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Raghavacharya And Others v. Saligramcharya Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Additional District Judge of Bhagalpur, under Section 113 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), stated a case for the opinion of the High Court on whether the provisions of section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951) are void and inoperative. Section 48 (text reproduced in the opinion) authorises the Board, or a person interested (with the Board's prior sanction), to apply to the District Judge for orders including removal of a trustee, appointment of a new trustee, vesting property, directing accounts and inquiries, and that the District Judge's order under subsection (1) shall be final. The Additional District Judge considered these provisions unconstitutional because they make the District Judge's order final with no right of appeal. When the reference reached the High Court, counsel for the opposite party (Mr. G.P. Das) supported the view that section 48 was ultra vires for lack of any appellate remedy. The High Court framed and answered the reference and returned its opinion to the lower court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951) are constitutionally valid or are void and inoperative.
- Whether the absence of a statutory right of appeal from an order made by the District Judge under section 48(1) constitutes an unreasonable procedural restriction that infringes the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution (right to acquire, hold and dispose of property).
Arguments of the Parties
Additional District Judge's View
- The Additional District Judge considered section 48 of the Act to be unconstitutional because subsection (2) makes the District Judge's order final, providing no right of appeal to any higher authority.
Opposite Party's Arguments (Mr. G.P. Das)
- Supported the Additional District Judge's view and contended that section 48 is ultra vires because no right of appeal is provided against the District Judge's order, thereby infringing constitutional rights.
- Relied on precedent: the Supreme Court decision in Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa (1954 SCR 1046 : AIR 1954 SC 400), where sections were held invalid when an executive officer framed a scheme without judicial intervention.
- Also relied on this Court's decision in Jugal Kishore Bhadani v. Labour Commissioner, Bihar (1958 Pat LR 93 : AIR 1958 Pat 442), where provisions were held unconstitutional because the appellate authority was non-judicial and appeal rights were asymmetrically provided.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1046 : (AIR 1954 SC 400) | Sections invalid where an executive officer (not a judicial tribunal) framed a scheme for administration of endowed property and the order was final and conclusive — this was held to amount to an unreasonable restriction on the right of property, because there was no judicial intervention. | The Court distinguished this decision: the present Act vests the decision-making power in a District Judge (a judicial officer) who hears evidence. Therefore, the principle in that precedent—that executive settlement without judicial intervention is unconstitutional—does not apply to section 48 of the Bihar Act. |
| Jugal Kishore Bhadani v. Labour Commissioner, Bihar, 1958 Pat LR 93 : (AIR 1958 Pat 442) | Sub-sections held unconstitutional where the appellate authority was a non-judicial officer (Labour Commissioner) and appeal rights were asymmetrically granted (to employees but not to employers), resulting in infringement of Article 19(1)(g). | The Court held this case distinguishable: in the present matter the authority under section 48 is a judicial officer of high rank (District Judge), and the constitutional infirmities identified in Jugal Kishore Bhadani (non-judicial appellate authority and asymmetry) are not present here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court analysed the constitutionality of section 48 by focusing on the nature of the authority invested with decision-making power and the statutory safeguards limiting that power.
- On the absence of an appeal: The Court observed that mere absence of a statutory right of appeal from an order of the District Judge under section 48(1) is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the procedure imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f).
- On the character of the deciding authority: The Court emphasised that the power to remove or appoint a trustee under section 48(1) is conferred on a high judicial officer — a District Judge — rather than an executive authority. That distinction is central to the analysis because the involvement of a judicial officer provides procedural safeguards not present when an executive officer makes conclusive orders.
- On statutory limitations of power: The statute itself prescribes specific circumstances under which the power of removal must be exercised (for example, acting prejudicially to the trust, repeated defaults in payment, breach of trust). Thus, the power is not unrestricted or unfettered, and the statute contains principles guiding exercise of the power.
- On precedents relied upon by the opposing party: The Court considered the Supreme Court's decision in Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das, noting that the invalidation in that case turned on the fact that the scheme was settled by an executive officer without judicial intervention. Because section 48 places the decision with a judicial officer who hears evidence, that line of reasoning does not apply. Similarly, the Court distinguished Jugal Kishore Bhadani because that case involved a non-judicial appellate authority and asymmetry in appeal rights, which are not features of section 48.
