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Smt. Fulkalia v. Nathu Ram And Others

Patna High Court
May 11, 1960
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Summary of Opinion by Untwalia, J. (with concurrence by Kanhaiya Singh, J.) — Testamentary Case No. 8 of 1956

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Factual and Procedural Background

Mahadeo Bania (also referred to as Mahadeo Halwai), who lived alone for many years in a two-storeyed house at Jugsalai (near Jamshedpur), was murdered in October 1951. The estate comprised the house and related premises. The Administrator-General of Bihar learned of the death and sought a report and appointment under the Administrator-General's Act and the Succession Act to take possession. An Intestate Case was initiated in the Sub-ordinate Judge's Court at Jamshedpur in early 1952 and a general notice calling claimants to present claims was directed.

A sequence of claimant petitions followed: one claiming to be Biharilal Bania (who died while his claim was pending), and thereafter Mewalal (claiming to be son of Bihari's deceased daughter) filed a petition. The Administrator-General filed Testamentary Case No. 1 of 1953 in the Patna High Court seeking Letters of Administration as Administrator-General. Despite an objection petition filed on behalf of Mewalal and others, Ramaswami, J. granted Letters of Administration to the Administrator-General on 4-8-1953. The Administrator-General took possession of the properties on 30-8-1953.

Fulkalia (the present appellant) later obtained succession certificates in 1954 and an extended certificate in 1957 for alleged rents, and attempted to sell the house (she purportedly sold it for Rs. 15,000 but permission based on that sale was recalled). On 20-9-1956 she filed Testamentary Case No. 8 of 1956, seeking revocation of the Letters of Administration granted to the Administrator-General and that letters be granted to her on the ground that she was heir through Bihari Bania (alleged brother of Mahadeo).

The High Court (Untwalia, J.) heard the appeal from the order of Sahai, J., who had dismissed the appellant's application. The appeal was ultimately dismissed by Untwalia, J., with Kanhaiya Singh, J. concurring.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant proved, by admissible and reliable evidence, that Bihari Bania was the brother and heir of the deceased Mahadeo Bania, thereby entitling the appellant to have Letters of Administration revoked from the Administrator-General and granted to her.
  2. Whether Letters of Administration granted to the Administrator-General under Section 7 of the Administrator-General's Act could be revoked under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act (or only under Section 18 of the Administrator-General's Act).
  3. The admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the appellant — specifically, whether testimonial material and reputation evidence adduced satisfied Section 50 (and Section 60) of the Evidence Act.
  4. The legal effect of succession certificates (particularly Exhibits 4 and 4(a)) obtained by the appellant and whether those certificates could displace the Administrator-General's rights or support revocation of Letters of Administration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted that Mahadeo died intestate and issueless, that his estate devolved on his brother Bihari Bania, that Bihari died leaving the appellant as his nearest heir, and therefore the Letters of Administration granted to the Administrator-General should be revoked and re-granted to her.
  • She relied on oral evidence (including her evidence recorded on commission), statements recorded in preliminary enquiries, and succession certificates (Exhibits 4 and 4(a)) as proof of her entitlement.
  • Counsel for the appellant contended that revocation could be sought under Section 263 of the Succession Act (as opposed to Section 18 of the Administrator-General's Act), and urged that the succession certificates and other evidence established her claim.
  • By way of amendment the appellant asserted that the controversy related to the estate of Bihari Bania (having devolved from Mahadeo) and that Letters granted earlier were irregular in that light.

