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Raj Nandan Singh And Another v. Ram Kishun Lohar And Others

Patna High Court
Aug 5, 1957
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by the plaintiffs against a judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Chapra dated 30th November 1951, which affirmed the decision of the Munsif dated 23rd December 1949. The suit concerned plot 319 (measuring & kathas 17 dhurs) in mauza Rusi, recorded in the record-of-rights as ghairmazrua malik land. Immediately to the west of plot 319 lie plots 320 and 321 (the plaintiffs' Sahan), and to the west of those is the plaintiffs' residential house (situate in mauza Mairwa).

The plaintiffs claimed title to plot 319 by settlement from the landlords (half in 1330 fasli / 1923 and the other half in 1355 fasli / 1948), alleged they obtained possession and cultivated the land (mustard and peas), and had constructed a Bhusaul and stored cow-dung. They alleged that the defendants interfered with their possession on 26-11-1848 by uprooting crops and converting part of the land into a Khalihan for stacking paddy, and sued for possession with mesne profits.

The defendants (primarily defendants 1 to 7) denied the plaintiffs' title and possession, contended the plot was ghairmazrua am (public) and not khas property of the maliks, and asserted they (and named persons and their ancestors) had used the plot as a khalihan from time immemorial and had thereby acquired customary and easementary rights (including a claim of absolute title according to custom). Several factual contentions by the defendants were recorded (construction of mud-built Berhi, shifting of bathan, planting, etc.).

The learned Munsif framed multiple issues (two reproduced in the record): whether the defendants acquired any customary right of using the disputed land as a common husking ground, and whether the disputed lands had been settled with the plaintiffs and, if so, whether those settlements were genuine and had conferred title and possession. The Munsif held the land was ghairmazrua malik land and that the plaintiffs had valid title by settlement, but also held that certain defendants had acquired an easementary right to hold khalihan (by prescription) over part of the plot, subject to specified temporal and spatial limitations. The suit was decreed in part.

The defendants did not appeal. The plaintiffs alone appealed to the District Judge (Subordinate Judge), who affirmed the Munsif's findings but characterized the defendants' right as arising from long user/lost grant rather than prescription. The plaintiffs then appealed further; the present opinion disposes of that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Have the defendants acquired any customary right of using the disputed land as a common husking ground (khalihan)?
  2. Have the disputed lands been validly settled with the plaintiffs by the landlords, and if so, are those settlements genuine and valid such that the plaintiffs acquired title and possession?
  3. Whether any right claimed by the defendants (customary right, prescription, or presumption of lost grant) can be sustained in law against the title of the plaintiffs and, if so, the nature and extent (spatially and temporally) of that right.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The decrees of the Courts below are contrary to the pleadings: the defendants pleaded a customary right, but the Munsif upheld a prescriptive easement and the appellate Court relied on a lost grant — none of which were specifically pleaded.
  • It was improper for the Courts below to make out a case for the defendants (prescription or lost grant) that was not pleaded and on which no specific evidence was adduced; a lost grant, if relied upon, must be pleaded with particulars.

Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments

  • In the written statement the defendants claimed that they and named persons and their ancestors had used plot 319 from time immemorial as khalihan, with no obstruction by proprietors, and thereby acquired customary rights and easementary rights, and even absolute title by custom.
  • During proceedings the defendants at various stages relied alternatively on customary right, prescription (easement by prescription), and in the appellate Court on a presumption of lost grant (immemorial user), asserting a legal origin for the right claimed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopal Krishna Sil v. Abdul Samad Chaudhuri, AIR 1921 Cal 569 When claiming a customary right, it must be specifically pleaded with all essential requisites; prescription and custom are fundamentally distinct and a party cannot succeed on one when he pleaded the other. The court relied on this principle to hold that defendants could not succeed on a theory of lost grant or other unpleaded easementary basis when they had pleaded customary right; the courts below erred in making out an unpleaded cause of right for the defendants.
Kirpa Singh v. Nabi Baksh, AIR 1932 Lah 256 Defendant cannot be allowed to make out a new case in a later stage of the proceedings (including appeals) when that case was not set up in the pleadings. Applied to reinforce that the defendants could not rely on a presumption of lost grant (long user) in appellate proceedings when no such plea was in the written statement.
Krishna Chandra Mandal v. Ram Sahay Katari, AIR 1917 Pat 530 As a principle, an easement cannot arise between landlord and tenant. The court invoked this authority to conclude that an easementary right could not be established between the defendants and their landlords/successors; therefore defendants could not claim an easement in derogation of owners' rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first examining the pleadings, evidence and the findings of the lower courts. It identified a crucial procedural and substantive defect: the defendants had pleaded customary right in the written statement and joined issue on that claim, but during trial and on appeal they shifted their case — first abandoning customary right, then claiming easement by prescription, and finally in the appellate Court urging a presumption of lost grant (long user). The court emphasized that courts must decide on the case as raised by the parties; they cannot, as a matter of principle, make out a new legal basis for a party's right that was not pleaded and on which no evidence was led.

Relying on cited authority, the court held that customary right, prescription and lost grant are distinct bases of right and that the defendants' inconsistent and shifting positions undermined their entitlement. The court concluded that the defendants could not succeed on a lost grant ground because no such plea was taken in the written statement and no evidence had been adduced to establish it.

On the merits, the court set out the ingredients necessary to raise the presumption of a lost grant (long and continuous enjoyment; enjoyment as of right openly and peaceably; reasonableness and absence of inherent wrong), and placed the burden on the claimant. It found the evidence in the record inadequate: the defendants did not assert enjoyment "as of right" in the pleadings or proof and the evidence did not extend beyond the period covered by the survey record-of-rights; thus the period of enjoyment did not demonstrate immemorial user sufficient to raise the presumption of a lost grant.

The court further analysed the nature of easements under the Indian Easements Act: an easement requires a dominant and a servient tenement and must be for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant heritage. The defendants' asserted rights were personal and not alleged to be appurtenant to any dominant tenement; customary rights (if they had been pressed) are different in nature and vested in a community or class, but the defendants had abandoned that claim. Additionally, the court reiterated the principle that an easement cannot arise between landlord and tenant. Taking these points together, the court concluded that no easementary or other right in derogation of the owners' rights had been established.

Consequently, the court found the decrees of the Courts below insofar as they granted defendants the right to hold khalihan were not sustainable and needed to be set aside; the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration of title and recovery of possession subject only to what had been finally established in their favour by the earlier findings on settlement (which had become final as between the parties).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The decrees of the Courts below insofar as they conferred on the defendants any right to hold khalihan on the disputed land are set aside, and the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of their title to and recovery of possession of the disputed land. The plaintiffs' appeal is allowed with costs; the defendants' cross-objection is dismissed (without costs).

Implications: The direct effect is that the plaintiffs' title (derived from the settlements) is declared valid and enforceable, and the defendants' claimed easementary/customary/right by lost grant or prescription is rejected for want of pleading and inadequate evidence. The opinion emphasizes procedural strictness about pleading distinct bases of right (customary right, prescription, lost grant) and reiterates that courts should not permit a party to succeed on a legal theory not pleaded and unsupported by evidence. The decision resolves the parties' dispute over title and possession but does not purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond application of established principles on pleading and proof.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; cross-objection dismissed without costs.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Chapra, dated 30th November, 1951, affirming the decision of the Munsif of the same place dated 23rd December, 1949. The suit related to plot 319 measuring & kathas 17 dhurs situate in mauza Rusi. In the re-cord-of-rights this plot has been recorded as ghairmazrua malik land. To the immediate west of this plot are situate two plots 320 and 321, north to south, which constitute the Sahan of the plaintiffs, and to the adjacent west of this Sahan lies their residential house. I may point out that while the residential house of the plaintiffs is situate in mauza Mairwa the disputed plot along with plots 320 and 321 falls in mauza Rusi.

