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Lachmi Koeri v. The State Of Bihar .

Patna High Court
Aug 4, 1959
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Lachhmi Koeri, was convicted by the Sessions Judge of Patna under Section 302 of the Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. The deceased, Havildar Daud Khan, and Constable Sunderdeo Kuer were attached to the Sultanganj Police Station. A case under Sections 457 and 380 of the Penal Code was registered against unknown persons, and the appellant was suspected in connection with that case. On 24-1-1957, Havildar Daud Khan and Constable Sunderdeo were deputed to arrest the appellant. Upon attempting arrest, a scuffle ensued during which the appellant inflicted fatal injuries on the havildar with a chhoora (knife). The havildar died shortly after being taken to the hospital. The appellant was arrested later that day in possession of the chhoora. The appellant filed an appeal against his conviction and a rule for enhancement of sentence was also issued. Both matters were heard together in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant was guilty of murder under Section 302 of the Penal Code for causing the death of Havildar Daud Khan.
  2. Whether the appellant had a right of private defence against the havildar and if so, whether he exceeded that right to the extent of committing murder.
  3. Whether the procedure for arrest was lawful, specifically compliance with Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding written orders for arrest.
  4. Whether the sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate or whether it should be enhanced.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • There was no case under Sections 457 and 380 of the Penal Code against the appellant, and the prosecution case in this regard was false.
  • The appellant was attacked and mercilessly beaten by an unidentified man before he used a knife in self-defence.
  • The appellant had the right of private defence as the arresting officers did not comply with the requirements of Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including the absence of a written order for arrest.
  • The appellant only inflicted injuries in defence and did not intend to cause more harm than necessary.
  • There were discrepancies and criticisms of the prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding their presence and reliability.

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The appellant was suspected and wanted in connection with a case under Sections 457 and 380 of the Penal Code, and proper procedures were followed for his arrest.
  • Four eyewitnesses and supporting police witnesses reliably identified the appellant as the assailant who caused the death of the havildar.
  • The appellant exceeded the right of private defence, as evidenced by the number and severity of injuries inflicted on the havildar, including fatal wounds inflicted while the havildar was helpless.
  • The arresting officers were deputed lawfully, and the fardbeyan was recorded at the place of occurrence contrary to the appellant's claims.
  • The injuries on the appellant were mostly received after his arrest, not during the scuffle, undermining the claim of excessive self-defence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Section 33 of the Evidence Act Admissibility of evidence of a witness not available for examination in Sessions Court The Court ignored the evidence of a witness admitted under this section because he was not examined in the Sessions Court.
Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Requirement of written order for arrest and notification to the person arrested The Court found that the arresting officers did not have a written order and thus did not comply with the procedural requirements.
Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Power of police officer to arrest without warrant under certain circumstances The Court held that none of the conditions justifying warrantless arrest were present in this case.
Section 99 of the Penal Code Right of private defence against acts of public servants The Court explained that the appellant did not know the havildar was a public servant and thus initially had the right of private defence.
Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Penal Code Exceeding the right of private defence without intention to cause more harm than necessary The Court held that the appellant exceeded his right of private defence with clear intention to cause more harm than necessary, leading to murder conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the evidence of eyewitnesses and police officials, finding the four eyewitnesses reliable and their testimony consistent. It rejected the appellant's claims of discrepancies and the suggestion that the arrest was unlawful due to lack of written order under Section 50 CrPC, noting that while the order was not in writing, the arresting officers were deputed by the Sub-Inspector who suspected the appellant in a pending case. The Court held that the appellant initially had a right of private defence because he did not know the havildar was a public servant, as the havildar was not in uniform. However, the Court found that the appellant exceeded this right by inflicting multiple severe and fatal injuries, including nine incised wounds, some delivered while the havildar was helpless. The injuries on the appellant were mostly received after his arrest, not during the scuffle, negating the argument that he was excessively defending himself. The Court concluded that the appellant's intention was to cause more harm than necessary for defence and thus upheld the conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code. Regarding sentencing, the Court acknowledged the appellant's initial right of private defence and the difficulty of making a balanced judgment at the moment but held that life imprisonment was adequate and declined to enhance the sentence.