Administrator-General's / Respondent's Arguments

  • The Administrator-General denied the appellant's allegations and resisted revocation of the Letters of Administration granted to him.
  • The Government Advocate argued that Letters of Administration granted under Section 7 of the Administrator-General's Act could not be revoked except under Section 18 of that Act (a point conceded by the appellant's counsel insofar as Section 18 was concerned).
  • It was contended that the evidence relied on by the appellant — including oral testimony of certain witnesses and the police officer's report — was inadmissible or insufficient; in particular the trial court found the oral evidence failed to meet the requirements of Section 50 of the Evidence Act.
  • It was submitted that succession certificates (Exhibits 4 and 4(a)) did not affect the Administrator-General's rights and, in any event, were invalid where prior Letters of Administration had already been granted (invoking Section 385 of the Succession Act).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 S.C. 914 Clarification of Section 50 of the Evidence Act: the relevancy of opinion expressed by conduct and the conditions for admissibility of such evidence; relationship between Sections 50 and 60. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision's exposition of S.50 and S.60 to test the appellant's evidence (P.Ws 1 and 2 and other conduct-based evidence) and held that the evidence fell short of statutory requirements.
Chandu Lal v. Khalilar Rahman, ILR (1942) 2 Cal 299 (reported AIR 1943 Cal 76) Authorities supporting the proposition that S.50 admits only "opinion as expressed by conduct" and explaining how conduct moves the court to infer opinion. The court cited the passage to reinforce the proper scope of S.50 and to explain why general or reputational assertions without proving the requisite conduct are insufficient.
Lakshmi Reddi v. Venkata Reddi, AIR 1937 P.C. 201 Authority for the view that Section 50 does not make mere general reputation evidence admissible as proof of relationship. The court accepted this view to conclude that the testimony before the police officer and the general reputation evidence relied on by the appellant did not satisfy Section 50.
Kartar Singh v. Administrator-General of Bihar, AIR 1959 Pat 349 (Letters Patent decision) Reported Letters Patent Bench decision concerning recall of permission to execute a conveyance that had been granted on misrepresentation. The court referenced that earlier Letters Patent appeal (which failed) to note that permission obtained under misrepresentation had been recalled and that a prior attempt by Fulkalia to transfer the property had not succeeded.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps focusing on evidentiary sufficiency, statutory effect of succession certificates, and the narrower technical questions raised by counsel.

1. Evidentiary sufficiency as to relationship between Mahadeo and Bihari

  • The court observed there was no documentary evidence supporting the appellant's claim that Bihari was Mahadeo's brother — "absolutely no documentary evidence, not even a chit of paper." (para. 10)
  • The oral evidence consisted mainly of the appellant's deposition (recorded on commission) and the testimonies of Ramdhani Dwivedi (P.W.1) and Ramdas Bania (P.W.2). The court considered whether evidence recorded on commission could be read; it accepted that, on the facts, the appellant's commission evidence was rightly admitted but then examined its contents and reliability. (paras. 11–13)
  • Critical weaknesses in the appellant's testimony were identified: her statements were inconsistent and she lacked personal familiarity with Jamshedpur and with facts she purported to know (e.g., uncertainty whether the house was single-, double- or triple-storeyed, denial of knowledge about the tenant Bisambhar Maharaj). The court found indications she may have been "a tool in the hands of somebody" and therefore declined to rely on her evidence to establish the familial relationship. (paras. 14–16)
  • Evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 was examined under Section 50 of the Evidence Act. The court held their testimony amounted to general reputation evidence and did not fulfil Section 50's requirements. It applied the principles articulated in Dolgobinda Paricha and related authorities about the nature of evidence admissible under S.50 (i.e., opinion expressed by conduct from persons with special means of knowledge), finding the witnesses' testimony inadequate. (paras. 17–18)
  • On the whole, the court concluded there was no reliable and legal evidence to establish that Bihari was Mahadeo's brother or that any heir entitled to supplant the Administrator-General existed. Therefore the factual basis of the appellant's claim failed. (para. 18)

2. Legal effect of succession certificates (Exhibits 4 and 4(a))

  • The court analysed the statutory effect of succession certificates under Section 381 of the Indian Succession Act: such certificates are conclusive only with respect to the debts specified therein, as between the certificate-holder and the persons owing those debts; they operate to indemnify persons who pay in good faith pursuant to such certificates. (para. 20)
  • Consequently, Exhibits 4 and 4(a), being certificates for arrears of rent and similar debts, could not affect the Administrator-General's rights nor serve as a basis to revoke Letters of Administration. (para. 21)
  • Further, Section 385 of the Succession Act was invoked: a certificate under that Act is invalid where there has been a previous grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the estate and such grant is in force. Since Letters of Administration had already been granted to the Administrator-General in respect of Mahadeo's estate, the succession certificates were declared invalid as regards that estate. (para. 22)

