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Sukhdeo Kumar v. State Of Bihar And Others Opposite Parties.

Patna High Court

Feb 14, 1959

Judgment

Subsequent
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Sukhdeo Kumar, filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash an order dated 30-4-1958 of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, Bihar. The impugned order had allowed an appeal and set aside an order of the Regional Transport Authority that fixed timings for various operators on the Purnea–Rupauli route. The petitioner contended that the Appeal Board lacked jurisdiction because Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act did not provide a right of appeal against an order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing timings of arrival and departure of stage carriages. The court heard submissions on this jurisdictional issue, as well as related points concerning the effect of an amendment to Section 48 and the availability of revision under Section 64A of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an appeal lies under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act from an order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the timings of arrival and departure of stage carriages (i.e., whether the State Transport Authority / its Appeal Board had jurisdiction to set aside such an order).
Whether the amendment made to Section 48 by Act 100 of 1956 changed the legal position so as to confer jurisdiction on the State Transport Authority or its Appeal Board to hear appeals against timing orders fixed by the Regional Transport Authority.
Whether, alternatively, the order of the Appeal Board can be sustained as an order in revision under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether the Appeal Board's decision could be treated as an exercise of the revisionary power of the State Transport Authority).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The Appeal Board's order is without jurisdiction because Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not provide a right of appeal against an order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing timings of arrival and departure of stage carriages.
The present case is governed by the ratio decidendi of Phulchand Ram v. State of Bihar (Misc. Judl. Case No. 163 of 1957, Dated 14-1-1959 (Pat)), where a similar point was decided against the availability of such an appeal.
Support was also drawn from the decisions in Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala Mudaliar (AIR 1952 Mad 545) and Jairamdas v. Regional Transport ((S) AIR 1957 Raj 312) to the same effect.

Opposite Party No. 4's Arguments

An amendment to Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act made by Act 100 of 1956 changed the language and therefore required reconsideration of the jurisdictional question.
Alternatively, the State Transport Authority could have exercised revisionary jurisdiction under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Appeal Board's order could be supported as a revisionary order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Phulchand Ram v. State of Bihar, Misc. Judl. Case No. 163 of 1957, Dated 14-1-1959 (Pat)	Held that the State Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to set aside on appeal an order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing timings of stage carriage services.	The court held the present case was governed by the principle laid down in this judgment and applied that principle to conclude the Appeal Board lacked jurisdiction.
Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala Mudaliar, AIR 1952 Mad 545 (Division Bench: Rajamannar, C.J. and Venkatarama Iyer, J.)	Principle that timings fixed by the Regional Transport Authority at grant of permit are not conditions of the permit; regulation of timings is a power exercised in the public interest and is not a condition attracting appeal under the permit provisions.	The court relied on the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. (as quoted in the opinion) and held there was no material difference after the amendment to Section 48; the Madras decision fully applies and supports the conclusion that an appeal under Section 64 against timing orders is not maintainable.
Jairamdas v. Regional Transport, (S), AIR 1957 Raj 312 (Full Bench)	Referenced as a decision addressing similar points concerning the jurisdiction to interfere with Regional Transport Authority timings.	The court cited this decision as one of the authorities governing the present case and treated it as supporting the principle that the State Transport Authority lacks jurisdiction to set aside timing orders on appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal analytical strands aligned with the issues raised:

