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Ramsarup Prasad v. Shiva Dutta Prasad .
Judgment Summary — Kanhaiya Singh, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns whether the payment of the third instalment of Rs. 1,500 was a valid payment and whether the execution sale should be set aside. The respondent (decree-holder) applied for execution of a money decree against the appellant (judgment-debtor) in the Court of the 3rd Subordinate Judge, Patna. The appellant's objections were dismissed in the executing court. He appealed to this Court (Miscellaneous Appeal No. 341 of 1954). By consent order dated 9-5-55 this Court directed that the appellant should pay the total sale price of Rs. 7,000 in four instalments: Rs. 2,000 by 31-8-55; Rs. 1,500 by 30-11-55; Rs. 1,500 by 28-2-56; and Rs. 2,000 by 31-8-56. Each instalment was to be deposited in the executing Court on or before the prescribed dates, and default in any instalment would result in dismissal of the appeal and confirmation of the sale.
The appellant paid the first two instalments on time. For the third instalment he visited Patna on 27-2-56 but (allegedly) his lawyer was not available. A chalan was filed in the executing Court on 28-2-56; the chalan was processed by the Accountant on 29-2-56, presented to the Treasury and made over to the appellant at 3 P.M. on 29-2-56. Because of the timing the money could not be deposited in the bank on 29-2-56 and was actually deposited on 1-3-56. The decree-holder applied for withdrawal; the executing Court held the deposit invalid because it was not made on or before the due date and refused payment to the decree-holder. The appellant then filed an application under Section 47, CPC, asking the Court to treat the deposit as valid; the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed that application. The appellant appealed to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the payment of the third instalment (Rs. 1,500), which was deposited after the due date but for which a chalan was filed on the due date, constituted a valid deposit in satisfaction of the instalment obligation.
- Whether the executing Court could treat the late deposit as valid or extend the time for payment when the time for payment had been fixed by consent of the parties (i.e., whether the Court had jurisdiction to extend that time).
- Whether the execution sale should be set aside (or the appeal kept alive) in light of the alleged deposit.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant believed the last date for deposit of the third instalment to be 29-2-56 rather than 28-2-56, and he was ready with the money from 27-2-56.
- Even if the due date were 28-2-56, the appellant contends there was no default because the chalan was presented in the Court on 28-2-56; the delay in actual deposit resulted from the chalan being passed by the Accountant only on 29-2-56.
- Given the filing/presentation of the chalan on 28-2-56 and the fact he was ready with funds, the appellant argued the deposit complied with the High Court's order and should be regarded as a valid discharge of the instalment.
Respondent / Decree-holder's Position
- The decree-holder applied for withdrawal of the amount; the executing Court held the deposit invalid because it was not made on or before the due date and accordingly refused payment to the decree-holder. (The opinion records the respondent's successful application in the executing Court but does not elaborate further legal arguments from the respondent in the text.)
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Koilpillai Samban v. Sappanimuthu Samban, AIR 1923 Mad 354 | Cited in submissions relating to the validity of tender/deposit timing. | The Court held that this case did not apply to the present facts because, in that case, delay was on the part of the Court rather than the applicant. |
| Gopala Krishna Pillai v. Kunjithapatham Pillai, AIR 1924 Mad 324 | Cited in submissions relating to the validity of tender/deposit timing. | The Court held this precedent did not apply because the delay there arose from the Court, not from the applicant. |
| Mt. Gomti v. Lachman Das, AIR 1934 All 817 | Cited in submissions relating to tender/deposit procedures or delays. | The Court found that this authority was inapposite to the present case because the earlier cases involved delay by the Court. |
| Bijoy Singh v. Raja Kirtyanand Singh, AIR 1932 Pat 342 | Cited in submissions concerning deposit/tender issues. | The Court stated this case did not apply, as the delay in those cases was by the court and not by the applicant. |
| Seth Jaher Mal v. G.M. Pritchard, (Pat LJ 381; AIR 1919 Pat 503) | Cited for the principle that parties should not wait until the last moment to take steps within prescribed time limits and that courts should not routinely grant indulgence where a party delays until the last moment. | The Court relied on the passage quoted from this Bench decision to reinforce the conclusion that a party who waits until the last moment bears the risk of unexpected delay and is not entitled to indulgence; this supported the Court's finding of appellant's default. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by applying the consent order and the record facts strictly. The key steps in the Court's analysis, as stated in the opinion, are:
- The consent order plainly required the third instalment to be deposited in the executing Court on or before 28-2-56. The deposit was not made on that date.