Holding and Implications

The Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Penal Code and affirmed the sentence of life imprisonment. The appeal was dismissed and the rule for enhancement of sentence discharged. The decision confirms that while a right of private defence may initially exist, it does not extend to causing fatal injuries when the defender clearly exceeds the necessary force. The Court emphasized adherence to procedural requirements for arrest but recognized that failure to comply with formalities does not automatically negate criminal liability if other conditions are met. No broader precedent was set beyond the application of established principles regarding private defence and procedural lapses in arrest.

Show all summary ...

Sahai, J.:— The Sessions Judge of Patna has convicted appellant Lachhmi Koeri under S. 302 of the Penal Code and his sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. This Court issued notice to the appellant to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced if the conviction is upheld. The appeal filed by the appellant and the rule for enhancement have been heard together and this judgment will dispose of both.

2. Deceased Havildar Daud Khan was attached to Sultanganj Police Station of Patna town on 24-1-1957, and so was constable Sunderdeo Kuer (P.W 2). The prosecution case is as follows:

On 9-1-1957, a case under Ss. 457 and 380 of the Penal Code, being Sultanganj police station case No. 4(1)57, was registered against unknown persons. In the course of investigation of that case, the officer in charge of the Police Station, Nasiruddin Ahmad Mallik (P.W 22), suspected the appellant's participation in the occurrence. As the appellant could not be found and arrested on search, he prayed to the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Patna City to issue a warrant of arrest and also processes under Sections 87 and 88 of the Cr PC against the appellant. Before the warrant could, however, be issued, N.A Mallick (P.W 22) learnt some thing about the appellant. He then deputed havildar Daud Khan and constable Sunderdeo Kuer to arrest him. Station Diary entry No. 444 (Ext. 1/2) shows that the deputation was made at 8-10 a.m on 24-1-1957.

3. It is further alleged that havildar Daud Khan and constable Sunderdeo Kuer were proceeding upon the Dargah road when they saw the appellant coming out of a toddy shop. They chased him and he ran towards the west. The havildar was ahead of the constable and he managed to catch him at a short distance from the toddy shop. There was a scuffle between the havildar and the appellant in the course of which the appellant's shirt was tom. The appellant then took out a chhoora from his waist and gave a blow with it on the havildar's arm. The havildar fell down in a nala by the side of the road, while still holding the appellant who fell on him. The appellant then gave several blows to the havildar, got out of the nala and fled towards the south. Constable Sunderdeo attempted to catch him but he threatened that he would stab him also with his chhoora. It is said that this happened at 8-30 a.m While the appellant was running away, constables, Rahamatullah (P.W 4) and Chandrika Singh (P.W 18), arrieved there from Mosallahpur that where they had gone to purchase vegetables. They took out havildar with the help of constable Sunderdeo from the nala. Rahamatullah then took the havildar on a rickshaw to the Patna General Hospital, arriving there at 9-18 a.m as shown by the O.D slip (Ext. 2/1). It appears that the havildar died very shortly afterwards because Dr. Syed Hasan Mazid (P.W 20) made a note (Ext. 10) on the bed head ticket of the havildar at 9-35 a.m that he was dead.

4. In the meantime, constable Sunderdeo rang up the Sultanganj Police Station at 9-10 a.m from somewhere close to the place of occurrence and gave information about the occurrence. This was recorded in station diary entry No. 445 (Ext. 1/3) and Sub-Inspector Mallick (P.W 22) immediately left the Police Station along with Assistant Sub-Inspector Sheomangal Prasad Singh (P.W 11) and others for the place of occurrence. They arrived there at about 9-30 a.m and immediately. P.W 11 recorded the fardbeyan (Ext. 6/1) on the statement of Sunderdeo at the instance of the Sub-Inspector. After the fardebeyan was recorded, the Assistant Sub-Inspector went to the Police Station under the orders of the Sub-Inspector who continued to investigate the case at the spot. Station diary entry No. 449 (Ext. 1/1) shows that the Assistant Sub-Inspector returned to the Police Station at 10-15 a.m After instituting the present case which was Sultanganj Police Station case No. 8(1) 57, the Assistant Sub-Inspector alerted other police station about the occurrence and deputed 11 constables including constables, Ramdayal Singh (P.W 9). and Chuman Pathak (P.W 10) to go to different places watch for the appellant and arrest him, if found.