Analysis of Section 48 (pre- and post-amendment):
- The court compared the language of Section 48 before and after the amendment made by Act 100 of 1956 (the opinion reproduces the pre-amendment text and the post-amendment S.48(3) text) and concluded there was "no material difference" between the amended and unamended versions for the purposes of the legal question in issue.
- The court relied heavily on the reasoning of the Madras Division Bench in AIR 1952 Mad 545 (Rajamannar, C.J.), quoted at length, which held that timings fixed by the Regional Transport Authority at the time of the grant of a permit are not “conditions” of the permit and that the power to regulate timings is exercised in the public interest rather than as a permit condition that attracts appeal under permit provisions.
- On that basis the court concluded that the precedent authority applied and that Section 64 did not provide a right of appeal against an RTA order fixing timings — in short, an appeal against such an order is not maintainable under Section 64.
Analysis of Section 64A (revision argument):
- Opposite party No. 4 argued that the State Transport Authority could have exercised revisionary jurisdiction under Section 64A and that the Appeal Board's order could be supported on that basis.
- The court rejected this argument because the statutory power of revision is vested in the State Transport Authority itself, whereas the impugned decision was made by an Appeal Board constituted under rule 71 of the State Rules framed under Section 41. The constitution (membership/quorum) of the State Transport Authority when sitting to exercise revision (as set out under rule 41) differs from the constitution of the Appeal Board which heard the appeal under Section 64.
- Because of this difference in constitution and statutory allocation of powers, the court found it impossible to treat the Appeal Board's order as an order in revision passed under Section 64A. Consequently the Section 64A argument could not sustain the Appeal Board's decision.
Synthesis and conclusion:
- Applying the authorities (including Phulchand Ram, the Madras Division Bench decision, and the Rajasthan Full Bench decision), and given the court's view that the amendment to Section 48 did not alter the legal position relevant to this question, the court concluded that the Appeal Board did not have jurisdiction to set aside the Regional Transport Authority's timing order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the petition and issued a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226, quashing the order of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, Bihar, dated 30-4-1958. The application was allowed and the hearing fee of Rs. 100 was directed to be paid by opposite party No. 4.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the Appeal Board's order setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's timings for the Purnea–Rupauli route is quashed; the Regional Transport Authority's order fixing timings stands unimpaired by that Appeal Board decision.
The court explicitly relied on prior decisions (Phulchand Ram, Kali Mudaliar, Jairamdas) and concluded those authorities govern the present case; the opinion does not claim to lay down a new precedent beyond applying existing authorities.
The opinion rejects treating an Appeal Board order as an exercise of revision under Section 64A where the tribunal making the order is not constitutionally the same body as the State Transport Authority which has statutory revisionary power; the decision therefore underscores a separation between appeal bodies created by rules and the statutory body vested with revisionary jurisdiction under Section 64A.
No broader implications or expansions of law beyond the application of the cited authorities are discussed in the opinion; the ruling operates to grant relief to the petitioner by quashing the specific Appeal Board order complained of.

Disposition: Application allowed. (Signature/initials in the opinion: D.H.Z.)

Show all summary ...

1. This application is made on behalf of the petitioner, Sukhdeo Kumar, for grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for calling up and quashing the order of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, dated 30-4-1958, by which the Appeal Board allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing timings for various operators on the Purnea-Rupauli route. It was submitted by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that the order of the Appeal Board is without jurisdiction because there was no right of appeal provided under Section 64 of the Motor Vehices Act against the order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the timings of arrival and departure of stage carriages. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that this case is governed by the ratio decidendi of the decision of this High Court in Phulchand Ram v. State of Bihar, Misc. Judl. Case No. 163 of 1957, D/- 14-1-1959 (Pat) where an exactly similar point of law arose and in which it was held that the State Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to set aside on appeal an order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the timings of arrival and departure of stage carriage service.

2. Learned Counsel also referred in support of his argument to the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J and Venkatarama Iyer, J. in Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala Mudaliar, AIR 1952 Mad 545 and also to the decision of a Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Jairamdas v. Regional Transport, (S), AIR 1957 Raj 312. On behalf of opposite party No. 4 it was contended, however, by Mr. Baldeva Sahai that there has been an amendment of Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act by Act 100 of 1956, and as there is a change of language between the amended and unamended section, the point requires further consideration. We do not accept this argument as right. Section 48 of the Act as it stood before the amendment made by Act 100 of 1956 was in the following terms:

“48. Power to restrict the number of stage carriages and impose conditions, on stage carriage permits. — A Regional Transport Authority may, after consideration of the matters set forth in sub-s. (1) of S. 47,—

(a) limit the number of stage carriages or stage carriages of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or any specified route within the region;

(b) issue a stage carriage permit in respect of a particular stage carriage or a particular service of stage carriages;

(d) attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one or more of the following conditions, namely:—

(i) that the service specified in the permit shall be commenced not latter than a specified date and be continued for a specified period;

(ii) that the service may be varied only in accordance with specified conditions;

(iia) that the stage carriage or stage carriages shall be used only on specified routes or in a specified area;

(iii) that copies of the fare table and time table shall be exhibited on the stage carriage and that the fare table and time table so exhibited shall be observed;

(iv) that not more than a specified number of passengers and not more than a specified amount of luggage shall be carried on any specified vehicle at one time;

(v) that within municipal limits and in such other areas and places as may be prescribed passengers shall not be taken up or set down at or except at specified points; or

(vi) that tickets shall be issued to passengers for the fares paid.”