- Although a chalan was filed on 28-2-56, the chalan was passed by the Accountant only on 29-2-56. The Court examined whether this procedural sequence absolved the appellant of responsibility for failing to make the deposit on time.
- The Court relied on its order-sheet entry for 28-2-56, which recorded: “Judgment-debtor files chalan to deposit 1500/- being the third instalment. Today is the last date for depositing the money. Nazir to receive the money...” That order-sheet entry was treated as a peremptory direction empowering the Nazir to receive money that day.
- The Court found no evidence that the appellant tendered the money to the Nazir or that the Nazir refused to accept it. The appellant's obligation was not satisfied merely by filing the chalan; he had to present the chalan and the money to the Nazir as directed.
- The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the delay was caused by the chalan not being passed on 28-2-56. The opinion characterizes the failure to tender the money as negligence on the part of the appellant and therefore not a ground for invoking the maxim nunc pro tunc or for treating the late deposit as valid.
- The Court considered Rule 18, Chapter 1, Part X of the General Rules and Circular Orders (Civil), Volume I, which provides that when a tender is made which must by law be received, payment shall be made direct into Court in cash but only under the express order of the presiding officer to be recorded on the top of the original chalan. The Court observed that Rule 7 (referred to in Rule 18) applied, and that the purpose of recording the order on the chalan is to authorise ministerial officers to accept money. However, the Court held that the order-sheet entry of 28-2-56 had the same operative effect as an order on the original chalan and conferred authority on the Nazir to accept the money that day.
- The Court distinguished the precedents cited to the appellant on the ground that in those cases the delay was attributable to the Court, whereas in the present case the delay resulted from the appellant's own conduct. The Court also invoked the principle from Seth Jaher Mal v. G.M. Pritchard that parties who delay until the last moment take the risk of accidents/obstacles and are not entitled to indulgence where they have delayed.
- Because the dates for payment were fixed by consent, the Court held that time was of the essence of the contract/order, and the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment once the date had passed without deposit.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct effect on the parties:
- The Court affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge that the deposit of the third instalment was invalid because it was not made on or before the due date and the appellant was responsible for the default.
- The appeal was dismissed with costs. (V. Ramaswami, C.J., agreed.)
The opinion does not elaborate broader doctrinal innovations beyond applying established principles: (a) that parties who wait until the last moment risk unexpected delays and are not entitled to indulgence, and (b) that where time for payment is fixed by consent, the Court lacks jurisdiction to extend that time after default. The Court indicated that the precedents cited by the appellant were inapposite to the facts and therefore did not change those conclusions.
Source: Opinion of Kanhaiya Singh, J., as provided. This summary is limited to and based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.
Kanhaiya Singh, J.:— The question involved in this appeal is whether the payment of the third instalment of Rs. 1500 was a valid payment and the execution sale was liable to be set aside. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be shortly stated. The respondent decree-holder applied for execution of the money decree against the appellant judgment-debtor in the Court of the 3rd Subordinate Judge, Patna. The appellant judgment-debtor raised various objections which were all decided against him. He carried an appeal to this Court which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 341 of 1954. On 9-5-55 this Court disposed of the said appeal by consent of the parties in the following terms:
“1. The judgment-debtor appellant shall pay the entire sum of Rs. 7,000 (the price at which lot No. 1 — the house — has been sold) in four instalments in the following manner:
The first instalment of Rs. 2000 shall be paid on or before the 31st August, 1955; the second instalment of Rs. 1,500 shall be paid on or before the 30th November, 1955; the third instalment of Rs. 1,500 shall be paid on or before the 28th February, 1956; and the fourth instalment of Rs. 2,000 shall be paid on or before the 31st August, 1956. In case of default in payment of any of the instalments, on or before the dates fixed for each of those instalments, the appeal shall stand dismissed and the sale of lot No. 1 shall be confirmed.
