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Smt. Savitri Devi v. Jiwan Chaudhary And Others

Patna High Court
Apr 13, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Appeal from Additional Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga — Decree dated 23 December 1955)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga dated 23rd December, 1955, which dismissed her suit for partition.

Relevant family relationships and key factual assertions (as stated in the opinion):

  • Prasad Chaudhary was the common ancestor of the defendants' family and the father of the plaintiff's antecedent generation.
  • According to the plaintiff, Prasad died before the survey and settlement operation. After his death, his two sons, Badri and Dilan, are said to have separated from each other in mess and management, though no partition by metes and bounds was effected.
  • Badri died before the survey operation. The survey record of rights recorded family properties in the names of Balgovind, Pearey and Dilan.
  • Balgovind predeceased Pearey and had no issue. Pearey later died leaving a son, Ramkhelawan.
  • Ramkhelawan died leaving only a daughter, Srimati Savitri Devi, who is the plaintiff in this appeal.
  • The plaintiff's claim: there was separation between Badri and Dilan before the survey (though no formal metes-and-bounds partition), and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to partition of Schedule I properties by metes and bounds and to an eight annas share (the share of her father) and a separate takhta; for Schedule II properties she sought declaration of her shares only.
  • Defendants (descendants of Dilan) denied separation, disputed the plaintiff's genealogy (including initially denying that the plaintiff was the daughter of Ramkhelawan), alleged Ramkhelawan died issueless (a contention later negatived by the trial court), and contended the family remained joint and the properties devolved upon them by survivorship.
  • The trial court (Additional Subordinate Judge) found the plaintiff to be the daughter of Ramkhelawan and that the plaintiff's genealogy was correct, but held there had been no separation between Badri and Dilan and dismissed the suit on the basis that the properties devolved upon the defendants by survivorship. The plaintiff appealed that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was a separation between Badri and Dilan such as to disrupt the jointness of the family.
  2. If such separation is established, whether the plaintiff (as daughter of Ramkhelawan) is entitled to an eight annas share in the joint family properties and to allotment of a separate takhta for that share.
  3. Whether documentary entries in revenue and village records (survey record-of-rights/khatian), and various documents such as sale-deeds, chaukidari receipts, sugar-factory records and licences, constitute sufficient evidence of separation or definition of shares amounting to severance of the joint family status.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Assertions and Evidence

  • The plaintiff alleged a separation between Badri and Dilan before the survey and settlement, with separate cultivation by mutual arrangement according to respective shares, though no formal metes-and-bounds partition was made.
  • The plaintiff sought partition of Schedule I properties and declaration of shares in Schedule II.
  • Witnesses examined for the plaintiff included P.Ws 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15.
  • Documentary material relied upon (as argued by counsel for the appellant): sale-deeds (exhibits 2, 2(A), 2(B), 2(C) — some standing in the name of Balgovind, with emphasis on exhibit 2(a)/exhibit B), chaukidari receipts (exhibit series 3), sugar-factory records showing supplier names (exhibit series 5), and a licence to cure tobacco (exhibit 6). The khatian (exhibits 7 and 7(c)) showing Dilan recorded along with Balgovind and Pearey with indicated shares was also relied upon by counsel as evidence of defined shares and therefore separation.
  • The plaintiff explained that original sale-deeds were not produced by her because they were allegedly stolen from her custody (an explanation offered to account for certified copies only being tendered by the plaintiff and originals being produced by defendants).