5. P.Ws 9 and 10 happened to be standing in front of Mithapur town out post, outside the Patna Junction Railway Station, at about 12-30 p.m when they saw the appellant passing by. They immediately chased him and arrested him near the taxi stand at a short distance to the southeast of the town out post and he had a chhoora in his possession. They took him after arrest to the out post and thereafter sent information on the phone to Sultanganj police station. The information was received there at 1-30 p.m and entry No. 450 (Ext. 1/5) was made in the station diary of that police station at that very time. The Assistant Sub-Inspector (P.W 11) immediately started on a Police truck for Mithapur town out most. He took the appellant from the out post to Sultanganj police station, arriving there at 2-10 p.m This has been recorded in station diary entry No. 452 (Ext. 1/6).

6. Sub-Inspector Mallick (P.W 22) investigated the case and after completing investigation, he submitted the charge sheet on 23-3-1957.

7. In his examination under S. 342 of the Code, the appellant merely said in answer to almost all questions that he would file a written statement. Subsequently a long written statement was filed on his behalf. It is, in fact, a written argument, and all kinds of trifling discrepancies in the evidence have been pointed out, in it. The positive defence which has been taken is contained in paragraphs 15 to 25 which are as follows:

“15. That on the date alleged near the alleged P.O the accused was suddenly caught and mercilessly stamped(?) by a stout and sturdy man wearing a lungi and a white ganji whom he could not identify.

16. That the accused wanted to free himself from his grip but by that time the accused was forced down on the earth and was continuously being beaten by fists on face and nose and by knee all over the body including the stomach.

17. That the accused felt unbearable pain.

18. That unable to free himself and apprehending that death will be the only consequence of such an assault the accused was forced to use a knife against his assailant.

20. That to free himself the accused gave a few knife blow's on the hand of the aforesaid man.

21. That the assailant snatched the knife and caused injury to the accused and during the snatching the assailant also caused injury to himself, probably somewhere in the edge by that time the accused was also getting senseless.

22. The only thing that the accused remembers afterwards is that he found himself free from the clutches of the assailant and after going a little distance fell senseless.

23. That after recovering sense the accused found himself in custody.

24. That the assailant did not disclose his identity at the time of catching the accused and was wearing a lungi and white ganji.

25. That the accused while in jail learnt that his assailant was Havaldar and his name was Daud Khan.”

8. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, the first point which Mr. Ramnandan Sahay Sinha has urged is that there was no case under Ss. 457 and 880 of the Penal Code against the appellant and that the prosecution case in this connection is false. In my opinion, there is no substance in this argument. The Sub-Inspector (P.W 22) has clearly said that a case under Ss. 457 and 380 was instituted in his police station on 9-1-1957, that it was originally investigated by the Assistant Sub-Inspector and that subsequently he himself took over charge of its Investigation. He has admitted that the first information report of that case was against unknown persons but he wanted to arrest the appellant as he suspected him. He appears to have brought the case diary of that case to the Court when he was giving his evidence but he has not been cross examined in relation to the contents of that diary.

9. The Assistant Sub-Inspector (P.W 11) has supported the Sub-Inspector. He has said that the appellant was wanted in Sultanganj police station case No. 4(1) 57 and hence havildar Daud Khan and constable Sunderdeo were deputed on 24-1-1957, to arrest him. The warrant (Ext. 12) for the arrest of the appellant appears to have been issued by the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Patna City on 24th January, i.e on the same date on which the occurrence is alleged to have taken place in the morning. In these circumstances, I have no doubt that the appellant was suspected in case No. 4(1) 57 and the Sub-Inspector (P.W 22) wished to arrest him or to get him arrested in connection with that case. I further accept the prosecution case that havildar Daud Khan and constable Sunderdeo were deputed at 8-10 a.m on 24-1-1957 to arrest the appellant.

10. The next question is whether the occurrence took place as alleged by the prosecution. Four witnesses have deposed as eye witnesses. They are Sunderdeo (P.W 2), Bhuar Dusadh (P.W 5), Jangli Mian (P.W 7) and Saddique Mian (P.W 8). One Gobardhan Chamar also deposed as an eye witness in the Committing Magistrate's Court but he was not available for examination in the Sessions Court. Hence his evidence was admitted under Section 33 of the Evidence Act, but the learned Sessions Judge has ignored his evidence and I also do not propose to refer to it. It has to be considered, however, whether the four eye witnesses have given reliable evidence. Mr. Sinha has criticised all of them and I propose to discuss his criticisms as also other points in order to decide whether their evidence can be accepted.

