Kanhaiya Singh, J.:— These two applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution by two different persons arise out of the same order and hence have been heard analogously and will be governed by this judgment. Rameshwar Sinha, the petitioner of M.J.C 53, and Laiji Prasad Kohli, the petitioner of M.J.C 57, have bath obtained a rule in the High Court calling upon the opposite party to show cause why a writ in the nature of certiorari should not be issued to call up and quash the order dated 29-12-58 of Sri S.M Ozair Munimi, Minister of Transport, purporting to act under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and also a writ in the nature of mandamus prohibiting the opposite party from interfering with the right of the petitioners to ply bus on the disputed route.

2. By an advertisement published in the Bihar Gazette dated 22-2-56 the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the R.T.A) which is opposite party 3, invited applications for a permanent stage carriage permit in respect of the route Chapra-Bheldi-Suthiar-Derni, and in pursuance of the same the two petitioners and Dwarka Nath Sharma (opposite party 4) along with others made applications for a permit. Those applications were considered by the R.T.A on 14/15-12-56, and it decided to grant the said permit to opposite party 4, on the express condition that he would produce a 1956-model bus, with all valid papers, within four months from the date of the order, and in the meantime he was ??? anted a temporary permit for four months to ply on the advertised route the 1949 model bus which was with him (vide Annexure A).

3. It appears that at that time opposite party 4 had only a 1949-model bus and had no intention to substitute a bus of 1956-model for it. Accordingly of 11-1-57 he made an application to the R.T.A for a permanent permit to ply a 1949-model bus on the said route. This application was considered by the R.T.A on 27-4-57 when it passed a resolution requiring him to report within 15 days whether he was prepared to produce a 1956-model bus or not with a warning that on his failure to comply with the order other applications received for the route would be reconsidered for the permanent permit (vide Annexure A1). Even this order, which was peremptory in nature, was not complied with, and on 21-5-57 opposite party 4 presented another application praying that he should be granted a permanent permit to ply his 1949 model vehicle instead of a new vehicle of 1956-model. This time, it appears, he succeeded. In a resolution dated 1-6-57 the R.T.A granted him a permanent permit for three years for his existing 1949-model vehicle instead of a new vehicle off 1956-model. It will be observed that the effect of this order is that the R.T.A reviewed its initial order dated 14th/19th December, 1956, subsequently confirming it on 27-4-57. Against this order Lalji Pd. Kohli, the petitioner in M.J.C 57, preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Authority (opposite party 2).

4. This appeal was heard on 30-4-58 and 1-5-58, and by an order dated 6-5-58 (Annexure B) it ??? aside the order of the R.T.A dated 1-6-57 on the ground that it was wholly without jurisdiction and ab initio void and directed the R.T.A to reconsider the applications, excluding the application of opposite party 4, and select the most suitable candidate for the permit. In compliance with the aforesaid directions the R.T.A considered the remaining applications, and by its order dated 7th/8th September, 1958, decided to give the permanent permit to Rameshwar Sinha, the petitioner in M.J.C 53, who in his opinion, was most fitted for the permit and offered to ply on the advertised route a vehicle of the latest model (vide Annexure C). Pursuant to the said order Rameshwar Sinha produced a brand new 1958-model bus bearing No. BRD 917 and was granted a permanent permit, valid up to 21-12-61.

5. He started running the said service on the advertised route. In the meantime, being aggrieved by the order dated 6-5-58 of the State Transport Appellate Authority opposite party 4 preferred a petition before the State Government under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This petition was heard by the Transport Minister, Bihar, on 6-11-58 in presence of the petitioners and other applicants. By his order dated 29-12-58 the learned Minister held that the order of the R.T.A dated 1-6-57, by which he reviewed its previous orders, was wholly wrong, because (i) it was passed without affording any opportunity to other applicants, and (2) there was no provision in law for a review by the R.T.A of its own orders. But he set aside the order of the State Transport Appellate Authority on another ground, namely, that the appeal before it was time-barred and it had no jurisdiction to set aside the order on different grounds. It is against this order of the Transport Minister dated 29-11-58 that these two applications for appropriate writ have been made.

6. Cause has been shown on behalf of opposite party 4, Dwarka Nath Sharma, only. There is no substantial denial of the facts alleged in the petitions. It only alleges that no objection was filed before the R.T.A, as provided in Section 57(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the appeal of Lalji Prasad Kohli before the State Transport Appellate Authority was incompetent as time-barred, and the order of the R.T.A granting permit to him thus became final.

7. In support of these applications Mr. B.C Ghose appearing for the petitioners put forward two contentions, first, that the order of the R.T.A dated 1-6-57 was wholly incompetent, without jurisdiction and null and void, inasmuch as the R.T.A had no power under the existing law to review its own order, and, second, Section 64-A introduced by the Bihar Motor Vehicles Amendment Act (XXVII of 1950) is void by reason of its being repugnant to Section 64-A inserted newly in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the Central Act (Act 100 of 1956) which came into force on 16-2-57, and consequently the order of the Transport Minister dated 29-12-58 was wholly without jurisdiction.