2. Each of these instalments shall be deposited in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Patna, which is the executing Court, on or before the dates fixed for each of the instalments.
3. The costs of this appeal will be borne by the parties.”
The appellant deposited the first and second instalments on due dates and they were withdrawn by the decree-holder respondent. On the third occasion the appellant, it is alleged, came to Patna on 27-2-56 for the payment of the third instalment. His lawyer was not available and, therefore, the necessary chalan for the deposit of this instalment was filed in the Court below on 28-2-56. The chalan was passed by the Accountant on 29-2-59 and it was presented to the Treasury Officer on the same day and was made over by the treasury to the appellant at 3 P.M on 29-2-56. As it was too late the money could not be deposited in the bank on that date.
2. It was actually deposited on 1-3-56. The respondent decree-holder made an application for withdrawal of the amount. But the Court found that the deposit was invalid as it was not made on or before the due date and, therefore, refused payment of the money to the decree-holder. On 10-5-56 the judgment-debtor appellant filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC on the ground that the deposit of the third instalment was a valid deposit and operated as sufficient discharge of this instalment in the eye of law and prayed for acceptance of the same. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled this objection and dismissed the application. Now, the judgment-debtor has preferred this appeal to this Court.
3. The case made out by the appellant is that he was under the impression that the last date for deposit of the third instalment was 29-2-56 and not 28-2-56, that he was ready with the money since 27-2-56, and that even if the due date be taken to be 28-2-56, as mentioned in the order of the High Court, there was no default in payment on his part, since the chalan was presented in time to the Court on 28-2-56, but the deposit could not be made on that date as the chalan was passed not on 28-2-56 but on the next day, 29-2-56. It is alleged that in the circumstances the deposit of the third instalment was in strict compliance with the order of the High Court and should be regarded as a valid discharge of that instalment. It is manifest that the third instalment was to be deposited in the Court of the 3rd Subordinate Judge, Patna, on or before 28-2-56. This was not deposited on the due date. The chalan was no doubt filed on 28-2-56, and it appears that it was passed by the officer on 29-2-56. The grievance of the appellant is that in absence of the chalan he could not make any deposit and that since the chalan was made over to him on 29-2-56 he was not at all responsible for the delay in making the deposit. In my opinion, this contention is wholly beside the point. The facts appearing on the records of this case show that the default arose because of negligence on the part of the judgment-debtor appellant himself. The order-sheet of date 28-2-56 is as follows:
“Judgment-debtor files chalan to deposit 1500/- being the third instalment. Today is the last date for depositing the money. Nazir to receive the money. Put up on 31-8-56 for depositing of Rs. 2000 being the fourth and last instalment.”
It will be observed that the learned Subordinate Judge was conscious of the fact that 28-2-56 was the last date for depositing the money and, therefore, he gave a direction to the Nazir to receive the money. In spite of this direction the judgment-debtor appellant did not tender the money to the Nazir. His business did not end with the filing of the chalan in the Court below. He should have also offered the money to the Nazir for acceptance. There is no evidence that this money was offered to the Nazir or that the Nazir refused to accept the money. In view of the positive order of the Court below the Nazir could have hardly refused to accept the money.
4. Any way, the fact remains that the money was not tendered to the Nazir. The grievance of the appellant is that the chalan was not made over to him then and there. He knew that according to the agreement the money had to be deposited on that very day. If that were so and if there was no acceptance of the money by the Nazir as directed by the Court, the proper course for him to follow was to approach the Court then and there and see that the money was accepted in due time. This he apparently did not do. The contention is raised on the technical ground that the chalan was not passed on that day. Stritcly speaking, this was not at all necessary in view of the positive direction of the Court to the Nazir to receive the money.