11. Mr. Sinha has urged that Sunderdeo (P.W 2) did not see the occurrence because he was not there at all. He has first pointed out that this witness himself stated before the Committing Magistrate that he and the havildar were at about 500 yards from the appellant when they saw him. I do not see how this statement helps the appellant because the consistent evidence of P.W 2 is that he and the havildar ran to catch the accused and that the havildar, who was a little ahead of him, caught him. Mr. Sinha has next pointed out that P.W 7 stated before the Committing Magistrate that he did not see any constable during the time of assault and that constables came there after the assault.

12. No importance can be attached to this statement because the mere fact that he did not notice constable Sunderdeo at the time of the assault cannot be taken to mean that Sunderdeo was not there at all. P.Ws 2 and 5 have stated that P.W 2 was there and the presence of P.W 2 at the place of occurrence has also been proved by other witnesses, including constables Rahamatuallha (P.W 4) and Chandrika (P.W 18), P.W 4 did not state in his examination-in-chief what Sunderdeo told him but it was elicited from him in cross examination that Sunderdeo said that he and the havildar had come and that the havildar was assaulted by the appellant with chhoora.

13. Mr. Sinha has also urged that there is a discrepancy in the evidence of P.W 2 which shows that he did not actually see the occurrence. The discrepancy arises like this. In the first information report, P.W 2 stated that he and the havildar found Lachhmi drinking toddy in a toddy shop. In the Committing Magistrate's Court, he stated that he did not see the appellant taking toddy in a toddy shop, but saw him coming out of a toddy shop. In the Sessions Court again, he stated that he saw the appellant taking toddy. In cross examination in the Sessions Court, he made the position clear. He has stated that he cannot say which of the two toddy shops the appellant came out of and that all that he saw was that the appellant started fleeing after coming out of a toddy shop. In my opinion, the discrepancy is absolutely immaterial because, when one sees a person coming out of a toddy shop, one may say figuratively that the man was drinking toddy.

14. Bhuar Dusadh (P.W 5) is a sweeper working under the Municipal Corporation. The only criticism advanced against him is that he has first stated that he was filling up ditches on the road but has later admitted that he was filling up ditches in the land of a Municipal Commissioner. The Municipal Commissioner's land may have been by the side of the road and this apparent contradiction may be due to that fact. He has not been asked how far the Municipal Commissioner's land is from the road. It has been suggested that these witnesses have come forward to give evidence at the instance of a man named Dr. Ainul Haq. The only connection which the Doctor appears to have had with this case is that he was found sitting in the Committing Magistrate's Court at a time when P.W 2 was being cross examined there. There is no evidence at sill to show that he is inimical towards the appellant, or in fact, that he has any interest in this case. Abdul Shakur (P.W 6) admits that he is a step brother of Dr. Ainul Haq. But the mere fact that he is related to the Doctor cannot go to support the defence case that Dr. Ainul Haq has been manipulating evidence in this case.

15. Jangli Mian (P.W 7) is a rickshaw driver. He says that he happened to be near the place of occurrence in his rickshaw and that he, therefore, saw it. Then; seems to be no reason for him to have given false evidence against the appellant. The criticism against him is that he has not been named in the first information report and that he do not appear to have been one of those witnesses who were examined by the Sub-Inspector (P.W 22) at the place of occurrence. This criticism is correct, but I do not think that it is sufficient to enable me to throw out his evidence, specially when he appears to be quite a disinterested witness.

16. Saddique Mian (P.W 8) is also an employee of the Municipal Corporation. No criticism has been levelled against him except that he is a co-employee of the Corporation with Bhuar Dusadh (P.W 5). It is not possible to discard his evidence on that account.

17. Having carefully considered the evidence of the 4 alleged eye witnesses, I hold that they are perfectly reliable and that they have given a true version of the occurrence. Their evidence receives considerable support from the evidence of constables Rahamatullah (P.W 4) and Chandrika (P.W 18) who arrived in time to see the appellant fleeing away and the havildar lying in the nala with serious and bleeding injuries on his person.