Respondents' (Defendants') Assertions and Evidence

  • The defendants denied any separation and asserted continuous jointness of the family; they maintained that Ramkhelawan died in a state of jointness and that the properties devolved upon them by survivorship.
  • They challenged aspects of the plaintiff's genealogy and alleged omissions of other members.
  • The defendants examined D.Ws 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14, who testified unanimously that there was no separation and that all members lived jointly.
  • The defendants produced original sale-deeds (B-series exhibits) which the plaintiff said had been stolen; D.Ws 2 and 14 denied any theft and pointed out there was no police complaint or independent evidence of theft. The defendants relied upon these originals and their oral testimony as supporting jointness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anurago Kuer v. Darshan Raut, 19 Pat LT 131; (AIR 1938 PC 65) It is a rule of Hindu (Mitakshara) law that partition consists in defining the shares of coparceners; definition of shares may be proved inter alia by an entry in the record-of-rights showing each member's share. The court acknowledged this principle but held that an entry in revenue records alone is not conclusive evidence of severance; the khatian entries here did not by themselves prove separation.
Inder Kuer v. Pirthipal Kuer, (AIR 1945 PC 128) Once shares are defined, that definition may amount to severance of the joint status even without physical division. The court accepted the general principle but distinguished the case facts: mere mention of separate shares in survey records without evidence of intention to separate is insufficient to prove severance in the present matter.
Gajendar Singh v. Sardar Singh, ILR 18 All 176 (observations of Sir John Edge, C.J.) A definition of shares in revenue and village papers is, by itself, only a slight indication of an actual separation and cannot alone overcome the presumption of jointness. The court relied on this observation to hold that the khatian entries are of very slight weight and cannot displace the presumption of jointness in the absence of further evidence of intention to separate.
Nagesar Baksh Singh v. Mt. Ganesha, 47 Ind App 57; (AIR 1920 PC 46) Approved the principle that definition of shares in revenue papers is of limited significance and not by itself sufficient to prove separation. The court noted that the Privy Council approved the view and applied it to conclude that the revenue entries here did not prove partition or separation.
Mt. Bhagwani Kunwar v. Mohan Singh, 29 Cal WN 1037; (AIR 1925 PC 132) Collector's books and entries kept for revenue purposes are not conclusive as to title; an entry as occupant does not necessarily establish title, and similar observations apply to settlement khewats. The court invoked this principle to emphasize that survey and settlement entries (khatian) are maintained for revenue and are not determinative of the existence of a partition or of title changes; thus, khatian entries did not establish separation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a methodical fashion, applying evidentiary rules and established principles of Hindu joint family law as expounded by higher authorities:

  1. The court accepted the uncontested finding of the trial judge that the plaintiff is the daughter of Ramkhelawan and that the genealogy advanced by the plaintiff is correct. Given that finding, if separation between Badri and Dilan were proved, the plaintiff would be entitled to a father's share (eight annas) and a separate takhta.
  2. The court stated the governing evidential rule: the party alleging separation must prove it; the legal presumption is one of continued jointness until contrary is shown.
  3. Evaluation of oral evidence: the plaintiff examined several P.W.s (2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15), but the court found that this evidence fell short of establishing the alleged separation. The defendants' witnesses (D.Ws 1, 2, 4–11, 13 and 14) uniformly testified to continuous jointness, and the court found the defendants' evidence "overwhelming and quite credible" and therefore preferred it over the plaintiff's evidence.
  4. Documentary evidence was scrutinized individually:
    • Sale-deeds: The appellant relied on sale-deeds (exhibits in the B-series and certified copies). The court observed that one sale-deed's boundary description (plot 9242) naming Dilan as boundary-owner is consistent with Dilan being alive and the karta at the time; this is not inconsistent with a joint family and does not indicate separation. The court also held that separate acquisitions by coparceners are consistent with joint Mitakshara family law and do not, by themselves, indicate separation.
    • Alleged theft of original sale-deeds: The plaintiff's explanation that originals were stolen from her custody was disbelieved. Defendants produced originals; D.Ws denied any theft; no police complaint or independent proof of theft was produced. The court considered the theft story an afterthought intended to explain why originals were not produced by the plaintiff, and found that the circumstances pointed against the plaintiff's contention.
    • Chaukidari receipts and related documents: The appellant relied on chaukidari receipts (exhibit 3 series) and sugar-factory records (exhibit 5 series) and a tobacco curing licence (exhibit 6) to show separate residence or separate cultivation. The court found these documents not conclusive: separate residence does not necessarily demonstrate severance of joint status; chaukidari receipts were of doubtful genuineness and lacked supporting proof of separate assessment; supply records and a licence are consistent with separate activity but are not decisive evidence of separation.
    • Khatian / survey record-of-rights: The appellant relied on khatian entries (exhibits 7 and 7(c)) showing shares assigned to branches. The court carefully reviewed Privy Council authority and earlier observations (including Gajendar Singh and related precedent) and concluded that while a definition of shares can be evidence of partition in some circumstances, mere entries in revenue or village papers (survey records) are, by themselves, only a slight indication and insufficient to rebut the presumption of jointness unless there is additional evidence showing that such definition was intended to effect a division. On the facts, the khatians did not demonstrate the necessary intention to separate, and the court found it implausible that the purported separation would have left the lands cultivated under mutual agreement for nearly fifty years.
  5. On the whole appraisal — oral testimony preferred for the defendants, documentary evidence either inconsistent with separation or of little weight, and legal principles limiting the evidentiary value of revenue entries — the court concluded there was no proven separation between Badri and Dilan.
  6. Consequently, the court held that the joint family continued, the joint family properties remained jointly held and cultivated, and on the death of Ramkhelawan the properties devolved upon the defendants by survivorship.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the properties claimed in the suit.
  • The court held that on the death of Ramkhelawan the entire joint family properties devolved upon the defendants by survivorship.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent; it applies existing authorities (including Privy Council decisions and earlier rulings) to the facts and concludes that the evidence in this case does not establish separation sufficient to disrupt the presumption of jointness.