- On reasonableness under Article 19(5): The Court rejected any attempt to lay down an abstract or universally applicable test of reasonableness. Instead, reasonableness must be judged with reference to the particular circumstances: the character of the right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the authority to whom decision-making power is given, and the character and status of that authority. The presence or absence of a right of appeal is a factor but not conclusive.
- Conclusion of analysis: Applying these considerations, the Court concluded that section 48 — being procedural in nature, conferring power on a judicial officer, and containing statutory restraints — does not impose an unreasonable restriction on the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's final answer to the reference is that the provisions of section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951) are constitutionally valid and operative. In other words, the Court held SECTION 48 CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
Implications:
- The absence of a statutory right of appeal from an order of the District Judge under section 48(1) does not, in the circumstances of this Act, amount to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f).
- The decision directly affects the parties to the reference: the records are to be sent back to the lower court with a copy of the High Court's opinion for further proceedings in accordance with law (the court directed that the record be remitted to the lower court).
- There will be no order as to costs in respect of the hearing of the reference.
- The opinion confines itself to the validity and operation of section 48 as presented; it does not purport to lay down a rigid or abstract test of reasonableness applicable to all future cases. The Court did not indicate any broader change to precedent beyond the distinctions drawn from cited authorities.
1. Under Section 113 of the CPC the Additional District Judge of Bhagalpur has stated a case for the opinion of the High Court on the question whether the provisions of section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951), are void and inoperative.
2. Section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951) is in the following terms:
“48. (1) The Board, or with the previous sanction of the Board, any person interested in a religious trust may make an application to the District Judge for an order—
(a) removing the trustee of such religious trust, if such trustee
(i) acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the said trust: or
(ii) defaults on three or more occasions in the payment of any amount payable under any law for the time being in force in respect of the property or income of the said trust or any other statutory charge on such property or income; or
(iii) Defaults on three or more occasions, in the payment of any sum payable to any beneficiary under the said trust, or in discharging any other duty imposed upon him under it; or
(iv) is guilty of a breach of trust;
(b) appointing a new trustee;
(c) vesting any property in a trustee;
(d) directing accounts and inquiries; or
(e) granting such further or other relief as the nature cl the case may require.
(2) The order of the District Judge under sub-section (1) shall be final.”
3. The view taken by the Additional District Judge is that the provisions of section 48 of the Act are unconstitutional because the order of the District Judge upon the application has been made final by section 48(2) of the Act and there is no right of appeal to the aggrieved party from the decision of the District Judge to any higher authority. When the reference was heard in this Court, Mr. G.P Das on behalf of the opposite party supported the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge and contended that the provisions of section 48 of the Act are ultra vires for the reason that no right of appeal is provided against the order of the District Judge to any higher judicial authority. In our opinion, the opinion expressed by the learned Additional District Judge is erroneous, and the provisions of section 48 of the Bihar Act 1 of 1951 must be held to be constitutionally valid and operative.
4. It is true that no right of appeal is provided from the order of the District Judge made under section 48(1) on the application of the Board or with the previous sanction of the Board by any person interested in a religious trust. The mere fact that the Act does not provide a right of appeal to an aggrieved party is not sufficient to show that from a procedural point of view there is an unreasonable restriction imposed on the fundamental right of the trustee of a religious trust under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
5. The reason is that the power of removing a trustee or appointing a new trustee under section 48(1) of the Act is conferred upon a high judicial officer of the status of a District Judge and not upon any executive authority. It is also to be noticed that the power of removing a trustee conferred by section 48(1) is not an unrestricted and unfettered power.
6. The statute specifies the circumstances in which the power of removal should be exercised by the District Judge. For instance, section 48(1)(a) provides that the power of removal may be exercised if a trustee acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the said trust, or defaults on three or more occasions in the payment of any amount payable under any law for the time being in force in respect of the property of the trust or any other statutory charge on such property.
7. It is manifest, therefore, that the statute contains the principle on which the power of removal of the trustee can be exercised, and, as we have already said, the power is to be exercised by an officer of the rank of a District Judge. We, therefore, hold that in the context of the object and purpose of the Act the absence of the provision of the right of appeal against the order of the District Judge under section 48 does not constitute any infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
8. Reference was made by Mr. G.P Das on behalf of the opposite party to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1046 : (AIR 1954 SC 400). In that case a question arose whether sections 38 and 39 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, as amended by the Amending Act II of 1952, were constitutionally valid. These two sections related to the framing of a scheme for the due ad ministration of the endowed property.
