Minister's order. The Court heard counsel and disposed of the petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Transport Minister had jurisdiction to entertain and pass the revisional order in this case under section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether the Minister could exercise revisional jurisdiction under the provision as applicable).
- Whether a party aggrieved by an order must first exhaust statutory appeal remedies (including any second appeal) before invoking revision under section 64A.
- Whether the amendment to section 64A introduced by Central Act 100 of 1956 impliedly repealed the provision introduced in the Bihar amendment (Bihar Act 27 of 1950), producing repugnancy and thereby ousting the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government under the Bihar Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments
- The Transport Minister had no power to make any revisional order in the matter and no application in revision lay before him; consequently the Minister's order was without jurisdiction.
- Because rules provided for appeal (under rules 70 and 71), a party could not resort to revision without first exhausting statutory appeal remedies (an argument that respondent No. 3 should have filed a second appeal and could not instead file a revision under section 64A).
- The Central Act 100 of 1956, by introducing its version of section 64A, implicitly repealed the Bihar amendment's section 64A; therefore the Bihar provision (which gave the State Government revisional power) stood impliedly repealed and could not support the Minister's order.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments on behalf of the respondent(s).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vijai Motor Transport Association v. Mahakoshal Transport Service, AIR 1953 Nag 150 | That the statute (as construed) did not provide a right of second appeal against appellate orders constituted under the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act. | The Court relied on this decision to support its conclusion that no statutory provision existed for a second appeal against an order of the State Transport Authority, reinforcing the view that absence of a second appeal does not preclude revision under section 64A as applicable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the relevant statutory framework and the specific amendments at issue. It began by identifying the applicable provisions:
- Section 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act allows a person aggrieved by refusal of a State or Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit to appeal to the prescribed authority within prescribed time and manner, giving both the appellant and the original authority an opportunity to be heard.
- Section 64A had been introduced into the Act by Central Act 100 of 1956. Under that Central Act version, the State Transport Authority may call for records of cases where an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority "in which no appeal lies," and if the State Transport Authority finds the RTA's order improper or illegal it may pass such order as deemed fit.
- The Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act 27 of 1950) had earlier introduced a different section 64-A providing that the State Government may, on application within thirty days, call for records of proceedings taken under the Chapter by any subordinate authority or officer and, after examining the records, pass such order as it thinks fit.
- Rules 70 and 71 framed under section 111 prescribe the authorities to decide appeals: Rule 71 makes the Chairman and members of the State Transport Authority the authority to decide appeals against orders of a Regional Transport Authority; Rule 70 prescribes the authority (an officer of State Government or tribunal) to decide appeals against an order of the State Transport Authority.
Applying these provisions to the facts, the Court observed that although the Transport Minister's order mistakenly referred to Central Act 100 of 1956, the application filed by respondent No. 3 (annexure D) only stated that the petition was filed under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., without expressly invoking the Central Act amendment). The Court concluded the petition must be treated as having been filed under the Bihar Act's section 64-A, because the Central Act version vests revisional power in the State Transport Authority (not the State Government/Transport Minister), whereas the Bihar Act version vests revisional power in the State Government.
The Court applied the principle that the label or quotation in the order-sheet does not determine jurisdiction; rather, the authority must apply the proper law to the facts disclosed. Thus the misstatement in the order-sheet that the petition was under the Central Act was disregarded; the Transport Minister's action was treated as taken under the Bihar amendment's section granting the State Government revisional jurisdiction.
On the appeal-versus-revision contention, the Court analyzed section 64 together with rules 70 and 71, and held that those rules prescribe the authority to decide appeals but do not create any provision for a second appeal against an order of the State Transport Authority. Consequently, the argument that a party must pursue a second appeal before seeking revision under section 64A was rejected. The Court relied on the cited Nagpur High Court decision (Vijai Motor Transport Association) for the proposition that no statutory right of second appeal exists against appellate orders constituted under the rules.
On the alleged repugnancy between the two versions of section 64A (Central Act vs Bihar Act) the Court found no repugnancy. The Central Act version is limited: it vests revisional power in the State Transport Authority and is confined to cases where "no appeal lies" and concerns orders of a Regional Transport Authority. The Bihar Act version is broader in scope: it empowers the State Government to call for records and revise orders of any subordinate authority or officer, without the "no appeal lies" condition. Because the two provisions address different classes of cases and grant jurisdiction to different authorities in different circumstances, the Court concluded there was no implied repeal of the Bihar provision by the Central Act.