Outcome recorded in the opinion: Appeal dismissed (with costs).

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga dated 23rd December, 1955, dismissing her suit for partition. The following genealogical table will show the relationship between the parties and help in appreciating the facts of the case:

It will appear from the above that Prasad Chaudhary was the common ancestor of the family of the defendants and the father of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, Prasad died before the survey and settlement operation. Shortly after his death, his two sons, Badri and Dilan, separated from each other, both in mess and management. Badri also died before the survey operation. In the survey record of rights, the family properties were recorded in the names of Balgovind, Pearey and Dilan. Balgovind predeceased Pearey and had no issue. Pearey also died subsequently leaving him surviving his only son Ramkhelawan.

2. The latter also died leaving no heir, except his daughter Srimati Savitri Devi, who is the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that although Badri and Dilan separated from each other, there was no partition of the joint family properties by metes and bounds, and Badri and Dilan cultivated the family properties separately by mutual arrangement for the sake of convenience. On these allegations, the plaintiff prayed for partition of the joint family properties, as mentioned in Schedule I. by metes and bounds and for allotment to her a separate takhta of eight annas share. The properties mentioned in Schedule II to the plaint also consisted of joint family properties. Since, however, there are other cosharers and the share, of the plaintiff was small, as indicated in the said Schedule of the different properties, the plaintiff did not seek partition of Schedule II properties and prayed that her shares in those properties only may be declared.

3. The defendants who were all descendants of Dilan denied separation in the family. They denied that Badri and Dilan had separated from each other. They denied further that the plaintiff was the daughter of Ramkhelawan. They alleged that Ramkhelawan died issueless. They asserted that the family is and has all along been joint, and there was no separation at any stage, and Ramkhelawan, the husband of the plaintiff, died in a state of joint-ness with the defendants and by survivorship all the family properties devolved upon them. They also challenged the correctness of the genealogy set up by the plaintiff and alleged that certain other members had been omitted.

4. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff was the daughter of Ramkhelawan and that the genealogy as given by the plaintiff was correct. He further held that there was no separation between Badri and Dilan and that the family was all along joint and that on the death of Ramkhelawan, the entire joint family properties devolved upon the defendants by survivorship. He accordingly dismissed her suit.

5. The correctness of the finding of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff is the daughter of Ramkhelawan and the genealogy as set up by the plaintiff is correct has not been challenged. It must be held, therefore, that the plaintiff is the daughter of Ramkhelawan and if there was separation in the family, the plaintiff was indeed entitled to eight annas share in the joint family properties, namely, the share which her father had therein. She will also be entitled to allotment of a separate takhta in respect of her share. The important question that falls for determination is whether there was separation between Badri and Dilan.

6. It is well established law that those who alleged that the members of a joint Hindu family had separated must prove, unless it is admitted, that there was a separation at some material time. The presumption, until the contrary is proved, is that the family continues joint. It is well to remember that according to the plaintiff the separation between Badri and Dilan took place before the survey and settlement operations and that though partition by metes and bounds was not effected, both the brothers cultivated the joint family properties separately for the sake of convenience according to the respective shares. In order to prove separation the plaintiff has examined P.Ws 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15. (After reviewing the evidence his Lordship continued:)

7. Their evidence, therefore, falls short of establishing separation between Badri and Dilan. It is this separation which the plaintiff had to establish.