3. Technical statutory arguments

  • The Government Advocate argued that Letters of Administration granted under Section 7 of the Administrator-General's Act cannot be revoked except under Section 18 of that Act. The appellant's counsel conceded he could not proceed under Section 18. (para. 23)
  • The appellant's counsel argued that Section 263 of the Succession Act provided a proper basis for revocation; the court stated it was unnecessary to decide the question whether revocation under Section 263 was available, because even assuming that it were, the appellant's case would fail on the factual finding that she had not established next-of-kin status or any of the statutory grounds for revocation. (para. 24)
  • Another contention urged was a statutory interpretation point about the effect of Letters of Administration being granted to the Administrator-General "unless" letters had been granted to next-of-kin. The court again noted it was unnecessary to decide that contentious legal point because the appellant had not made out the factual basis required. (para. 25)

In sum, the court grounded its decision primarily on factual findings about the insufficiency and inadmissibility of evidence proving the familial relationship, and on statutory rules limiting the effect of succession certificates where prior Letters of Administration exist.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED — the application to revoke the Letters of Administration granted to the Administrator-General and to have them granted to the appellant fails. (paras. 26, 29)

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Letters of Administration previously granted to the Administrator-General in respect of the estate of Mahadeo Bania remain in force; they are not revoked and are not re-granted to the appellant. (paras. 5, 21–22, 26)
  • The court held the succession certificates obtained by the appellant (Exhibits 4 and 4(a)) do not displace the Administrator-General's rights; further, they are invalid insofar as they purport to relate to the estate for which Letters of Administration had already been granted. (paras. 20–22)
  • The appellant's factual claim of next-of-kinship (through Bihari) was not established by reliable evidence; consequently, the statutory routes available to displace the Administrator-General's grant were not engaged. (paras. 18, 24–25)
  • The appellant was ordered to pay costs (appeal dismissed with costs), and a hearing fee of Rs. 100/- was noted. (paras. 26–27)

Broader legal implications: The opinion rests on application of established evidentiary rules (particularly S.50 and S.60 of the Evidence Act) and statutory provisions of the Succession Act and the Administrator-General's Act. The court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle; rather, it applied existing authorities (including the cited Supreme Court decision) to the facts before it. Therefore, no novel precedent was stated beyond the application of those established rules to the facts of this case. (paras. 17, 24–25)

Concurrence: Kanhaiya Singh, J. agreed with the result. (para. 28)

Show all summary ...

Untwalia, J.:— This appeal under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment and order dated 8-9-1959, passed by Sahai, J., in Testamentary Case No. 8 of 1956, dismissing the application of the appellant to revoke the Letters of Administration granted to the Administrator-General and to grant them to her. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are shortly these: One Mahadeo Bania (Halwai) was living in a two-storeyed house in Jugsalai, a suburb of Jamshedpur town in the district of Singhbhum. He was living alone there for a considerable number of years, almost throughout his life. In October, 1951, he died an unnatural death, being murdered by some unknown person or persons. The property left by him was the house and the premises appertaining thereto.

2. The Administrator-General of Bihar got information about his death, and he wrote a letter dated 19-12-1951, to the District Judge of Manbhum-Singhbhum at Purulia, asking for a report under Section 54 of the Administrator-General's Act (Act III of 1913) and for his appointment under Section 269 of the Succession Act to take possession of the properties left by the said deceased. He was directed by the learned District Judge to apply to the Sub-ordinate Judge at Jamshedpur who had jurisdiction to deal with such matter occurring within his territorial jurisdiction. On the Administrator-General's writing to the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, he started Intestate Case No. 1 of 1952, the order sheet of which is Ex. 8 in this case. On 23-1-1952, he directed issue of general notice calling claimants, if any, to file their claims by 20-2-1952.