8. The first point raised by Mr. Ghose appears to be well founded & must be accepted as correct. The R.T.A passed an order on 14/15-12-56 granting the permit to opposite party 4. But this order was conditional upon his producing a 1956-model bus within four months from the date of the said order, and for the intervening period of four months he was granted a temporary permit to ply the 1949-model bus which lie then owned and possessed. The other applications were rejected.

9. On a subsequent application dated 11-1-57 by opposite party 4 to obtain a reversal of the previous order and a permanent permit for plying a 1949-model bus the R.T.A passed order on 27-4-57 rejecting his prayer and directing him to produce within 15 days a 1956-model bus, as ordered previously, and he was further warned that in the event of his failure to produce a bus of the required model, the cases of the other applicants for a permanent permit would be considered. In other words, the R.T.A adhered to its previous order of date 14/15-12-56. On 21-5-57 opposite party 4 made another attempt to obtain a permanent permit on the strength of his 1949-model bus, and this time the R.T.A accepted his prayer, and by its order dated 1-6-57 granted him a permanent permit for three years. The effect of his order, it is manifest, is that the R.T.A reviewed its own order dated 14/15-12-56 which was subsequently confirmed on 27-4-57 without any reason. The question is whether the R.T.A is competent to review its own order. No authority or, for the matter of that, Court can claim by implication a power to revise its own order. It is purely a question of statute, and in absence of any provision empowering any authority or Court to review its own order, there cannot be a valid review of the order.

10. There is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, conferring upon the R.T.A a power to review its own order. The view I have ventured to express finds ample support from a Bench decision of this court in Ramnath Pd. v. State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar Patna 1956 BLJR 711 : (AIR 1957 Pat 117). It has been laid down therein that the R.T.A has no power either to entertain an application for review of its own order or to review its own order. In this view of the matter, the order of the R.T.A dated 1-6-57 was wholly without jurisdiction, null and void and without any I legal effect.

11. The learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party did not contend that the R.T.A had authority to review its own order. His contention was that the order dated 1-6-57 did not amount to review of its previous order but only effected a variation in the condition of the permit. He referred to clause (xxi) of sub-s. (3) of Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act which empowers the R.T.A, after giving notice of not less than one month, to “(a) vary the conditions of the permit (b) attach to the permit further conditions”. He also referred to cl. (b) of S. 64 of the Act, which provides for appeal by any person “aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by ‘any variation’ of the conditions thereof’ (underlined (here in ‘’) by me).

12. His argument is that the order of the R.T.A dated 1-6-57 only purported to vary the conditions of the permit. I am unable to accept this contention as correct. This order in effect operated to resuscitate the order of the R.T.A dated 14/15-12-56 and 27-4-57 which had become dead by efflux of time, with the result that the petitioners and others became entitled to have a reconsideration of their applications. It was purely a case of review of its own previous order, by which it made a fundamental change in his previous order to the great detriment to the petitioners and that too without notice and hearing. In my opinion, this order having been made without authority is wholly without jurisdiction and of no legal validity.

13. The said order being void ab initio, the State Transport Appellate Authority was right in setting aside this order. The learned Transport Minister was clearly wrong in thinking that the appeal before the State Transport Appellate Authority was incompetent as it was time-barred. He took the view that the appeal, if any, should have been filed within thirty days of the order of the R.T.A dated 14/15-12-56. The petitioners were satisfied with this conditional order, and there would have been no occasion for them to prefer an appeal if the condition imposed by it was fulfilled. They might have considered any appeal futile because of their knowledge of the inability of opposite party 41 to produce a bus of the required model.

14. It was only when the R.T.A passed the final order on 1-6-57 grading opposite party 4 a permanent permit in direct contravention of its previous orders that the occasion for an appeal to the higher authority arose. If the period of limitation is computed from the date of the final order, namely, 1-6-57, the appeal before the State Transport Appellate Authority was well within time. The learned Transport Minister was, therefore, not right in upsetting the order of the State Transport Appellate Authority. Apart from this, the order of the learned Transport Minister operated to uphold an order which was wholly without jurisdiction and void ab initio in disregard of the apparently just and proper order of the State Transport Appellate Authority reversing the said order cannot be maintained and is liable to be set aside by an appropriate writ.

15. In the view which I take of the case it is not necessary to express any concluded opinion on the second part of the argument of Mr. Ghosh, namely, the constitutionality of Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, introduced by the Bihar Motor Vehicles Amendment Act (XXYII of 1950).

16. In the result, both these applications are allowed, and the order of the Transport Minister dated 29-12-58 is quashed. Further a writ of mandamus would issue prohibiting the opposite party from interfering with the right of Rameshwar Sinha, the petitioner in M.J.C 53, to ply bus of the required model on the advertised route.

17. Hearing fee of Rs. 100/- to each of the petitioners.

18. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.

GC/R.G.D

19. Applications allowed.