18. Mr. Sinha has put forward the argument that the fardbeyan does not appear to have been recorded at the place of occurrence as alleged by the Sub-Inspector and the Assistant Sub-Inspector as Well as other witnesses. In support of this argument, he has relied upon some statements which constable Chandrika Singh (P.W 18) has made. He has rated that he and Sunderdeo (P.W 2) went, to the thana from the place of occurrence, that the Sub-Inspector was not there at that time, that he did not meet the Sub-Inspector and the Assistant Sub-Inspector at tile place of occurrence and that he remained in the police station from 9 a.m to 5 p.m

19. It sems to me that he has made these statements because he has a weak memory and he could? not remember what actually happened. The evidence of the Sub-Inspector, the Assistant Sub-Inspector and constable Sunderdeo is just to the contrary. P.W 5 has stated that the Sub-Inspector arrived at the place of occurrence within a short time after the occurrence. P.W 6 has stated that the police came to the place of occurrence and prepared seizure lists of the blood and the articles fallen there. P.W 12 arrived at the place of occurrence after hearing about the occurrence. He says that he saw two constables at the place of occurrence before the arrival of the Sub-Inspector and that the constables were in their uniforms.

20. He obviously refers to constables Sunderdeo and Chandrika. The Sub-Inspector says that he examined both these constables at the place of occurrence. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, hold that constable Chandrika has made some statements which are not correct and that he has made them on account of failure of memory. I have not the slightest doubt that, as deposed by the Sub-Inspector and the Assistant Sub-Inspector, the fardbeyan was recorded by the Assistant Sub-Inspector (P.W 11) at the place of occurrence on the statement of Sunderdeo.

21. In view of the evidence of identification given by the eye witnesses as well as P.Ws 4 and 18. There cannot be any doubt about the identity of the appellant as being the assailant of havildar Daud. The fact that the occurrence took place between the appellant and the havildar is also admitted in that part of the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant which I have quoted above. It is also in evidence that a fountain pen (Ext. I), a muffler (Ext. II) and a booklet of songs (Ext. Ill) belonging to the appellant fell at the place of occurrence during the scuffle between him and the havildar. P.W 12 has said that he saw the appellant at 8 a.m on the same morning with the muffler (Ext. II) round his neck. In my opinion, there is not much importance in the identification of the articles, Exts. I, II and III, and their identification as belonging to the appellant supports the other evidence to a very small extent.

22. On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case and the entire evidence on record I hold that the occurrence took place in the manner alleged by the prosecution and that it was the appellant who caused injuries to the Havildar with a chhoora.

23. The next question is whether the appellant had a right of private defence. Mr. Sinha has argued that he had. There seems to be some substance in this argument. The Sub-Inspector deputed the havildar and the constable to arrest the appellant but he did not comply with the requirements of S. 50 of the Code. In accordance with the provisions of that section, he should have given an order in writing to them but he did not do so. If he had given an order in writing, the havildar would have been required to notify to the appellant before his arrest a substance of that order.

24. As there was no order in writing, this could I also not be complied with. S. 54 empowers any police officer to make an arrest without warrant but none of the circumstances mentioned in it appears to have been present, so as to entitled the havildar to arrest the appellant without warrant. Constable Sunderdeo has stated that he was not told in connection with what particular case the appellant was to be arrested nor was he told about any particular crime. Neither he nor the havildar appears to have had any credible information or reasonable suspicion against the appellant. The Sub-Inspector also does not say that he gave any information about any case to them at the time of deputing them to arrest the appellant. In view of these facts, it is perfectly clear that the havildar was not acting strictly in accordance with law in arresting or attempting to arrest the appellant.

25. The question still remains whether the appellant had a right of private defence against the havildar who was a public servant. Section 99 of the Penal Code provides that ‘no right of private defence’ is available ‘against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done,’ by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law'. Explanation 1 of that section reads:

“A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.”

There is no evidence in this case whatsoever to show that the appellant knew the havildar from before the date of occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge has assumed from the fact that the appellant started running away on seeing the havildar and the constable that he must have known both. The evidence, on record, however, shows that the havildar was not in uniform. P.W 5 has said that the havildar had a sarkari ganji and a lungi and nothing else on his person.

26. P.W 8 has stated that the havildar was not in uniform. The letter (Ext. 11) written by Dr. Mazid (P.W 20) to the Sub-Inspector of Sultanganj police station shows that the clothes which were taken out of the person of the havildar consisted of one shirt, one woollen sweater, one lungi and one ganji. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the havildar was not in uniform. On the other hand, P.W 8 states that the constables were in uniform. Constable Sunderdeo, therefore, appears to have been in his uniform. It may be that the appellant saw his uniform and therefore, started running away. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned Sessions Judge's view. As there is nothing to show that the appellant knew that the man who had caught him was a havildar of police and a public servant. I do not think he can be held to have been deprived of his right of private defence. In my opinion, there is no doubt that he initially had the right of private defence.