8. On the other hand, the defendants have examined D.Ws 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14. They all speak unanimously that there was no separation in the family of Prasad Chaudhary and that all the members lived jointly and further that Ramkhelawan died in a state of jointness with the defendants. (His Lordship reviewed the evidence and proceeded:)

9. After a proper appraisal and due scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both the parties, I think the evidence adduced by the defendants to prove jointness is overwhelming and quite credible and must be preferred to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the members of both the branches were dealing separately and purchasing lands in their names and that this fact, in his opinion, constituted valid evidence of separation. He referred to four sale-deeds, exhibits 2, 2(A), 2(b) and 2(c) standing in the name of Balgovind. It is in the evidence that at one time Balgovind was a karta of the family. Great emphasis was laid by learned counsel on the sale-deeds, exhibit 2(a), whose certified copy has been produced by the defendants and is exhibit B. One of the plots conveyed to Balgovind under this sale-deed is plot 9242.

11. The boundaries of this plot given in the sale deed shows that on the south it is bounded by the land of Dilan. It shows that when this sale deed was taken Dilan was alive. He was then the eldest male member and naturally the karta. This description is not inconsistent with the jointness of the family. When the joint family was purchasing the land in the name of one of the junior members and when the family had land on the boundaries of one of the plots conveyed thereunder, there is nothing improbable nor inconsistent with the jointness to describe the boundary in the name of the karta of the family, namely, Dilan. I do not, therefore, think that this description of the boundary in any way conflicts with the jointness or shows even indirectly separation between Badri and Dilan.

12. Apart from this, separate acquisitions by separate coparceners of a joint Mitakshara family are not evidence of separation and are perfectly consistent with the jointness of the family. The law governing a joint Mitakshara family does not discountenance either separate acquisitions or separata business by different members of the joint family. In this particular case, since the original sale deeds which are exhibits B series have been produced by the defendants. The plaintiff has produced only certified copies of the sale deeds.

13. The plaintiff explained the production of the original sale deeds by the defendants by saying that there was a theft in her house and all of the deeds and papers standing in the name of Balgovind were carried away by Ram Siristha Chaudhary (Defendant No. 3). D.Ws 2 and 14 have emphatically denied the occurrence of theft. Now, there is no evidence that any such theft took place. No in formation was given to the police, nor was any complaint lodged. Nobody saw the actual commission of theft.

14. They were in the custody of the plaintiff (P.W 8), and from her custody defendant No. 3 took them away stealthily. She sent information to her husband, who was then at his house. Still, no step was taken against defendant No. 3. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge is right in holding that the introduction of the story of theft is an after-thought to explain away the production of the original sale deeds by the defendants. For these reasons, these sale deeds do not afford any evidence of separation. The circumstances attending them rather point to the contrary.

15. Learned counsel for the appellant further referred to the chaukidari receipts, exhibits 3 series, some of which stand in the same of Balgovind, some in the name of Pearey, some in the name of Banarsi Kuer and some in the name of Mahendra Thakur. He contended that these chaukidari receipts show separate residence. He also referred to the record of the sugar factory showing the name of the person who had supplied sugarcane. They are exhibits 5 series. In all of them the name of Pearey Choudhary has been mentioned.

16. The contention is that Pearey was having separate cultivation and supplying sugarcane to the factory. It was further pointed out that Pearey had obtained license to cure tobacco (exhibit 6). None of there documents, in my opinion, is conclusive on I the point. Separate residence does not indicate severance of the joint status. Apart from this, chaukidari rent receipts do not necessarily show that they have been paying chaulddari tax separately. Furthermore, these chaukilari receipts, as rightly held by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, appear to be spurious.

17. The connected documents with respect to the payment of chaukidari tax should have been proved to show the genuineness of the payment. Further, it should have been shown that the defendants had also been separately assessed with chaukidari tax. The chaukidari receipts, therefore, are of little weight in determining the question of separation or jointness. Similarly the supply of sugarcane by Pearey aid obtaining by him of license to cure tobacco do not necessarily indicate separation and they are consistent with the jointness of the family. These documents, in my opinion, do not prove separation at all.