2. The plaintiffs claimed title to disputed plot 819 by virtue of a settlement from the landlords. They alleged that they obtained settlement of half of this plot in 1330 fasli (1923) and of the remaining half in 1355 fasli (1948) and obtained possession of the land soon after the settlement. The plaintiffs' case further was that subsequent to the settlement the major portion of the disputed plot was brought under cultivation and mustard and peas were grown thereon and that they also put up a Bhusaul on a portion of the land and stored cow-dung in the other portion. The defendants first party interfered with their possession on 26-11-1848 by forcibly uprooting the mustard and peas and converting that portion into a Khalihan for stacking bundles of paddy. Hence this suit for possession with mesne profits after establishment of their title thereto.

3. The main contest was between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 7. Out of the remaining defendants, some supported the plaintiffs and some the contesting defendants. The contesting defendants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) denied both the title and possession of the plaintiffs and alleged that the entire setdement was invalid and illegal because plot 319 was ghairmazrua am (public property) and not khas property of the maliks.

4. They denied further that the plaintiffs had got any Bhusaul upon the disputed land and asserted that defendant 1 had constructed mud-built Berhi for storing chaff and that defendants 1, 2 and 6 and Lachhi Ram had also shifted their bathan (cowshed) to the disputed land, because of heavy rains, and had also kept cowdung there. It was further alleged that defendant 1 had planted brinjal and Ramtoroi. Their main defence, however, was a defence of acquisition of customary right to hold Khalihan on the disputed land.

5. In the written statement this right was asserted in the following manner. The disputed land had been in possession of these defendants and Satnarain Thakur (respondent 14), Bindeshwari Thakur (respondent 12). Sohawan Thakur (respondent 11), Dukhharan Kohar (respondent 17), Lachmi Ram Mahto (respondent 18) and their ancestors from time immemorial, which has been used as Khalihan for keeping paddy, rabbi and maize crops and no obstruction was ever made on behalf of the proprietors.

6. The aforesaid tenants with their title and without obstruction continued to keep their khalihan to the knowledge and information of the proprietors, on account of which these defendants and also Bindeshwari Thakur and others had already acquired right of easement and customary right therein. The proprietors or anybody have got no right to dispossess them. These defendants have also acquired absolute title according to custom.

7. The learned Munsif framed as many as eight issues, two of which only may be reproduced below:

“5. Have the defendants acquired any customary right of using the disputed land as a common husking ground?

6. Have the disputed lands been settled with the plaintiffs by the landlords?

Is so, is the settlement by the maliks in favour of the plaintiffs genuine and valid and have the plaintiffs acquired any title over the disputed land by virtue of the said settlement and had they ever been in possession of the disputed land?”

8. The learned Munsif held that the disputed plot 319 was not ghairmazrua am but ghairmazrua malik land & that the plaintiffs had acquired it by virtue of two settlements from the landlords as alleged by them and that the settlements were legal and valid. In other words, he held that the plaintiffs had acquired valid title to the disputed land. But, in his opinion, this exclusive right of the plaintiffs to own and possess the disputed land was subject to the right of easement which the defendants first party had acquired therein.

9. On the question of easement, it will appear that the defendants had made out a case of customary right (see the issues above), but it appears that before him the defendants gave up their case of customary right and admitted that they had failed to prove this right. Apart from this admission there was, in his opinion, no case of customary right even on merits. The defendants had adduced no evidence to prove this customary right beyond the entry in the survey record-of-rights to the effect that the raiyats of the village maintained their khalihan on this plot.

10. The learned Munsif, however, found that their failure to prove the customary right did not affect their right to hold Khalihan thereon, because, in his opinion, this right of easement the defendants had acquired by prescription. On the question as to who has this right to hold the Khalihan, the learned Munsif held against the pleadings and against the survey record-of-rights and only six of the defendants possessed this right, namely, Ram Kishun Lohar (respondent 1), Muni Lal Lobar (respondent 2), Sriram Kurmi (respondent 4), Jagdeo Mahto, whose son is respondent 8, Abdula Sain (respondent 10) and Sohawan Thakur (respondent 11).