9. The objection was taken on behalf of the appellant that the Act provided for the framing of 8 scheme not by a civil court or under its supervision but by the Commissioner, who was a mere administrative or executive officer. It was also objected that there was no provision for an appeal against the order of the Commissioner to the civil court, and it was pointed out that under sub-section (4) of section 39 the order passed by the Commissioner with regard to the framing of a scheme was final and conclusive.
10. In these circumstances, it was observed by the Supreme Court, that sections 38 and 39 of the Act were invalid and those sections required redrafting. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the settling of a scheme in regard to a religious institution by an executive officer without the intervention of any judicial tribunal amounted to an unreasonable restriction upon the right of property of the superior of the religious institution which is blended with his office.
11. It should be noticed that the gist of the Supreme Court decision is that the sections were invalid not because of the absence of the right of appeal but because the scheme was settled by an executive officer without the intervention of any judicial tribunal. We think that this line of reasoning of the Supreme Court does not apply to the present case because section 48 of the Bihar Act specifically provides that the application is to be made to the District Judge and it is the District Judge who makes an order, after hearing the evidence of the parties, for removing a trustee of a religious trust or for appointing a new trustee.
12. In our opinion, the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1954 SCR 1046 : (AIR 1934 SC 400), has no application to the present case. On behalf of the opposite party Mr. G.P Das also referred to the decision of this Court in Jugal Kishore Bhadani v. Labour Commissioner, Bihar, 1958 Pat LR 93 : (AIR 1958 Pat 442), in which it was decided that sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act 1953 (Act VIII of 1954) were unconstitutional as there was an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
13. But this case is also distinguishable and it has no bearing on the decision of the present case. The question for decision in Jugal Kishore Bhadani's case 1958 Pat LR 93 : (AIR 1958 Pat 442), was whether sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 26 of the Bihar Act VIII of 1954 were constitutionally valid. Section 26(1) of the Act states as follows:
“26. (1) No employer shall discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than six months except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one month's notice or one month's wages in lieu of such notice.
Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of such misconduct as may be prescribed by the State Government, sup-ported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose.”
Section 26(2) reads as follows:—
“26. (2) Every such employee shall have a right of appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that—
(i) there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services, Or
(ii) no notice was served on him as required by sub-section (1), or
(iii) he had not been guilty of any misconduct ts held by the employer.”
Section 26(3) provides that the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the employee. It should be noticed that the appellate authority under the Act was the Labour Commissioner who was not a judicial officer and it was further pointed out of that case that section 39 of the Bihar Act gave a fight of appeal to an employee against the order of the appellate authority under the Act, but did not give such a right to the employer. For these reasons it was held that sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 26 of the Bihar Act were unconstitutional.
14. But, as we have already pointed out, the material provisions of section 48 of the Bihar Act 1 of 1951 are entirely different. The authority empowered under section 18 for removing the trustee or for appointing a new trustee of a religious trust is an officer of high judicial rank, and the mere fact that no right of appeal is provided against his decision to any higher judicial authority is not a circumstance for holding that there is an unreasonable restriction on the right of the trustee of a religious, trust guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
15. It is important in this context to bear in mind that no abstract test of reasonableness of the law within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Constitution can be laid down as being applicable to all cases. We think that the test of reasonableness cannot be confined within the straight jacket of any narrow and rigid formula. In our opinion the question of reasonableness of the law has to be answered with reference to the circumstances of each particular case.
16. We have to take into account the character of the right which is said to be infringed, the underlying purpose for which the restriction is imposed the authority to whom the power of decision is conferred and the character and status of the deciding authority. The provision of the right of appeal may be one of the factors to be taken into account in considering whether the law is reasonable from the procedural standpoint, but it is not a conclusive factor. It is equally manifest that the absence of a provision with regard to the right of appeal does not necessarily mean that the law is unreasonable from the procedural aspect.
17. In the present case we hold, for the reasons, already given, that the provisions of section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar, Act 1 of 1951) do not impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of property guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and, in our opinion, the provisions of section 48 of the Act are constitutionally valid and operative. That is our answer to the question of law referred to the High Court by the Additional District Judge of Bhagalpur.
18. Let the records of the case be sent down to the lower court with the copy of our opinion for being dealt with in accordance with law.
19. There will be no order as to costs with regard to the hearing of this reference.
LC/D.H.Z
20. Answer accordingly.
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