Having resolved the jurisdictional questions against the petitioner's contentions, the Court found no other point in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the Article 226 petition.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition under Article 226 is DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
Direct consequences and practical effects:
- The Transport Minister's order of 5 October 1958, which set aside the appellate authority's order and restored the Regional Transport Authority's original grant of permit to respondent No. 3, stands.
- The petitioner's challenge in this Court was unsuccessful; the matter is dismissed and costs were awarded against the petitioner. The Court recorded a hearing fee of Rs. 150.
Broader implications: The opinion applies and reconciles the Central and Bihar amendments to section 64A by distinguishing their scope and thereby rejects the contention of implied repeal. The decision resolves the jurisdictional questions presented in this case but does not purport to set a novel or sweeping precedent beyond the analysis applied to the statutory scheme.
Ramaswami, C.J. agreed with the judgment of Choudhary, J.
This summary is confined strictly to matters stated in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond the text of the opinion.
Choudhary, J.:— This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner in this case is the Express Auto Service (Private) Ltd. Dumka it appears that, by a Gazette notification, dated the 18th of December, 1956, a vacancy for a permanent bus service on the Dumka Sahebgunj route was advertised by the East Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Bhagalpur, and, in response to the said advertisement, the petitioner as well as certain other persons, including respondent No. 3, made applications for the grant of permit. The East Bihar Regional Transport Authority, after considering those applications, passed an order granting a permit to respondent No. 3 on the 6th of April, 1957.
2. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under section 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), and the appellate authority, by its order dated the 6th of May, 1958-set aside the order dated the 6th of April, 1957 of the Regional Transport Authority, and granted a permit to the petitioner for the said route. On the 24th of May, 1958, respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 64A of the Act before the Transport Minister, who, by his order dated the 5th of October, 1958, set aside the order of the appellate authority granting the permit to the petitioner, and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the permit to respondent No. 3. Being thus aggrieved, the petitioner has presented this application in this Court.
3. Mr. P.R Das, appearing for the petitioner, has put forward a contention that the Transport Minister had no power to make any order and no application in revision lay before him. In order to appreciate the point raised it may, perhaps, be necessary to make a reference to certain provisions of law on the subject. Section 64(a) of the Act, sc far as is relevant for the purpose of the present case, lays down that any person aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard. Section 64A was introduced in the Act by section 59 of Act 100 of 1956, and it states that the State Transport Authority may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit. An amendment in the Act was also made by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act 27 of 1950) in its application to the State of Bihar and by section 13 of that Act another section 64-A was introduced in the Act, which provides that the State Government may, on application made to it in this behalf, within thirty days of the passing of the order in the course of any proceedings taken under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, call for the records of such proceedings, and alter examining such records pass such order as it thinks fit.
4. Under section 111 of the Act, the Central Government has been empowered to make rules, and rules 70 and 71 so framed are very important. Rule 70 lays down that the authority to decide an appeal against an order of the State Transport Authority in respect of any of the matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) of section 64 of the Act shall be such officer of the State Government or such tribunal as, the State Government by order appoint either generally or for any particular appeal or class of appeals. Rule 71 provide that the Authority to decide an appeal against any order of a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any of the matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) (e), (f) or (g) of section 64 of the Act shall be the Chairman and the members of the State Transport Authority appointed by the Chairman from a penal nominated by the State Government of members of that authority.
5. The first contention of Mr. Das is that in the present case the Transport Minister appears to have dealt with the revision application under section 64A of the Act, as amended by the Central Act 100 of 1956, but he had no jurisdiction under the above provision to entertain any revision application, and he should have, therefore, dismissed the application in limine. True it is that in the impugned order, which is annexure E to the application, it has been stated in the very beginning that the petition was under section 64A of the Act, as amended by Act 100 of 1956, but the application which respondent No. 3 filed before the Transport Minister, which is annexure D to the present application, only states the petition to have been filed under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
6. The application does not show that it was made under section 64A of the Act, as amended by the Central Act 100 of 1956. As a matter of fact, section 64A of the Act, as amended by the above Central Act, gives power of revision only to the State Transport Authority, and not to the State Government. The power of revision to the State Government is really given by section 64A of the Act, as amended by the Bihar Act 27 of 1950, so far as it may have application to the State of Bihar.