11. Even this right did not extend to the entire disputed plot. The learned Munsif held that the plaintiffs were in exclusive possession of 1 ½ kathas out of the disputed plot which has adjacent to their house to the exclusion of the defendants and no right of easement had been exercised over this portion for the statutory period of 20 years. He, therefore, gave the aforesaid defendants a right to hold the Khalihan on the remaining portion only. Again, this right was limited to certain periods in the year.

12. The learned Munsif found that the defendants had right to hold Khalihan in respect of both paddy and rabbis, and since in his opinion (there being no definite evidence on this point), ordinarily, paddy is harvested and tiirashed between Kartik and Pous and rabbi between Chait and Jeth, he directed that the plaintiffs would keep the disputed land parti (?) for at least 2 ½ months from 1st Kartik to 15th Pous and again for 2 ½ months from 15th Chait to 30th Jeth each year. Subject to this right the plaintiffs were allowed to possess the disputed land and to use it in whatever manner they liked. The suit was accordingly decreed in part.

13. The defendants did not prefer any appeal from the decree. The plaintiffs alone took an appeal to the District Judge, and there was no cross-objection on behalf of the defendants. The learned Subordinate Judge, who disposed of the appeal, affirmed all the findings of the learned Munsif and maintained the decree. But, in his opinion, the right which the defendants had acquired to hold Khalihan was not an easement by prescription, but a right arising out of long user from time immemorial on the principle of lost grant. Therefore, the learned Munsif and the learned Subordinate Judge were not agreed on the nature of the right the defendant had; in other respects they were in agreement.

14. On behalf of the appellants, Mr. Jaleshwar, Prasad has raised the contention that the decrees of both the Courts are against the pleadings of the parties and against the defence of the defendants and cannot, therefore, be sustained. He pointed out that the defendants had made out a case of customary right in the written statement and the issue that was framed was with respect to the acquisition by them of this customary right. The learned Munsif, however, he pointed out, ignored the issue & made out a case of easement by prescription.

15. He further urged that on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge made out an entirely different case of easement by immemorial user on the strength of lost grant. His contention is that if the defendants sought to rely upon a presumption of lost grant, it was incumbent upon them to plead clearly and specifically the origin of the right claimed to have been in a lost grant. He urged that when no such case was made out in the written statement, it was not for the Courts below to presume suo motu the origin of a right in the lost grant.

16. In my opinion, this contention is well-founded. It is quite manifest that the defence taken by the defendants has not been consistent. The written statement, the oral evidence and the case as presented before the Court all were at variance, and they have been shifting their position from time to time. In the written statement they pleaded customary right by virtue of long user and both parties joined issue on this question alone. There was no issue framed as to the acquisition of easement by virtue of lost grant.

17. When after the close of the evidence the defendants found that the evidence fell short of establishing customary right, they changed their position and claimed easement by prescription which the Court of first instance upheld. In the appellate Court it appears that when they were confronted with the argument that an easement by prescription under the Limitation Act cannot arise between the landlord and tenant, they again shifted their ground and urged that since they had used this right to hold Khalihan from time immemorial, this right, must be presumed to have a legal origin.

18. The appellate Court found that the right of easement by prescription had not been established and could not arise because of the relationship between the parties, and the learned Munsif, in his opinion, was wrong in this respect. He came to another conclusion altogether and upheld the rights claimed by the defendants on the principal of lost grant. In my opinion, it was not open to the Courts below to make out a case for the defendants which was not specifically pleaded and on which no evidence was adduced. Easementary right, customary right and easement on the ground of lost grant are all fundamentally distinct. In the case of Gopal Krishna Sil v. Abdul Samad Chaudhuri, AIR 1921 Cal 569 (A) their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows:

“But it is indispensable that when a customary right is claimed, it should be specifically pleaded; all the essential requisites to its validity and binding effect must be averred and the custom so pleaded must when put in issue be proved as laid. When the plaintiff sets up a prescriptive right, he cannot in fairness to the defendant be allowed to succeed on the basis of a customary right. The two are fundamentally distinct, for as has been well said, custom differs from prescription in the fact that prescription is the making of a right while custom is the making of a law.”