18. Learned counsel laid great stress upon the survey record of rights (khatian)?, exhibits 7 and 7(c) which showed that Dilan was recorded in the khatians along with Balgovind and Pearey and further that Dilin had half share and Balgovind and Pearey had the remaining half. On the strength of these entries in the survey records of rights, learned counsel urged that the definition of shares indicated separation. He referred to two decisions of the Privy Council in Anurago Kuer v. Darshan Raut, 19 Pat LT 131 : (AIR 1938 PC 65), and Inder Kuer v. Pirthipal Kuer, AIR 1945 PC 128.

19. In the first case their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down that it is a well-settled rule of the Hindu Law, as followed by the Mitakshara School, that the partition of the joint estate consists in defining the shares of the coparceners in the joint family property and that it is not necessary that there should be an actual division of the property by metes and bounds. They have further observed that the definition of shares may be proved inter alia by an entry in the record-of-rights showing the share of each member of the family.

20. They have laid down that such an entry will be evidence of the severance of the joint status. Similarly, in the case of Inder Kuer. AIR 1945 PC 128, their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down that once the shares are defined there is a severance of joint status. It is true that for partition physical division of property, is not necessary, and once the shares have been defined, it will amount to disruption of the joint status. But, at the same time mention of separate shares of different branches in the survey record-of-rights does not indicate at all that there was definition of the shares in the sente that severance of joint status had taken place.

21. In all cases, the shares of different branches of the joint Mitakshara family are indicated in the survey record-of-rights, and the khatian, therefore, cannot be regarded as a document evidencing definition of shares. The definition of shares must be brought about with an intention to separate, and mere mention of the shares of different branches in the revenue records does not indicate that the shares have been defined with the necessary consequence of the severance of the joint status. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have explained on more occasions than one the significance of the definition of shares in the revenue and village papers. In 1896 Sir John Edge, Chief Justice, made the following significant observations in Gajendar Singh v. Sardar Singh, ILR 18 All 176:

“A definition of shares in revenue and village papers affords, by itself, but a very slight indication of an actual separation in a Hindu family, and certainly in no case that has ever come before us could we have regarded such a definition of shares standing alone as sufficient evidence upon which to find, contrary to the presumption in law as to jointure, that the family to which such definition referred had separated.”

This pronouncement of the learned Chief Justice was approved without qualification by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagesar Baksh Singh v. Mt. Ganesha, 47 Ind App 57 : (AIR 1920 PC 46). Their Lordships observed that the statements of principles are sound as applied not only in Allahabad, but in India as a whole. These principles of law were further reiterated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Mt. Bhagwani Kunwar v. Mohan Singh, 29 Cal WN 1037 : (AIR 1925 PC 132).

22. They have further laid down in that case that the collector's book is kept for purposes of revenue and not for purposes of title, and consequently the fact of a person's name being entered in the Collector's book as occupant of land does not necessarily of itself establish that person's title or defeat the title of any other person. Their Lordships have further made clear that the same observation applies to entries of the names of persons in settlement khewats as the names of cosharers in a mauza.

23. It is thus clear beyond doubt that a mere definition of shares in revenue and village papers would not, by itself, be conclusive evidence, even that an actual partition was then intended. In order to establish separation, it must further be proved that such definition of shares was with a view to obtain partition. In absence of such evidence, mere definition of share by itself affords as very slight indication of actual separation and is insufficient to displace the presumption of jointness.

24. In my opinion, the khatians in this case, therefore do not afford any evidence of separation between Badri and Dilan. It is really difficult to believe that in spite of separation the lands continued to be cultivated separately by mutual agreement for nearly fifty years. These khatians, therefore, are of no assistance to the plaintiff and do not support the contention of the learned counsel.

25. The above survey of the evidence, both oral and documentary, leads inevitably to the conclusion that there was no separation in the family of Prasad Choudhary and that the family continued to be joint and all the family properties were jointly cultivated and on the death of Ramkhelawan, the entire joint family properties were jointly cultivated, and on the death of Ramakhelawan, the entire joint family properties devolved on the defendants by survivorship.

26. The plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to any share in the said properties.

27. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs.

ID/R.G.D

28. Appeal dismissed.