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East Indian Coal Co. Ltd. v. East Indian Coal Co. Ltd., Workers' Union Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the opposite party, East India Coal Company Limited Workers' Union, to show cause why the order of the Munsif, 1st Court, Dhanbad dated 11-2-1958, permitting the opposite party to institute a suit in forma pauperis, should not be set aside by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The opposite party is a registered trade union under the Indian Trade Unions Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a registered trade union, being a body corporate under Section 13 of the Indian Trade Unions Act, can institute a suit in forma pauperis under Order 33, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- A registered trade union cannot institute a suit in forma pauperis within the meaning of Order 33, Rule 1 of the CPC.
- Reliance on the Calcutta High Court decision in Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1938 Cal. 745, which held that the word "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 does not include a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, and such a company cannot sue as a pauper.
Opposite Party's Position (Implied from Court's Analysis)
- By implication, the opposite party relied on decisions from the Madras High Court which took a different view, allowing corporations or bodies corporate to sue as paupers under Order 33, Rule 1, interpreting "person" to include companies and incorporated bodies.
- Reference to decisions such as Perumal Koundan v. Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi Ltd., ILR 41 Mad 624 (AIR 1918 Mad 362), and Swaminathan v. Official Receiver, AIR 1937 Mad 549, supporting the inclusion of incorporated bodies within the meaning of "person" for the purpose of suing as paupers.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1938 Cal. 745 | Held that "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 CPC does not include a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, thus such a company cannot sue as a pauper. | Petitioner's counsel relied on this decision to argue that registered trade unions cannot sue as paupers. |
| Perumal Koundan v. Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi Ltd., ILR 41 Mad 624 (AIR 1918 Mad 362) | Held that "person" includes companies under the General Clauses Act and that incorporated bodies can sue in forma pauperis under Order 33 CPC. | Cited by the Court as laying down the correct law on the inclusion of incorporated bodies within "person" for pauper suits. |
| Swaminathan v. Official Receiver, AIR 1937 Mad 549 | Held that an official receiver vested with the estate of an insolvent can sue as a pauper if conditions of Order 33, Rule 1 CPC are met. | Supported the principle that legal persons can sue in forma pauperis. |
| Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. Shreepathirao, AIR 1958 SC 658 | Approved the Madras High Court decision in ILR 41 Mad 624, affirming that "person" includes incorporated bodies for the purposes of Order 33 CPC. | Supreme Court approval reinforced the Court's view allowing registered trade unions to sue as paupers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by acknowledging that the opposite party is a registered trade union and thus a body corporate under Section 13 of the Indian Trade Unions Act. The central question was whether such a body corporate can sue in forma pauperis under Order 33, Rule 1 of the CPC. The petitioner argued that the term "person" in this rule does not include corporate bodies, relying on a Calcutta High Court decision. However, the Court referred to authoritative decisions from the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court which interpreted "person" in Order 33, Rule 1 to include both natural and legal persons, including companies and incorporated bodies.
The Court emphasized that there is nothing in the context or subject matter of Order 33, Rule 1 that excludes incorporated bodies such as registered trade unions from its provisions. The Court applied the definition of "person" under the General Clauses Act, which includes companies and bodies corporate, to the provisions of the CPC. The Supreme Court’s approval of the Madras High Court’s view further solidified this interpretation.
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the Munsif did not err in permitting the registered trade union to sue in forma pauperis and dismissed the petitioner's application.
Holding and Implications
The petitioner's application to set aside the order permitting the registered trade union to sue in forma pauperis is dismissed.
The decision confirms that registered trade unions, as bodies corporate under the Indian Trade Unions Act, are entitled to institute suits in forma pauperis under Order 33, Rule 1 of the CPC. The ruling directly affects the parties by upholding the Munsif's order but does not establish a new precedent beyond affirming existing authoritative interpretations.
1. In this case the petitioner has obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Munsif, 1st Court, Dhanbad, dated 11-2-1958, permitting the opposite party to institute a suit in forma pauperis should not be set aside by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
2. It is the admitted case that the opposite-party, namely East India Coal Company Limited. Workers' Union is a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act.
3. Section 13 of the Indian Trade Unions Act (Act XVI of 1926) provides for the incorporation of registered trade unions and is in the following terms:
“13. Incorporation of registered Trade Unions. Every registered Trade Union shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold both moveable and immovable property and to contract, and shall by the said name sue and be sued”.
4. It is not disputed in this case that the plaintiff opposite party is a registered trade union and that it is a body corporate within the meaning of Section 13 of the Indian Trade Unions Act. The submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that a registered trade union cannot institute a suit in forma pauperis within the meaning of Order 33, Rule 1 of the CPC which reads as follows:’
“1. Subject to the following provisions, any suit may be instituted by a pauper.
Explanation: A person is a ‘pauper’ when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit, or, where no such fee is prescribed, when he-is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees-other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit”.
5. In support of his submission learned Counsel referred to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1938 Cal. 745 in which it was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the word “person” in Order 33, Rule 1 does not include a “company” incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, and it is not possible for and competent to such a company to sue as a pauper or to prefer an appeal as a pauper under the provisions of Order 44, Rule 1. A different view as regards the construction of Order 33, Rule 1 and Order 33 Rule 3 has been taken by the Madras High Court in Perumal Koundan v. Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi Ltd., ILR 41 Mad 624 : (AIR 1918 Mad 362).
6. The question which was debated in that case was whether an official liquidator of a company was-competent to apply for leave to sue in forma pauperis on behalf of the company under Order 33 of the CPC, if the company was a pauper within the meaning of Rule 1 thereof. It was held by Kumaraswami Sastriyar, J. that the reference to ‘necessary wearing apparel’ in the Explanation to Rule 1 and the provisions of Rule 3 requiring presentation of petition by ‘applicant in person’ in Order 33 do not necessarily exclude the application of the order to a Company; and that the definition of “person” as including a company in the General Clauses Act applies to Order 33 of the CPC as there is nothing in the definition which is repugnant to the subject matter or context of the Order.
7. The same view has been accepted by a Full-Bench of the Madras High Court in Swaminathan v. Official Receiver, Ramnad, AIR 1937 Mad 549. It was held in that case that an official receiver, in whom the estate of an insolvent has vested under Section 28 clause (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act by virtue of an order of adjudication made by the Court can institute a suit as a pauper for the recovery of the said estate provided he fulfils the conditions laid down in the Explanation to Order 33, Rule 1 of the CPC.
8. It was pointed out that the word “person” occurring in the Explanation to Order 33 Rule 1 of the CPC should be construed to include both natural and legal persons, and an official receiver was a person within the meaning of the above Explanation. In our opinion the view expressed in ILR 41 Mad 624 : (AIR 1918 Mad 362) and in AIR 1937 Mad 549, lays down the correct law on the point.
9. There is in our opinion nothing in the context or subject-matter of Order 33, Rule 1 which necessarily excludes the application of the provisions of Order 33, Rule 1 to an incorporated body like a registered trade union, and there is no reason why the definition of a “person” under the General Clauses Act should not be applied to this case. Our view is supported by the observations of the Supreme Court in Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. Shreepathirao, AIR 1958 SC 658. At page 663 of the report the decision of the Madras High Court in ILR 41 Mad 624 : (AIR 1918 Mad 362) has been expressly approved and the principle laid down has been accepted by the Supreme Court in its judgment.
10. For these reasons we hold that the learned Munsif has not committed an error of law in holding that the opposite party as a registered trade union should be declared a pauper. In our opinion, there is no merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
JD/D.R.R
11. Application dismissed.
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