27. It is clear from the evidence that the appellant could not entertain any fear of grievous hurt or death from the havildar. The question which arises is whether he can be held to have merely exceeded, the right of private defence in committing the murder. Exception 2 to S. 300 of the Penal Code reads:

“Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.”

28. In my opinion, it cannot be held in the circumstances of this case that the appellant had no intention of doing more harm than was necessary for the purpose of his defence. The evidence of P.Ws 2, 7 and 8 shows that the first blow given with a chhoora by the appellant to the havildar fell on the havildar's forearm. Immediately on receiving that blow, the havildar fell in the nala. The evidence of all the eye witnesses shows that the havildar was holding the appellant when he fell and that the appellant also fell on him in the nala and thereafter the appellant gave him incessant blows with his chhoora. As a result, no less than 9 incised injuries were caused to the havildar. Dr. Hussain (P.W 16) found all of them on the upper part of the body, some being on the face. The most serious injury was injury No. 8, described as follows:

“One oblique incised penetrating wound 1½′ × 1/2′ cranial cavity in the left eye-lid extending from its middle to the inner end of the eye. The external axis of the wound was directed abovewards and inwards.”

The doctor has further stated:

“On dissection of injury No. 8, the muscles of the eye-balls and soft tissues at the upper and inner part of the left eye were cut. The left nasal bone was found fractured. The left tissues of the orbit above the eye-ball were cut and ecchymosed. The eye-ball was intact. The left orbital plate of the frontal bone was fractured and perforated 3/4′ × 1/2′ half of inner end of the under surface of the left frontal lobe of the brain and 2½′ of the front of the right frontal lobe (under surface) was cut and about 2 1/4′ deep.”

29. In view of the injuries caused. I am perfectly satisfied that the appellant intended to cause very much more harm than was necessary for his defence; in fact, he appears to have inflicted most of the injuries including the fatal one at a time when the havildar was lying helpless under him. Mr. Sinha has argued that the appellant's right of private defence extended to the causing of all those injuries because he himself was found to have a number of injuries on his person and he received them at the time of his scuttle with the havildar. It is true that the appellant had a number of injuries on his person when he was examined at 4-15 p.m on the date of occurrence i.e 24-1-1957. Dr. L.K Thakur (P.W 17) examined him at that time. He has described the number of abrasions and bruises which he found upon the appellant's person. The appellant was again examined by the Jail Doctor (P.W 19) on the same date at 10 p.m He says that he found signs of bleeding from the nose and multiple bruises and abrasions all over the appellant's body. He also found the appellant's upper and lower lips swollen.

30. Randayal Singh (P.W 9), who was one of the constables who arrested the appellant, has stated that the appellant was severely assaulted by members of the public after his arrest which was effected after dhakha dhukki and use of force. The Assistant Sub-Inspector (P.W 11), who went to Mithapur town out post shortly after the appellant's arrest, says that he found the appellant lying on the floor and that he was not speaking and was pretending to be senseless. It is also ordinarily seen that, when an offender is arrested, the members of the crowd who assemble assault him rather severely. There is, therefore, no reason to disbelieve the evidence of these two witnesses.

31. Dr. Thakur has stated that the injuries were fresh at the time of examination. Accordingly, I hold that, while the appellant may have received one or two abrasions at the time of scuffle with the havildar, he received most of the injuries found on his person later at the time of his arrest. Hence I am not prepared to accept Mr. Sinha's argument that the right of private defence available to the appellant extended to the causing of the injuries including the fatal injury which he caused to the havildar.

32. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances mentioned above, I have reached the conclusion that, while initially the appellant had the right of private defence, he does not come under Exception 2 to S. 300 and it cannot be held that his right of private defence extended upto the causing of the havildar's death. That being so and also because her obviously intended to cause a bodily injury to the havildar which was likely, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause his death, he is guilty under S. 30 of the Penal Code. I uphold his conviction under that section.

33. The last question which has to be considered is the question of sentence. Two considerations arise in this connection. The appellant had the right of private defence of person at the start.

34. He could not be expected to make a balanced judgment at the time and to desist from intentionally causing death. I am, therefore, of the view that the sentence of imprisonment for life is sufficient to meet the ends of justice in this case, I, therefore, affirm that sentence, dismiss the appeal and discharge the rule for enhancement.

35. Untwalia, J.:— I agree.

KC/D.H.Z

36. Order accordingly.