19. Although in that case there was a question of customary right, the principles laid down therein applied to the present case also. In Kirpa Singh v. Nabi Baksh, AIR 1932 Lah 256 (B), their Lordships observed as follows:

“A perusal of the judgments of the lower Courts in this case, however, shows that neither the plea of customary right nor that of implied dedication from long user was set up by the defendant; and he cannot be allowed to make out a new case in second appeal.”

20. On this ground alone, the defendants cannot succeed on the ground of easement through lost grant, because no such plea was taken in their written statement.

21. On the merits it will appear that the evidence did not warrant the raising of a presumption of lost grant. In order to succeed on the strength of the presumption of lost grant, it must be established (1) that the right has been enjoyed continuously for a long number of years; (2) that the exercise of this right was as of right openly and peaceably; and (3) that it was reasonable and there was nothing inherently wrong in it. The onus to establish the ingredients which raise a presumption of lost grant lies on the person who claims it.

22. The evidence adduced by the defendants in this case is not adequate in law to establish these elements. As a matter of fact, neither in the written statement nor in the evidence the defendants asserted that they enjoyed this right to hold. Khalihan ‘as of right’. If it was not as of right, in other words, if it was only with the leave and license of the owner, namely, the landlords and their successors, then the defendants cannot be said to have acquired any such right. Apart from that, it is not shown that this right had been exercised from time immemorial. In fact, the very beginning, of this right is the survey record-of-rights, and the evidence does not take us beyond that period. Therefore, it cannot be said that this right had been enjoyed for such a long number of years as to raise a presumption that it had a legal origin.

23. Again, no question of easement arises in this case. ‘Easement’ has been defined by the Indian Easements Act as follows:

“An easement is a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done, in, or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own.

The land for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right exists is called the dominant heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the dominant owner; the land on which the liability is imposed is called the servent heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the servient owner.”

24. ‘Easement’, therefore, postulates the existence of a dominant tenement and a servient tenement. This right is exercised for the beneficial enjoyment of, the dominant heritage. Now, in this case the rights, which the defendants are claiming are not the rights for the beneficial enjoyment of any dominant heritage, but purely personal rights. The defendants do not allege that there is any dominant tenement to which this right of easement is appurtenant. A customary right no doubt exists, independent of any dominant heritage and is vested in a defined class or community of a particular locality, as distinguished from individuals for their sole benefit;, but this right the defendants gave up altogether. It follows that there is no right of easement in such a case.

25. Again, if it is an easement at all, the question being between the defendants and their landlords and their successors, there is, as laid down in the case of Krishna Chandra Mandal v. Ram Sahay Katari, AIR 1917 Pat 530 (C), no easement between landlord and tenant. Taking any view of the matter, the defendants have failed to establish any right in the disputed land in derogation of the rights of its owners. Therefore, the decrees of the Courts below giving the defendants the right to hold Khalihan on the disputed land must be set aside. The plaintiffs will be entitled to a declaration of their title to and recovery of possession of the disputed land. The decrees of the Courts below will be varied accordingly.

26. The defendants have filed cross-objection disputing the validity of the settlements with the plaintiffs and asserting their unfettered right to hold Khalihan. They had not preferred any appeal or cross-objection against the decision of the learned Munsif and thus his finding that the settlements were valid and conferred good title on the plaintiffs became final. Any way, this question is now concluded by findings of fact and was also not seriously pressed. The second ground also falls in view of the findings above. There is, therefore, no merit in the cross-objection. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, as directed above. The cross-objection is also dismissed but without costs.

M.K.S

27. Appeal allowed.