5. After this order of the Subordinate Judge all that the appellant had to do was to present before the Nazir both the chalan and the money. It was a peremptory order to meet an extra-ordinary situation to accommodate the appellant himself and having failed to avail himself of the concession accorded to him by the Court, he cannot rest his case on mere technicality that there was delay in passing the chalan. Reference was made in this connection to Rule 18, Chapter 1, Part X of the General Rules and Circular Orders (Civil), Volume 1. This Rule lays down as follows:
“When, under clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 7 above, a tender is made of money which must, by law, be received, the payment shall be made direct into Court, in cash, but only under the express order of the Presiding Officer to be recorded on the top of the original chalan.”
There is no dispute that Rule 7 referred to in Rule 18 applies to the present case. Now, Rule 18 quoted above is against the appellant. The Rule requires that the payment shall be made direct into Court in cash under the express order of the presiding Officer. It was urged that the order of the presiding Officer was not recorded on the top of the original chalan. This is no doubt true, but in view of the order of the Court dated 28-2-56 recorded in the order-sheet of the case it was not at all necessary to repeat it on the original chalan.
6. The object of recording the order of the Court on the chalan is that the chalan would provide an authority for the ministerial officers to; accept money. The order of the Court as recorded in the order-sheet empowered the Nazir to receive the money and had the same effect as an: order recorded on the top of the original chalan. Learned counsel referred to the decisions in Koilpillai Samban v. Sappanimuthu Samban, AIR 1923 Mad 354 (2), Gopala Krishna Pillai v. Kunjithapatham Pillai, AIR 1924 Mad 324, Mt. Gomti v. Lachman Das, AIR 1934 All 817 and Bijoy Singh v. Raja Kirtyanand Singh, AIR 1932 Pat 342. None of these cases has application to the facts of the present case.
7. In all those cases there was no laches on the part of the applicants. The delay was actually on the part of the Court. The present case is distinguishable. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, more particularly the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 28-2-56, the appellant was entirely responsible for the delay in making the deposit and, therefore, the maxim nunc pro tunc has no application. Here, the Court had fixed by consent of the parties specific date for payment of the money, and the time was, therefore, the essence of the contract and as no deposit was made within the time fixed by the contract of the parties, the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of the deposit. I may refer in this connection to the Bench decision of this Court in Seth Jaher Mal v. G.M Pritchard, ??? Pat LJ 381 : (AIR 1919 Pat 503), where Dawson-Miller, C.J, made the following observations:
“There is one other matter I should like to draw attention to. It is a matter which is continually being brought to the notice of the Courts in this country, and that is this. It almost invariably happens that one party or the other intending to appeal or to take some other step in the course of an action for which a time limit is prescribed by the rules waits until the very last moment before taking that step. Sufficient time in all these cases is granted to the parties for doing whatever may be necessary for furthering their suit, and if they choose to put off until the very last minute either the filing of the appeal or the taking of any other steps which are necessary part of the prosecution of their case they run a very great risk, and it does not seem to me that it is sufficient for a party to come to Court and say that if everything had gone absolutely smoothly and if no unexpected accident had happened, he would have been in time in taking the steps required for his appeal. Ono is not entitled to put things off to the last moment, and hope that nothing will occur which will prevent them from being in time.
8. There is always the chapter of accidents to be considered, and it seems to me that one ought to consider that some accident or other may happen which will delay them in carrying out that part of their duties for which the Court prescribes a time limit and if they choose to rely upon everything going absolutely smoothly and wait till the very last moment I think they have only themselves to blame if they should find that something has happened which was unexpected but which ought to be reckoned with, and are not entitled in such circumstances to the indulgence of the Court.”
9. It follows that the appellant had made default in making the third deposit, and the Court is incompetent to extend the time fixed by consent of the parties for making the deposit.
10. The decision of the Court below was, therefore, right.
11. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
12. V. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.
KC/V.S.B
13. Appeal dismissed.
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