7. It is, therefore, clear that the petition of respondent No. 3, which purports to have been filed under section 64A of the Act, must be deemed to have been filed under that section, as amended by the Bihar Act, and not by the Central Act. Where there are two sections giving revisional jurisdiction to two different authorities, an order passed by any of those authorities must be taken to have been passed under the section which gives that authority a jurisdiction to pass such an order.
8. In this case, therefore, the impugned order of the Transport Minister, who, undoubtedly, has a revisional jurisdiction under section 64A of the Act, as amended by the Bihar Act, must be deemed to have been passed under that section. The quotation in the order-sheet about the petition having been filed before the Transport Minister under section 64A, as amended by the Central Act 100 of 1956, is obviously wrong, and must be ignored. It is a well settled principle of law that the label given to a case does not determine the jurisdiction of the authority, and the authority has to apply the proper law to the case on the facts disclosed in the petition.
9. It was next contended that, under rule 71 of the rules framed under the Act, an appeal against an order of the Regional Transport Authority lay before the Chairman and the memljers of the State Transport Authority appointed by the Chairman, as prescribed in that rule, and a second appeal lay against an order of the State Transport Authority, under rule 70, to an officer of the State Government or a tribunal, as the State may appoint and it is submitted that in the present case respondent No. 3, not having filed a second appeal against the order of the State Transport Authority, could not file a revision application under section 64A of the Act.
10. An argument has been put forward that, where a provision for appeal has been made under the Act, a party cannot avail of the remedy by way of revision without having exhausted his remedy by way of appeal. In my opinion, there is no substance in the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. Rules 70 and 71 of the rules framed under the Act prescribed the authority to decide an appeal against an original order of the State Transport Authority or of a Regional Transport Authority.
11. This is apparent from section 64(a) of the Act itself, which lays down that any person aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit may prefer an appeal to the prescribed authority which, in the case of the order of a State Transport Authority, is the officer or tribunal, as the State Government may appoint under rule 70, and, in the case of a Regional Transport Authority, is the Board of the Chairman and the members of the State Transport Authority as provided in rule 71.
12. The order of refusal by the State Transport Authority is, therefore, an order passed by that authority in its original jurisdiction, and not in its appellate jurisdiction. Reading section 64 of the Act together with rules 70 and 71, there is no room for doubt that there is no provision for a second appeal to be filed before any authority against an order of the State Transport Authority. The view taken above gains suport from a Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Vijai Motor Transport Association v. Mahakoshal Transport Service, AIR 1953 Nag 150, wherein it was held that there is no right of second appeal provided by the statute against the appellate orders of the appellate authority constituted under the rules framed under the Act.
13. Lastly, it has been contended that section 64A of the Act, as amended by Bihar Act 27 of 1950, has to give way to section 64-A of the Act, as amended by the Central Act 100 of 1956, inasmuch as both the Sections make the same provision giving revisional jurisdiction to certain authorities. It is submitted that there could not be two parallel Acts to deal with revision applications and it must, therefore, be taken that by amendment of the Act by Central Act 100 of 1956, section 64A, as amended by the Bihar Act, stood impliedly repealed.
14. In my opinion, there is no force in this argument also. There is no repugnancy between the two sections of the Central Act and the Bihar Act, and they make provisions to meet different classes of cases. Section 64A of the Act, as amended by the Central Act, provides for revision by the State Transport Authority only in cases in which no appeal lies; but section 64A of the Act, as amended by the Bihar Act, does not lay down any such condition for giving revisional jurisdiction to the State Government.
15. Again, section 64A of the Act, as amended by the Centratl Act, gives power to the State Transport Authority to revise an order of a Regional Transport Authority only, but the above section, as amended by the Bihar Act, gives jurisdiction to the State Government to revise the order of any authority or officer subordinate to it. It is not, therefore, correct to say that the two sections make provisions for the same remedy by two different authorities. There is thus no repugnancy in the two sections, and it cannot be legitimately urged that, by the introduction of Section 64-A in the Central Act, Section 64-A of the Act, as amended by the Bihar Act, stood repealed.
16. No other point has been raised. There is thus no merit in this application, which is accordingly, dismissed with costs.
17. Hearing fee Rs. 150.
18. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.
HD/D.R.R
19. Petition dismissed.
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