3. After the amendment S. 48(3) reads as follows:

“48. (3) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a service of stage carriage of a specified description or for one or more particular stage carriages and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Art. attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely:

(i) that the service or any specified part thereof shall be commenced with effect from the specified date;

(ii) the minimum and maximum number of daily services to be maintained in relation to any route services to be maintained in relation to any occasions;

(iii) that copies of the time-table of the service or of particular stage cranage approved by the Regional Transport Authority shall be exhibited on the vehicles and at specified stands and halts on the route or within the area;

(iv) that the service shall be operated within such margins of deviation from the approved time table as the Regional Transport Authority may from, time to time specify;

(v) that within municipal limits and such other areas and places as may be prescribed passengers of goods shall not be taken up or set upon except at specified points;

4. In our opinion, there is no material difference between the language of the amended and the unamended S. 48 so far as the point of law arising in this case is concerned, and the decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1952 Mad 545, fully applies to the present case. At page 548 of the report Rajamannar, C.J states in the course of his judgment:

“In our opinion, the time fixed by the Regional Transport Authority at the time of the grant of the permit is not one of the conditions of the permit. The sections above referred to clearly indicate what is meant by a condition attached to a stage carriage permit. Section 59(3) mentions the conditions which should be attached to every permit and S. 48 (3) gives power to the Regional Transport Authority to attach to a permit any one or more of the conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (vi) of S. 48(d). There may be also other conditions, but they should be in pari materia with the conditions mentioned above. The Regional Transport Authority is given the power to regulate the timings of arrival and departure of stage carriages whether they belong to a single owner or several owners. This power to regulate has nothing to do with the grant of the permit to individual owners. It is a comprehensive power conferred on the authority to be exercised in the interests of the general public. The only condition in this matter would be a condition that the timings as fixed from time to time should be exhibited on the stage carriage and the timing so exhibited should be observed. For a breach of any of these conditions, a permit may be cancelled, under S. 60 of the Act. We think, therefore, S. 48-A, has no application to this case, because there has been no variation, cancellation or addition to any condition attached to a stage carriage permit. It is only if there is any variation of a condition that clause (b) of that section would apply. Clause (f) also has no application. It cannot be said that the first respondent is a person who had opposed the grant of a permit. It is true that S. 208 (sic) provides that if there is an application for the variation of the permit which would authorise transport facilities materially different from those attached to the original perimic, the procedure to be followed is the same as that prescribed for considering applications for permit; but we do think that because this procedure applies, the person opposing an application for variation could be deemed to be a person opposing the grant of a permit within S. 64(f). We must, therefore, hold that an appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority changing the timings to the Central Road Traffic Board was not maintainable.”

5. It follows, therefore, that the present case is governed by the principle of law laid down by us in Misc. Judl. Case No. 163 of 1957, D/- 14-1-1959 (Pat) & also by the decisions of the Madras High Court in AIR 1952 Mad 545 and of the Rajasthan High Court in (S) AIR 1957 Raj 312.

6. There was also another point taken on behalf of the opposite party No. 4 that under the provisions of Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act the State Transport Authority could have made an order in revision against the order of the Regional Transport Authority. Section 64A of the Act reads as follows:

“64A. Revision. — The, State Transport Authority may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to the case as deems fit:

Provided that the State Transport Authority shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by any order of a Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order:

Provided further that the State Transport Authority shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

7. It was, therefore, contended that the order which is challenged by the petitioner in this case could be, supported by a reference to the power conferred under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. We do not consider that this argument is right. The reason is that the appeal preferred under S. 64A (sic) in the present case was heard by the Chairman and two members constituting the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority under rule 71 of the Rules framed by the State Government under S. 41 of the Act; but the power of revision is given under the Act to the State Transport Authority, and under rule 41 the quorum fixed for any meeting of State Transport Authority is one-third of the total number of members, or ???, whichever is greater.

8. It is obvious, therefore, that the constitution of the authority which hears the revision is different from the constitution of the Appeal Board which has heard and decided the appeal under S. 64 of the Act. It is therefore, impossible for us to hold that the order of the Appeal board of the State Transport Authority in the present case is by some fiction of law an order in revision passed under S. 64A of the Act. The argument of learned Counsel for opposite party No. 4 on this point is, therefore, rejected.

9. For these reasons we hold that this application must be allowed and a writ in the nature of certiorari should be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, Bihar, dated 30-4-1958. We accordingly allow this application. Hearing fee Rs. 100 payable by opposite party No. 4.

D.H.Z

10. Application allowed.