3. He also directed an enquiry by the Officer-in-charge of the Jugsalai Police Station. Before the general notice could be issued, or the report of the Officer-in-charge could be received, a person claiming to be Biharilal Bania filed a petition on 2-4-1952, in the Sub-ordinate Judge's Court at Jamshedpur. He claimed the properties of Mahadeo Bania, the deceased. While the claim of the petitioner said to be Biharilal Bania was pending investigation, he (the claimant) died on 17-8-1952, and after his death one Mewalal, claiming to be the son of a deceased daughter of Bihari, filed a petition claiming the properties in question. There was some correspondence in this regard between the Administrator-General and the Government Pleader at Jamshedpur. The learned Sub-ordinate Judge also was informed of the position from time to time. Ultimately, the Administrator-General filed Testamentary Case No. 1 of 1953 in this Court for grant of Letters of Administration to him in respect of the estate of Mahadeo Halwai. This petition is Exhibit 1 in the record of this case. In the 12th paragraph of this petition it was stated that Mewalal, even according to the genealogy given by him, had no case, and in the 13th Paragraph it was asserted—

“that the deceased Mahadeo Halwai had been living all alone and carrying on business at Jugsalai for over 25 years before his death. Your petitioner further understands from the statements of a number of persons made to and recorded by the aforesaid Assistant Mr. A. Rauf, who were tenants of the deceased Mahadeo Halwai and are still residing in the premises of the deceased that the deceased himself used to repeat off and on that he had no relations or heirs and no relative was ever seen by them to visit him, and no person claiming to be an heir of the deceased Mahadeo Halwai has ever approached any of them for any purpose.”

This petition was filed on the 3rd of February, 1953. On the 13th of May, 1953, an objection petition (Exhibit 3) was filed on behalf of the opposite parties, namely, Mewalal, Fulkalia and others in Testamentary Case No. 1 of 1953. It would appear from the Vakalatnama (Exhibit E) filed in that case that) all the opposite parties had appeared and filed the said objection petition through Shri Nripendra Narayan Roy, Advocate. Ramaswami, J. as he then was, granted the Letters of Administration by his order dated the 4th of August, 1953 (Exhibit 2) to the Administrator-General under Section 7 of the Administrator-General's Act. In the penultimate paragraph of the order His Lordship observed:

“If the affidavit filed on behalf of the objector is true and if Mosstt. Fulkalia is daughter of Bihari Bania and niece of Mahadeo Bania it is undoubtedly open to her to file a proper application for letters of administration and obtain a grant. But no such grant has so far been obtained by Mosstt. Fulkalia and the application filed on behalf of the Administrator-General of Bihar for grant of the letters of administration of the estate of Mahadeo Bania is competent.”

In pursuance of this order, it is stated, the Administrator-General took possession of the properties on the 30th of August, 1953.

4. If the genealogical table given on behalf of the appellant showing the relationship between the parties be correct, it is obvious that Fulkalia being the daughter of Bihari Bania, who was said to be the brother of Mahadeo Bania, had the topmost claim and the other contesting opposite parties of Testamentary Case No. 1 of 1953, namely, Mewa Lal, Chhotey Lal, two sons of deceased daughter Dalia and Kalawati, a minor daughter of another deceased daughter Kainla, had no case. Instead of applying for grant of Letters of Administration, as observed in the order of Ramaswami, J. (as he then was), (Exhibit 2), it appears from Exhibit 4, the succession certificate, that Mussammat Fulkalia applied on 13-1-1954, in the Court of the District Judge of Manbhum-Singhbhum at Purulia for a succession certificate in respect of a sum of Rs. 900, said to be arrears of rent due from one Bisambhar Maharaj in respect of the house in question, and the said certificate was granted to her on 20-4-1954.

5. Thereafter, she proceeded to sell the house in question for a sum of Rs. 15,000 only to one Sardar Kartar Singh, and the then Administrator-General Mr. G.P Shahi applied for permission to execute a fresh conveyance in favour of the said Sardar in respect of the house. This permission was granted on 5-9-1955. It is admitted on all hands that permission had been obtained under some misrepresentation of facts, and, therefore, the said order was recalled by Ramaswami, J. as he then was, on 10-9-1956. A Letters Patent Appeal against that order also failed, and the decision of the Letters Patent Bench is reported in Kartar Singh v. Administrator-General of Bihar, AIR 1959 Pat 349.

6. Be that as it may, the fact remains that Mossammat Fulkalia attempted to sell the property for a grossly inadequate price, but failed in her endeavor. Ultimately on 20-9-1956, she filed the application giving rise to the present proceeding which was numbered as Testamentary Case No. 8 of 1956.

7. The case of the appellant, in short, is that Matiadeo Halwai died intestate and issueless, and on his death his estate devolved upon Bihari Bania, his brother and only heir. Bihari Bania also died on 17-8-1952; leaving the appellant as his nearest heir. The parties are said to be residents of Uttar Pradsh in the district of Allahabad. She prayed for, has stated above, revocation of the grant of Letters; of Administration to the Administrator-General and for their grant to her.

8. By an amendment petition filed on 5-7-1957, she sought to introduce an amendment in her case that realty the controversy was in respect of the estate of Bihari Bania and not in respect of the estate of Mahfdeo Bania as the same had devolved upon Bihari after the death of Mahadeo. The Letters of Administration, according to her, which were granted to, the Administrator-General in respect of the estate of Mahadeo were irregular in that case. By another amendment petition filed on 27-11-1957, she gave, four grounds as mentioned in that petition as grounds A, B, C and D in support of her case as to why the Letters of Administration granted to the Administrator-General should be revoked.

9. The Administrator-General has refuted the allegations made on behalf of the appellant and resisted her prayers. The learned Judge of this Court sitting; on the original side has rejected the application, chiefly on the ground that it has not been established by legal and reliable evidence that Mahadeo Bmia died leaving Bihari Bania as his brother and heir or for the matter of that, any other heir. The learned Judge has answered most of the technical points raised on behalf of the Administrator-General against him. I shall briefly indicate them in my judgment hereinafter, but in view of the agreeing decision which I am going to give in regard to the main question, I do not think it would be necessary to decide any of the technical questions.

10. There is absolutely no documentary evidence, not even a chit of paper, in support of the appellant's case that Bihari Bania was the brother of Mahadeo Bania. Exhibit 7, the report of the Officer-in-charge of Jugsalai Police Station has got no evidentiary value, and I shall deal with it when I come to deal with his evidence. The oral evidence consists of that of the appellant herself, who was examined on commission, and that of Ramdhani Dwivedi (P.W 1) and Ramdas Bania (P.W 2). There was a controversy before the learned trial Judge as to whether the evidence of Fulkalia recorded on commission at Allahabad could be read as evidence in this case.

11. The same controversy was faintly raised on behalf of the Administrator-General in this Court also I think, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, her evidence has been rightly read as evidence in the case by the learned Judge, and I shall also-not discard her evidence on the technical grounds that she was in a position to come and depose in Court at the time her evidence was utilised as evidence in the case at the time of argument. Coming to her evidence, however, I find that she has not specifically stated in her examination-in-chief that Bihari was brother of Mahadeo. She has no doubt said that Mahadeo was her uncle and Bihari was her father. Inferentially, therefore, it may suggest that she claimed Bihari to be the brother of Mahadeo.

12. In her cross-examination she said that she had gone to Jamshedpur and Tatanagar only once, about five years prior to her deposition. But it is strange that the other two witnesses did not claim to have seen her there. There is no evidence on behalf of the appellant to show as to who came after the murder of Mahadeo Bania and whether Bihari came and took any interest in bringing to book the alleged murderer. When cross-examined on behalf of the opposite party No. 4 she stated that she could not say whether the house in which Mahadeo lived was a single storeyed, double storeyed or triple: storeyed building. She further said that she had not seen the town of Jamshedpur.

13. These answers suggest that she had never gone to the town of Jamshedpur as claimed by her earlier in cross-examination. In my opinion, the learned Judge has rightly refused to place any reliance upon her evidence in order to establish the alleged relationship between Mahadeo and Bihari. It further appears that she is merely a tool in the hands of somebody as in regard to the succession certificate obtained against Bisambhar Maharaj she said that she did not know him and that she did not know if any person named as Bisambhar Maharaj was a tenant of the house in question.

14. She further stated that she did not file any case for the rent of the house against him. The evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 is not admissible in evidence as it does not fulfil the requirements of Section 50 of the Evidence Act. In a recent Supreme Court decision, namely, Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 914, the law has been lucidly laid down and on reference to the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act, Das, J. said:—

“On a plain reading of the section it is quite clear that it deals with relevancy of a particular fact. It states in effect that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship of any person who has special means of knowledge on the subject of that relationship is a relevant fact. The two illustrations appended to the section clearly bring out the true I scope and effect of the section. It appears to us that the essential requirements of the section are — (1) there must be a case where the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, (2) in such a case, the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship is a relevant fact; (3) but the person whose opinion expressed by conduct is relevant must be a person who as a member of the family or otherwise has special means of knowledge on the particular subject of relationship; in other words, the person must fulfil the condition laid down in the latter part of the section.

15. If the person fulfils that condition, then what is relevant is his opinion expressed by conduct. Opinion means something more than mere retailing of gossip or of hearsay; it means judgment or belief, that is, a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question. Now, the ‘belief or conviction may manifest itself in conduct or behaviour which indicates the existence of the belief or opinion. What the section says is that such conduct or outward behaviour as evidence of the opinion held is relevant and may, therefore, be proved. We are of the view that the true scope and effect of Section 50 of the Evidence Act has been correctly and succinctly put in the following observations made in Chandu Lal v. Khalilar Rahman, ILR (1942) 2 Cal 299 at, p. 309 : AIR 1943 Cal 76 at p. 80.

‘It is only ‘opinion as expressed by conduct’ which is made relevant. This is how the conduct comes in. The offered item of evidence is the conduct’, but what is made admissible in evidence is ‘the opinion’, the opinion as expressed by such conduct. The offered item of evidence thus only moves the Court to an intermediate decision: its immediate effect is only to move the Court to see if this conduct establishes any ‘opinion’ of the person, whose conduct is in evidence, as to the relationship in question. In order to enable the Court to infer ‘the opinion’ the conduct must be of a tenor which cannot well be supposed to have been willed without the inner existence of the ‘opinion’.

16. When the conduct is of such a tenor, the Court only gets to a relevant piece of evidence, namely, ‘the opinion of a person’. It still remains for the Court to weigh such evidence and come to its own opinion as to the ‘factum probandum’ — as to the relationship in question.’

17. We also accept as correct the view that S. 50 does not make evidence of mere general reputation (without conduct) admissible as proof of relationship:” Lakshmi Reddi v. Venkata Reddi, AIR 1937 P.C 201.

After referring to S. 60 of the Act His Lordship has further observed:

“If we remember that the offered item of evidence under S. 50 is conduct in the sense explained above, then there is no difficulty in holding that such conduct or outward behaviour must be proved in the manner laid down in S. 60; if the conduct relates to something which can be seen, it must be proved by the person who saw it; if it is something which can be heard, then it must be proved by the person who heard it; and so on. The conduct must be of the person who fulfils the essential conditions of S. 50, and it must be proved in the manner laid down in the provisions relating to proof.

It appears to us that portion of S. 60 which provides that the person who holds an opinion must be called to prove his opinion does not necessarily delimit the scope of S. 50 in the sense that opinion expressed by conduct must be proved only by the person whose conduct expresses the opinion. Conduct, as an external perceptible fact, may be proved either by the testimony of the person himself whose opinion is evidence under S. 50 or by some other person acquainted with the facts which express such opinion, and as the testimony must relate to external facts which constitute conduct and is given by persons personally acquainted with such facts, the testimony is in each case direct within the meaning of S. 60. This, in our opinion, is the true interrelation between Section 50 and Section 60 of the Evidence Act.”

Applying this test to the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 it will be noticed that their evidence falls far short of the requirement of the law. It is in the nature of a general reputation evidence which is not at all evidence. These are the two persons who had given evidence before the Officerin-charge, Jugsalai Police Station, when he made the enquiry. But that is of no consequence.

18. (His Lordship then discussed the evidence and continued as under:) On a consideration of the entire evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant I am definitely of the view that no reliable and legal evidence has been adduced on behalf of the appellant in this case in support of the alleged relationship between Mahadeo and Bihari. In that view of the matter I hold, in agreement with the learned trial Judge, that the basis of the case is gone and it; has no legs to stand upon, even though the appellant may be a daughter of one Bihari Bania.

19. I have already alluded to Exhibit 4, the succession certificate granted in favour of Fulkalia in regard to a sum of Rs. 900/- said to be due from Bisambhar Maharaj. This certificate was extended on 2-1-1957, by grant of an extended succession certificate, exhibit 4(a), to cover two more debts, (1) an alleged debt of Rs. 20,000/- from the Administrator-General, and (2) Rs. 1000/- from one Mnhmud Alam. These amounts also are said to be due on account of arrears of rent of the house in question.

20. On the basis of these two succession certificates, Exhibits 4 and 4(a), especially placing very great reliance on the latter, it was argued by Mr. Prem Lall that they conclusively show that the appellant is entitled to the house in question and to the grand of Letters of Administration in respect of that. The simple answer is that under Section 381 of the Indian Succession Act the effect of such certificate is to make it conclusive with respect to the debts specified therein as against the persons owing such debts and to afford full indemnity to such person or persons as regards all payments made in good faith in respect of such debts to the person to whom the certificate is granted.

21. The grant of the certificate, therefore, to the appellant in regard to the debts said to be due from Bisambhar Maharaj and Mahmud Alam cannot affect the rights of the Administrator-General under the Administrator-General's Act and cannot be a ground for revocation of the Letters of Administration granted to him. The grant of a succession certificate with respect to the alleged debt due from the Administrator-General is a curious thing. The Administrator-General was granted Letters of Administration long before the grant of this certificate to Fulkalia. The grant of a succession certificate to her, therefore, in respect of the alleged debt on account of arrears of rent is very peculiar and cannot affect the rights of the Administrator-General in the least.

22. Moreover, under Section 385 of the Succession Act a certificate granted under that Act in respect of any of the effects of the deceased person shall be invalid if there has been a previous grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the estate of the deceased person and if such previous grant is in force. The Administrator-General was granted Letters of Administration in respect of the estate of Mahadeo Bania, the deceased person. He never admitted that he left any Bihari Bania as his brother. The succession certificates, Exhibits 4 and 4(a), also relate to the estate of Mahadeo Halwai or Bania. They are, therefore, obviously invalid in view of the provision of Section 385 of the Succession Act.

23. I shall now just indicate the two main technical arguments which were advanced and are involved in the case. It was argued by the learned Government Advocate on behalf of the Administrator General that the Letters of Administration, once granted to the Administrator-General under Section 7 of the Administrator-General's Act (Act III of 1913), could not be revoked except under S. 18 of this Act. Mr. Prem Lall conceded that the appellant could not bring her case for revocation of the grant of Letters of Administration to the Administrator-General under that provision.

24. But he contended that his client's case came wider Section 263 of the Succession Act, and Letters of Administration granted under Section 7 of the Administrator-General's Act could be revoked under Section 263 of the Succession Act. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha combated this position of law. I do not think it is necessary to decide this question, as even assuming that grant could be revoked under Section 263 of the Succession Act, it is obvious that on the finding of fact arrived at by me above, the grant cannot be revoked even under that provision of law as it does not come under any of the clauses in that section or under any other principle akin to it.

25. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha further contended that Letters of Administration were granted to the Administrator-General as they had not been granted to the next-of-kin of the deceased at that time. The section does not say that such Letters of Administration are granted “until they are granted to the next-of-kin of the deceased”. But the word is “unless” in the section. He, therefore, submitted that even if it be found that there was a next-of-kin and in spite of the observations of Ramaswami, J., as he then was, in his order granting Letters of Administration to the Administrator-General in the penultimate paragraph of the order as quoted by me above, Letters of Administration granted to the Administrator-General could not be revoked and could not be granted to the appellant. Again, I feel it is not necessary to decide this contentious question of law. I would have proceeded to decide both these questions if I would have found that the appellant was the next-of-kin of the deceased. But, as I have stated above, they do not fall to be decided in view of my finding of affirmance on the main question of relationship between Mahadeo Bania and Bihari Bania.

26. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

27. Hearing fee Rs. 100/-.

28. Kanhaiya Singh, J.:— I agree.

HD/D.R.R

29. Appeal dismissed.